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Abstract 
 
Following the violent crackdown on students demonstrating in Tiananmen Square in 
June 1989, tens of thousands of sympathetic ethnic Chinese and nationals of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) from across the globe (hereafter described as the 
Overseas Chinese or OC1) unified in protest against the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP).  While some were too afraid to speak out, others were much more critical and 
antagonistic by calling for democratic reform on the mainland.2  Fearing an escalation 
of anti-CCP sentiment amongst a diaspora crucial to its national interests, Beijing 
promptly intensified qiaowu gongzuo (hereafter described as qiaowu or OC work) to 
deal with the precarious situation.  It employed a foreign legion of diplomats, attaches 
from various government ministries and specialist qiaowu cadres to aggressively 
manage and control strategic OC communities under a comprehensive set of 
influential tools and persuasive techniques.3  Over the next two decades, the CCP 
continually developed and improved qiaowu to the extent that it had become more 
successful with these methods in the current period than any other era – particularly 
so with new migrants and PRC students.  Such prowess became apparent in 2008, 
when large numbers of the OC again took to the streets in heated protest.  This time 
their response was not in defiance of the regime, but in strong support of China and its 
leaders.   
  
How has qiaowu been able to influence and manage the OC in this way?  Why have 
qiaowu efforts worked with such success?  Why has the CPP become so confident in 
advancing OC work since the crisis of 1989?  This thesis explains the nature and 
development of qiaowu, details its specific work methods, and analyzes the platforms 
employed to advance relations with the OC diaspora.  By assessing a wide range of 
Chinese language references, primary source policy documents and internal 
memoranda, this thesis argues that over decades of counter-efforts from rival political 
factions, gradual cultural assimilation, changes in OC demographics, technology and 
the international geo-political climate, qiaowu has served as an accomplished and 
necessary component of the CCP’s modernized propaganda and thought work system 
for influencing, managing and unifying a heterogeneous population of OC for 
Beijing’s national interests.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 This paper uses the term OC in a generic manner to include ethnic Chinese living outside of China 
(including the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau) and Taiwan, irrespective of 
citizenship.  Where specific types of OC are referred to, the term will be qualified. 
2 Franka Cordua-von Specht, “Discourse on the China Crisis: Three Perspectives,” Ubyssey 8, no. 1 (5 
July 1989): 5, http://www.library.ubc.ca/archives/pdfs/ubyssey/UBYSSEY_1989_07_05.pdf, (accessed 
30 September 2009). 
3 Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 163-164. 
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Notes on Romanization of Chinese 
 
The content of this thesis spans over a century of OC affairs, overseen by different 
government regimes, and consequently, different publishing conventions.  As such, 
the romanization of certain Chinese words may be inconsistent, depending on their 
origin and usage.  The majority of personal names, terms and titles used in this thesis 
follow the commonly accepted PRC phonetic system of hanyu pinyin.  However, 
names that are widely recognized under the Wade-Giles system or some variant of it 
(particularly those connected to Taiwan, such as the Kuomintang, Chiang Kai-shek or 
Ma Ying-jeou) have not been changed so as not to confuse the reader with different 
spellings.  Finally, the author takes full responsibility for the accuracy of translation 
from the original Chinese language source materials. 
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1.00 Introduction 
 
Amongst the various definitions, notions and typology of classical and modern 
diasporas,4 a general consensus encompasses the concept of any population that has 
migrated from its country of origin and settled in a foreign land, but maintains its 
continuity as a community through maintaining strong sentimental and material links 
with its home country.5  Those sharing such links of solidarity have the potential to be 
politicized and mobilized in order to influence political, economic, diplomatic and 
military outcomes from the home or host country.6  For example, during the Second 
World War, ethnic Japanese doho or dokokujin (Japanese naturalized or born abroad 
owing first allegiance to Japan and the emperor) were employed for propaganda 
purposes to demoralize allied forces.7  To advance Israeli interests abroad, American 
Jewish and Zionist lobbies in the United States (US) are widely acknowledged to 
influence Washington’s Middle East policy.8  Britain, Greece,9 France and Germany 
all have government level ministries or representative agencies to project or advance 
their political and cultural interests throughout the world with help from their overseas 
populations. 
 
For facilitating domestic economic development, the Israeli government created the 
Jewish Agency for Israel in 1948 for encouraging Jewish immigration to Israel and 
other political and cultural interests.10  Similarly, the governments of Iraq,11 India,12 
                                                 
4 Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction (London: UCL Press Ltd., 1997); Daniel J. Elazar, 
“The Jewish People as the Classic Diaspora: A Political Analysis,” in Modern Diasporas in 
International Politics, ed. Gabriel Sheffer (Kent: Croom Helm Ltd., 1986), 212-257. 
5 Gabriel Sheffer, “A New Field of Study: Modern Diasporas in International Politics,” in Modern 
Diasporas in International Politics, 1-15.  
6 For a general discussion of ethnic groups and their influence upon home/host country foreign policy, 
see J. Rothschild, Ethnopolitics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); J. Bertelsen, Non State 
Nations in International Politics: Comparitive System Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1980); Milton 
Esman, Diasporas in the Contemporary World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 120-132; Yossi Shain, 
Kinship and Diasporas in International Affairs (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 3; 
Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds. The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (London: 
Lynne Reinner, 1996); Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth, “Diaporas and International Relations Theory,” 
International Organization 57, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 449-479; Chris Ogden, “Diaspora Meets IR’s 
Constructivism: An Appraisal,” Politics 28, no. 1 (2008): 1-10. 
7 “Life in Shadow of ‘Tokyo Rose’,” Press, 7 October 2006, D19. 
8 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (NewYork: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007).   
9 World Council of Hellenes Abroad homepage, http://en.sae.gr/ (accessed 30 September 2009).  
10 Daniel J. Elazar and Alysa Dortort, eds. Understanding the Jewish Agency (Jerusalem and 
Philadelphia: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 1986); The Jewish Agency homepage, 
www.jewishagency.org/JewishAgency/English/Home (accessed 30 September 2009).  
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Vietnam13 and the Philippines14actively embrace and attract their diaspora for the 
same purpose.  Mexico has used dual state membership to keep the ties of its 
expatriates alive for business and election processes.15  More recently, Russia has 
attempted to institutionalize identity politics in order to take advantage of its diaspora 
in the newly independent states following the breakup of the former Soviet Union.16   
 
However, these efforts pale in comparison to the CCP’s huaqiao shiwu effort 
(hereafter abbreviated as qiaowu).  It is a multi-level superstructure – consisting of 
governmental, diplomatic and non-governmental agencies and organizations catering 
for a target group of 48 million ethnic Chinese across the globe.17  Staff numbers are 
estimated to be in the tens of thousands18 with over 1000 trade, sports and cultural 
groups travelling abroad annually to promote China and things Chinese. 19   The 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) has attachments in PRC embassies, 
consulates, and representative agencies in almost every country to personally liaise 
with local OC communities.   
 
The OCAO has developed and implemented qiaowu policies with a special 
consideration of the people-to-people methods typical of the CCP’s dealings with the 
masses.20  Under a systematic approach of persuasion, influence and manipulation, the 
CCP has been successful in guiding and directing many OC communities around the 
                                                                                                                                            
11 Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq homepage, www.iraq-iri.org/ (accessed 30 September 2009).  
12 Ministry of Overseas Indians Affairs homepage, www.moia.gov.in/ (accessed 30 September 2009).   
13 Dang Nguyen Anh, “Enhancing the Development Impact of Migrant Remittances and Diaspora: The 
Case of Vietnam” (paper presented at the Regional Seminar on the Social Implications of International 
Migration, Bangkok, 24-36 August 2005), www.unescap.org/esid/psis/meetings/SIIM/VietNam.pdf 
(accessed 30 September 2009). 
14 Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc, Nations Unbound: Transnational 
Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States (Langhorne: Gordon and 
Breach, 1993), 225-257.  
15Agustin Escobar Latapi and Eric Janssen, “Migration, the Diaspora and Development: The Case of 
Mexico,” discussion paper DP/167/2006, International Institute of Labor Studies, Geneva, 2006, 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/dp16706.pdf (accessed 7 July 2009); Thomas 
Faist, The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 278. 
16 Neil Melvin, Russians Beyond Russia: The Politics of National Identity (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1995). 
17 “2008 huayi baogao: 4800 wan huaqiao huaren fenbu zai shijie gedi” (2008 Ethnic Chinese Report: 
48 Million Overseas and Ethnic Chinese Spread Around the World), Qiaoqing jianbao, 30 March 2009. 
18 KMT News Network, “Merger of Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission Opposed,” 11 March 
2009, www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=5891 (accessed 30 
September 2009). 
19 Flor Wang, “OCAC Head Urges Increased International Publicity,” Central News Agency, 7 April 
1999. 
20 Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 12, 156-170. 
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world to be supportive of Beijing; and where it cannot do so, to at least seek to change 
their perceptions so that they are favourable towards China.  No other government 
initiative can match qiaowu’s scale of operation or sophistication, nor profess to reach 
the level of success that China has enjoyed under a wide variety of specialist 
programmes and activities.   
 
The only other government able to come close to making a claim of reaching out to so 
many millions of people is that of Taiwan.  In representing the Republic of China 
(ROC), the Kuomintang (KMT) Nationalist party sought to continue its historical 
association with the OC following the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949.  Through 
its own qiaowu efforts, Taipei dominated OC communities around the world for 
decades, dictating the management of OC education and their organizations up until 
the 1990s.  However, after this period, Taiwanization (advanced by the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) and the independence movement) saw Taipei’s focus shift 
solely to pro-Taiwan OC (Taiqiao), while efforts with traditional OC groups (laoqiao) 
waned.  In this context, China’s rival qiaowu effort took to the fore, and has 
continuously gained ground to become the leading form of extra-territorial 
engagement with the OC diaspora in the contemporary period.  
 
1.01 A Comparison: Incorporating the Turkish Diaspora in Europe 
 
Understanding the relationship between governments and diasporic populations 
entails some theoretical considerations.  Combined with modern logistical technology 
and information flows, a diaspora can be a highly co-ordinated ethno-nationalist force 
with transnational loyalties.  Post-national (liberalist) theory contends that the nation-
state has become obsolete and replaced by other formations for allegiance and 
identity.21  According to Shain and Barth, diasporas can be broadly divided into active 
or passive elements.  Passive members become involved in international relations 
unwillingly or beyond their control; they act according to the wishes of their leaders, 
or remain silent or inactive, possibly mobilizing in the event of a crisis.22  Active 
members organize and mobilize in order to influence the foreign policies of their host 
governments.  In this case, their scope of activities is determined by the resources 
                                                 
21 Arjun Appadurai, “Patriotism and Its Futures,” Public Culture, no. 5 (1993): 411-429. 
22 Shain and Barth, “Diaporas and International Relations Theory,” 449-479. 
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available to them, the opportunities and support structures of their host country, and 
their inclinations and motivation to maintain solidarity for exerting group influence.23  
As such, diasporas become the subjects of elimination, control, cultivation, or 
expansion in terms of the home or host state’s interests. 
 
Sociologist Yasemin Soysal examined how institutions and available resources served 
as determinants of the incorporation of migrants.  She looked at how the patterns of 
organizational structure and policy discourse constructed an incorporation regime – 
these included the officially stated policy goals, instruments, administrative structures 
for policy implementation, the legal frameworks that defined the status and rights of 
migrants, as well as their participatory schemes.24  A comparison of her findings 
concerning Germany’s attempts to incorporate the migrant Turkish community with 
that of China and the OC assists with explaining the reasons behind the success or 
failure of alternative diaspora policies.  Both exhibit similarities in their institutional 
structure, yet each has reaped quite different results.  
 
During the 1960s, Turkish immigrant workers were supposed to be a temporary 
‘economic’ solution to acute labour shortages in Europe, but few returned to Turkey.  
Later, in the face of unemployment and policies regulating the presence of foreigners, 
Turkish guestworkers in Germany faced antagonism from the local population and 
consequently became marginalized from society.  Recognizing a need to provide them 
with subsidized specialist education programmes and social services, the German 
government offer Turkish migrants two sets of support structures to draw upon.  At 
the local level, there is a Commissioner for Foreigners’ Affairs for formulating basic 
policy for integration and funding, while multiple advisory councils serve as channels 
for migrants to participate in the consultation process.  Although this Commissioner 
acts as the major sponsor of these measures, there are no federal agencies specifically 
designed to administer these tasks.  Instead, there is a committee within the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Affairs (with representation from a wide range of government 
organizations and interest groups) charged with co-ordinating integration programs 
                                                 
23 Milton Esman, “Diasporas and International Relations,” in Modern Diasporas in International 
Politics, 335-226; Charles King and Neil J. Melvin, “Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign 
Policy, and Security in Eurasia,” International Security 24, no. 3 (Winter 1999-2000): 108-138. 
24 Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994): 29-44. 
 5
that are run through local authorities and semi-public institutions.  To guide policy for 
migrants in Germany, the Office of the Federal Commissioner for Foreigners’ Affairs 
has advisory status but no formal mechanisms to consult with its subjects, nor a 
budget.25   
 
Germany, despite its decentralized administrative structure, features a highly 
centralized public sphere of bureaucracies and intermediary groups which retain 
strong links to the state as the locus of sovereignty.  This arrangement can be 
explained by Soysal’s statist model, whereby the state is a bureaucratic administrative 
unit that centrally organizes the polity and decision-making processes.  The subjects 
and their activities are defined as elements of, and subordinate to the state, which 
provides, initiates and intervenes in societal function.  Under this framework, subjects 
are incorporated as individuals and lack intermediary structures linking migrants and 
their interests to the state and its administrative organs.  The corporatist model 
assumes vertical formal avenues for official participation and incorporation in 
intermediary ‘group’ structures sponsored by the state.  Membership to these 
corporate ‘groups’ and their functions allows collective access to rights and protection 
with emphasis on standardized services under a centrally organized structure.  This 
framework closely reflects aspects of the qiaowu administration and its role, which as 
a collective action for the OC, takes place according to a centralized state apparatus 
under a top-down mode of operation.  Moreover, it features a wide range of 
intermediary structures for participation.  As such, under Soysal’s typology of 
membership model, both the German-Turkish diaspora and PRC-OC relationship fall 
into the statist-corporatist pattern of action and authority.   
 
Soysal concluded that even without formal citizenship in Germany, the Turkish 
diaspora were incorporated into various legal and organizational structures of the host 
society.  She noted how migrants have forged a transnational status and identity 
through organizational activity, campaigning and lobbying their host governments in 
a recontextualization of “nationness” whereby the dimensions of territoriality and 
                                                 
25 Ibid, 77-79; see also Jurgen Fijalkowski, “Conditions of Ethnic Mobilization: The German Case” in 
Ethnic Mobilisation in a Multi-Cultural Europe, eds. John Rex and Beatrice Drury (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing Company, 1994): 123-134. 
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citizenship have become irrelevant.26  Soysal also raised the issue of postnational 
identity politics as a means of participation in politics, negotiation of membership, 
and assertion of identity without a necessary reference to shared nationhood.  As 
demonstrated throughout this thesis, such structural aspects of the PRC’s relationship 
with the OC share many similarities with Soysal’s findings.   However, this is where 
the commonalties end. 
 
In practice Germany has not achieved a satisfactory outcome with incorporating the 
Turkish community.  German authorities have largely turned over to Turkish religious 
institutions key educational aspects of the relationship (including other means of 
transmitting identity back to Turkey) in an attempt to distance Turks from the German 
state, and to maintain their cultural and political allegiance to Turkey.27  In other 
words, the German government, although offering support for Turkish migrants, hope 
that they will return to their homeland.  Similarly, the Turkish attempt to effectively 
engage with its diaspora is also severely limited.  Turkey does not have a single 
administrative body to oversee such service provision – 36 different government 
bodies are involved with the diaspora, but lack effective co-ordination; in addition, 
there is limited or little communication, publicity and information on diaspora issues.  
Moreover, discontinuity and lack of comprehensiveness and understanding of 
diaspora policy by successive governments has meant the relationship was never 
given consistent priority.28   
 
In addition, both the home and host governments have failed to articulate a sense of 
identity and nationhood over the Turkish diaspora.  Second and third generation Turks 
have no formal memory of “home.”  Subsequent findings by historian James Helicke 
illustrate how the Turkish (mis)understanding of “nation” has resulted in migrant 
Turkish communities not connecting to either their host or homeland, but instead 
through religious interpretations.  As a result, many Turks outside Turkey exist 
“between” states and result in a large number of fragmented Turkish associations 
                                                 
26 Soysal, Limits of Citizenship, 136-162. 
27 James Helicke, “Turks in Germany: Muslim Identity “Between” States” in Muslim Minorities in the 
West: Visible and Invisible, eds. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Jane I. Smith (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers Inc. 2002): 175-191. 
28 Burcu Mirac Diraor, “How to Mobilize the Turkish Diaspora as a Political and Economic Actor In 
the EU Accession Process,” Havard Kennedy School Faculty Working Paper, 2009, 
www.hks.harvard.edu/kokkalis/gsw/2009/.../Diraor%20PAPER.pdf (accessed 16 March 2010). 
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representing different political stances. 29   Ultimately, Turkish migrants remain 
marginalized in Germany; at the same time, the Turkish government’s failure for 
achieving integration of the Turkish diaspora in Germany and the region has affected 
its accession process into the European Union.   
 
From this perspective, where both Germany and Turkey have failed to connect with 
the Turkish diaspora, qiaowu offers numerous policy areas for improvement in terms 
of co-ordination, organizational structure, communications, and ethnographic 
reconnection.  This raises some important questions: why has China been more 
successful with obtaining the support of the the OC?  Does the type of regime matter?  
Are policies the determining factor?  China’s use of platforms such as ethnic linkages, 
patriotism, economic opportunity and social mobility are several areas of analysis that 
can help answer these questions.  In an age of transnationalism and mobile identities, 
other countries may find certain aspects of the study of qiaowu useful for maximizing 
the untapped potential of their own diasporas.30 
 
1.02 Introduction to the Extant Literature31 
 
In contrast to predictions that it would fall to democratization, the CCP has 
successfully reconsolidated itself since the turmoil of 1989.  Many of the reasons for 
this transformation are due to its pragmatic approach to regime institutionalization – 
based upon Huntington’s theory of adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence 
of state organizations.32  This development of coherent institutionalization is partly 
discernable from studying how China has dealt with the OC over the years – including 
the anthropological, socio-economic and historical aspects of Chinese immigration,33 
                                                 
29 Helicke, “Turks in Germany,” 175-191; Soysal, Limits of Citizenship, 107-111. 
30 “Yindu qiaomin buyuan huiguo touzi, Yindu zhengfu huyu ‘xuexi huaqiao’” (Overseas Indians Don’t 
Wish to Return for Investment, Indian Government Calls on Them to Learn from the Overseas 
Chinese), Qiaoqing jianbao (20 March 2007): 17. 
31 The literature review offered in this introduction is brief for stylistic reasons.  I will engage with and 
refer to the wider scholarship throughout the thesis by weaving it into the narrative as supporting 
references where relevant so as not to bog the reader down at the outset with material that may be 
repeated in depth later.   
32 Andrew J. Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience,” Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 (January 2003): 6-17; 
Samuel P. Huntingdon, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1968): 12-24. 
33 Lea E. Williams, The Future of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1966). 
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their integration in host societies,34 and their relationship with China.  Amongst the 
relevant literature pertaining to these concerns is Stephen Fitzgerald’s comprehensive 
study China and the Overseas Chinese – A Study of Peking’s Changing Policy 1949-
1970, which focused specifically on the PRC’s influence upon Chinese abroad in a 
domestic context (rather than external development) during the 1950s and 1960s.  
Fitzgerald argued that OC policy changed constantly, with their treatment veering 
from left to right, and alternating between severity and leniency depending on the 
political environment.35  Similarly, other academics argued that Beijing’s OC policy 
was largely dependant upon the domestic and international geo-political situation:36 
Pingping Zhu described China’s three regimes of OC patriotism;37 Wang Gungwu 
identified a four-stage relationship between OC and the Chinese government. 38  
Similarly, Frank Pieke suggested Four Models of OC Relations.39  Although Harold 
Hinton was incorrect by arguing that Beijing would protect the OC at any cost,40 
David Mozingo 41  and Leo Suryadinata 42  both accurately asserted that national 
interests would determine Beijing’s actions.   
 
                                                 
34 Lawrence W. Crissman, “The Segmentary Structure of Urban Overseas Chinese Communities,” Man 
2 (New Series, 1967): 185-204; Anthony Reid, ed. Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia 
and the Chinese (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001); Edgar Wickberg and Harry Con, eds. 
From China to Canada: A History of the Chinese Communities in Canada (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1982).  
35 Stephen Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Beijing's Changing Policy, 1949-
1970, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 54. 
36 Jeanyoung Lee, “China’s Policy Towards the Overseas Chinese: From Exclusion and Exploitation to 
Network Making,” Hyonsang Kwa Insik 29 (2005): 54-76. 
37 PingPing Zhu Lincoln, “Towards a Theory on Sino-Southeast Asian Relations,” NUCB Journal of 
Language, Culture and Communication 7, no. 2 (2005): 55-67. 
38 Wang Gungwu, “Greater China and the Chinese Overseas,” China Quarterly 136 (1993): 937-938; 
Wang Gungwu, China and the Chinese Overseas (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991). 
39 Frank N. Pieke, “Four Models of China’s Overseas Chinese Policies,” China Information 2, no. 1 
(Summer 1987): 8-16.  
40 Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966). 
41 David Mozingo, “China and Indonesia,” in China in Crisis, ed. Tang Tsou (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1968), 333-356. 
42 Leo Suryadinata, China and the ASEAN States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension, (Singapore: 
Singapore University Press, 1985). 
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Pal Nyiri,43 Hong Liu,44 Mette Thuno45 and Elena Barabantseva46 all argued state-
sponsored facilitation of the OC relationship.  They noted that the CCP exploit 
business, cultural and ancestral links for the purpose of imparting PRC state ideology, 
encouraging dual anchored identity and promoting dual allegiance – all in the hope of 
influencing their actions and creating politically active citizens under an engagement 
of “long distance nationalism.”47  In this manner, Chinese migrants who strongly 
identify with the motherland can assist China’s external development in a way that 
does not depend on political structures.48  This research builds upon their argument of 
nationalism and patriotism as central to China’s evolution of modern OC policy, and 
explains how the CCP has achieved such a successful relationship with the OC.  
 
Since economic reforms after 1978, PRC scholarship on OC affairs has also enjoyed 
increased attention.  An enormous amount of interest and research amongst PRC 
academics in the 1980s indicated the state-driven directive to find out how the OC 
could fit into assisting China’s plans for modernization, including: methods for 
mobilizing OC technological expertise and investment; techniques for connecting 
with and winning over the OC after years of injustices; reclaiming the OC under 
ethnic and cultural considerations despite their foreign nationalities; and how to write 
OC history in an accommodative fashion both domestically and abroad without 
causing controversy.  In addition to examining the OC in the context of their 
                                                 
43 Pal Nyiri, “The New Migrant: State and Market Constructions of Modernity and Patriotism,” in 
China Inside Out: Contemporary Chinese Nationalism and Transnationalism, eds. Pal Nyiri and 
Joanna Breidenbach (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2005), 141-176; Pal Nyiri, “The 
Yellow Man's Burden: Chinese Migrants on a Civilizing Mission,” China Journal, Issue 56 (July 2006): 
83-106, http://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=268668219785151;res=IELHSS 
(accessed 30 September 2009). 
44 Hong Liu, “Old Linkages, New Networks: The Globalisation of Overseas Chinese Voluntary 
Associations and Its Implications,” China Quarterly 155 (1998): 582-609. 
45 Mette Thuno, “Reaching Out and Incorporating Chinese Overseas: The Trans-Territorial Scope of 
the PRC by the End of the 20th Century,” China Quarterly 168 (2001): 910-929. 
46 Elena Barabantseva, “Trans-nationalising Chineseness: Overseas Chinese Policies of the PRC’s 
Central Government,” ASIEN 96 S. (July 2005): 7-28, www.asienkunde.de/articles/Barabantseva96.pdf 
(accessed 30 September 2009); Elena Barabantseva, “The Party-State’s Transnational Outreach: 
Overseas Chinese Policies of the PRC’s Central Government,” Greater China Occasional Papers no. 2, 
Institute of Chinese and Korean Studies, University of Tuebingen, August 2005, www.uni-
tuebingen.de/sinologie/sino/gcs/papers/paper2.pdf (accessed 30 September 2009). 
47 Basch, Schiller, and Blanc, Nations Unbound, 7-8; Jia Gao, “Transnationality of Settled Migrants 
and the Evolving Nature of their Transnational Lives: A Case Study of the Mainland Chinese Migrants 
in Australia,” (paper presented at the 5th Conference of the International Society for the Study of 
Chinese Overseas, University of Copenhagen, May 10-14 2004): 19, 
http://www.nias.ku.dk/issco5/documents/GaoJia.doc (accessed 30 September 2009); Hong Liu, “New 
Migrants and the Revival of Overseas Chinese Nationalism,” Journal of Contemporary China 14, 
no.43 (May 2005): 291-316.  
48 Tom Dusevic, “The Quiet Revolution,” Time, 25 April 2005, 14-26. 
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contribution to China from abroad, PRC scholars also assist qiaowu policy 
development by analyzing their social integration in host countries. 49   These 
programmes are primarily located at the OC universities at Jinan and Xiamen – 
complete with special staff, libraries and think tanks dedicated to providing qualitative 
and quantitative research.    
 
1.03 Aims of this Research 
 
Having located itself in the literature, this thesis analyzes the evolving nature, scope 
and patterns of the PRC’s qiaowu strategies and policies in order to describe the 
CCP’s continued and strengthening influence over the OC.  The research focuses 
upon the institutional actors, mechanisms and processes of the qiaowu infrastructure –
essentially how and why the PRC’s OC policies and methods have developed since 
1949, in particular the period between 1989 and 2008.  This study takes place in the 
context of China’s rivalry with Taiwan’s own efforts of engagement with the OC, and 
how that has changed as a result of Taipei’s own domestic and international geo-
political situation.  Moreover, qiaowu policies are very much influenced by both 
ideology and the wider geo-political concerns of the state.  This thesis argues that 
despite a sometime turbulent relationship with the OC, Beijing’s intention was always 
to retain their trust and access to their political and economic resources for facilitating 
its domestic development, extending its foreign policy, challenging political rivals, 
and boosting its international image.   
 
In addition, this thesis addresses the implications and challenges of managing and 
dealing with the world’s largest ethnic group.  The research describes and analyzes 
the nature of the CCP’s transnational influence over the OC.  It examines the 
mechanisms for incorporating the OC into advancing China’s national interests, 
                                                 
49 Zhuang Guotu, “1978 nian yilai Zhongguo zhengfu dui huaqiao huaren taidu he zhengce de 
bianhua” (Changes in PRC Government Attitudes and Policies Towards Overseas Chinese and Ethnic 
Chinese Since 1978) Nanyang wenti yanjiu (Research on Nanyang Issues) 103, no. 3 (2000); Cheng Xi, 
“The ‘Distinctiveness’ of the Overseas Chinese as Perceived in the People’s Republic of China,” in 
Beyond Chinatown: New Chinese Migration and the Global Expansion of China, ed. Mette Thuno, 49-
64 (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007); Cheng Xi, “Guanyu muqian huaqiao huaren yanjiu ruogan wenti 
de guancha yu sikao” (Observations and Reflections on Current Issues Related to Overseas Chinese 
Studies) Huaqiao huaren lishi yanjiu (Overseas Chinese History Studies), no. 4, (2002): 1-6; Wang 
Gungwu, “South China Perspectives on Overseas Chinese,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 
3 (January 1985): 69-84; Wang, China and the Chinese Overseas, 242. 
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affirming the CCP’s political legitimacy, improving China’s international image and 
status, promoting Chinese culture, and for boosting its economic situation.  Whether it 
be securing its territorial borders, economic development and modernization, 
expanding its soft and hard power spheres of influence, the OC are key links to these 
aims and interests that legitimize the CCP regime.  From this summary, various 
research questions can be generated: 
 
1. To what extent, if any, are the OC a tool of China’s comprehensive national 
power? 
2. What is the role of the OC in the CCP-led Party-State system?  
3. How and why are the OC managed, influenced and mobilized to serve this 
purpose? 
4. How are the OC used as political leverage for Beijing’s interests? 
5. How and why are the OC used as public relations devices for China? 
6. Why has qiaowu work been strengthened in recent years?   
7. What are the limits to China’s influence over the OC? 
8. How has Taiwanization affected China’s approach to qiaowu? 
9. How has qiaowu policy developed in accordance with modern migration 
patterns? 
10. What are the implications of China’s qiaowu policy for other countries? 
 
These research questions address a different facet of the PRC-OC relationship – the 
target groups, the specific methods, the reasons and ideology, the constraints, the 
rivalry with Taiwan and other challengers, and how qiaowu has been affected by the 
wider geo-strategic environment.    
 
1.04 Importance of Qiaowu Research to International Relations 
 
Following the Tiananmen Incident of 1989, the CCP recognized that it had a serious 
problem with maintaining its legitimacy amongst the OC diaspora.  This group 
provided support for a wide range of China’s economic, political and national 
interests both domestically and abroad.  The CCP quickly put in place a 
comprehensive strategy to reclaim their hearts and minds.  Over the subsequent 
decades, this strategy has yielded significant results.  Although there exists a wealth 
 12
of scholarship concerning China’s efforts to connect and benefit from the OC (such as 
attracting contributions, resources and support through instilling ethnographic or 
nationalistic sentiment amongst them), there still lacks a comprehensive and 
systematic examination of qiaowu methodology and its wider implications for 
international and regional relations. 
 
This thesis seeks to fill this gap of knowledge by exhaustively dissecting qiaowu 
down to its core attributes and philosophies on every aspect of the OC relationship in 
order to make a complete and thorough assessment.  It takes an investigative approach 
that uncovers, describes and links qiaowu policies to the OC situation and human 
interactions under different conditions.  Specifically, it examines how qiaowu is 
institutionally structured and how it functions, analyzes the change in goals since the 
Mao years, and describes the future challenges that it faces.  While one is able to 
glean many of these aspects by examining various case studies, qiaowu and its 
underlying philosophies and inner workings remain shrouded in bureaucracy and 
secrecy.  This thesis seeks to offer a descriptive attempt to understand the existence 
and importance of this relationship to China and its national interests.   
 
Under the theme of ‘thinking globally, acting locally,’ qiaowu has attempted to unify 
a heterogeneous population of OC in support of the PRC’s interests.  In addition to its 
traditional embrace for the wider diaspora, Beijing has sought to target and co-opt 
select groups of elite and new migrant OC to raise both its own status as a responsible 
international power, and the status of the OC themselves.  These developments have 
seen a revitalization of qiaowu activity reflected in China’s global rise.  The empirical 
detail which illustrates these aspects of qiaowu is very rich, and speaks to larger 
questions and implications for international relations. 
 
Firstly, do diasporas play a significant role in foreign policy decision making?  As 
China specialists Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross noted, it is not clear what, 
if any, political and economic preferences the OC can bring to the foreign policy 
making process.50  Yossi Shain and Ahron Barth suggested that this depends on how 
permeable the policy process is, and how much control the state can exercise over the 
                                                 
50 Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy 
(Stanford: Stanford Univerdsity Press, 2006), 410. 
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diaspora.51  An analysis of the evolution of qiaowu policies shows that the PRC’s 
approach to OC affairs has been, and continues to be, constrained by Beijing’s 
international position.  Qiaowu policy has historically and continues to be subordinate 
and related to China’s foreign policy.52  China has moved from its cautious and vague 
policies of the mid-1950s towards active relationships with all ethnic Chinese 
regardless of their citizenship.   
 
Since 1989, the CCP has placed renewed efforts of using qiaowu as a form of pro-
active co-optation and incorporation as tools for social control and management of the 
OC.  In the current period, the main thrust of China’s qiaowu policy has not changed; 
methodology has been modernized in accordance with new demographics, migration 
patterns and the globalized geo-political environment while policies have evolved in 
scope, methods and sophistication.  Beijing has continued to cite its policy of non-
interference, yet expanded and intensified its extra-territorial influence and dominance 
over the OC populace to incorporate methods for best utilizing old and new OC 
populations, to promote economic integration, and to deter or quash threats to the 
CCP.  These advances in qiaowu have consolidated warm relationships with new 
migrant OC and PRC students studying abroad, and consequently acheived a new 
sense of legitimacy for the CCP regime by increasing its influence over OC 
communities as a form of soft power foreign policy.   
 
1.05 Political/Social Control 
 
Qiaowu provides a clear demonstration of the methods behind the CCP’s attempt for 
political control over the OC community, serving as a strategic antidote for anti-CCP 
behaviour.  Qiaowu seeks to gain and secure the loyalty of the OC before others do.  
History has shown how the OC have influenced China’s domestic politics, and the 
CCP has made every effort to prevent such challenges from occurring.  Strategic 
groups of the OC can be mobilized as channels for Beijing to pursue its interests and 
expand an ethnically conscious source of support throughout the world.  The CCP has 
actively asserted its extra-territorial influence upon the OC diaspora through 
                                                 
51 Shain and Barth, “Diaporas and International Relations Theory,” 449-479. 
52 Chuang Hsi-chuan (vice-chairman of the PRC OCAC) in a report to the inaugural All-China 
Returned Overseas Chinese Association, 17 October 1956, as noted by Fitzgerald, China and the 
Overseas Chinese, 25.  
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sophisticated cultural and nationalistic channels in order to advance its long term 
interests, while preventing challenges and attacking threats to its legitimacy and hold 
onto power.  Encouraging nationalism and patriotism are central to China’s 
relationship with the OC. 
 
The OC, composed of autonomous individuals, groups and organizations, create 
issues, problems and pressures to which qiaowu policy makers must address.  While 
all OC are considered the subject of qiaowu, the OC diaspora itself cannot be 
described as a single collective – it is a heterogeneous population composed of 
discrete and interlinking subset communities, each with different agendas.  This 
diversity has increased in recent years – facilitated by modern migration patterns, 
liberalized immigration and multicultural policies of receiving countries (particularly 
following trade, cultural and political relations), and the proliferation of illegal 
migration.  In this context, the PRC divides the OC community on sub-national lines, 
with provincial, professional, commercial, sporting or religious demarcations for the 
purposes of management.53   
 
While some groups are more easily influenced and guided (such as pro-Beijing 
associations), other groups present significant difficulties for management.  For 
example, during the Mao years, governments in Southeast Asia regarded any appeals 
from Beijing towards the OC as suspicious, requiring decades of careful and strategic 
measures so as to reassure neighbours that the OC problem was resolved; in the 
contemporary period, illegal migrants to the Pacific, Africa and Eastern Europe have 
tarnished China’s cultivated national image as a ‘responsible’ power.  In response, the 
Chinese government continues with caution – ensuring that it is not to be perceived by 
others as interventionist, invasive or exploitative, but as a helpful and co-operative 
friend and partner bringing ‘win-win’ results for all.  This raises the question of 
whether China is simply adapting to global norms for tactical benefit, or if it is 
genuinely learning?54  The findings of this thesis show that tactical benefit and the 
                                                 
53 Pal Nyiri, “Expatriating is Patriotic? The New Discourse on ‘New’ Migrants in the People’s 
Republic of China and Identity Construction Among Recent Migrants from the PRC,” Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies 27, no. 4 (October 2001): 635-653. 
54 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Learning versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control 
Policy in the 1980s and 1990s,” China Journal, no. 35 (January 1996): 27-62; Pauline Kerr, Stuart 
Harris and Qin Yaqing, “Tactical or Fundamental Change?” in China’s ‘New’ Diplomacy: Tactical or 
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pursuit of national interests remains Beijing’s foremost consideration for qiaowu 
policy development.   
 
1.06 Qiaowu for the 21st Century 
 
These issues point to a new understanding of OC affairs in a context that is specific 
for the 21st century, incorporating themes such as globalization and modern 
migrational trends.  This thesis examines whether the increase in the numbers of the 
OC settling or working around the world, and their links with China, indicate a 
specific strategy of using them to advance Beijing’s national interests.  How the CCP 
engages with the OC remains a significant cause of concern and interest, particularly 
for countries with large OC populations.55  Although this study does not seek to 
propagate or sensationalize theories of “yellow peril”, “China threat” or “fifth 
column” activity as some other observers have alluded to,56 it does highlight the 
potential political and social implications of qiaowu for host governments and 
receiving countries.  
 
As mentioned earlier, academics have addressed the significance of state-sponsored 
facilitation in the PRC-OC relationship.  Moreover, they note how China has become 
increasingly confident over the past twenty years in dealing with qiaowu affairs with 
both the OC and the host governments of countries in which they reside.  
Underscoring this confidence is a sense of revitalized pro-Beijing sentiment amongst 
the OC that encourages them to participate in China’s re-emergence economically, 
culturally and politically.  The CCP has been successful in cementing amongst 
China’s domestic population and certain factions of the OC diaspora (mainly new 
migrants and PRC foreign students) the concept of equating patriotism with love of 
China and its communist leadership.  These groups have likewise consolidated and 
strengthened their relationship with qiaowu agencies and PRC diplomatic 
representatives.  This implies their willingness to be embraced by China and its 
                                                                                                                                            
Fundamental Change? eds. Pauline Kerr, Stuart Harris and Qin Yaqing (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), 229-245. 
55 Wang Gungwu, “External China as a New Policy Area,” Pacific Affairs 58, no. 1 (1985): 28-43. 
56 David S. G. Goodman, “Are Asia’s ‘Ethnic Chinese’ a Regional-Security Threat?” Survival 39, Issue 
4 (Winter 1997/1998): 140-156; Elizabeth Feizkhah, “How to Win Friends: Beijing is Courting Tiny 
Pacific Nations,” Time Pacific, 4 June 2001. 
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leadership, and hence their political subservience. 57   Moreover, this interaction 
signifies a move from traditional ethnographically-based associations to quasi-
political platforms. 
 
This thesis builds upon and updates the existing scholarship in a modern context, 
resulting in an original detailed study illustrating precisely how the CCP has 
strengthened its presence throughout the OC diaspora for China’s long term interests.  
The future direction of qiaowu points towards key goals: improving China’s 
international image, China’s domestic and foreign advancement, raising the status of 
the OC in their places of residence.  These objectives face several stumbling blocks, 
however: a revival of the ‘OC problem’, acculturation, migration, illegal migration, 
and transnational crime.  An analysis of these issues contributes to the understanding 
of China’s wider relationship with the OC, and also how external actors and 
opportunities impact upon China’s foreign policy development. 
  
1.07 Problems with Assessing Qiaowu 
 
Can extra-territorial direction and control of the OC be proven?  There is no way of 
measuring the complex attitudes of the Chinese authorities towards the OC; moreover, 
the PRC-based ascription of citizenship and the unofficial but powerful ethnicity-
based perceptions of Chineseness remains vague (this point is discussed in further 
detail when examining the role of nationalism and patriotism in qiaowu policy 
development).  Similarly, it is difficult to measure the extent to which qiaowu has 
been successful.  As such, this thesis does not lend itself to quantification.  While 
there is no true measure of “effectiveness”, there has been a distinct and significant 
shift of attitudes amongst OC, amplified by larger numbers of mainland Chinese 
migrants over the past few decades since 1989.  Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to 
show how qiaowu policies have evolved and assisted with this shift, and highlight 
cases were these measures have yielded significant results.   
 
In addition, this thesis makes no claim to constructing a relevant theoretical 
description of China’s relationship with the OC diaspora.  While relevant theory 
                                                 
57 Flemming Christiansen, Chinatown, Europe: An Exploration of Overseas Chinese Identity in the 
1990s, (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 127-128. 
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might be applied to various qiaowu scenarios throughout the research, it is not the 
purpose of this thesis to repeat established discourses already covered in the current 
literature.58  For the purposes of locating the importance of qiaowu in the wider 
scholarship, this thesis refers to and surveys a variety of disciplines and models from 
which a relevant theoretical framework could be generated in order to explain the 
relationship between the CCP and the OC diaspora as a future research project.   
 
1.08 Methodology 
 
Evaluation of ethnographic fieldwork within discourse research is prone to 
subjectivity – a natural result of the selective process of data gathering.  As such, 
objectivity, validity and reliability of data often come into question.  Ethnographic 
studies seek to reconstruct and understand specific situations, but not to replicate them.  
Quality of research, therefore, must be evaluated along lines of transparency, suitable 
case studies, and reliance upon a range of different sources in order to support one’s 
conclusions.   
 
I have gathered data for this research from a wide range of sources as both a 
researcher and long serving member of the OC community.  I have been an executive 
member of various OC voluntary community groups in New Zealand (both pro-
Beijing, pro-Taipei and neutral organisations).  I am a Director of the Overseas 
Exchange Association of Guangdong Province.  I am also a regular participant in 
activities organized or hosted by the PRC embassy, Taipei Economic and Cultural 
Office (TECO) and qiaowu agencies at various levels (including international forums, 
tours, and youth programmes).  With such broad non-partisan affiliations, I have been 
able to write about my experiences with both Taiwan and China’s qiaowu 
programmes without political bias.  
 
Moreover, these engagements and positions have provided me with access to crucial 
resources and contacts, and ultimately a unique insight into how the qiaowu polity, 
bureaucracy and institutions interact with OC communities and their leaders.  In many 
ways, I have had the opportunity to deal with qiaowu affairs in a broad scope – much 
                                                 
58 For example, see Laurence J.C. Ma and Carolyn Cartier, The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, 
Mobility, and Identity, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 
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more so than other OC community members who may be restricted to certain (and 
localized) aspects of the relationship.  Therefore, assumptions about the effects of 
qiaowu policies on personal matters (such as identity constructions and ethnic 
affiliations of the OC) throughout the thesis are based upon my own extensive 
firsthand experiences and observations derived from a broad range of situations and 
circumstances over different time periods. 
 
My own conclusions have been complemented by the personal views of those directly 
involved in OC affairs (such as government officials, academics and OC community 
leaders).  My fieldwork was done in the form of open-ended casual discussions and 
conversations rather than a qualitative interview, questionnaire or survey.  These 
included personal communications with numerous OC leaders and members of OC 
community groups in the Pacific Islands and New Zealand as well as qiaowu cadres in 
China.  Formal interviews were avoided as they might have raised suspicions about 
my intentions.  For example, cadres in Guangzhou were wary of divulging too much 
information to me.  Content and details from meetings, private conversations, and 
participation in qiaowu activities were not expressly quoted or referred to due to 
excessive footnoting, but woven into the narrative as examples, descriptions, analysis 
and insight of various situations.  Other personal comments or situations may have 
appeared too trivial to reference.  In short, for the purposes of managing the huge 
volume of information, I was selective in largely listing only my traceable written 
sources (such a ‘guidance’ documents and speeches).    
 
This thesis employs a wide range of Chinese language primary source materials –
including government policy documents, internal circulars and memoranda, books 
accessed firsthand from a dedicated qiaowu library/depository in Beijing (which 
functioned to monitor, collect, and collate news of OC affairs from China and around 
the world) and the library for OC research at Jinan University in Guangzhou.  In both 
cases I had full access to classified information and sensitive materials not normally 
available to the public, such as neibu (internal), jimi (classified) and mimi (secret) 
qiaowu policy documents deemed too sensitive for open publication.  The typology 
and origin of these empirical data sources confirms existing knowledge or assertions, 
and also provides a deeper and wider understanding of qiaowu.   
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For example, the main primary source policy document used throughout this thesis is 
Qiaoqing – a regular internal publication (and therefore marked as classified and/or 
secret) issued by the State Council concerning anything about qiaowu.  It is intended 
for distribution amongst government ministries and high-level qiaowu cadres.  It is 
made up of advisory papers, memoranda and reports from all provincial, county, city 
and town levels of the qiaowu bureaucracy, as well as additional input from relevant 
research bodies (such as universities and think tanks).  Qiaoqing highlights important 
findings and statistics, outcomes of policy implementation, as well as policy 
recommendations.  It is therefore the most important document that indicates the 
internal attitude and position of the State Council towards qiaowu during any given 
period.  
 
I also referred to various compilations of qiaowu policy, such as encyclopedias, 
magazines published by qiaowu authorities, and compilations of speeches from high-
level CCP and qiaowu officials, state media newspaper editorials, historical reports 
and commentary.  One example of the latter is Wang Tang’s Qiaowu chunqiu (Spring 
and Autumn of Overseas Chinese Affairs), which conveniently illustrates the 
evolution of Beijing’s attitudes towards qiaowu policy from 1949 to 1997.59 
 
This thesis also uses a variety of internal handbooks and manuals written by experts at 
the State Council for OC Affairs (OCAO).  They are intended for qiaowu cadres and 
illustrate the specific methodology, techniques and philosophies surrounding qiaowu 
and its implementation.  The content of these materials is significant because they 
highlight exactly how cadres are to deal with the OC in accordance with the relevant 
policies – and therefore revealing the true nature of qiaowu at the frontline. 
 
Many Chinese language secondary sources were used, such as journals, newspapers, 
newsletters and magazines, discussion and working papers (some scholarly and non-
scholarly) which have useful information.  Some are published by qiaowu agencies, 
both at the national and provincial level.  These manuscripts intended for open 
publication are first vetted by the CCP United Front (UF) Department, which ensures 
that the audience receives appropriately worded material; that policies, personalities 
                                                 
59 Wang Tang, ed. Qiaowu chunqiu (Spring and Autumn of Overseas Chinese Affairs) (Beijing: 
Zhongguo guojiguangbo chubanshe, 1997). 
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and the Party are ‘accurately’ portrayed; and that secret material is not revealed.  For 
example, I referred to a website of the OC Literature and News Centre at Jinan 
University (whose address is unknown to the general public) and found the internal 
source Qiaoqing jianbao – an electronic compilation of qiaowu news items, stories of 
interest (taken from newspapers both inside and outside of China), policy updates, 
reports and statistics intended for OC researchers and qiaowu cadres.  While some of 
these items may reflect a pro-Beijing stance, they can be regarded as indicative of the 
type of material used by qiaowu analysts in their policy formulation. 
 
There were also large amounts of policy documents and communications taken from 
the open online sources of qiaowu organizations (both national and provincial, and 
from the PRC and ROC), PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and consular 
offices/embassies around the world.  These sources outlined the public information 
and policies surrounding qiaowu.  In addition, to incorporate a sense of the wider geo-
political environment during the Cold War period, I referred to declassified US State 
Department telex communications to guage international reaction towards OC affairs. 
 
There were also a large volume of media sources used.  Most of these were 
mainstream publications and are widely accepted as independent and accurate.  
However, others were the mouthpieces of political movements (such as propaganda 
materials by both pro-CCP and pro-KMT sources and the Falun Gong (FLG)) and 
written with intentions to incite fear or distaste for rivals, or support for their own 
agendas.  The challenge of this thesis was to carefully sort through scattered and 
unsubstantiated evidence that may have led to invalid or inaccurate assessments.  For 
example, I accessed some articles concerning the Olympic Torch rallies from web 
postings and blogs by participants.  While these types of sources are not of a scholarly 
nature, they clearly demonstrate the methods that students went to mobilize 
themselves.  They also reveal the strong emotions and feelings that PRC students had 
during this period, and their level of commitment to supporting China and its leaders.   
 
Although some of these sources may have been unreliable for backing my assertions 
about the qiaowu administration itself, they were used only in instances to 
demonstrate how rival regimes and organizations may have sought to engage with 
their OC targets.  While some sources may appear to be jingoistic in nature, they have 
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been carefully selected to demonstrate their different points of view concerning OC 
affairs and their particular intentions with reaching out to strategic groups of the OC 
diaspora.  Overall, the context of the evidence put forward reflects the same attitudes 
expressed in reliable primary sources issued by policy makers and commentators 
during each period in China’s modern history. 
 
1.09 Thesis Outline 
 
To answer the research questions in the context of qiaowu’s importance for 
facilitating China’s economic, political and great-power status aspirations, this thesis 
is divided into three sections.  Each is described and compared in the context of 
Taiwan’s own rival qiaowu effort, as well as how qiaowu has evolved as a result of 
modern migration and China’s emerging role on the global stage.   
 
The first section links historical, government and policy documents and other 
empirical evidence with various real world situations concerning OC affairs to show 
how and why China’s qiaowu policies and methods have continually evolved since 
1949, and in particular between 1989-2008.  It details the background and nature of 
qiaowu: Chapter Two begins with a broad overview of China’s successful 
management of certain cohorts of the OC since 1989.  This sets the scene for Chapter 
Three, which details the specific nature and applications of qiaowu.  This is followed 
by an analysis of the qiaowu bureaucratic structure in the historical context of OC 
policy since the late 19th century until the contemporary period; Chapter Four 
investigates how the OC have been viewed by various governments of China, and the 
policies that have resulted over different periods as a result of these evolving 
definitions.  The findings from these chapters conclusively demonstrate that the 
overall goal of Beijing’s qiaowu policies have never really changed, but adapted to 
the geo-political environment. 
 
The second section analyzes the tools and methodology of qiaowu given the 
challenges of a diverse OC diaspora:  Chapter Five explains how China has 
reconnected with the OC beyond its geographic borders by employing an articulate 
reconstruction of common identity, cultural traditions and emotional connection 
through education; Chapter Six examines how China has successfully influenced 
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specific OC populations through youth work, media and propaganda; Chapter Seven 
describes how the OC are managed and mobilized to contain, subvert or eliminate 
threats to the CCP regime.  This section shows how qiaowu cadres attempt to cope 
with diversity and view the OC diaspora on different lines – thinking globally and 
acting locally. 
 
The third section examines qiaowu in the context of China’s foreign interests in a 21st 
century geo-political environment – both in terms of national security and its 
international relations: Chapter Eight examines the role of consular protection and 
evacuation as an integral part of Beijing’s overall embrace of all ethnic Chinese; 
Chapter Nine suggests a new model for qiaowu work, developed from Beijing’s own 
views on modern migration, and the resulting implications for host countries.  It also 
explains how qiaowu methods have evolved in response to transnational social 
mobility, and its role in China’s aspirations to become a respected global citizen.  
From this evidence, this thesis conclusively demonstrates that Beijing views the OC 
and their resources as a key means to advance China’s national interests, and 
highlights the potential political and social implications behind its appeals to those 
OC participating in China’s re-emergence. 
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2.00 Mobilizing the OC in the 21st Century 
 
This chapter explains the CCP’s shift in attitudes and strategy towards the OC by 
highlighting two important periods of its relationship with them – namely the 1989 
Tiananmen Incident, and the 2008 Olympic Torch Relay rallies.  Driven by a need to 
reclaim their hearts and minds after the June 4th events, Chinese authorities focused 
upon a strategy that engaged with the OC through ethnographic, cultural and 
economic appeals.  The CCP has continually developed these methods over the years 
to incorporate patriotic and nationalistic sentiment, culminating in a set of 
programmes that encourages support for the CCP regime itself. 
 
By strengthening and managing relationships with a growing population of foreign 
students and new migrants from the PRC over two decades, the CCP has successfully 
recruited a friendly pro-Beijing force to ease China’s rise throughout the world, to 
support its objectives, and to challenge any threats.  These qiaowu efforts indicate the 
extent of the CCP’s influence over the OC community, and expose a darker side to 
this relationship. 
 
2.01 Capitalizing on the Olympic Spirit 
 
The CCP recognized the Olympic movement as a potent source of national pride for 
the OC everywhere and sought to use it for drawing them together by the millions.60  
PRC officials described the successful bid for the 2008 Summer Games as the “joint 
efforts made by the overseas Chinese throughout the world” and a “tremendous 
spiritual force pushing the Chinese people forward” for China’s unity, prosperity and 
rejuvenation. 61   Giving the OC the opportunity for input into its affairs and 
development through the Olympics was another way of getting them to identify with 
China – and they were extremely positive in their response.  330,000 OC from around 
                                                 
60 Ya Ming, “Hongyang Aoyun jingshen huhuan shijie heping,” (Enhance the Olympic Spirit, Call Out 
for World Peace) Qiaowu gongzuo yanjiu, no. 3, 2008, http://qwgzyj.gov.cn/aypd/142/1137.shtml 
(accessed 7 June 2009); “Nimen de shengli, jiushi women de shengli, geng shi quanqiu huaren de 
shengli!” (Your Victory is Our Victory, Moreover is all the World’s OC’s Victory!), Qiaoqing jianbao, 
20 September 2004. 
61 Zhao Xiangling (Auckland Consul General) as quoted by the Consulate-General of the PRC in 
Auckland, “Celebrations on Beijing’s Successful Bid for Hosting the 2008 Olympic Games,” 14 July 
2001, www.chinaconsulate.org.nz/eng/xwdt/t44155.htm (accessed 30 September 2009).   
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the world gave more than 900 million yuan towards the effort.  The Olympic hosts 
welcomed proposals for the construction of venues, with the ‘Watercube’ complex 
representing the foremost symbol of OC contribution. 62   175,000 tickets were 
allocated to OC communities around the world, including those from Taiwan. 63  
Furthermore, Beijing specifically extended invitations to OC of foreign citizenship to 
participate as volunteers, with a special program to recruit from abroad.64  With such a 
feeling of ‘ownership’ for the Olympics, many of those who identified themselves as 
Chinese considered anything negative about it as a direct affront not only to China, 
but also to themselves as well. 
  
This surge of pro-China sentiment (both domestic and abroad) was evident in the 
months prior to August 2008.  Fostering these emotions was a key means to 
strengthening CCP authority within China, where indignation, frustration and anger 
resulted following foreign protests against the Olympic Torch relay, racist comments 
aired on Cable News Network (CNN) and a perception that riots in Tibet were 
misreported by the Western media.  Demonstrators alleged that the French retail chain 
Carrefour was supporting the Dalai Lama, and held large-scale protests outside its 
various outlets, as well as the French embassy and the Beijing French school.  These 
rallies legitimized the CCP position on dissidents (such as cracking down on Muslim 
cells in Xinjiang and jailing human rights activist Hu Jia under the premise of national 
integrity) without raising criticism. 
 
However, after a couple of days of heated protest, the government issued a front page 
editorial in the People’s Daily urging citizens to cherish patriotism but expressing it in 
a “rational” way.  It cited the need to maintain focus on economic development by 
converting “full-hearted patriotic zeal into patriotic action”.65  Following this line, 
senior Chinese intellectuals called on the public to “choose a rational way to express 
                                                 
62 “Guojia youyong zhongxin “Suilifang” huo gangaotaiqiao juanzhi jiangchao jiuyi” (National 
Aquatic Centre “Watercube” Captures Almost Over 900 Million Yuan from OC Donations) Xinjingbao, 
7 November 2007. 
63 Renmin ribao, 22 September 2007, 6. 
64 “Beijing aoyunhui xuyao huayi qingnian zhiyuanzhe” (Beijing Olympics Require Ethnic Chinese 
Youth Volunteers), Qiaoqing jianbao, 20 September 2006; eBeijing, “Olympic Games-time Volunteer 
Projects,” 2008, www.ebeijing.gov.cn/Home_of_EV/AboutEV/t915421/htm (accessed 25 September 
2009). 
65 “Xinhua shiping: jiang aiguo reqing qingzhu dao fazhan xingdong Zhong qu,” (Xinhua Commentary: 
Pour Patriotic Zeal Into China’s Development) Xinhua, 17 April 2008, 
http://new.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-04/17/content_7998798.htm (accessed 30 April 2008). 
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their love for the country,” suggesting a better way to win understanding and support 
worldwide was to introduce the positive side of the country and its people, to show its 
friendliness, and “win those holding bias” against China.66  This reflected a similar 
government response to the Belgrade embassy bombing in 199967 and the Hainan spy-
plane incident in 2001, which saw Beijing briefly allow its nationals to vent 
nationalistic feeling, but then moving quickly to curb it.  While putting an end to 
over-zealous nationalistic outbursts was aimed to prevent possible protest at the 
Chinese government itself, this time the purpose was also to restore a peaceful 
international image of China (in light of the Dafur68 and Tibet issues), and to ensure 
its economic security in a globalized market environment.   
 
The situation overseas, however, was quite different.  Pro-Tibetan and FLG 
movements both presented themselves as potential threats and embarrassments to 
China’s efforts to successfully host the Olympics.  Therefore, nationalism and 
patriotism amongst the OC was to be managed for China’s interests.  Strategic groups 
of OC in major cities throughout the world mobilized in huge numbers to demonstrate 
their support for the Beijing games, promote national unity, oppose Tibetan 
independence, and protest against distorted Western reporting.  The majority of these 
supporters were young and educated.  They proudly wore red T-shirts emblazoned 
“One China, One Family”, sang patriotic songs and chanted “Go Beijing!”  Others 
raised banners with slogans such as “One World, One Dream”.69  How was this 
apparent level of widespread support for Beijing achieved amongst the OC?  The 
answer lies in the CCP’s continuous efforts to guide and manage their perceptions and 
behaviours – a set of techniques collectively described as qiaowu. 
 
 
                                                 
66 “Zhuanjia, wangmin tan dizhi Jialefu: yi lixing taidu biaoda aiguo qinggan” (Experts and Netizens 
On the Boycott of Carrefour: Reasons for Attitudes that Express Patriotic Feeling) 17 April 2008, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-04/17/content_7998084.htm (accessed 30 April 2008); 
“Experts Say Patriotism Understandable, but Urge People to be Rational,” Xinhua, 19 April 2008. 
67 Jim Frederick, “Standing Their Ground,” Time, 2 May 2005, 34-37. 
68 Beijing was criticised for its involvement in Dafur and refusing to put pressure on the Sudan 
government to end the humanitarian crisis.  See Jonathan Holslag, “China’s Diplomatic Manoeuvering 
on the Question of Dafur,” Journal of Contemporary China 17, no. 54 (February 2008): 71-84; Jane 
Macartney, “China Lashes Out Against Dafur Critics in Olympic Row,” Times Online, 14 February 
2008, www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article3367440.ece (accessed 30 September 2009).  
69 “Overseas Chinese Rally in Support of Beijing Olympics, Against Western Media’s Biased 
Coverage,” Xinhua, 21 April 2008, http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6395679.html 
(accessed 30 September 2009).   
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2.02 The 1989 Tiananmen Incident 
 
The Tiananmen Incident of June 4th 1989 sent shockwaves throughout the OC 
diaspora.  Vehement protests against the CCP erupted all across the globe.  Most (if 
not all) of these demonstrations were led and dominated by OC groups.  Beijing saw 
an urgent need to win back their confidence and loyalty and immediately went into 
damage control.  Provincial governments quickly mobilized those with OC family and 
business connections to make contact with them and explain the situation from 
Beijing’s perspective.  It supplemented these efforts with specially produced 
propaganda materials.70  For example, they made videos to distribute amongst OC 
community groups abroad.71  In addition, authorities dispatched special delegations to 
visit them personally to present their version of the events in an attempt to dispel ill-
feeling and “preserve the harmony” (baohe) towards the regime.  The purpose of 
these measures was not only to strengthen relations, but also to continue the flow of 
OC investment in the face of trade sanctions from the West.  After 1989, the CCP 
would base its legitimacy on both maintaining economic growth and return to a 
renewed emphasis on the propaganda and thought work methods it had used between 
the late 1920s to the late 1970s.72 
 
One group deserved special attention.  Students were supposed to be the agents of 
change for China in the context of its scientific and technological modernization.73  
However, in the wake of Tiananmen, state-sponsored PRC students abroad became a 
liability for Beijing.  Following the Emergency Immigration Relief Act of 1989 for 
Chinese Nationals following the June 4th Incident, Washington accorded PRC 
students in the US special immigration conditions.74  This policy precipitated the 
                                                 
70 Chen Xitong, Report and Checking the Turmoil and Quelling the Counter-Revolutionary Rebellion 
(Beijing: New Star Publishers, 1989). 
71 Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 163. 
72 Deng Xiaoping, “Address to Officers at the Rank of General and Above in Command of the Troops 
Enforcing Martial Law in Beijing,” Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Deng Xiaoping Selected Works), Vol. 3, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp (accessed 30 September 2009) as noted by Anne-Marie 
Brady, “The Beijing Olympics as a Campaign of Mass Distraction,” China Quarterly, 197 (March 
2009): 3.  
73 Cheng Xi, “Non-Remaining and Non-Returning: The Mainland Chinese Students in Japan and 
Europe since the 1970s,” and Li Minghuan, “A Group in Transition: Chinese Students and Scholars in 
the Netherlands,” in Globalizing Chinese Migration: Trends in Europe and Asia, eds. Pal Nyiri and 
Igor Saveliev (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2002), 158-172, 173-188. 
74 Canada, Australia and New Zealand passed similar legislation allowing students to remain as 
refugees, and later as permanent residents. 
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potential problem of tens of thousands of China’s elite graduates choosing to remain 
abroad and not return to participate in China’s modernization, or worse yet, engage in 
anti-CCP activities.  As a key target group for China’s development and mobilization, 
PRC students overseas became the focus of an intense struggle – not only for 
reclaiming their talents and skills, but also their political value.75   
 
Thus began a new phase in the development of OC relations, whereby PRC students 
were the targets of aggressive methods comprising of group management, extra-
territorial influence, counter-infiltration and counter-subversion.  For example, the 
PRC consul in Vancouver had identified student leaders and demanded they stop their 
pro-democracy demonstrations.  When they arrived to collect their scholarship 
cheques, he showed them the ‘official videotape’ of the crackdown and indirectly 
threatened their relatives by reminding them of their contractual obligations.76  In 
March 1990, the PRC State Education Commission convened a meeting of education 
counsellors in Chinese embassies and consulates, instructing diplomats to expand 
their influence over student organizations by strengthening CCP ideology amongst 
them, winning their support, and isolating or eliminating reactionary factions.  In 
December 1990, senior foreign propaganda official Zhu Muzhi suggested rectifying 
any negative feelings of PRC students by encouraging the most patriotic students to 
return to China, while strengthening the patriotism of those choosing to stay abroad.77   
 
To facilitate this, a 1992 order by the State Council Administrative Bureau provided 
amnesty for those who engaged in acts against the PRC or its interests when returning 
to China.78  The CCP categorized the remainder staying abroad depending upon their 
loyalty to Beijing, with each group managed under specific measures.  For example, it 
would maintain and strengthen relationships with pro-CCP students; for those less 
                                                 
75 Appendix I “Summary of the Meeting of Educational Counselors (Consuls) in Chinese Embassies 
and Consulates” and II “Directive on Policy Toward Chinese Students and Scholars in the United 
States and Canada, March 1990” in Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations (Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 1994), 117-139. 
76 Franka Cordua-von Specht, “Chinese Students Fear Spies,” Ubyssey 8, no. 1 (5 July 1989) 
http://www.library.ubc.ca/archives/pdfs/ubyssey/UBYSSEY_1989_07_05.pdf, 
(accessed 30 September 2009). 
77 Zhu Muzhi, “Jiaqiang dui liuxue renyuan de xuanchuan gongzuo” (Strengthen Propaganda Work 
Towards Foreign Students), 15 December 1990 in Zhu Muzhi, Zhu Muzhi lun duiwai xuanchuan (Zhu 
Muzhi Discusses Foreign Propaganda) (Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 1995), 292-293. 
78 Order no. 44. as noted by Qian Ning, Liuxue Meiguo (Studying in America), (Nanjing: Jiangsu 
wenyi chubanshe, 1996): 285. 
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patriotic, it used propaganda methods to win them over; finally, those elements 
deemed dangerous to PRC national interests would be exposed and attacked.  These 
arrangements would ensure that students would remain a controllable asset for the 
CCP.79   
 
2.03 The CCP’s Ideological Work and Influence on PRC Students 
 
Domestically, Beijing stepped up its recruitment and ideological work on China-based 
college students after 1989.80  The CCP placed importance on boosting the level of 
domestic nationalism amongst China’s youth by initiating a campaign for national 
unity.  In 1994, the CCP Propaganda Department continued this effort by 
strengthening patriotic ideas and spirit. 81   Three concepts arose from this: a 
traditionalist discourse emphasizing Confucian and Chinese culture in order to 
maintain political order; a neo-conservative discourse to consolidate power; and 
finally a populist “Say No” attitude that reflected frustration towards the West.82   
 
Externally, maintaining influence over them after their move abroad has continued to 
be an important part of qiaowu work.  In a 1992 State Council ruling, diplomats were 
to support students abroad, and attempt to raise their patriotism for China.83  One of 
these efforts was ‘guiding’ PRC students abroad through consultation and support.  
PRC embassies and consulates provided funding, planning, finance, co-ordination and 
management for various pro-Beijing groups.  Although students initially formed their 
own organizations, since 1989 PRC embassies (through Ministry of Education (MOE) 
attaches) have been instrumental in establishing branches of the Chinese Student and 
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Scholar Association (CSSA) on various university campuses around the world as a 
means of co-ordinating various student groups under one umbrella.84  Furthermore, 
the embassy has supported and guided their activities together with other pro-Beijing 
organizations and business groups for increased influence and exchange of 
information.85  For example, at the University of Washington in Seattle in 2008, the 
local chapter protested against the Dalai Lama and pressured campus officials to 
prevent him from speaking on political issues.86  Alternatively, they work to boost 
positive sentiments for China-related issues, such as fundraising for humanitarian 
concerns or natural disaster. 
 
Much of this aspect of qiaowu involves building personal relationships with leading 
figures.  Activities include hosting meetings and dinners, or sending embassy 
representatives to attend student functions.  Diplomats use these opportunities to 
express their concern and care for students while stoking patriotism and enthusiasm 
for their homeland. 87   They remind students how they could strengthen this 
relationship in combination with diligent study in order to make their parents’ hopes 
and dreams a reality – and therefore make the Chinese nation proud of their success.88  
As a result, many of them feel a responsibility to do well in representing their country 
and are thus ready and willing to act when called upon, or when mobilized with 
incentives or inducements.89  Some openly demonstrate their willingness to seek and 
accept “guidance” from PRC diplomats.  They are eager to enhance their political 
connections for access to benefits, resources, prestige and status.  They demonstrate 
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their support for the regime by organizing and supporting marches, protests and 
demonstrations under consultation with the embassy.90   
 
Since the 1990s, the PRC authorities have played a leading role in orchestrating 
various pro-Beijing events outside of China by using a systematic process of micro-
management of the OC.91  Embassy attaches (such as those from the MOE, MFA and 
Ministry of State Security (MSS)) work with qiaowu agencies to ensure a perfect and 
trouble free welcome by dictating the preparation, specifications and wording of large 
banners, or in some cases requesting special cultural performances. 92   Likewise, 
dinners and other social functions also follow protocol set down by the visiting 
delegations.  OC business interests determined to forge a closer relationship with 
Beijing contribute other items that facilitate the welcome, such as distributing Chinese 
flags.  Consequently, pro-Beijing groups always give high-level PRC officials a warm 
reception.93   In many cases, such mobilization is not only designed for pleasing 
visiting Chinese officials, but to completely overwhelm any expected opposition.  For 
example, in anticipation of noisy demonstrators during Hu Jintao’s visit to London in 
October 2005, Chinese officials wearing red armbands directed hundreds of PRC 
students drafted in from across Britain to challenge anti-China protestors.94   
 
2.04 The 2008 Olympic Torch Rallies 
 
PRC involvement in the 2008 Olympic Torch relay was no different.  With a high 
level of domestic support stemming from years of patriotic education, Li Dongsheng 
(chair of the Beijing Olympics News Propaganda Work Co-ordinating Group) 
asserted that there was “basically no chance” of the CCP losing power because of a 
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mass-led democratic transition. 95   These same pro-China feelings have been 
successfully exported, transplanted and entrenched into xinqiao OC and PRC students 
abroad through the OC media, the internet and the qiaowu framework. 
 
CCP officials labelled Australia and Japan as ‘relatively dangerous’ destinations for 
the relay due to the anticipated presence of pro-Tibetan independence and FLG 
protestors.  Internet postings warned that the “weak” number of OC in Canberra 
would surely be outnumbered by crowds of opponents.  The OC in these areas were 
described as “the last sentry” and organized to prevent a repeat of the embarrassment 
in London and Paris days earlier.96  So that PRC students would swamp out their 
rivals (those groups had been consistently labelled as a ‘minority’ by state media), 
thousands of supporters were recruited on short notice to ostensibly ‘support the 
Beijing Olympics, propagate Olympic spirit and promote Sino-foreign friendship.’97  
A patriotic call to rally descendants of the Yellow Emperor, no matter their nationality 
or origins, was launched.98  Chinese language websites used the Olympic spirit to 
unite all OC both nationalistically and ethnically, and to stand up and be heard as part 
of mainstream society.99  This effort showed that it was Beijing’s intention to gather 
as many voluntary supporters as possible, rather than attempt indoctrination of the 
masses.  
 
There were also many incentives offered in order to attract the numbers required.  
Some in the San Francisco rally were reportedly paid,100 while other pro-Beijing 
student groups were ferried to rallies on chartered buses and provided accommodation 
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– all courtesy of the PRC.101  CSSA leader Zhang Rongan confirmed the consulate 
had offered such facilities for the Canberra rally.102  In Japan, co-ordinators charged a 
2000 yen flat fee, while the PRC embassy in Tokyo advised the local police to look 
after the safety and security of the 70 busloads of students travelling to Nagano.103  
Protest paraphernalia from China (such as thousands of Chinese flags and red T-shirts) 
was sent to organizers in the form of ‘donations’.104  Other gifts for participants 
included Olympic souvenir items and certificates.105  Local OC businesses seeking a 
closer relationship to Beijing provided or subsidized some of these items. 
 
To ensure the demonstrations proceeded smoothly, 4000 students were vetted fearing 
anti-China infiltrators amongst them.  Records of participants in Japan and Australia 
were taken using online registration.  On signing up, students acknowledged they 
would abide by certain rules. 106   This followed previously noted CCP practices 
whereby participants had signed declarations acknowledging that they would be fined 
if they caused any unapproved disturbance, would inform officials if contacted by 
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anti-Beijing groups, and would waive all rights to protest with all other groups.107  
These strict measures reflected the level of paranoia surrounding high profile China-
related events, and demonstrated the obsessive lengths the CCP would go in order to 
ensure a successful result. 
 
Reports concerning this mobilization effort soon surfaced in the international media.  
Accusations of the PRC employing ‘rent-a-crowds’ to denounce pro-Tibetan 
protestors could not be allowed to persist.  Beijing was obliged to make a public 
‘about face’ on openly supporting the OC.  Consequently, Xinhua reports emphasized 
that students had mobilized themselves and established the rallies at their own will.108  
Likewise, PRC officials either denied any involvement or deflected questions 
surrounding the embassies’ provocation of OC nationalism or offering of support to 
protestors.109  Furthermore, student groups were instructed to deny any links between 
the rallies and the embassy.  They removed previous internet postings and Zhang 
Rongan retracted his earlier statement, claiming students paid for all expenses 
themselves.110   
 
Despite this cover-up, relations between the embassy and consulates and PRC student 
groups continued.  After the London relay, representatives of the All England Chinese 
Students and Scholars Federation were among guests invited to an official function at 
the PRC embassy. 111   After the Canberra demonstrations, an embassy statement 
thanked PRC students for successfully supporting the Olympic spirit and maintaining 
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China/Australian relations – it singled out their “exceptional management and 
organization efforts” as a point of high praise.112   
 
2.05 Another Evolution in Qiaowu 
 
In the weeks following the Olympic Torch rallies, Beijing was well aware of the 
negative fallout surrounding the noisy and aggressive protests.  If such elements were 
to strengthen and proliferate amongst the OC, their efforts could easily backfire in the 
face of public opinion.113  Following the outbursts that characterized the rallies both 
inside and outside of China, the resulting embarrassment pointed towards a new 
development in how they could manage the patriotic zeal amongst PRC students 
abroad.  During the 2009 Melbourne Film Festival, initial efforts to prevent the 
screening of pro-Uygher documentary “The Ten Conditions of Love” included flag 
waving and demonstrations, resulting in scuffles between rival groups.  From these 
high profile protests, a more mature attitude began to emerge.  CSSA leaders in 
Canberra realized that the more they protested, the more attention their opponents 
would enjoy.  Their new stance was to remain collectively inactive, and move towards 
more dialogue and communication as the primary tool for promoting a new 
perspective on the ‘real China’.  This strategy achieved a positive response in France, 
where the French National Assembly invited PRC students to present reports and their 
views on Sino-French relations in an effort to “influence the influential opinion 
leaders.”114   
 
Efforts to promote a less aggressive image, yet tempered with the same level of 
security and crowd management techniques were again evident during Li Keqiang’s 
visit to Christchurch in November 2009.  In this instance, the PRC embassy had 
selectively notified key pro-Beijing groups to form a welcome party outside the hotel 
where the vice premier and his entourage would be staying.  Reflecting the CCP’s 
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constant fear of being attacked by protest groups, the specific details of his visit were 
kept secret to avoid potential embarrassment from FLG protestors.  As a result, the 
participants waited for over two hours.  In anticipation of this delay, organizers had 
earlier prepared refreshments.  With the expectation for crowd control, the leader of 
the local branch of the Peaceful Reunification Society used a loudhailer to keep 
excited participants in line.  Similarly, minders from pro-Beijing organizations 
circulated amongst rowdy PRC supporters and quietly reminded them not to engage in 
any embarrassing activity.  They also requested police support for blocking the 
activities of the eight FLG practitioners who were holding a silent protest right 
alongside the official welcome party.   
 
2.05 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has highlighted two important periods of qiaowu: as a crisis point for the 
CCP, the 1989 Tiananmen Incident served as the catalyst for reviewing and revising 
the methods for managing the OC diaspora for China’s interests.  Through qiaowu, 
the CCP increased its efforts to consolidate the OC diaspora (particularly the new 
migrant and student groups) through directly and indirectly organizing, co-ordinating 
and guiding their activities in the context of its own discourse.  
 
The CCP remains wary of anti-China elements that threaten to damage or embarrass it.  
By keeping a tight control over OC activities, the CCP has attempted to prevent 
anything that might question or challenge its leadership.  The Olympic Torch rallies 
and subsequent protests highlight the existence of the CCP’s continuously evolving 
strategy to deal with the OC – at the heart of which seeks to guide, manage and 
ultimately control their perceptions and behaviour. 
 
Qiaowu demonstrates Beijing’s ability to mobilize tens of thousands of OC for its 
interests – a dramatic and significant breakthrough for the CCP since 1989.  The last 
twenty years has seen an increase in the level of sophistication and scope of activity 
appealing to modern demographics, migration patterns and new levels of Chinese 
nationalism.  To maintain control, the CCP has taken a structured and systematic 
approach to regulate the behaviour of participants so that they reflect their desired 
image of China and the Chinese overseas. 
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3.00 Unveiling Qiaowu 
 
Having illustrated some of the most successful aspects of qiaowu during 2008, the 
remainder of this thesis examines the reasons, techniques and philosophies 
underscoring China’s relationship with the OC in a historical, contemporary and 
future context.  The CCP, in classic totalitarian fashion, attempts to impose a wide 
extension of social order upon them both inside and outside of China, involving the 
absorption or destruction of social groups that obstruct its complete control. 115  
Qiaowu methodology (in particular the micro-management techniques of controlling 
various aspects of OC behaviour) indicates the CCP’s desire for manipulation and 
influence over its targets, as well as its obsession to eliminate any potential threats 
amongst them.  This chapter explains why qiaowu is a necessary component of 
China’s international affairs, and how it has evolved according to China’s geo-
political and economic situation. 
 
3.01 The Role of the OC for the CCP-led Party-State 
 
While the stereotypical image of the OC is often introverted and passive, they have 
always been useful “envoys of communication” for implementing China’s 
international strategy. 116   The OC have been a significant source of support for 
various governments of China by serving to extend its foreign policy abroad and by 
being politically active for Chinese interests through boycotts, protests, sabotage and 
direct political intervention.117  The movements that shaped China in the modern 
historical period (such as Ming loyalists, the Fujian Incident in the 1930s,118 and Sun 
Yatsen’s Republican movement119) all found their roots and strength from beyond its 
geographical borders.  Those OC facing discrimination and exclusion in their adopted 
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countries were also active in building a strong China.  They believed that in doing so, 
it would lead to better treatment for themselves and their motherland.  
 
For the CCP, the OC played a significant role in its early years of development.  
Firstly, the CCP was forged by various OC communities around the world.  These 
included groups of seafarers, migrants, students and workers in France, Germany, the 
Soviet Union, and the US, who widely identified with political causes for 
internationalism.120  The OC have since been a source of support for protecting and 
maintaining the CCP’s dominance within the Chinese state system.  Although the OC 
were viewed with suspicion during the the Mao years, their financial and political 
relationship with China was always valued.  The CCP viewed the contribution of the 
OC towards the development of the PRC as necessary and co-opted them through 
their representation in the Chinese political system, albeit sometimes in an ambiguous, 
symbolic or indirect manner.  For example, the OC have assisted with China’s 
modernization though participation in its political system as guiqiao (returned OC) 
representatives.  The CCP is fully aware of their role as part of China’s development 
strategy and foreign policy, and has continuously raised qiaowu to the highest levels 
of national importance.121 
 
To promote better integration of OC work within government, at the 1954 National 
Peoples’ Congress qiaowu official He Xiangning first acknowledged that all agencies 
should play a co-ordinated role in OC affairs. 122   These views continue in the 
contemporary period, whereby OC officials emphasize the common responsibility of 
government (and hence the Party) to take advantage of OC resources.123  For example, 
in 2001, Vice Premier Qian Qichen called for progress in “bringing into full play the 
advantages of OC under the leadership of the CCP Central Committee with President 
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Jiang Zemin as the core.”124  Hence, qiaowu is not only a ministerial and provincial 
level matter, but one for the wider state and party level to address.125 
 
3.02 Political Mobilization 
 
The OC are an important soft power tool in China’s grand strategy.  They take a 
special place in the political, economic and great nation aspirations of the PRC.126  
Although they account for only about 2.5 percent of China’s own total population, the 
OC remain indispensable to China’s national interests.  As such, qiaowu analysts 
describe them as a “vital treasure trove of human resources.”127  This is because the 
OC are part of China’s comprehensive national power and are intimately related to its 
development and to the international environment.128  They feature strongly in three 
of China’s grand goals (sange dayou zuowei): as a diplomatic vanguard for promoting 
China’s integration with the world (tuishou), as a lobby group opposing Taiwanese 
independence, and as a vehicle for people-to-people promotion of Chinese pride, 
culture and confidence.129  Moreover, the OC have a purpose for bringing about 
political, economic and societal change around the world.130   
 
At the Eighth National Congress on Return Overseas Chinese in 2009, politburo 
member Wang Zhaoguo urged the OC to unite closely with the CCP in advancing 
China’s national interests under the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, 
Deng Xiaoping thought and Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents”; they were also told to 
“struggle with one mind” and build a well-off society (xiaokang shehui) and revitalize 
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the Chinese nation.131   In short, the OC can assist China by creating a friendly 
environment in which Beijing can pursue its national interests, moderate anti-CCP 
activity and promote pro-CCP goals.   
 
In terms of China’s international relations, the OC are “a unique advantage” that can 
be used as a key bridge for promoting mutual understanding.132   They serve to 
improve foreign perspectives of things Chinese as their social status and community 
clout improves. 133   For example, the OC act as economic, cultural and political 
intermediaries with ASEAN nations to strengthen China’s regional relationships.134  
In these contexts, the OC are complimentary to China’s other platforms of 
international relations (such as hard power, aid and financial assistance135) and cannot 
be separated from the broader spectrum of foreign affairs work (waijiao shiwu or 
waishi).136   
 
Waishi is different from traditional foreign affairs work because it encompasses issues 
beyond matters of diplomacy – it extends to anything related to things foreign to 
China or overseas.137  As such, diplomats regularly call upon local OC communities 
to support the PRC (such as confronting FLG, promoting reunification and opposing 
Tibetan independence).  They issue them with pro-Beijing material (such as DVDs 
and literature) on these subjects in the hope they will transmit their contents amongst 
themselves and to the wider public.138   
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In particular, PRC officials contend that ‘new’ migrant OC (xinqiao) are the 
“backbone of forces friendly to us in America and some other developed Western 
countries.”139  They have Western education, work experience, values, culture and 
mindsets.  They are knowledgeable of foreign political systems, and understand how 
to make best use of them for their purposes.140  OC associations, lobby groups, and 
media serve as conscious or unconscious fronts for China’s public “multi-track 
diplomacy”141 for winning the trust of or influencing the policy and opinions of other 
governments.142  As such, Beijing has used strategic groups of the OC to intervene in 
foreign politics. 143   Media reports cited examples alleging that Beijing offered 
members of the American OC community unofficial protection from the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) for their business interests in exchange for channeling Beijing 
money into US Democrat election campaigns;144 similarly, their access to military 
technology resulted in the Donorgate scandal between 1992 and 1996.145  In addition 
US authorities identified other key fundraisers as Chinese spies, or found that they 
reported directly to Beijing.146   
 
Since the 2000s, qiaowu specialists have suggested a broader approach for political 
mobilization.  According to an internal 2004 report entitled “Chinese Political 
Participatory Strength in American Election Revealed,” cultivation of an ethnic 
Chinese voting bloc and ethnic Chinese candidates for public office was an area cited 
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for further development.  As populations of OC increase and become integrated in 
local society as an economic and consumer force, more of them will be aware and 
active in political participation.147  The OC needed to be encouraged about this in 
order to raise their status and position in society.148  To this end, the PRC conducted 
an investigation on OC voting habits, patterns, and demographics.  It found that they 
tended to vote for personalities, and not specific parties; that they did vote for OC 
candidates; that voters could be mobilized if sufficient organizational work was done 
(such as the “80/20” movement149); and that the OC media played an important part in 
facilitating them with voting and the success of ethnic Chinese candidates.150   
 
However, the research also concluded that there was still much work to do.   For 
example, the standard of education amongst the OC was low (35 percent had no high 
school education and 23 percent were unskilled).  Furthermore, many of them were 
not engaged in the Western democratic system and did not think that it affected them 
as a minority group.  Finally, language difficulties, self-reliance and a reluctance to 
deal with local government made it difficult to mobilize the OC in a single 
direction.151  These issues pose significant difficulties for a quick mobilization of the 
OC as a pro-Beijing voting bloc.  The purpose of qiaowu in addressing these 
challenges is to slowly guide the OC as a part of China’s long term effort to amplify 
its influence abroad. 
 
3.03 Espionage 
 
As such, it is important that the qiaowu administration maintains a benevolent public 
face, and therefore concentrates on “inclusive” forms of co-optation and 
“transformation work” which involve influence and persuasion over the long term to 
seek their sentimentality, loyalty and support (see later chapters).  While qiaowu 
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includes intelligence gathering on the OC and their activities, the boundaries between 
the qiaowu administration and the state become blurred when mobilizing the OC for 
national interests that go beyond the mandate of the qiaowu administration itself.  In 
these cases the qiaowu administration prefers to leave aggressive and coercive 
practices for other authorities to handle.   
 
One such area of mobilizing the OC that is not necessarily a part of qiaowu includes 
espionage or stealing commercial secrets.152  Various companies have caught some of 
their OC employees disclosing confidential company trade information to PRC buyers 
or facilitating the export of sensitive technology.153  The Cox Report alleged that the 
PRC actively identified and enlisted OC scientists, businessmen and others with 
access to sensitive information.154  For example, Royal Dutch Shell uncovered a 
group of Chinese nationals meeting socially after work – these meetings were in fact a 
PRC-sponsored recruiting front for obtaining confidential pricing information. 155  
Between 2004 and 2006, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) arrested a total of 
twenty-five Chinese nationals or Chinese Americans for industrial espionage.   
 
Information is usually gathered through monitoring or infiltration of labour 
movements, trade unions and student associations or seemingly legitimate front-
organizations.156   US intelligence officials suspect that amongst the thousands of 
legitimate visitors, students and business people around the world operating trading 
companies, manufacturers, banks and other enterprises, recruits act as intelligence 
gathering stations under a special decree of the Politburo.157  An unclassified PRC 
government handbook for would-be spies provided some guidance: using open source 
information, official publications, direct contact and exchange with government 
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agencies, research offices, corporate enterprises, academic institutions, libraries and 
information offices.158  As China’s ‘Thousand Grains of Sand’ (shali yuanli), PRC 
nationals and those of Chinese descent abroad are encouraged to provide information 
or technology for China’s development in the form of de-centralized micro-
espionage.159  Targets are often unaware that they are the subject of such manipulation.  
Many respond positively and voluntarily, while others may require more persuasion, 
incentive or corrective tools to ensure obedience.  
 
How are certain OC mobilized to act in this way?  The answer lies in the specific 
techniques and methodologies used for recruitment.  The first is to appeal to their 
ethnic pride and sympathies in “helping the motherland advance.”160  PLA and MSS 
units recruit potential candidates for intelligence gathering before they leave China or 
offer favours for their co-operation.  Money does not always change hands – rather, 
experts suggest that they are not necessarily asked to spy illegally, but simply invited 
to share information.161  Once abroad, handlers with links to these units cultivate 
relations with them through Chinese friendship and cultural groups.162   
 
The second method employs carrots and sticks.  Recruiters may offer targets a job and 
housing upon their return, and provide stipends while abroad.  If they refuse to assist, 
they might be threatened.  In one case, MSS authorities told a Japanese national of 
Chinese ancestry that he was subject to Chinese law as a Chinese citizen despite his 
foreign passport.  They threatened him with jail or execution and told him that his son 
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would never leave China if he did not co-operate.  Similarly, the Canadian Globe and 
Mail reported that PRC authorities pressured Chinese students to be “sleeper” agents 
by using threats concerning their relatives in China, visa issuance and future job 
prospects.163   Attaches from the MOE deal with OC schools or liaise with PRC 
student organizations as part of their scope of work; MSS and MFA play a key role in 
determining the outcome of visa and passport applications pending orders from their 
political leaders, who also dispatch MSS officers to check on the progress of consular 
staff.   
 
The CCP uses such aggressive or clandestine methods of mobilizing those OC 
identified as potential sources for information for espionage and fifth column activity 
only in specific situations and circumstances where the aim is to enhance China’s 
security, scientific, technological or commercial interests.  Most successes have been 
with first generation OC, foreign students or new migrant OC who still hold strong 
cultural and sentimental affinity with China.  They have been less successful with 
gaining the support of the second and third generation of OC who have mostly 
identified with their host countries.164  Thus for the vast majority of the OC, qiaowu is 
executed in the context of cultural and economic development, and as such, appears 
completely benign. 
 
3.04 Unveiling Qiaowu 
 
The literal translation of huaqiao shiwu, or its shortened equivalent qiaowu is “OC 
affairs/matters.”  Therefore, qiaowu is ostensibly a comprehensive effort that seeks to 
maintain, protect and enhance OC rights and interests.  Tasks include propagating OC 
policy, promoting OC affairs, researching their needs, and resolving their problems.165  
It seeks to attract OC talent and contributions to satisfy domestic needs within China, 
as well as encourage them to facilitate external efforts for international exchange, 
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integrate with other OC, and lead them towards a better lifestyle and development 
abroad.166   
 
In practice, however, qiaowu has two aims: firstly to attract the OC back into the fold 
of the Chinese nation state, and secondly to convey and project to them the nation 
state agenda.167  This consists of various policies and programmes to manage OC 
communities vital to China’s economic, scientific and technological development; and 
moreover, to promote its national interests, global image, and soft power across the 
globe.168   
 
Qiaowu policy is divided into two categories: policy for the OC in China (including 
guiqiao (returned huaqiao) and qiaojuan (relatives and dependents of huaqiao 
resident in China)); and secondly, policy for the external Chinese diaspora (huaqiao 
(PRC nationals abroad) and huaren (ethnic Chinese of foreign nationality)).169  For 
the former group, qiaowu policies offer various rewards and privileges in order to 
maintain their economic, scientific and technical contribution to China.  For the latter 
group, cadres tailor specific methods of management for each subset of the OC, 
depending upon their level of loyalty to the regime and cultural connection with the 
motherland.   
 
Qiaowu is essentially a pro-active effort to take advantage of the economic, political 
and cultural opportunities between China and the OC.  There are six tasks that qiaowu 
is charged with.  These include strengthening Chineseness and ethnic affinity amongst 
the OC; strengthening qiaowu propaganda, cultural exchange and activities; 
continually strengthening economic relations both in and outside of China; 
encouraging the OC to support peaceful reunification and oppose independence; 
protecting the rights and interests of returned OC; and finally, to protect the rights and 
interests of the OC in their countries of residence and integrating them into local 
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society.170  Implicit in these goals is the elimination of potential threats and rival 
discourses that may challenge the CCP and its hold on power.  As such, qiaowu can 
be described as a massive operation involving incorporation and co-optation of the 
OC at every level of society, and managing their behaviour and perceptions through 
incentive or disincentive to suit the situation and structural circumstances that the 
CCP desires.171   This issue is given special attention in Chapter Seven. 
 
3.05 Service for the OC: Qiaowu Cadres and Their Duties 
 
One of qiaowu’s core responsibilities is “service” for the OC. 172  The methodology is 
essentially a form of people-to-people diplomacy, based upon emotional exchange 
and integration according to basic human sensibilities, needs and desires.  It is a 
continuous effort employing social and psychological tools that seeks to influence the 
choices, direction and emotions of the OC by dispelling their negative suspicions and 
misunderstandings concerning China, and replacing those with a positive 
understanding instead.173  In this context, elements of qiaowu fall into the CCP’s 
wider external propaganda effort towards the OC.174   
 
Qiaowu is based upon Marxist-Leninist mass line tactics, techniques and strategies.175  
Cadres have honed their methods over various stages of evolution, drawn from the 
long experience of CCP propaganda techniques of dealing with people and their 
perceptions.  The PRC’s qiaowu effort has it roots in the Third Office of the UF Work 
Department (UFWD).  Work is generally conducted through the “Three Pillars” of 
qiaowu: OC associations, OC media, and OC schools.176  As a co-ordinated effort for 
all levels of class, society, government, party and organizations both inside and 
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outside of China, UF work aims to win over non-CCP community leaders, neutralize 
Party critics, build temporary alliances of convenience, and systematically shut down 
adversaries.177   
 
Historically, from the 1950s through to the 1980s, various techniques to liaise with 
the OC were employed: such as establishing front-organizations and schools to stage 
industrial campaigns, providing language and education for indoctrination, aiding the 
poor, showing movies, and holding sports and cultural activities for youth and student 
movements.  Up to the early 1990s, qiaowu content continued to be interspersed with 
socialist rhetoric;178  since that time, however, cadres have increasingly embraced 
pragmatic methods by actively influencing individuals and their organizations, 
promoting exchange and co-operation, and maintaining OC rights and interests under 
a service philosophy of “more action, less talk.”179   
 
This reflects the one essential factor that has consistently underscored the success of 
qiaowu – the understanding of human behaviour and the adept use of people-to-
people skills.  As such, qiaowu cadres are likely to have other frontline roles (such as 
in the peaceful reunification effort, OC education, and youth work).  They have a 
variety of experiences and hence able to deal with OC affairs in a meaningful way. 
 
By the 1990s, strict protocols set the tone of qiaowu, with handbooks outlining its 
basic manner and conduct.  For example, it sought to contact and liaise with the OC; 
promote and give impetus to them and their interests; and ultimately, guide them 
under a continuous precondition of merging and unity.180  These objectives were 
qualified by a “Three Dos and Don’ts” attitude (san er bu) that sought to co-ordinate 
and assist OC activities from a distance without them being aware of it: ‘support but 
don’t depend upon’ (retain sufficient independence from OC groups), ‘penetrate but 
don’t intervene’ (understand their inner workings), ‘to guide but don’t lead’ (simply 
                                                 
177 Holly Porteous, “Beijing’s United Front Strategy in Hong Kong,” Commentary, no. 72 (1998), 
http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/cmmntr/cm72-eng.asp (accessed 30 September 2009); Gerry Groot, 
Managing Transitions: The Chinese Communist Party, United Front Work, Corporatism, and 
Hegemony (New York: Routledge, 2004), 124. 129. 
178 “Zai yici yewu zuotanhui shang de fayan” (Statement from a Vocational Forum) 1983 in Qiaowu 
chunqiu, 118. 
179 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 31. 
180 Ibid., 2, 4-5, 10-17, 29-31. 
 48
influence them).181  During a period in which suspicions of Tiananmen remained fresh 
amongst the OC, these principles strengthened qiaowu as an effective tool for 
intensive behavioural control and manipulation yet appearing benevolent and helpful.  
These methods have not changed in the 21st century.  According to top OC affairs 
official Li Haifeng, pragmatic and scientific methodology was the key to developing 
and deepening qiaowu.182   
 
Internal qiaowu handbooks describe the specific methods, manner and protocol by 
which to liaise with them (including personal presentation, deportment and etiquette) 
– a complete guide detailing the appropriate methodology for receiving, welcoming 
and introducing guests by written correspondence or face-to-face contact.  Cadres are 
instructed to use sincerity and substance to win the trust of the OC (yong zhenxin 
yindele xinren, zhazha shishi wei huaqiao huaren fuwu).  To facilitate a solid 
connection with its target, qiaowu remains full of warmth (qinqing qiaowu), without 
which it cannot penetrate OC hearts and minds.183  This methodology is backed by a 
philosophy of serving the OC on a large scale (da qiaowu guan).184  They spend 
considerable time and effort studying step-by-step instructions designed for every 
conceivable scenario concerning the OC.   
 
As part of their instruction, cadres maintain a sense of flexibility and efficiency with 
their time and resources, taking full advantage of opportunities while reducing 
inconvenience and personal cost to the target.185  The OC should feel as if they are 
treated with genuine interest.  For example, methods include regular contact in the 
form of letters, e-mails and greeting cards in order to ensure warm sentiments 
continue long after their face-to-face meetings.186  The goal is to form strong long-
lasting bonds of friendship based upon mutual exchange in which they can appreciate 
the motherland’s warmth, develop a sense of patriotism, and foster a desire to 
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contribute to China.187  In short, OC must feel as if they are receiving a ‘service’ in 
order to achieve a ‘win-win’ result.188 
 
To enlarge the scope of qiaowu and therefore best harness OC of various backgrounds, 
origins, and levels of society, cadres conduct continuous investigation into their local 
circumstances all across the globe.  Qiaowu officials pay attention to variations in 
their attributes and tailor work to suit accordingly.189  For example, cadres make note 
of their targets’ regional peculiarities and the appropriate topics of conversation in 
order to prevent embarrassment or offense.  Any action should take care to respect 
and maintain their rights and interests, focus upon appealing to and exploiting their 
sentimentality towards China, and to encourage patriotic feelings and their 
‘understanding’ of China.190   
 
To build a strong knowledge base, the PRC regularly send out fact-finding 
delegations at the state, provincial and local level.191  OC associations serve as useful 
points of contact for gathering information and recruitment for transnational 
networking.  Cadres survey the opinion of community members, and ascertain their 
position on various China-related issues.  For example, Overseas Exchange 
Association officials determine the attitudes, feelings and needs of the OC.  They 
engage them on multiple levels, aspects and issues and do not restrict themselves to 
the traditional channels and groups.  OC who return to China are also encouraged to 
make reports to authorities.192   
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3.06 The CCP’s Guiding Hand 
 
However, as the OC are not under any jurisdiction or obligation to follow such CCP 
directives, other means of influence are required.  There is no formal instruction from 
the qiaowu apparatus itself, but a ‘guiding hand’ serves to maintain a loose, yet still 
powerful, means of social control.  Behaviour under ‘guided’ relationships is also 
desirable because activity and responses still follow implicit protocols – moreover, 
behaviour is voluntary and consenting, rather than compelled.  OC groups 
(particularly the pro-Beijing organizations) are well aware of the limits and scope of 
behaviour under which they are able to deal with Chinese issues and authorities.  
They are also aware of their role for protecting and advancing China’s interests.  For 
example, during the early 2000s, PRC diplomats perceived those OC attending 
Double Ten National Day celebrations with TECO as political supporters of Chen 
Shui-bian’s regime.  The PRC embassy would indicate its disapproval and give those 
groups the cold shoulder by withholding invitations to official functions or other 
benefits to signal that such behaviour was unacceptable.  Consequently, OC groups 
carefully avoid taboo subjects, or refuse to co-operate with other OC groups not 
aligned with Beijing for fear of retribution or denial of services, cultural resources or 
access to the embassy. 
 
Other forms of the ‘guiding hand’ can be more direct – comprising of gentle 
reminders from diplomats or qiaowu cadres, personal communications, e-mails, 
telephone calls, or speeches at OC forums.  For general matters, diplomatic staff liaise 
with OC leaders on a regular basis.  Specific attaches are responsible for those matters 
under their portfolio, while the ambassador and higher level consular staff work to 
build up personal connections.  In other cases, qiaowu agencies are responsible for 
logistical advice, and offer suggestions directly to the association leaders for 
implementation.  In the case of visiting delegations from the PRC, the OCAO will 
advise when their provincial and lower tier cadres visit, while embassy staff will 
advise when government officials visit.   
 
These techniques are a very private part of OC policy.  Qiaowu is inherently part of a 
discourse that is concealed from the wider public.  OC organizations and individuals 
are denied access to knowledge that may affect the unity and success of OC work.  
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The true purpose of OC affairs cannot be revealed for fear of damaging the imagined 
‘service’ that is the public face of qiaowu.  To this end, embassies and consulates are 
instructed to protect the secrecy of OC information, and prevent classified documents 
and policy from outside scrutiny. 193   Instead, special qiaowu policy advisors 
selectively impart onto the OC only what they need to know.194   
 
3.07 A Brief History of Qiaowu Organizational Structure 
 
The PRC qiaowu administration evolved from infrastructure established by previous 
Chinese governments in the latter half of the 19th century.  Traditionally, Qing 
dynasty law prohibited migration from China.  Authorities considered those who 
moved abroad as outcasts and denied them any recognition or assistance when in 
trouble. 195   However, their role for China’s political and economic interest was 
apparent in an emerging age of globalized trade.196  Efforts to develop an official 
relationship with the OC began in 1858, when the Qing government established 
bureaus in Guangdong, Xiamen, Tianjin and Ningbo to deal with ‘British Chinese’ 
following the opening of Treaty Ports after the Opium War.197  Emigration policies 
were gradually relaxed after 1868, and Qing diplomats began actively courting the 
OC with the prime objective of securing their loyalty to the Chinese empire. 198  
Delegations were sent abroad to conduct extensive research of OC communities.199   It 
was during this period that the term huaqiao emerged to describe the OC and their 
                                                 
193 Guangdong Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (GOCAO), Clauses 27-28 of “Guowuyuan qiaowu 
bangongshi keti guanli banfa” (State Council OC Affairs Office Task Management Guidelines), 13 
September 2006, www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2006/0913/1/3149.shtml (accessed 30 September 2009).  
194 “Guowuyuan qiaoban xinfangtuan fu Ouzhou siguo diaoyan” (State Council OCAO Trust-building 
Delegation Go to Four Nations for Research), Qiaoqing, no. 54 (5 December 2005): 5. 
195 Shozo Fukuda and George Hicks, With Sweat & Abacus: Economic Roles of Southeast Asian 
Chinese on the Eve of World War II (Singapore: Select Books, 1995) 20-22. 
196 Harley Farnsworth McNair, The Chinese Abroad: Their Position and Protection – A Study in 
International Law and Relations (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1924).  
197 “The Historic Track of Overseas Chinese Affairs,” Haihua, no. 87 (April 1992): 60-62. 
198 Yen Ching-hwang, Studies in Modern Overseas Chinese History (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 
1995), 139; Wang, China and the Chinese Overseas, 245; Wang Gungwu, “Upgrading the Migrant: 
Neither Huaqiao nor Huaren,” in The Last Half Century of Chinese Overseas, ed. Elizabeth Sinn (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998), 18; L. Ling-chi Wang, “The Structure of Dual Domination: 
Toward a Paradigm for the Study of the Chinese Diaspora in the United States,” Amerasia 21, no. 1 & 
2 (1995): 157. 
199 Anthony B. Chan, “Chinese Canada: Reflections on Historical Eras and Watersheds,” Polyphony: 
The Bulletin of the Multicultural Historical Society of Ontario 15 (2000): 1-12. 
 52
connection with China – appearing in an 1883 letter addressed to court official Li 
Hongzhang.200  
 
To formalize the embrace of ethnic Chinese overseas for the first time, the 1909 Law 
of Nationality acknowledged the OC as a special grouping.201  It defined anyone born 
to a Chinese father (or mother) as a Chinese citizen under the principle of jus 
sanguinis (the right of blood, or the right of a person to have the nationality of ones’ 
parents).  The Law also granted dual nationality to all Chinese and their descendants 
living in foreign countries.  This broad definition of “Chinese” gave the Qing court 
the capacity to claim those with foreign citizenship as its own nationals, and implied 
that they could exercise extra-territorial rule over any OC.  In this context, OC 
communities could be considered as de facto colonies of China, and hence subject to 
its jurisdiction. 202   As such, the Qing used the term huaqiao to encourage OC 
sojourners who would reside temporarily away from home to identify with China and 
its civilization. 
 
Following the overthrow of the Qing dynasty in 1911, the Republican Beiyang 
government headed by Yuan Shikai retained the 1909 principle of jus sanguinis and 
subsequently passed an amendment in 1912 that added that those born in China, as 
well as those born with at least one parent who held Chinese nationality, could claim 
Chinese nationality.203  Anyone wishing to revoke this status had to apply to the 
relevant authorities; otherwise, the Chinese government deemed them to remain as 
Chinese citizens.204  In other words, the OC remained a prized asset, and not to be 
forsaken under any means.   
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Institutionalization of OC affairs began in 1917.  Premier Duan Qirui was an advocate 
for China to enter the First World War, and hoped that sending labourers to Europe 
would demonstrate sincerity to the Allies.  Laws to protect them had been in 
discussion since 1916 between the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Agriculture and 
Commerce.  Consequently, the State Council of the Beijing government (headed by 
Duan) set up the Bureau of Overseas Chinese Workers.205  This Bureau continued 
until December 1921, when it was dissolved and re-organized by the Beiyang 
government in January 1922 as the State Council Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau to 
accommodate a broader scope of OC matters.206   
 
In the following year Sun Yatsen established his revolutionary government in 
Guangzhou and also set up the first OCAO under his direction.207  This demonstrates 
the different agendas between the rival governments of Beijing and Guangzhou – 
protection of the rights of OC workers in Europe in the context of China’s 
international relations versus the protection and care of returnee sojourners.  The latter 
reflected Sun’s attempt to mobilize and control OC loyalties and resources for his 
political ambitions. 
 
In 1925, the Second Nationalist Party Conference announced its first policy to 
encourage the OC to invest in China, provide facilities for OC youth wishing to study 
in China, as well as protecting the OC against discriminatory laws abroad.208  These 
policies would set in motion the guiding principles of qiaowu.  The ROC Overseas 
Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC) was established in October 1926 and continued 
under similar polices to its predecessor;209 in 1932 (at the urge of returned OC) it was 
made subordinate to the Nationalist government under the Executive Yuan as a 
cabinet level unit.210  With these developments, qiaowu gradually evolved into a 
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comprehensive set of regulations, laws and policies overseen by a framework of 
government and non-governmental bodies, organs and offices.   
 
The OCAC served as the government arm of ROC OC affairs – however, it was the 
No. 3 Section of the KMT Central Committee (later known as the Overseas Work 
Committee after 1972) that influenced all qiaowu activity.  In fact, between 1952 and 
1958, the same person headed both the OCAC and the No. 3 Section.211  As such, 
anti-communist KMT ideology and nationalist sentiment dominated OCAC 
activities.212  No. 3 Section activities with the OC were later downscaled so as not to 
make the OCAC appear as a direct instrument of the KMT.  However, the MFA 
continued to have a limited but important role in formulating and executing OC policy 
by working to promote exchange and contact through diplomatic organs, pro-KMT 
organizations, media and schools.  Under this structure, the ROC would continue to 
influence OC communities throughout the world for the next several decades.  This 
successful model for co-ordinating OC affairs also served as the basic framework for 
the PRC’s own rival effort to manage and influence the OC after 1949.   
 
3.08 Origins of the PRC OC Qiaowu Bureaucracy 
 
Although the CCP had maintained relations with sympathetic OC groups since the 
1920s, it did not establish specific organs to liaise with the wider OC populace until 
some time later.  The first, in September 1940, was the Association of OC National 
Salvationists (Tingan huaqiao jiuguo lianhehui), later renamed as the China 
Liberation Association of Returned OC (Zhongguo jiefangqu guiquo huaqiao 
lianhehui).  In 1942, the CCP set up an “Overseas Affairs Committee” to implement 
communist missions amongst the OC.  
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After its founding in 1949, the PRC’s own qiaowu policy was somewhat incoherent 
due to inactivity and a lack of long term planning.  It was further hampered by the 
CCP’s commitment to class struggle and proletarian revolution in ex-colonial 
countries, as well as the emerging nationalism amongst the elites of newly-
independent Southeast Asian governments.  At the same time, the CCP was in direct 
competition with the KMT for winning sympathy and support from the OC.213   
 
Despite making a declaration that all KMT reactionary laws were to be abolished and 
that its own OC policy were distinct from that of its rival, the CCP retained the 
KMT’s qiaowu policy and the 1929 Nationality law.  The CCP still considered the 
OC to be an extension of the PRC under the principle of jus sanguinis.  The 1953 
census showed that 11.5 million OC were included as part of China’s population.  
Furthermore, Article 58 of the Common Programme adopted by the Chinese Peoples’ 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in 1949 iterated the PRC’s intention to 
“protect the proper rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad.”  Beijing also 
accepted all OC wishing to return to China, and allowed their election to the National 
People’s Congress.214 
 
The PRC established its own version of the OCAC in October 1949 (later re-named as 
the PRC OCAC in 1954) as a high-level unit with direct access to Premier Zhou Enlai.  
This body was charged with all matters relating to external huaqiao development and 
consisted of four departments: International Liaison, Foreign Affairs, Propaganda and 
UF Work.  The other major agency for qiaowu dealt with the domestic issues of 
returned OC.  The All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (qiaolian) was 
established in June 1956 to oversee and influence a variety of domestic and returned 
OC constituencies, such as women, youth, workers, scientists, writers, artists and 
cultural workers.  This agency helped to integrate and unite returned OC and OC 
abroad with the CCP by assisting with patriotic national reconstruction through 
education and welfare policies.   
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Like its ROC counterpart, the PRC qiaowu system was also a complex web of 
interlinked organizations.  As a result, many of the leading qiaolian officials were 
also PRC OCAC officials.  Consequently, co-ordination and duties in the two 
administrative organs were almost identical.215   For example, both bodies served 
routine frontline affairs.  These included policy development and UF activities, 
resettlement of OC returnees and their families, procurement of OC investment, 
promotion of education and attracting OC to return to China for study, establishment 
of a front for patriotic unification, and expansion of New China’s international 
influence by reforming the beliefs and practices of OC to fit the CCP’s socialist 
ideology.   
 
3.09 The OC “Problem” 
 
Washington’s containment policy to isolate China from Southeast Asia meant that by 
the mid-1950s Beijing had to change its foreign policy direction from spreading 
socialism to identifying with the third world.  However, because it did not distinguish 
between PRC nationals and ethnic Chinese, this ambiguity caused concerns for 
countries with large OC populations.  Governments of these nations feared that their 
OC residents might become a source for communist infiltration.216  Thus the question 
of OC loyalty and its implications for China’s international relations (described as the 
OC “problem”) would determine Beijing’s policies towards ethnic Chinese for the 
next 50 years.217  Moreover, Beijing could not assume that the OC would respond 
positively to its qiaowu efforts.  
 
In 1955, Beijing appeared to have temporarily brushed the OC aside in an effort to 
address the issue of dual nationality.218  In April that year, both China and Indonesia 
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signed the Bandung Dual Nationality Treaty,219 introducing concepts of the modern 
nation state and doing away with the principles of dual nationality and jus 
sanguinis.220  Beijing encouraged the OC to take local citizenship and give up their 
PRC citizenship voluntarily – in other words, to become huaren (foreigners of 
Chinese descent).  If they chose to take this option, they were no longer considered to 
be under the jurisdiction or responsibility of the PRC and were instructed to clearly 
distinguish themselves by not joining huaqiao groups; however, if any country denied 
that person local citizenship, equal rights or expel them, China reserved the right to 
their repatriation.221  Beijing instructed the minority of the OC who chose to remain as 
Chinese citizens abroad not to interfere in local politics, not to persist in patriotic 
activity, and not to promote political issues.  Instead, Beijing expected these huaqiao 
to assist in improving relations and unity between other OC and locals by abiding to 
local laws and customs, using the local language, and serve as good citizens for 
promoting a stable livelihood.  If huaqiao wished to organize CCP groupings and 
activities, they were to do so only back in China.222  Effective implementation of the 
Bandung Treaty, however, was fraught with difficulty.  Internal rival factions within 
the Indonesian government and military meant ratification did not take place until 
1960; and ultimately repealed altogether in 1969.  Nevertheless, the Treaty provided 
Beijing with legal and tactical disengagement from the OC problem by establishing 
China’s credentials as an independent nation, and fostering goodwill with its 
neighbours.223 
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Although the Treaty served to allay suspicions of external interference, Beijing’s real 
intention was to sever only the political relationship – internally, it wished to maintain 
a strong connection with the OC.  Thus Zhou Enlai was quite clear that China would 
not abandon huaren in Southeast Asia, but rather they would still remain close as 
family relatives (as sons or daughters) abroad, and would continue to be ethnically 
and culturally linked with China.224  This was because the OC were still needed for 
China’s development.  As a communist state, the PRC found that foreign exchange 
and overseas investment from OC sources had decreased substantially as a result of 
US economic sanctions.  Any foreign money going into ‘Red China’ was deemed a 
criminal offence under the Trading with the Enemy Act.225  Beijing had to ensure that 
the financial relationship continued by providing guarantees of return for investors 
and maintaining standards of living for dependants – thus making foreign investment 
a purely material or business connection without any patriotic, family or political 
commitment.226  Remittances made through clan and hometown association channels 
were the most significant form of overseas income during this period.   
 
Secondly, the OC remained a frontline force for China’s interests abroad.  While it 
claimed non-interference in local affairs, in practice Beijing quietly continued to 
provide indirect assistance for the purposes of maintaining OC as a resource for 
communist revolution, economic development and technical advancement.  They 
were expected to unite and be patriotic, oppose the KMT and not allow their activities 
to damage the CCP position with sensitive Southeast Asian countries (such as 
Indonesia).227   The PRC continued to persuade regional governments that it had 
disassociated itself from the OC.228  To demonstrate this, Beijing embarked on a 
process of “decolonization” of the external OC after 1957.  The UFWD, qiaolian and 
state media not only downgraded matters pertaining to OC affairs, but contended that 
the OC had assimilated with their places of abode; moreover, Beijing urged OC 
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schools to teach youth the local language, history and geography, and respect the 
culture of the countries of residence, and to abandon Chinese language and culture. 
 
3.10 Domestic Returned OC Work and Internal Chaos 
 
Between 1949 and 1956, the focus of qiaowu was attracting the OC to participate in 
China’s modernization.  In general, most OC in Western countries were careful to 
stay away from the political rivalry and kept their heads down.229  Some maintained a 
staunch anti-communist attitude and supported the KMT.  For example, OC leaders in 
the US worked with US and ROC government officials in order to suppress their pro-
Beijing opponents.230  However, other OC were disillusioned at the corruption and 
ineptitude of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime, and changed sides.  The CCP enjoyed 
support amongst those who identified with socialism and regarded Mao Zedong as an 
impressive nationalist hero.231   Moreover, ethnic Chinese tended to dominate the 
membership of communist parties in Southeast Asia.  Most of their members were 
educated students attracted towards an internationalist movement that transcended 
local racial and political issues.232  For this group, the PRC represented an alternative 
attraction to bourgeois Western civilization. 233   CCP relations with these OC 
blossomed, making use of their leaders and representatives by persuading them to 
accept their training.234  Throughout the 1950s and 60s, the PRC supported them as 
political revolutionaries.235   
 
The OC who returned were initially welcomed as guiqiao (returned OC).  Despite its 
“leftist” leanings, the qiaolian was quite successful in facilitating foreign investment, 
attracting OC to return to study, and gaining the support of returned OC and their 
                                                 
229 Stuart W. Greif, “Political Attitudes of the Overseas Chinese in Fiji,” Asian Survey 15, no. 11 
(November 1975): 977. 
230 Wu, “America’s Chinese,” 391-422. 
231 Ningkun Wu and Yikai Li, A Single Tear: A Family’s Persecution, Love and Endurance in 
Communist China (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1993). 
232 Fitzgerald, The Third China, 62-64; Benedict Anderson, Spectres of Comparison: Nationalism, 
Southeast Asia and the World (London: Verso, 1998): 289. 
233 For personal accounts of life in China as an OC during the early years of the PRC, see Esther Cheo 
Ying, Black Country Girl in Red China (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1980); Pamela Tan, The Chinese 
Factor: An Australian Chinese Woman’s Life in China from 1950 to 1979 (Sydney: Rosenberg 
Publishing Pty, 2008). 
234 Yu-sun Lu, “Programs of Communist China for Overseas Chinese,” Communist China Problem 
Research Series EC12 (1956), 7-9. 
235 Cheung, “Involuntary Migrants,” 55-66. 
 60
families. 236   Chinese authorities resettled about 200,000 guiqiao on specially 
established OC farms.  Nevertheless, Beijing viewed these returned OC with 
suspicion.  Resettlement (rather than integration with the local community) was an 
effort to better manage them in isolation, and transform them into working people 
living off their own labour. 
 
The main problem with dealing with returned OC was contending with their political 
ideology.  During this period, officials stated that qiaowu policy should comply not 
only with the needs of the domestic class struggle, but also with the needs of 
international class struggle 237  under an eight-character principle yishi tongren, 
shidang zhaogu (treat equally with appropriate preferential treatment).  According to 
the CCP, the OC were seen to be mainly of working class peasant origin and they 
were to be accorded special privileges and exemptions as an incentive to encourage 
their role in socialist reconstruction, and at the same time present China in a 
favourable light abroad so as to attract more remittances.   
 
Beginning in 1950, Land Reform was supposed to remove the feudal exploitation of 
landlords.238  However, its implementation was marred by ideological confusion and 
contradiction over what the OC represented to socialist China, and how both 
conformity and privilege could be simultaneously promoted.239  Swept up in a tide of 
radicalism, local cadres failed to distinguish between landlords and qiaojuan 
(relatives of OC) households renting out their land while their men were overseas.  
Some early methods included extortion, blackmail and ‘taxes’. 240   In 
acknowledgement of the mistakes made during Land Reform, in 1954 and 1955 OC 
landlords were given new class status, granting them protection and immunity from 
socialist transformation, guaranteed protection of remittances, and investment 
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privileges aimed to mobilize OC financial resources for China’s development.241  In 
1957, Beijing established a Special Commission for Handling Outstanding Problems 
of OC Houses to resolve disputes.  However, these measures were only a temporary 
reprieve – much more aggressive forms of treatment towards the OC were yet to come. 
 
Throughout the late 1950s, the CCP continued to view guiqiao with suspicion.  Their 
connections abroad and entrepreneurial nature meant that they became the target of 
discrimination and oppression.  A 1957 Anti-Rightist Campaign targeted anyone with 
foreign contacts as class enemies or agents of imperialism. Discrimination against the 
OC became widespread.  Local authorities labeled them as “bourgeois” and 
undesirable given their capitalist tendencies.  Worse yet, they were branded as 
“imperialists”, “spies” and “counter-revolutionaries.”242  Intense pressure included 
extortion and wholesale removal of benefits and programmes that the OC had 
previously enjoyed.243   
 
During the Cultural Revolution, OC affairs suffered numerous attacks from radical 
elements.  Red Guards stormed the OCAC, qiaolian and UFWD offices in Shanghai 
in 1966; domestic OC publications and traditional announcements were suspended; 
references to special treatment for OC were removed from buildings and restaurants.  
The PRC abandoned its policy of attracting the OC, and qiaowu organizations ceased 
to function.  The OCAC had neither responsibility nor power, and OC properties were 
confiscated and their relatives persecuted.  In such chaotic and violent circumstances, 
many of the OC had to contemplate settling permanently abroad and adopting foreign 
citizenship.  Not surprisingly, about 400,000 OC left China between 1967 and 
1972.244  The OCAC itself dissolved in 1968 and became defunct in 1970.245   
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3.11 The OC and Their Role in UF Work Abroad 
 
Despite the situation at home, the OC always had an equally important role to play in 
Beijing’s UF operations abroad.  As mentioned earlier, the vague line between UF 
work and qiaowu meant that they were often the same thing.  As a part of this effort, 
prominent OC in local communist parties and the business sector abroad were given 
“Three Unities” to accomplish: promoting patriotic unity; developing economy, 
culture and a spirit of internationalism in their localities; and serving as a diplomatic 
front for China.  By setting up UF-guided associations in major cities all over the 
world to host public relations campaigns, global conferences, forums and special 
briefings, these associations sought to advance friendship and pro-China sentiment 
amongst the OC and to wear down support for the ROC.   
 
One example was New Zealand (NZ) resident Young Tong-Shing (Yang Tangcheng) 
who supported the CCP government during the early 1950s by distributing 
newsletters, showing propaganda films and asking for trade with China be channeled 
through his business concern.246  The ROC Consul-General viewed Young’s activities 
as a political issue and prompted an investigation.247  Police subsequently identified 
Young’s business as a contact point between the NZ Communist Party and the local 
Chinese community.  While on a visit to Hong Kong in 1951, authorities informed 
Young that he and his family would not be welcome back in NZ.  He resettled in 
China where he was initially welcomed as a returned OC, and consequently acquired 
many official connections with the CCP.248  The Party often appointed prominent 
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returned OC as special consultants to advise it on OC affairs and regional matters.249  
However, during the Cultural Revolution he became a target, and only after years of 
oppression was finally able to leave China under revised policy (laiqu ziyou – 
freedom to come and go).250 
 
With the domestic situation being increasingly chaotic during the late 1960s, Beijing 
shifted the focus of qiaowu onto external UF work.  The CCP made a brief attempt to 
export the proletarian revolution abroad.  For example, in 1967 the PRC embassy in 
Rangoon issued Mao badges to OC students in Burma, and followed this with a mass 
demonstration.251  By 1970, the CCP began efforts to break its isolation from the 
global community by repositioning its UF strategy from Southeast Asia to Japan and 
the US, with Hong Kong and Macau acting as a relay station.  Because of its 
geographical proximity, China chose Canada as a base to infiltrate the US – especially 
before diplomatic relations with Washington began.  To further its exposure on the 
West coast, Beijing sought approval for the establishment of a consulate in Vancouver 
(which hosted a large population of OC).252  Attempts to connect with them were 
cautious not to portray Beijing as directly interfering in local activities or causing 
overt hostility amongst the Canadian OC community.   
 
The main objective of the UFWD was to use propaganda and other activities to 
confuse the OC and discredit the KMT.  This was done by currying favour and 
expanding influence amongst target groups.253  In pursuing the ‘Three Unities’, OC 
were instructed not to directly confront pro-KMT organizations, but to take control of 
them through their elective processes; moreover, in order to maintain secrecy, they 
were to only contact diplomats by writing or by telephone, rather than making 
personal visits.  According to KMT propaganda of the time, these attempts to 
manipulate the broader OC community were largely unsuccessful, as few cared for 
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political involvement, or kept quiet out of fear for the safety of their relatives still in 
China.254     
 
During this period, Mao’s guiding principle of “internally tightening, externally 
loosening and root-taking” subjected guiqiao to further scrutiny and surveillance, 
while diplomats were instructed to act more cordially and amiable towards OC abroad.  
For example, they had priority to visit China over non-ethnic Chinese.255  However, 
these efforts were often contradictory to the geo-political circumstances of the time.  
Beijing still believed that the Soviet Union, US and Japan all posed an imperialist 
threat.  In 1973 Zhou remarked to Australian prime minister Gough Whitlam, that it 
was “a matter of basic principle” that the PRC would support peoples’ revolutions.”256  
Thus, foreign governments remained skeptical of where OC loyalties laid.257  At a 
reception later that same year, CCP leaders encouraged the OC to advance 
revolutionary pro-communist activity abroad and continue building relations between 
China and the world; and while they were welcomed back for short trips, they were 
actually discouraged from returning to China for long periods.  In light of the 
domestic upheaval and a pre-occupation with preventing unwanted influences from 
taking root, Deng was reluctant to accept any more OC returnees.  He pointed out that 
they might not be accustomed to China’s lower living standards, and that they could 
“produce greater results working in foreign lands.”258   
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3.12 Post-Revolution Qiaowu Policy 
 
Following the end of the Cultural Revolution, the need for OC contributions to 
continue China’s modernization was paramount.  Deng’s meeting with OC delegates 
during the 1977 National Day celebrations and making OC affairs part of the official 
agenda indicated the CCP had renewed its focus on qiaowu.259  In December 1977, 
Beijing hosted an “All Nation Overseas Chinese Conference” to dispel OC suspicions, 
resulting in calls for the revival and reinforcement of qiaowu under the slogan “all 
patriots are one family.”260  The meeting saw the Gang of Four blamed as the cause of 
the failure of OC programs and previous criticism of guiqiao as bourgeoisie, 
reactionary or foreign spies redressed in various policy changes.  
 
Widespread party-state support for OC affairs was evident from a Renmin Ribao 
editorial (4 January 1978) that argued that more attention should be paid to qiaowu.  It 
noted that the OC were “part of the Chinese people” and served as vital links in 
developing foreign relations and contributing to the PRC’s modernization.  This 
sought to change the previous view of the OC by contending that they were mostly 
labourers oppressed by imperialists and capitalists.261  The Beijing Review supported 
this opinion by translating Zhongguo minzu as “Chinese nation”, thus indicating 
Beijing viewed the OC as part of its own.262  At the Third Plenary Session of the 11th 
CCP Central Committee in 1978, Deng emphasized the importance of OC. 263  
Furthermore, OCAC chairman Liao Chengzhi commended the positive role of the OC, 
and brought their persecution to an end.264   
 
The CCP then promptly reinstated pre-Cultural Revolution qiaowu policy and re-
established the OCAC as the OCAO of the State Council (OCAO or qiaoban) in 
January 1978, and the Federation of OC Returnees (Zhongguo quanguo huiguo 
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huaqiao lianhehui or qiaolian) resumed in April that same year.265  A further two OC 
conferences were held in late 1978 to determine OC involvement in facilitating 
China’s socialist agenda.266  From these meetings, the OC no longer served China’s 
international revolutionary struggle.  Instead, bourgeois OC became “workers for 
socialism” and the National UF Work Conference declared patriotism would unite 
and harness the talents and skills of transformed classes to support the motherland in a 
new UF of social modernization and economic construction.267   
 
Methods to attract OC resources targeted those traveling to China as tourists or 
visiting relatives, short-term study and exchange, and investors.268  Through qiaowu, 
they would serve China’s “Four Modernizations,” 269  national reunification, and 
advance CCP interests.270  Moreover, qiaowu cadres called upon guiqiao to fulfill 
“Four Expectations.”  These included contributing towards China’s modernization, its 
reunification, promotion of Chinese culture, and the development of international 
friendship.  To facilitate this, guonei qiaozheng gongzuo (domestic OC administrative 
work) sought to educate them in order to unite, organize and develop a connection 
between their place of origin and their outside links for the purposes of China’s 
modernization and development under socialism with Chinese characteristics.   
 
The first step was to regain their trust and restore confidence.  This involved 
reforming policies that would rectify past abuses in the form of re-establishing official 
linkages. 271   Domestic OC work was conducted according to a revised sixteen-
character UF principle of yishi tongren, bude qishi, genju tedian, shidang zhaogu 
(treating everyone the same without discrimination, pay attention and care according 
to particularities) announced in December 1978.  Under this policy, despite their 
overseas connections and foreign habits/customs, guiqiao were no different from 
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other PRC citizens with the same rights. 272   Over the next ten years, the PRC 
government issued various policies and undertook a number of programmes to attract 
the OC back to China. 
 
Politically, the CCP reinstated qiaowu policy and expanded patriotic UF work.  Those 
who had previously participated in communist movements abroad (such as in 
Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam or India) were given special attention.  Domestic 
qiaowu united all these target groups under “Long term Co-existence, Mutual 
Supervision, Treat with Sincerity, Share the Good Times and the Bad.” It also 
promoted “One Country, Two Systems” with regard to the Taiwan issue.  In addition, 
Beijing made explicit that the intelligentsia were both part of the working class and 
together with workers and farmers were the strength of Chinese socialism; rectified 
“leftist” wrongs and concepts of ethnicity as a class problem; and managed religious 
activity.273  Without these measures, its target audience might otherwise dismiss OC 
work and policy as ‘false propaganda.’274   
 
Economically, on the state-run OC farm projects, guiqiao workers received special 
tax breaks.  Various propaganda programs were designed to inform returnees of OC 
law, co-ordinating them with various government agencies to develop “village-
related” work and methods for gathering more contributions and donations. 275  
Authorities accorded those OC adversely affected during the Cultural Revolution or 
land reforms special measures for the return of confiscated property.276  When farmers 
complained, officials justified the reversal by describing the decision as a ‘historical 
right.’277 
 
In March 1983, the CCP announced various policies providing benefits and privileges 
for housing and education for the OC and their children.278  This heralded a string of 
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policies aimed to attract the OC back to China.  At the same time, however, thousands 
of students were leaving to study abroad.  The next few years saw a period of 
loosening and tightening for those departing, with particular attention to counter the 
‘brain drain.’  After the 1989 Tiananmen Incident and subsequent sanctions by the 
West, qiaowu policy focused upon preserving links with the OC in order to continue 
the inflow of foreign investment.  These aspects are examined in detail in later 
chapters. 
 
The efforts to attract the OC had to appear genuine. Thus the rights and interests of 
OC investors and talent became legally protected, and processes for redress speedily 
facilitated through specially established special consultative committees.279  The 1990 
“Law of Protecting Rights and Interests of Overseas Chinese and their Relatives” 
guaranteed that they would be treated ‘adequately’ by the state.280  Over the next 
decade, various provincial governments also passed their own provincial legislation 
spelling out the additional policies, benefits and privileges for the OC.281   
 
In 2000, Beijing made several amendments to the 1990 Law.282  These included: 
protection of their remittances, farms, houses and property; guidance and support of 
their donations, investments and contributions; clauses welcoming their return to 
China and for settlement; encouragement for them to participate in China’s 
modernization; facilitation of their employment; encouragement for youth to study 
and the elderly to settle down in China; and also simplification of their entry/exit by 
ensuring speedy approval and a warm reception.283  In later years, other benefits and 
incentives included exemption from the one-child policy, 284  retirement, 285 
burial,286and foreign property ownership,287 amongst others.288   
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3.13 Political Structure of the Qiaowu Administration in the Contemporary Period 
 
How are the OC affairs authorities integrated into the Chinese political system in the 
contemporary period?  A clarification of the relative role of various state 
administrations and key nodes of the qiaowu system as a transparent and explicit 
apparatus provides a structuring format for the analysis of events.  As the 
accompanying chart (see Figure 1) shows, the vast qiaowu bureaucracy incorporates 
the OC into China’s national interests through a complex web of ministries, agencies 
and organizations that share vast inter and intralevel connections. 
 
The PRC’s power structure is composed of three systems (namely the CCP, the 
government, and the military) which operate vertically with central, provincial, 
prefecture, county and township levels.  Across these systems are six sectors (military, 
legal, administrative, propaganda, UF, and mass-organization affairs) each again 
sectorally divided and supervised by a committee or non-standing organ, such as a 
Central Leading Group headed by a member of the Politburo Standing Committee.  
Although these groups are not decision making bodies as such, their policy 
preferences and recommendations carry significant weight in the final decision.  
Leading groups and committees do not have permanent staff, and therefore rely on 
executive bodies to implement and co-ordinate policy.  This system allows centralized 
control over the entire political system and its policy making process, with a high 
level of power concentrated within the CCP.289   
 
Qiaowu is no different and shares many similarities with China’s other xitong 
bureaucratic frameworks, whereby all organizations in the system follow centrally 
established policies, while specialized bureaus handle particular aspects.  The CCP 
and the State Council share leadership for the key co-ordinating functions – 
instructing and guiding the entire qiaowu apparatus by formulating relevant policy 
and ideological direction.  Subordinate units attend to the practical aspects by co-
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operating and co-ordinating with each other to implement these policies.  Overall, 
there are five major qiaowu organizations that work together closely at all 
administrative levels to achieve this. 290   Two operate under central government 
structured lines, while the other three are intimately linked with the CCP and the 
UFWD.   
 
The first of these major organizations is the OCAO or qiaoban, a unit directly under 
the State Council.  In 1978 it re-emerged as the leading OC affairs organ for the PRC, 
and is known to cadres as the niangjiaren (family home) of OC affairs.291  It serves as 
the national level government body devoted to the co-ordination and implementation 
of OC policy through provincial and county level representation.292  The OCAO of the 
State Council is currently directed by Li Haifeng, and assisted by four deputy 
directors.   
 
According to its website, 293  the OCAO is responsible for several strategic and 
administrative tasks: firstly, drafting qiaowu policy and planning, drafting interrelated 
laws and regulations, drafting, supervising, inspecting, implement affairs.  Secondly, 
it has a role for intelligence gathering and dissemination: performing research on 
domestic and external OC affairs, and delivering this information to the CCP and the 
State Council; it also compiles OC policy with theory and research findings, and is 
responsible for circulating analysis to other relevant divisions of government.  Thirdly, 
the OCAO has a co-ordinating role throughout the qiaowu xitong super structure (see 
more below) by assisting the State Council executive in handling OC matters, overall 
planning and co-ordination of OC work with other relevant government divisions and 
social organizations, guiding them about OC work, and co-operating with the MFA by 
guiding consular offices and embassies with OC work.  This latter aspect will also be 
discussed in further detail below.   
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In terms of its frontline work, the OCAO works to support the OC with domestic 
matters by guiding guiqiao (returned OC) and qiaojuan (relatives of OC) work by 
organizing and co-ordinating them with other OC and ethnic Chinese for upholding 
their legitimate domestic rights and privileges; it also co-ordinates with relevant 
government divisions to participate and supervise OC contributions, and assists 
relevant divisions with human resource management with guiqiao and qiaojuan 
representatives.  The OCAO is responsible for external matters as well: guiding and 
developing friendly relations and service work with OC, ethnic Chinese and their 
organizations abroad, developing relations with compatriot OC in Hong Kong and 
Macau, and working with relevant divisions for advancing Taiwan (anti-independence) 
work.  It works to procure their talents and resources for China’s benefit – such as 
guiding and promoting OC economic, scientific, technological co-operation and 
exchanges.   
The OCAO also has a clear soft power agenda by promoting guidance, co-ordination, 
solidarity and friendship with the OC mass media, cultural societies and schools to 
carry out cultural communications. 294   This includes promoting OC propaganda, 
facilitating cultural exchange and Chinese language education work.  The OCAO 
assumes that many of the OC are unfamiliar with it and its policies, and works to 
resolve this concern by providing information, contact, gifts and resources to making 
more of them knowledgeable about China.295   
To carry out these tasks, the OCAO is divided into eight sections: 
1) Secretariat 
2) Policy, Laws and Regulations 
3) Domestic Affairs 
4) External Affairs (HK, Macau, Taiwan) 
5) Economic, Science and Technology 
6) Propaganda  
7) Culture 
8) Organization and Human Resources 
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Each division has close relations to the relevant CCP Central Committee Departments 
and various government ministries and agencies.  These links of the OCAO are 
extensive, and filter down provincial and city/town OCAO levels.  Local OCAO 
offices work with other local level organs of the Foreign Affairs Office (which 
operate under the MFA), Foreign Economic and Trade Commission (responsible for 
managing, attracting and supervising foreign, investment and enterprises), the UFWD 
and the Propaganda Department.   Offices exist in every province (except Tibet),296 
city or town.  While lower level agencies may not be expressly delegated authority for 
policy formulation, they enjoy sufficient space to move within the broad framework 
set out by the central government.  Motivated primarily by economic considerations, 
these subordinate agencies exploit new opportunities and maximise their interests.  
For example, in recent years the provincial level OCAOs have enjoyed both increased 
influence over qiaowu policy development as well as the authority to set their own 
agendas.  In Guangdong, the importance of OC affairs is so great that the number of 
its office staff exceed that of the Foreign Affairs Office.297  The delegation of power 
to provincial level OCAO offices has a significant role to play in explaining the 
Chinese political arrangement and is discussed in further detail below. 
 
The second major qiaowu organization is the All-China Federation of Returned 
Overseas Chinese Association (qiaolian).  This body is ostensibly a national non-
governmental organization under the CCP leadership for rallying and uniting all of the 
OC for China’s national interests – whether they be Chinese nationals residing abroad, 
foreign citizens of Chinese descent, or returned overseas Chinese (guiqiao) and their 
dependents.  In the same spirit before its dissolution in 1968, the qiaolian seeks to 
protect the legitimate rights and interests of guiqiao, their family members, ethnic 
Chinese of foreign nationality and compatriots by implementing policies and laws 
formulated by the state following investigation into their affairs.  It is also charged 
with managing OC donations and remittances, resettling them in China, directing their 
education abroad, receiving and sending delegations for visits, trade and sightseeing, 
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maintaining and fostering patriotic spirit amongst them, encouraging contribution to 
China’s modernization, national reunification, and international influence.298   
 
Connecting guiqiao and the OC down each level of the qiaolian and qiaoban network 
are various provincial and city/town associations, chambers, conventions, companies 
and mass organizations responsible for frontline activities.  These comprise of 
commercial, friendship, education, investment, tourism and scientific and 
technological exchanges that operate through a variety of mechanisms to ensure the 
widest outreach: OC banks, stores, China Travel Service CTS (Holdings) Corporation 
of China (originally established as the Overseas Chinese Travel Service), 299  OC 
universities and specific research facilities (such as the Institute of Overseas Chinese 
Study at Jinan University, the Research School of Southeast Asian Studies at Xiamen 
University, and the Centre for Overseas Chinese Studies at the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences in Beijing) for making strategic assessments and policy 
recommendations, OC schools (see section on OC education), guiqiao farms, and the 
OC Investment Company.300  In short, the qiaoban, qiaolian and their affiliates share 
the general responsibility of representating the public face of qiaowu both inside and 
outside of China – advancing various aspects of OC affairs, managing the framework, 
formulating technique and policy, and implementing those designs.   
 
3.14 CCP Influence over Qiaowu Affairs 
 
The real guiding power over qiaowu (as with all other aspects concerning China’s 
national interests) lies with the CCP, which acts in an ideological and advisory 
capacity to set its direction.  The CCP Central Committee oversees five Departments 
– four of which deal with qiaowu affairs.  Firstly, to manage communications with the 
OC, the CCP Central Propaganda/Publicity Department (CPD) works through the 
State Council Information Office and the Office of Foreign Propaganda.  These 
offices provide the appropriate content for the Xinhua News Agency and other state-
controlled media to disseminate amongst the OC, including articles that foster pride 
and sentimentality for the homeland, and to ‘clarify’ any negative opinions they may 
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have.301  Efforts are bolstered by pro-Beijing OC newspapers and other OC media 
platforms seeking to strengthen allegiances with Chinese authorities and diplomats, 
and look to the PRC embassy for guidance and prestige.302  This aspect will be 
accorded further analysis in Chapter Six. 
 
The second is the International Department, whose responsibilities include developing 
relations with other communist organizations and local political parties around the 
world, facilitating UF work, and advancing external propaganda work concerning 
Taiwan and China’s international image.  Although difficult to substantiate, it works 
closely with the MSS for assisting PRC diplomatic attaches with intelligence 
gathering on foreign political matters and agent recruitment.303  This work includes 
assessment, monitoring and addressing threats and challenges amongst the OC.  
While the International Department is different and independent of government 
institutions with related agendas, it is not responsible for their policies in general, but 
works with them through PRC embassies and consular offices. 
 
The third is the Organization Department (which deals with human resource, 
personnel control and social issues of the state) and helps determine the policies for 
recruitment of OC talent, and particularly addressing the concerns of returned OC and 
allocating them to suitable positions of employment.  As such, it works with the 
relevant government ministries and OCAO to achieve its objectives. 
The last of the four Departments responsible for qiaowu under the CCP Central 
Committee is the UFWD.  The UFWD is central to ensuring that qiaowu is 
implemented according to the wishes of the CCP.  Its leaders are mostly selected by 
the CCP or are themselves CCP members.  It has been instrumental in bringing 
together powerful pro-Beijing OC organizations and business elite seeking to 
maximise their relations with China by forming a “Chinese people’s patriotic” UF 
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organization.304  For example, one such ‘front’ organization for maintaining external 
relations is the Chinese National Association for Overseas Liaisons.   
However, it is with domestic relations with the returned OC that the UFWD holds 
most influence through guiding two other major qiaowu organizations – both of which 
share similar goals.  One of its most important achievements was the re-establishment 
of the CPPCC – an organ for the development of multi-party co-operation, political 
consultation, and a forum for promoting socialist democracy in the Chinese political 
system under the leadership of the CCP.305   To engage and co-opt the OC, the 
advisory level zhengxie qiaowei (Overseas Chinese Committee of the CPPCC) was 
established in 1983 as the third major qiaowu organization for political consultations 
concerning state policies and issues with other member parties, organizations and 
representatives.306 
 
The mechanism for linking the OC with this Committee is its subordinate China 
Overseas Friendship Association, which together with the OCAO works to 
consolidate contacts between people of various sectors in the mainland and others 
living in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, as well as those of Chinese origin living 
abroad.  The major tasks of the Association are to enhance contacts, increase 
understanding, development and friendship, and develop UF work by publicizing 
CCP policies, promoting socialist achievements and China’s modernization, and 
seeking consensus with the OC concerning reunification with Taiwan and the ‘one 
China’ principle. 
 
The UFWD is also responsible for the fourth major qiaowu organization – the 
Zhigong Party (China Party for Public Interest), which seeks to influence, guide and 
manage its members (mostly returned OC and their relatives, experts, scholars and 
those with overseas relations).  As a member of the CPPCC, it is one of the eight 
legally recognized political parties in China and follows the direction of the CCP.  
                                                 
304 “Backgrounder: Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference,” Xinhua, 2 March 2001. 
305 Bill Brugger, China, Liberation and Transformation, 1942-1962 (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 
1981): 51-53; China Internet Information Centre, “Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
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306 The CPPCC also established a Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao and Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Commission (zhengxie tai ao gang qiaowei) for similar purposes.  See Barabantseva, “Trans-
Nationalising Chineseness,” 11. 
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The Zhigong Party, with its political connections, is another unit that assists the 
OCAO and the China Overseas Friendship Association with their shared goals.307 
 
The fifth major qiaowu organization is the legislative level renda qiaowei (Overseas 
Chinese Committee of the National People’s Congress), currently chaired by Gao 
Siren, along with nine other vice-chairpersons.  This Committee is one of nine special 
committees working under the direction of the National People’s Congress, or under 
its Standing Committee when it is not in session.  Its role is to review bills and 
proposals concerning OC affairs for deliberation by the Standing Committee.  While 
it may appear that this special OC committee enjoys a high level of importance with 
the Chinese government, it has no real power as its activities are confined to 
discussions and approval of measures that are decided upon elsewhere.  
 
Qiaowu is not given as much top tier focus and importance as in previous periods 
mentioned earlier.  In the current era, qiaowu is relatively decentralized and its 
activities more widespread.  For example, a feature common to crucial xitong 
structures in CCP work is the ‘double-hatting’ of leading CCP personalities in 
multiple roles.  In the area of propaganda and mass communication, Liu Yunshan 
holds titles including Politburo Member, Director of the CPD, Deputy Head of the 
Central Leading Group for Propaganda (Publicity) and Ideological Work, Vice 
Chairperson of the Central Guidance Committee on Ethnical and Cultural 
Construction (Civilization Steering Committee), Member of the Central Group for 
Constitutional Amendment, Deputy Head of the State Leading Group for 
Informationalization Work, and Head of the National Anti-Pornography and Anti-
Illegal Publications Work Group).  As noted by China analyst Anne-Marie Brady, by 
“holding everything in one hand” the CCP is able to enforce its influence over 
multiple sectors under the control of one person.308 
By comparison, such concentration of power under one individual is not evident in 
qiaowu affairs.  For example, there are no Politburo members in any of the leading 
                                                 
307 “Zhigongdang yao nuli kaituo haiwai lianyi gongzuo xinjumian” (Zhigong Party Must Strive to 
Enter a New Phase of Overseas Relations Work) Qiaoqing jianbao, 25 December 2006, 10; Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference, “China Zhi Gong Dang,” 14 Feburary 2007, 
www.cppcc.gov.cn/English/brief_intro_non_comm/200702140128.htm (accessed 30 September 2009); 
Groot, Managing Transitions, 38-39. 
308 Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 23. 
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qiaowu agencies.  Neither Gao nor Li hold other significant titles – however there are 
three other high ranking qiaowu officials that hold multiple titles: Ge Zhenfeng (Vice-
Chairperson of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee of the National People’s 
Congress, Central Committee Member, and Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff); 
Wan Gang (Chairperson of the Zhigong Party Central Committee, Minister of Science 
and Technology, and Standing Committee member of the 10th and 11th Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference).  The third, Yang Bangjie, holds two 
positions of which both are directly related to qiaowu (Vice-Chairperson of the 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress and Vice-
Chairperson of the Zhigong Party).  The significance of their role in advisory bodies 
indicates that qiaowu policy is not necessarily controlled, but does operate under the 
overarching influence of the CCP. 
Of the three, Wan has the highest level of overall influence, with a diverse range of 
responsibility at the top tiers of the hierarchy; Ge also shares a broad portfolio, but at 
age 65, he is due for retirement from his military post.  Yang is able to directly 
influence qiaowu affairs from strategic positions – both at the policy recommendation 
stage, as well as with its implementation.  Wan and Yang’s links to the Zhigong Party 
are of particular significance – while the Zhigong Party is ostensibly non-
governmental in nature, both officials illustrate the direct relationship between the 
state and qiaowu affairs.  Links to the Zhigong Party also mean connections to the 
UFWD, OC publications and other frontline apparatus geared towards the OC.  There 
are also aspects of qiaowu that are closely related with the propaganda xitong (such as 
influence over OC media) – hence, important aspects of communication with the OC 
remain under the CCP’s guiding hand.  
 
3.15 Qiaowu and the Xitong Bureaucracy 
 
The qiaowu administration enjoys significant professional autonomy that evolves and 
responds systematically and opportunistically to various challenges.  As such, the 
qiaowu bureaucracy develops its own internal logic, assumes new tasks, and 
maneuvers for position in the leadership organs.  However, as part of the state 
authority, the qiaowu administration remains subject to leadership ideology and its 
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political discourse.  Because qiaowu falls under the scope of China’s external work, 
the qiaowu administration’s activities and objectives often become intertwined with 
the policy objectives of other government bodies.  As such, personnel from various 
authorities take on shared duties and responsibilities for matters related to the OC.  As 
mentioned earlier, China’s relationship with the OC goes beyond the parameters of 
the qiaowu administration itself.  Various agencies have specific objectives to 
achieve – involving, engaging and mobilizing the OC for their own ends. 
 
The MFA (through PRC embassies and consular offices) serves as the frontline 
conduit for co-ordinating various ministerial attaches in implementing their external 
policies – for example, the Ministry of Culture (MOC) promotes propaganda and 
information about China and responds to anti-China/CCP forces); the MOE liaises 
with PRC students, prescribes textbooks and learning materials for OC schools, and 
works with Confucius Institutes (see Chapter Five).  Similarly, Finance, Public 
Security, State Security, Personnel, Commerce and Science and Technology each 
have a stake in ensuring that they can derive the necessary talents, skills and financial 
resources from guiqiao and other OC.  These ministries produce jointly developed 
policy documents and regulations for these purposes.  While these ministries are not 
part of the qiaowu administration per se, their scope of activity clearly includes 
qiaowu issues and affairs because they are dealing with the OC as part of their 
broader mandate. 
 
However, each ministry operates with different agendas, responsibility and 
perspectives.  The complex intra-relationships and lines between qiaowu matters and 
the qiaowu administration become blurred despite separate career paths and command 
structures.  Different xitong superstructures have different operating systems, logic, 
ideological training, and management skills.  Training takes place in special 
universities, while intelligence gathering and policy development are performed at 
special research facilities.  Internal administrative matters, such as the recruitment of 
cadres, budgeting and implementing specific programmes are their own concerns.  
They also have affiliated companies with semi-commercial objectives (such as 
publishing services) and quasi-governmental and non-governmental associations for 
people-to-people activity.  This arrangement tends to encourage different xitong to 
pursue their own interests – resulting in systemic horizontal and vertical conflict 
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between the administrative organs of the central state and the subordinate local 
government level agencies.   
 
Conflict and interaction within the Chinese political system can be analyzed through 
interest group theory, which examines how power has been decentralized, with the 
central government converting the ‘demands’ of interest groups into policy. 309  
Although interest group theory may be useful for defining groups and their interests, it 
is the organizational structures they belong to, how they operate, the decision making 
processes, and the manner in which policies are implemented that explain the Chinese 
socio-political system.  While it is the Politburo and State Council that make decisions 
on which issues are pursued, subordinate bodies also have significant input into policy 
and decision making.  For this analysis, the complex bureaucracies model assumes 
that political leaders from different levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy bargain and 
negotiate with each other to reach a concensus that is translated into policy.  The 
process sees various xitong and the central bureaucracy defining their position, 
bargaining with local level bureaucracies, and competing or consolidating with each 
other to preserve its interests while expanding its political and economic capital and 
influence.  As such, this process may not necessarily fall in line with the central 
government’s grand strategy.  However, behaviour is moderated by shared values, set 
practices and frameworks as conflicting interests are weighed out against each other.  
This model is useful for understanding the formal networks of power and how they 
work, but lacks a representation of the actual and informal political processes.310   
 
Because the Chinese leadership as a whole is in agreement with the basic assumptions 
of OC policy, competing political and bureaucratic interests that may result in intra-
level conflict in a consensus-orientated policy making process have not affected the 
fundamental direction of OC policy.  As mentioned earlier, qiaowu has the ability to 
integrate with these other state and party administrations, both centrally and locally.  
This integration is particularly evident with the ‘emergency response mechanism’, 
where the qiaowu administration co-operates with MFA, local provincial government 
officials, with the backing of top tier leaders (examined in detail in Chapter Eight).   
                                                 
309 Peter Ferdinand, “Interest Groups and Chinese Politics,” in Groups and Politics in the People’s 
Republic of China, ed. David Goodman (Cardiff: University College Cardiff Press, 1984), 10-23. 
310 Flemming Christiansen and Shirin Rai, Chinese Politics and Society: An Introduction (London: 
Prentice Hall, 1996), 19-20. 
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Conflicts of interest between different xitongs and different hierarchical levels over a 
given policy area may require intervention (in the form of committees and leading 
groups) to create balance and ensure that, over all, central policy and strategy is 
maintained.  With qiaowu, the OC Affairs Committee under the NPC (although not 
having real power as such) has a role to reconcile subordinate agencies and ensure 
that policy implementation follows grand strategy.   
 
While the state maintains centralized control over subordinate government ministries 
through leadership (lingdao) relationships (which can be interpreted as direct 
intervention, governance and control), many other links in the qiaowu apparatus 
(particularly those connecting ‘non-government’ affiliated groups) operate under 
‘guided’ (zhidao) relationships.  In these circumstances, broadstroke ideology is set 
by the CCP Central Committee and its Departments, with the OC Affairs Committee 
of the NPC determining policy planning and direction.  Co-ordinated with the State 
Council, instructions from these leading bodies are issued through guiding documents 
(such as Qiaoqing and Qiaoqing jianbao) that provide the latest developments, 
regulations, important speeches, suggestions, recommendations and warnings that 
qiaowu cadres should be aware of.  Guidance can also take place through qiaowu 
schools, which provide cadres with the appropriate ideological and management 
training.  As such, the potential for intra-bureaucratic conflict is minimalized due to a 
shared ideology advanced from the highest levels. 
 
 
 
 
3.16 Decentralization of Power to Provincial Level Qiaowu Operations 
 
As a result of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms and open door policies after 1978, 
economic power and international interaction have passed from the central level down 
to the provincial level.  This has increased the assertiveness of provincial authorities 
and created a new dynamic in central-provincial relations for the formulation and 
implementation of foreign policy.  For example, the number of actors involved in its 
formulation and implementation has increased significantly since 1978, resulting in 
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more complex and consultative processes.  At the same time, except for grand 
strategy decisions (which remain the preserve of top leaders), power has moved down 
to subordinate agencies, and from Beijing to the provinces.311 
 
Similar patterns of decentralization have also occurred with qiaowu affairs.  
Provincial involvement in qiaowu affairs is influenced by geographic location, central 
government policy, and provincial development strategies.  Guangdong and Fujian 
were early recipients of preferential central government policies after 1979, given that 
they are both important points of origin and return for the OC, and also directly 
connected to Beijing’s objectives with Hong Kong and Taiwan.  Coastal development 
of the 1980s gradually moved to other regions in the 1990s.  In the contemporary 
period, provinces all over China compete for OC investment, skills and resources as 
an integral part of their domestic development strategies.312 
 
Provincial level qiaowu efforts have gone from strength to strength in recent years as 
a result of increased migration abroad and the intense effort to attract OC investment 
in a competitive environment.313  Delegations visit, exchange gifts, and encourage 
closer relationships with OC communities.  Their role is to showcase China’s modern 
developments, particularly to those who have resided outside of China for extended 
periods and unaware of changes over recent years.  Meetings between leading OC 
community members and visiting PRC officials are a common part of official state 
visits, comprising both a social and economic agenda.  
 
With a significant number of OC originating from its shores, the Guangdong OCAO 
(GOCAO) is one of the leading provincial level units.314  Its efforts provide the State 
Council with new and original concepts and proposals for qiaowu policy development; 
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in turn, other provincial offices have adopted many of the GOCAO’s programmes and 
strategies as part of their qiaowu activities.  Initiatives include The Guangdong 
Returned Overseas Chinese Association, Guangdong International Overseas Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce, the Youth Overseas Chinese Association, and the Guangzhou 
Convention of OC Scholars in Science and Technology.315   
 
An important and direct means of connection with the OC is achieved through 
provincial Overseas Exchange Associations (haiwai jiaoliu xiehui).  These 
Associations have special economic, science and technology divisions to facilitate 
exchanges with OC scientists and technical experts, and to gather intelligence on them 
for strategic purposes.  They also have a key mobilization role – Associations appoint 
and co-opt Directors from leading OC organizations to liaise and advance qiaowu 
influence abroad.  Without formal diplomatic representation, provincial authorities 
rely on these semi-official channels for establishing and maintaining links overseas.  
Directors act as quasi-diplomats for China, charged with furthering the Chinese 
connection with local governments and raising China’s soft power and influence at 
the people-to-people level.   
 
The KMT had its own system of managing OC communities by appointing 
commissioners (qiaoyu weiyuan) to promote its interests overseas before 1949.316  
Under jus sanguinis, commissioners were responsible not only for the legal protection 
of all OC, but also legal control over them as well.317  In contrast, the PRC does not 
seek jurisdiction over its diaspora, but simply confers honorary positions.  Various 
provinces have their own programmes.318  For example, since 1992 the GOCAO has 
had a global network of directors of the Overseas Exchange Association of 
Guangdong Province.  Their selection is based on education, talent and age – with a 
preference for younger skilled OC with connections in local government or 
organizations, and not necessarily those with economic prowess.  While most 
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originate from larger countries, the hope is to increase this pool to include those from 
less-represented areas in order to form a truly global network.319   
 
Directors are mobilized at four levels: small groups for specific tasks, regional groups 
for larger projects at the national/regional level, industrial/occupational groups for 
specialist knowledge tasks, and an internal China group for facilitating more exchange 
with other overseas directors.320  To keep them energized and loyal, the Association 
holds regular activities to maintain their interest.  Directors are encouraged to 
organize functions and report back to Guangdong authorities.  Cadres reward their 
work with five star treatment during return visits, and lavish praise on them at 
conferences and in newsletter articles.  As such, these elite OC are eager to serve 
closely with qiaowu and state authorities. 
 
Their role is important for frontline qiaowu operations as they themselves lead 
strategic OC organizations.  Directors are influential in directing how their 
communities behave and respond to cues.  In many cases, their constituency may be 
unaware that the directives they receive are actually from the OCAO itself.  By 
passing on responsibilities down the chain, the OCAO relieves itself of the work, 
costs and resources that would otherwise be required at the grassroots level.   
 
 
3.17 Conclusion 
 
The OC have always been an important resource for Beijing to draw upon.  While 
they were welcomed for their contribution to China’s development, radical elements 
within the CCP meant that the relationship was often troubled.  This chapter has 
demonstrated that following years of contradictory and confused policy, qiaowu has 
successfully evolved into a systematic and coherent apparatus of persuasion and 
influence.  Moreover, it enjoys an institutionalized workforce comprised of cadres 
who are expert in developing person-to-person relationships.  Since the early 1950s, 
                                                 
319 Lu Weixiong (Vice-Director of Guangdong Foreign & Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee), “Lishi 
dangjia, wutai zaiwai, neiwai wudong, gongchuang gongying” (Directors as Family, Stage is Outside, 
Work Both Inside and Out, Initiate and Prosper Together), (speech presented at the 15th Anniversary of 
Guangdong Overseas Exchange Association, Guangzhou, 23 November 2007). 
320 Ibid. 
 84
the PRC has moved from cautious activity to conspicuous and active support for OC 
communities in the 2000s.  This is the result of a renewed sense of confidence on the 
part of both Beijing and its intended targets.321   
 
The key to qiaowu’s success is its set of specific psychological tools for managing the 
OC.  By seeding pro-Beijing sentiment amongst them, the CCP seeks to pre-empt any 
challenge to its power.  Various techniques developed over the years demonstrate that 
China prefers to have the OC voluntarily support Beijing by encouraging positive 
feelings for it.  By emphasizing care and sincerity as the core of qiaowu work, support 
for China (and hence the CCP) has resonated strongly amongst various cohorts of the 
OC diaspora.  These modern qiaowu methods are conducted using effective and 
efficient platforms.  The infrastructure is co-ordinated and well resourced, and is 
capable of engaging with the majority of OC.  Indicators show that China’s economic, 
cultural and political strength is set to continue, and there is no reason why its 
relationship with the OC will not follow suit.  Cadres receive regular instructions to 
improve their work; state, provincial and local authorities are heavily engaged in 
building links with the OC; and the OC themselves are increasingly eager to further 
their access to educational and cultural resources, as well as economic opportunity.  
As such, aided by an ever-growing infrastructure and a favourable environment, 
qiaowu has, and will continue to, deepen in scope and penetration.   
 
 
4.00 Targets and Subjects of Qiaowu 
 
Given the importance of the OC for China’s national interests, this chapter examines 
exactly how the Chinese diaspora is comprised and defined.  Broadly speaking, this 
thesis uses the term ‘OC’ as a generic term to describe all ethnic Chinese people 
residing abroad.  Others may have a different opinion on this issue.  Some use the 
term ‘OC’ as casual shorthand to describe both Chinese nationals living outside of 
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China, as well as ethnic Chinese of foreign citizenship.322  Such ambiguity has led to 
disagreement amongst academics, given the patriotic and nationalistic connotations 
that the term may carry.323  In addition, Beijing and Taipei’s definition of the OC has 
developed over different periods.  While Taiwan has moved away from its traditional 
position of embracing all OC to focusing only upon Taiqiao in the DPP period, the 
PRC has become more confident in embracing all ethnic Chinese – no matter what 
their origins.  This chapter shows how China has successfully targeted various cohorts 
of the OC by adapting to the changes in the geo-political environment, responding 
quickly and effectively to their concerns, and by capitalizing on Taipei’s weaknesses 
and mistakes with its own qiaowu policies. 
 
4.01 ROC Definition of the OC 
 
Under the principle of jus sangunis, the ROC criteria for classification as an OC (from 
1911 until the late 1990s) was largely based on ethnicity, and included all people of 
Chinese descent regardless of their citizenship.324  This definition came into question 
in the 1970s when Vietnamese refugees claimed that they were ROC nationals based 
on the fact that they were ethnic Chinese.325  Until 1990, the ROC automatically 
granted citizenship to all ethnic Chinese upon their “return” to Taiwan as part of the 
great Chinese diaspora.326  Even into the early 1990s, Taipei continued to define the 
OC as “any person of Chinese descent living outside the borders of the Republic of 
China,” and accommodated them in its OC policy as it felt a “historical debt of 
gratitude” and sought to serve their interests in “whatever ways deemed appropriate 
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and feasible.”327  However, Taipei’s answer for separating ROC nationality from 
living in Taiwan lay in The Domocile Act of 1973.  Under this Act, there is no 
automatic right for ROC nationals who live overseas to enter or reside on the 
island.328  Such legislation spared Taipei from having to deal with a massive influx of 
refugees seeking to enter Taiwan based on their ethnic origins, yet allowed it to 
maintain jurisdiction over those OC considered as important to its interests. 
 
As OC demographics changed following the relaxation of ROC migration policy in 
1989, Taiwanese migrants (imbued with a growing distinct Taiwanese consciousness) 
were not content with being grouped together with huaqiao.  They demanded a more 
accurate form of terminology to describe themselves, and hence preferred the term 
Taiqiao.  This implied that they supported Taiwan, while huaqiao suggested only 
Chinese roots.329  Since 2002, the Overseas Compatriot Identity Certification Act has 
precisely articulated the modern definition of ROC citizenship.  OC are defined not as 
an ‘Overseas Chinese,’ but an ‘Overseas Compatriot’ – that is, a ROC national 
without registered permanent residence in Taiwan but holding a valid ROC passport 
and overseas resident status; or was born abroad or has been living overseas for more 
than four years and has acquired permanent residency abroad; or a former PRC 
national but living overseas for more than four years and has permanent residency or 
citizenship of that country and a valid ROC passport.330  In other words, the current 
ROC definition of an OC is someone with Taiwanese connections, and not simply 
someone of ethnic Chinese descent.  Thus in all of its contemporary announcements 
and policy, the OCAC is careful to avoid the term hua in order to clearly differentiate 
Taiwanese qiaomin (meaning Taiqiao) from ethnic Chinese (referred to as huaren).331  
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Such terminology clearly signifies how Taipei views the OC and their relationship 
with Taiwan, and how it intended to distance itself from the ethnic Chinese altogether. 
 
4.02 Taiwanization of ROC Qiaowu 
 
Following the CCP victory in 1949, the KMT was in a battle for political and 
diplomatic survival.  It sought legitimacy and international support by presenting 
itself as a staunch defender against communism.  Because the KMT saw future 
reunification with the mainland as its primary aim, it placed emphasis on promoting 
Chinese commonalities (with Taiwanese as part of being Chinese) with the OC.  
Although the ROC could not claim Taiwan to be their ancestral homeland, it acted 
instead as the “protectors and orthodox bearers” of Chinese tradition and values, and 
sought to persuade the OC that the Communists had abandoned them.  To maintain 
loyalty and support for the KMT regime, it took on the role of guardian of Chinese 
high culture in order to legitimize itself as the true government of China – or at least 
to perpetuate the myth and concept of a political and cultural “Great China on 
Taiwan”.332 
 
However, a longing amongst some Taiwanese (especially those with an inclination for 
pro-independence) to project their distinct identity eventually took hold amongst 
Taiwan’s domestic political environment.  These sentiments were likewise manifested 
in Taiwan’s OC affairs.  As early as the late 1970s, ROC qiaowu had already begun 
focusing on pro-ROC/KMT organizations that made explicit affiliation with Taiwan 
and Taiwanese affairs.333  Upon his re-election by the National Assembly in 1990, 
President Lee Teng-hui finally abandoned the claim for Taiwan to represent all of 
China.  In his inaugural address, he implicitly recognized the PRC by calling for full 
exchanges in all areas across the Strait.  Lee’s pro-independence movement brought 
into focus an assertion of Taiwanese ethnic consciousness in its government 
policies.334   
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The political direction of the ROC changed profoundly as it embraced a post-
nationalist identity in a process of Taiwanization (sometimes referred to as 
localization or bentuhua). 335   Rather than a rediscovery of its indigenous 
consciousness as its name might suggest, Taiwanization evolved from a political 
movement against KMT hegemony and antiquated values.336  Moreover, indigenous 
Taiwanese had entered into the ranks of the KMT power structure, local government 
offices and the Legislative Yuan.337   
 
In this environment, the ROC’s qiaowu effort was torn between KMT and DPP 
ideologies, faced declining support from traditional laoqiao (old and established OC) 
and attracted increasing frustration from Taiqiao.  Hence, its direction was often 
unclear and contradictory due to differences between the governing powers and the 
agency implementing the policy – the OCAC.  From the KMT perspective, it 
historically cherished laoqiao connections in the context of jus sanguinis, even into 
the second or third generation abroad.  Throughout the early 1990s, the OCAC 
continued to proclaim: “overseas Chinese, no matter how long they live overseas, are 
considered as one.” 338   Lee also described the relationship with the OC as 
“unbreakable.”339  The importance of the OC to maintaining Taiwan’s legitimacy, 
irrespective of their origins, was clear to the KMT. 
 
This view endured constant opposition from the DPP, and the OCAC faced intense 
pressure from pro-independence forces both domestically and abroad.  Throughout 
the 1990s, various legislators sought to push different policies for those of Chinese 
descent and Taiqiao, or to abolish the OCAC altogether.340  This was because groups 
representing native-born Taiwanese viewed the OCAC as a KMT preserve, and that it 
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only served Cantonese (the majority of the laoqiao population).341  They complained 
that many beneficiaries had little or no relationship with Taiwan at all and did not 
contribute anything back (such as taxes or national service).342  Influential Taiqiao 
associations were equally opposed to the OCAC’s anti-independence policy and how 
it was obliterating Taiwanese identity.343  As one of his pre-election platforms, DPP 
leader Chen Shui-bian appealed to these groups by advocating combining the OCAC 
with the MFA into a Ministry of External Affairs, and making qiaowu an integral part 
of Taiwan’s foreign policy.344  To remain in favour, the OCAC stepped up relations 
with Taiqiao and pro-Taiwan OC, whereby OC investors were encouraged to share in 
the Taiwanese identity.345 
 
Although many DPP members were ambivalent to the OC issue and could not accept 
the relationship between Taiwan and non-Taiwanese huaren, those links had to 
continue – because no matter what their origins, the millions of OC (particularly in 
strategic countries such as the US and Japan) remained an important political asset for 
Taipei.  Thus, prior to the 2000 elections, DPP officials toured around the world in 
order to solicit support from these laoqiao communities.  They vowed to them that 
they would not close down the OCAC (as voiced by some senior members) but 
strengthen services for them.346  As such, the director general of the TECO in Los 
Angeles referred to his organization as a “surrogate consulate” for over a million 
ethnic Chinese in the region.347  As the KMT had long recognized, the DPP also had 
to acknowledge and respect the importance of the OC diaspora. 
 
4.03 The ROC’s Redefinition of Huaqiao 
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Such efforts to maintain support from the OC began to waiver as the independence 
movement in Taiwan’s domestic politics took hold.  The appearance of the DPP in 
1986, the Taiwanization of politics and society, and the changes in the governing 
party were all significant reasons for causing a significant deterioration in the OC 
relationship.348  The most controversial changes occurred after the handover of power 
to the DPP in 2000, when the newly appointed ROC OCAC chairwoman Chang Fu-
mei announced that its target groups were those who identified and loved Taiwan – 
irrespective of their political affiliation or ethnic grouping. 349   Moreover, Chang 
remarked that the OCAC should provide services according to a priority system based 
on “three classifications.”350  This new effort would maintain ties with those who 
shared an interest, supported or paid tax to the ROC.351   
 
As a result, qiaowu was subsequently dispensed in a Taiqiao-centric fashion, whereby 
budgets and resources for activities varied for different groups and regions depending 
on their size and level of political importance. 352   In 2002, of the 9294 OC 
associations registered with the OCAC, only 45 percent (mainly comprising of 
Taiqiao) received guidance and close contact. 353   While more powerful pro-
independence Taiwanese in California received comparatively more resources, 354 
Taiwan looked upon other ethnic Chinese (mostly laoqiao communities) around the 
world with an “open view,” and accorded them only limited support; pro-Beijing 
groups that did not actively support Taiwan were not included at all.355     
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Politically, the OCAC would foster relations with both individuals and organizations 
to promote OC “citizen diplomacy.”  This included encouraging elite OC to 
participate in local politics and spread awareness of Taiwan’s situation abroad.  It 
emphasized Taiwan’s democratic environment and criticized the moral violations in 
China.356   The OCAC would manage them and their associations for helping to 
resolve the cross-strait issue, and to persuade the global community to accept Taiwan 
into international organizations.  The mechanisms to achieve this included registration, 
planning, preparation and co-ordination policy according to two guidelines: the 
“Measures on Providing Guidance to Overseas Chinese Associations” and the “Main 
Points on Overseas Chinese Association Liaison and Registration.”357 
 
Culturally, qiaowu would enhance the understanding of Taiwan’s situation and 
distinct culture amongst those OC unfamiliar with things Taiwanese (such as the 
second and third generation).  ROC education services centres would promote 
Taiwanese activities (such as youth tours and going to Taiwan for higher study), and 
provide communication on Taiqiao matters through propaganda, television, and the 
internet.358  Economically, the OCAC would assist the OC to invest in Taiwan and 
promote its exports.359  In this context, qiaowu services gravitated towards assisting 
Taiwanese to emigrate abroad (such as providing advice and seminars for prospective 
migrants) and integrating business interests between old and new migrants. 
 
Chang’s announcement drew strong criticism from laoqiao communities (particularly 
in the US) to the extent that some large associations threatened to boycott or withdraw 
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from OCAC affairs and functions.360  Those who had previously supported the ROC 
and the KMT as an alternative to communism consequently felt alientated, angry and 
frustrated with Taipei’s move to cut traditional ties.361  Others simply found a DPP 
government too difficult to accept.362  They argued that the “three classifications” was 
an attempt to discriminate against mainland born and KMT-affiliated ethnic Chinese – 
accusations that Chang flatly countered as necessary due to “limited resources.”363  
These comments would set the tone of OC relations for the next eight years, most of 
which were fraught with animosity. 
 
The manner in which the ROC OCAC functioned during the DPP period clearly 
reflected the effects of Taiwanization.  It worked to assist the OC in elevating their 
social status through acceptance in overseas societies364 with the aim of getting them 
to reciprocate through political involvement and influence in order to assist Taiwan’s 
political situation, international status and security.365  Operating upon principles of 
“reform, innovation, foresight and pragmatism,”366 the OCAC appealed to its target 
audience by presenting a progressive Taiwan that held democracy, freedom and 
human rights as its core values.367  These were values that many OC and Taiqiao who 
favoured independence (particularly strategic populations in the US) could identify 
with.  Thus it was clear that the OC, albeit a more selective cohort, remained very 
important to the DPP. 
 
4.04 Damage Control 
 
However, the DPP still acknowledged the need to maintain ties with laoqiao groups 
even if they were not Taiwanese.  In the context of its rivalry with Beijing for 
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international recognition, Taipei needed all the support it could muster, and the 
laoqiao remained a stronghold of political support. 368   The OCAC continued to 
emphasize that its top priority was to boost unity amongst the OC populace through 
promoting traditional Chinese family and educational values, and the resolution of 
Taiwan’s relationship with China.369   
 
The problem with Taiwan’s OC affairs during the DPP era was that policies were 
implemented through an organization entrenched in KMT values.  While it was 
resistant to accepting certain DPP directives, the OCAC had no choice but to bend to 
the demands of its political master.  DPP legislators continued to undermine the 
OCAC and its KMT supporters by questioning the legality of OCAC-controlled assets 
and KMT-affiliated activities, 370  and accused it of subsidizing non-patriotic 
activity.371  The future of the OCAC appeared bleak.   
 
The OCAC thus began a delicate balancing act of satisfying the pro-independence 
movement while trying not to upset decades of hard work with laoqiao by saying one 
thing while doing another.  Consequently, Taiwan’s qiaowu effort with these groups 
was often on the back foot.  For example, in response to her “three classifications” 
remark, top-level officials (including the vice chairman of the OCAC and vice 
president of the Legislative Yuan who condemned Chang’s comments as 
“inappropriate” and “misguided”)372 personally delivered a letter from Chang asking 
for forgiveness from OC leaders.  However, she later argued that left-wing OC groups 
had exploited her remarks as an opportunity to sow discord amongst the community.  
Chang consequently apologized again, citing her previous comments as a 
“misunderstanding.”373  The OCAC made continued efforts to assure laoqiao that they 
were still important to Taiwan.  Diplomats maintained they would never give up on 
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the OC374 because they were their “own flesh and blood.”375  Chang personally visited 
communities in the US to remind them of their importance by saying that anything to 
do with Taiwan’s future “will include overseas Chinese input.”376   
 
Likewise, the OCAC denied any major change or difference in their relationship with 
the OC.  Diplomats contended that there were neither budget cuts nor reduction of 
facilities and services to the OC, irrespective of their political or ethnic alignment.377  
However, Taiwan’s qiaowu effort had clearly narrowed to serving only Taiqiao, 
attracting their youth to study in Taiwan, while relinquishing attention over laoqiao 
groups. 378   For example, it either discontinued or did not sufficiently publicize 
activities for non-Taiwanese and second/third generation OC (such as 
conferences/forums/trips for laoqiao youth, scientists or business people).379  When 
questioned on these developments, OCAC representatives avoided criticism by 
arguing that laoqiao tended to be less active than their Taiqiao counterparts in 
pursuing these programmes.380  
 
Furthermore, it was clear that Taipei was only interested in supporting those OC who 
were loyal to Taiwan.  In addition to gathering Taiqiao statistics from around the 
world, the OCAC stepped up its collection of data on the wider ethnic Chinese 
communities (particularly in the US and other Western countries).381  This indicated a 
willingness to maintain and deepen links, as well as better understanding the nature 
and direction of various groups so that they could better identify those of interest and 
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value to Taiwan.  In line with the “three classifications”, those laoqiao actively 
seeking friendly links with Taipei continued to receive invitations to dinners, support 
for cultural activities, and opportunities for economic and technological development 
in an effort to dispel any suspicion of political bias.382 
 
4.05 Name Changes 
 
Another example of the OCAC’s reluctance to accept DPP directives was the 
difficulty and delays surrounding the alteration of its name.  Changing the title of the 
OCAC had been under discussion since 2002, following concerns that some sections 
of the public were incorrectly perceiving it as a unit that served PRC citizens.383  
While it was prepared to distinguish itself from the PRC, the OCAC did not wish to 
go as far as declaring a separate Taiwan identity for fear of offending laoqiao 
organizations.  For example, the suggestion of changing the ‘C’ for “Chinese” to 
“Taiwanese” was rejected by Chang Fu-mei who suggested the many OC who did not 
view themselves as Taiwanese would “spark an outcry.”384  She also remarked that 
most laoqiao would not shift their allegiance to China as long as Taiwan maintained 
the ROC name.385  Others feared the change of title might provoke China, or that 
Taiwanese citizens residing abroad might feel they owed a duty to Taiwan, which was 
not the case.386   
 
In the end, Taipei decided on a compromise – the acronym would remain unaffected, 
but the second word “Chinese” became “Compatriot”. 387   The OCAC did not 
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substitute qiao in its Chinese title with the more literal translation of tongbao, 
however.  Tongbao remains a patriotic term used by the PRC for uniting OC and 
those living in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.  Instead, it makes clear its 
independent stance by having Taiwan clearly emphasized in its title (Zhonghua 
minguo (Taiwan) qiaowu weiyuanhui). 
 
Moreover, while other ministries were co-operative with making name changes to 
reflect new government policy,388 the OCAC and other frontline OC organs stood in 
defiance.  A proposal to change the “T” in TECO to “Taiwanese” failed, as did a plan 
to include “Taiwan” in re-naming its Service Centres abroad.389  Correcting this took 
action from the highest level of the DPP regime – in December 2004 Chen Shui-bian 
pledged to change the names of all government agencies to include “Taiwan” within 
two years.390  The Taiwanization effort was in full swing – all overseas missions were 
obligated to highlight their “Taiwanese” identity in official engagements, while 
mission chiefs were to identify themselves as “ambassadors from Taiwan” in order to 
defend their “national sovereignty and dignity as well as to distinguish themselves” 
from their PRC counterparts.391   
 
It was not until mid-2006 that authorities finally (and very quietly) revised internet 
web pages, letterheads and other official documentation for the OCAC.392  Other ROC 
government agencies had their official titles amended to include the word “Taiwan” in 
both Chinese and English in official documents.  Moreover, reference to the ‘ROC’ 
has been increasingly relaxed, as long as its status as an independent entity is 
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recognized.393   For example, current Taiwanese literature for the OC (while still 
worded with terms such as “compatriot” and “motherland” in order to appeal to ethnic 
Chinese sensitivities) emphasizes the name “Taiwan.”394  The DPP had achieved its 
goal of redefining the image and role of the OCAC to suit its objective of serving only 
those OC prepared to contribute to Taiwan’s interests. 
 
4.06 ROC OC Organs in the Contemporary Period 
 
In the current period, the ROC OCAC comprises of a general Planning Section to 
assess and manage OC intelligence, co-ordinate the OC for cross-strait relations, 
consolidate and plan events/projects of OC associations. Three regional Sections 
(American, European-African and Asian-Pacific) perform specific research for 
policies and local laws pertaining to the OC, assist and guide OC activities, culture 
and education, mediate disputes, provide welfare, and reward patriotic OC for their 
contribution to OC and Taiwanese affairs.395   
 
The OCAC has a staff of over 350 in Taiwan, with another 60 based elsewhere in the 
world.396  In addition, numerous volunteers assist with domestic OCAC activities.  
There are also 180 OCAC commissioners (mostly one per country) around the world 
to assist overseas Taiwanese groups and promoting Taiwanese matters amongst the 
community.397  Unlike their role before 1949, today they act only as channels of 
communication between the ROC government and their OC constituencies.  Their 
appointment reflects their loyalty to the regime and their status in the local Taiqiao 
community.   
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Where an embassy is not accredited, the ROC MFA operates out of a TECO that 
“represents the Republic of China on Taiwan.”  It has the same function as an 
embassy except in name, serving and protecting the interests and welfare of 
Taiwanese in foreign countries.  It also promotes economic, trade, cultural, 
educational, scientific, financial, and other exchanges and co-operation between 
Taiwan and other countries. 398   TECO also provides cultural and educational 
resources for OC groups.   
 
In addition, special OC Culture and Education Services Centres serve Chinese 
communities around the world (particularly those with large Taiqiao populations).  
They are attractive to those wishing to learn more about Taiwan without having an 
overt political connection.399  In the past, Centres promoted ROC interests (such as 
the Double Ten (October 10th) anniversary of the founding of the ROC) and ROC 
Youth Day) and used posters and artwork to highlight historic events of nationalist 
importance and bolster ethnic solidarity.400  Today, 31 Centres (staffed mainly by 
volunteers) provide “contemporary overseas Chinese affairs work” around the world 
with emphasis on Taiwanese affairs.401   
 
Taiwan’s level of qiaowu infrastructure, financial support and manpower are all 
clearly much less than what the PRC enjoys.  Furthermore, the OCAC works under 
constant threat of budget cuts.402  Despite this, it campaigns as the underdog and 
trumpets success not withstanding its economic constraints.403  Nevertheless, Taiwan 
finds itself in a severely weakened position when attempting to reach out to the OC.  
Not only does it lack the resources required to engage with a massive target audience, 
                                                 
398 TECO in New Zealand website, http://www.roc-taiwan.org/mp.asp?mp=217 (accessed 1 October 
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399 Chen, Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan, 178.   
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the US,” trans. Jonathan Barnard, Sinorama, May 1998, http://www.taiwan-
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the DPP approach towards OC affairs had left many laoqiao quite bitter towards 
Taiwan.  Groups once friendly with Taipei and the KMT vented their frustrations by 
turning to Beijing, and pro-Beijing groups became even more closely aligned with the 
regime by supporting the anti-independence movement.  This emerging chasm 
signified fresh opportunities for the CCP to exploit. 
 
4.07 Rebuilding Links 
 
While the DPP was once ambivalent towards the OC, it later found them useful for its 
own purposes.  However, no matter how Taipei viewed the ethnic Chinese in their 
definition of OC, its relationship with them was constantly under threat.  For example, 
these frustrations came to a peak in 2006 when Taiwanese diplomats were slow to 
react to OC affected during riots in Honiara (a detailed analysis appears in Chapter 
Eight).  Taipei had no choice but to salvage what it had left of its relationship with 
these OC.  It was not an easy task.  The ROC embassy’s offer of US$100,000 to the 
Solomon Islands Chinese Association was initially rejected.404   Money was later 
accepted only after emphasizing that the funding was not compensation, but for the 
“clean up exercise.”405  To rebuild relations, diplomats actively helped to facilitate the 
Chinatown reconstruction process by working together with the local council and OC 
representatives.  The embassy also offered local OC representatives a sponsored trip 
to Taiwan. 
 
Despite such attempts to patch up relations, it was clear that the future of Taiwan’s 
qiaowu effort amongst laoqiao communities under the DPP was in jeopardy.  The 
KMT offered some hope for improvement.  During the eight years it was not in power, 
the KMT maintained that there was, and never would be, any change in its policy 
towards the OC.  In the spirit of jus sanguinis, the KMT promised that it would 
continue its traditional connection with all ethnic Chinese and reinstate the old OC 
policies that the DPP had removed.  However, they did acknowledge that while 
laoqiao groups could look forward to improved links with a KMT-led Taiwan, they 
could not be assured of enjoying a full restoration of pre-2000 policy.  They conceded 
                                                 
404 Joy A. Rikimae, “Chinese Group in Solomons Rejects Taiwan Aid,” Solomon Star, 5 June 2006, 
http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2006/June/06-05-09.htm (accessed 18 August 2006).  
405 “Taiwan Gives $100,000 for Honiara Cleanup,” Solomon Star, 6 July 2006, 
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that while it would endeavour to do its best to assist the OC, the KMT could not take 
care of them as well as before.  This reflected the modern geo-political and economic 
situation of the OC, who no longer relied on support from the KMT due to their own 
improving economic situation; it also reflected the limited resources that Taiwan had 
available for them.406   
 
Since the KMT was re-elected to government in 2008, Taiwanese diplomats have 
moved away from the previously politically motivated relationship of the DPP years.  
Instead, they returned to the KMT style of supporting the long term prosperity of the 
OC and encouraging building pragmatic relations with them.  Although these changes 
may have signalled some improvements with laoqiao, it is clear that Taiwan can 
never return to the level of relationship of times past.  After the KMT re-took power 
and despite its promises, Taiwan’s qiaowu effort was still very much influenced by its 
domestic political situation.  Reports that Ma Ying-jeou’s administration intended to 
scrap the OCAC soon surfaced.  Not long after, Ma announced that the OCAC (served 
through sixteen offices) would merge with Taiwan’s MFA in order to provide “better 
services to overseas Chinese” through its larger network of 121 offices.407   The 
OCAC itself was hesitant for such a merger, given it would alienate Taiwan from 
many old (predominantly non-Taiqiao) supporters, and create practical limitations for 
both OCAC and diplomatic personnel.408   
 
In the same way that they reacted to the DPP’s ‘three classifications,’ laoqiao groups 
around the world again sent petitions of protest and threatened to boycott Taiwanese 
exchanges and visits if the merger was to go ahead.  The KMT was well aware of the 
potential damage that could arise from losing the support of these OC groups.409  
Finally in April 2009, Ma made a last minute change to the proposal, and the OCAC 
was able to continue with its functions fully intact.410  The constantly looming threat 
                                                 
406 The KMT views all Chinese, no matter what their origin, as the same.  Interview with KMT official, 
Taipei, 25 October 2005 and 19 April 2008. 
407 International Community Radio Taiwan website, 25 March 2009, 
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409 “Merger of Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission Opposed.”  
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of Beijing’s qiaowu efforts to reclaim the OC was clearly a major factor in Taipei’s 
decision making process. 
 
In the contemporary period, Taiwan simply does not have the resources or the 
political support to deal with such a large and diverse community; nor does it possess 
a sufficiently robust or attractive enough platform that ethnic Chinese can readily 
identify with – particularly after a long period of Taiwanization.  Taiwan’s appeal is 
mostly limited to Taiqiao and OC with historical links to Taipei.  Beijing’s rival 
qiaowu efforts, however, have received a much more favourable response from a 
significantly wider and growing audience.   
 
4.08 PRC Definition of the OC 
 
The modern PRC definition of the OC includes those Chinese nationals of the PRC 
(including Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau without the right of abode elsewhere) 
living overseas and sojourners intending to return to China (huaqiao),411 Chinese 
naturalized abroad (huaren) and those born abroad of Chinese descent (huayi).  The 
first group can be further distinguished as tongbao ‘compatriots’ – those natural born 
Chinese eligible for citizenship but living in Hong Kong, Macau or Taiwan (Gangao 
tongbao and Taiwan tongbao respectively).  Huaren describes ethnic Chinese in 
general, and may be further qualified as waiji huaren (used for foreign nationals of 
Chinese descent and those former PRC citizens who have taken foreign citizenship) 
and their descendants.  The terms huaren and huayi also include huabao and qiaobao 
(ethnic Chinese compatriots living outside of China, Kong Kong or Macau).412  The 
country in which they reside is often added for clarity.413  However, while stipulating 
foreign nationality, these terms retained an ambiguous racial and cultural link to the 
mainland.414   
                                                 
411 Article 2 of “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guiqiao qiaojuan quanyi baohufa,” 236-238. 
412 An ill-defined External China (waihua zhengce) policy in the mid-1980s raised complex issues 
concerning not only those Chinese nationals outside the PRC, but also those related to them inside 
China.  This necessitated new policy to describe returned OC as guiqiao (returned OC for permanent 
settlement) and qiaojuan (OC dependants and relatives of huaqiao and guiqiao).  See Wang, “External 
China as a New Policy Area,” 28-43. 
413 Chen Youzheng, ed. Gongmin shouce (Citizens’ Handbook) (Beijing: Huayi chubanshe, 1988), 360-
361; Qiaoqing jianbao, no. 9, 2004, 11. 
414 Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logistics of Transnationality (Durham & London: 
Duke University Press, 1999), 43. 
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Consequently, American diplomats noted that Southeast Asian countries remained 
skeptical of the ‘OC problem,’ which was a major consideration in resuming 
diplomatic relations throughout the 1960s and 70s.415  Beijing had to take careful 
steps to advance its national interests with regional powers while ensuring that it 
could preserve its relationship with the diaspora.  This required a two-pronged 
approach: in the public arena, Beijing had to clearly define the relationship, yet in 
practice when dealing with the OC, the definition remained quite vague.  This 
ambiguity continued until the late 1990s and precipitated racial tensions in Southeast 
Asia.  Beijing had to make some hard decisions concerning who it could and could 
not assist given the geo-political climate. 
 
4.09 Distinguishing Huaqiao from Huaren 
 
Huaqiao (as PRC nationals) remained representatives of China and things Chinese 
overseas.  Beijing expected them to demonstrate patriotism and participate in its 
modernization and reunification, and mobilized them on several fronts to unite the OC 
for self-development.  These included promoting OC unity, strengthening OC 
intellectual work, and treating returned OC with special care and warmth.416  However, 
in the late 1970s, huaqiao totaled only five percent of the global OC population.  If 
China was to reach out to the wider OC populace, it needed to widen its scope to 
accommodate both Chinese nationals and foreign ethnic Chinese (tongbao and huaren) 
as sources of capital and expertise. 
 
Therefore, huaren have also been a significant target for OC work.  While they were 
clearly distinguished from huaqiao as foreign nationals, Beijing never had any 
intention to forsake them or their resources.417  Apart from the tumultuous years of the 
Cultural Revolution, huaren were very much a part of China, and warmly welcomed 
into its embrace.418  Huaren were also growing in numbers throughout the world.  
                                                 
415 US Embassy Jakarta, “Malik on China,” State Department cable to US Secretary of State, US 
National Archives, 1973JAKART04895, 26 April 1973. 
416 Wang, Qiaowu zhishi shouce, 70-71; Qiaowu zhengce wenda, 2-4; Gu, Qiao, Tai, minzu, zongjiao 
zhengce wenda, 3; Shang, Gu and Li, Dang de gongzuo fangfa shouce, 519-520.   
417 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 2, 11. 
418 “Buyao hunxiao huaqiao, huaren de gainian” (Do Not Confuse The Notions of Huaqiao and Huaren) 
1995, in Wang, Qiaowu chunqiu, 90-95. 
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They comprised of the millions in Southeast Asia who had been established there for 
centuries, those who had gone elsewhere and were emerging into their second and 
third generations, and other recent migrants who had adopted foreign nationality.  
Qiaowu analysts noted that these OC had become an important and powerful pool of 
resources for China.  Many of them had achieved status in society and participated in 
local politics, and therefore could be tapped as a trade network and export market for 
Chinese-made products.419    
 
Thus China’s OC policy after 1978 was no longer based upon promoting 
revolutionary ideology, but for advancing economic development with huaren upon 
the premise of ethnographic connection – in particular, targeting those from the 
surrounding ‘little dragon’ economies.  There is a large volume of academic study 
concerning the role of the OC in making foreign direct investment (FDI) into 
China.420  Their technical knowledge, managerial skills and global network is widely 
understood to have contributed greatly to China’s ‘economic revolution’.421  CCP 
leaders acknowledge that China’s progress with general economic reform is 
“inseparable” from the role of OC support.422   
 
                                                 
419 “Huaqiao, waiji huaren shehui jiegou de bianhua” (Changes in the Structure of OC Society) 1982 
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Direct Investment in China: Determinants and Impacts (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 
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In 1980, Beijing authorities announced The Nationality Law of the PRC.423  The 
significance of this legislation was that while it clearly defined the nature and 
conditions of PRC nationality (and hence the difference between huaren and huaqiao), 
it underscored the importance of respecting huaren ethnic sentimentality.424  Although 
they existed outside the legal jurisdiction of the PRC and had their own set of 
loyalties and values, huaren were not to be regarded or treated the same as yiban 
waiguoren (ordinary foreigners).425  Huaren maintain Chinese bloodlines, language, 
culture, traditions, and friends and family in China.  They have ethnic affinity for 
China and share the same hope that it can become strong and prosperous.  These 
attributes and feelings do not diminish just because they hold a different passport.426  
Thus in the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping remarked that anyone of Chinese descent was a 
“big advantage” for China’s growth.427   
 
At a 1984 provincial conference on OC in Beijing, officials noted that efforts and 
responsibilities for huaren did not go far enough.  The scope of OC work failed to 
accommodate them at the local level, nor was there enough research into their needs 
and requirements.428  As a result, OC associations, schools and media were becoming 
localized and less connected with China both culturally and ideologically.  Qiaowu 
had to resolve this problem, with policies addressing these concerns in the context of 
reconnection, cultural unity and rivalry with Taiwan’s own qiaowu effort – which at 
the time was far superior and dominant in comparison.  While recognizing the rights 
of foreign nationals, the PRC continued to encourage their sentiments of cultural, 
political, emotional or ethnic attachments towards China.  A May 1989 State Council 
OC work conference expanded policy for co-operation and exchanges between OC, 
qiaowu offices and those OC of foreign nationality.429  This basic strategy was a 
deliberate and calculated effort to reconnect with all OC, and it continues unchanged 
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into the 21st century (see later chapters).  Hence, the terms “foreign nationals of 
Chinese descent”, “foreigners of Chinese origin” and “people of Chinese origin 
residing abroad” are often used together with “Chinese nationals” when referring to 
OC work.430 
 
However, efforts to encourage emotional and cultural connection for the purposes of 
reaching out to OC resources conflicted with issues of citizenship and loyalty.431  
Western commentators criticized PRC pronouncements concerning the OC as 
“deliberately vague” when they did not distinguish between various kinds of Chinese 
abroad, but to call all of them ‘Overseas Chinese’ and declaring them as “part of the 
Chinese nation.’”432  Southeast Asian governments again became concerned.433  For 
example, in the 1980s the Singapore government sought to disempower ethnic 
Chinese elite and their links with China by preserving only the politically inoffensive 
cultural aspects of various OC clan associations.  In the early 1990s, both Lee Kuan 
Yew (the senior minister of Singapore) and his predecessor Goh Chok Tong 
expressed their fear of potential racial discord in the region should OC respond to 
PRC’s line of a common Chinese culture.434   
 
To placate these suspicions, Beijing reverted to its stance at Bandung, maintaining 
that ethnic Chinese of foreign nationality were different to its own nationals abroad.  
For example, qiaowu officials commented in March 1992 that grouping huaren, Hong 
Kong and Macau compatriots as qiaobao was not appropriate at a qiaobao festival in 
which OC delegates of all classifications would be represented.435  Similarly, in 1993, 
Qian Qichen (the PRC foreign minister) publicly denied that a ‘Greater China’ existed, 
even to the extent of remarking ethnic Chinese in the region were different to those in 
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Hong Kong and Taiwan.436  Thus huaqiao work during this period again aimed to 
dispel the ‘OC problem’: opposing dual citizenship, opposing forceful change of 
citizenship, encouraging huaqiao to voluntarily take local citizenship; protecting their 
rights and interests and demanding local authorities do the same; and educating them 
to respect local laws and customs in order to promote bilateral development and 
friendship.437  As such, a distinct sense of non-responsibility for huaren prevailed 
throughout the 1990s.  OC officials warned that an emotional relationship could not 
replace specific huaqiao policy – huaqiao work was strictly for huaqiao, and huaren 
work was strictly for huaren.438   
 
However, the entire OC diaspora was needed for helping realize China’s national 
interests. 439   Thus OC officials advised cadres that ‘some things’ (referring to 
connecting with huaren) could only be “acted upon but could not be spoken about.”440  
Therefore, internally at least, both huaren and huaqiao were the same.  Qiaowu had to 
ensure that work for both groups appeared distinct from each other through tactical 
disengagement and propaganda.  By remaining unclear when referring to its treatment 
of huaren yet explicit in its policy for its own nationals residing abroad, Beijing 
attempted to disguise its pre-occupation with the OC, minimize other countries’ 
sensitivities about OC loyalty, and ensure huaren a safe livelihood abroad.  
 
4.10 Xinqiao – Leading the Change in OC Demographics  
 
Following relaxation of immigration policies between sending and receiving countries 
during the final decades of the 20th century, xinqiao migrants (mostly from the PRC) 
changed the traditional demography of the OC diaspora. 441   After establishing 
diplomatic relations with Washington in 1979, Beijing had to review its policies for 
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non-official travel for private citizens and allowing emigration abroad in order to 
qualify for most-favoured nation status.  Consequently, authorities streamlined 
migration procedures from China, with increasingly less requirements needed for 
obtaining a passport. 442   For example after 1985, Beijing adopted legislation 
liberalizing travel, allowing PRC Chinese migrants to go abroad for work, study, join 
their relatives, or go for business if they had a sponsor.  On the receiving end, changes 
in local immigration policies intended to advance economic development meant those 
satisfying certain criteria could gain entry.443  As in the 1950s, while the Chinese 
government encouraged new migrant huaqiao to accept foreign citizenship, they 
remained as “kinsfolk and friends” and thus ethnically and emotionally still a part of 
China’s family.444  This generation of OC would usher in a new era of qiaowu. 
 
OC academics estimate that over four million Chinese have (legally) migrated from 
the mainland since 1978.445  As xinqiao, they are most likely to be either born, 
brought up or educated in China (particularly from urban centres).  They tend to be 
younger and maintain close links with family, friends and business contacts there.  In 
addition, they strongly maintain their Chinese language, values and culture, and have 
a tendency to live in metropolitan areas.  Consequently, they do not view themselves 
as a minority outside of China, but rather as a part of it overseas.  Moreover, they 
have an emotional and psychological need to participate in activities associated with 
their ancestral homeland.446   
 
The connections between new migrants and Chinese authorities have never been 
broken.  Xinqiao continue to use and expand their networks with them for business 
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and social development.447  With the availability of Chinese language newspapers, 
television, radio and the internet, many share a deeper interest in, or wish to be 
involved with Chinese affairs, policies, standards and opportunities, than previous 
generations. 448   As such, ‘new’ OC organizations offer transnational networking 
opportunities with China for business, career, cultural, educational and social 
advancement in a PRC context.  The emergence of these new OC groups provided the 
ideal environment for Beijing to push forward with its qiaowu strategy of identifying, 
targeting and reclaiming them for China’s national interests. 
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4.11 Elite OC 
 
Skilled migrant xinqiao (as opposed to uneducated labourer class migrants) are 
representative of a new mobilized Chinese diaspora throughout the world.449  They 
possess high-level skills and capability in science and technology, investment and 
capital, and more importantly, a new sense of OC nationalism.450  In 2005, Hu Jintao 
looked to the tens of millions of ethnic Chinese and Chinese nationals living abroad 
who were “talented, have sound economic power and a special affiliation with China” 
and “uniting these people to contribute to the building of a moderately affluent society, 
curbing the Taiwan independence attempts and enhancing friendly exchanges.”451  As 
quintessentially skilled and talented OC elites (jingying), they are the ones ideally 
suited to develop and integrate other OC into mainstream society, and thereby raise 
the status of China and their community.   
      
Jingying comprise of four groups: the first are the high profile leaders of well-
established, dynamic representatives of influential OC organizations.  They tend to be 
in touch with what is going on in China – either through frequent visits there, or 
through participation in various OC forums.  Many have the potential to become 
persons of influence, prestige and power in their home countries.   
 
The second group is made up of the millions of OC youth, particularly those from the 
second, third and fourth generation of laoqiao.  The CCP places great importance 
upon this group, as the fruits of working with them can be passed down their 
generations, thus making OC work easier to do in future.452  These include those of 
ethnic Chinese descent who have grown up outside of China, as well as ethnic 
                                                 
449 Mobilized diasporas are defined as ethnic groups that enjoy material and cultural advantages 
compared with other multiethnic polities.  John A. Armstrong, “Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas,” 
American Political Science Review 70, no. 2 (June 1976): 393-408. 
450 Liao Yiyang, “Xinhuaqiao – Shenme shi xin de, shenme shi jiu de” (Xinhuaqiao: What is the New? 
What is the Old?), n.d. www.nias.ku.dk/issco5/documents/Liao_000.doc (accessed 1 October 2009).  
451 Hu Jintao, as quoted in “President Stresses Unity of Chinese People,” Xinhuanet, 1 March 2005, 
www.in.china-embassy.org/eng/zgbd/t185181.htm (accessed 6 April 2007).  
452 “Yindu qiaomin zhengce yanjiu” (Indian Expatriate Policy Research), Qiaoqing, no. 49 (23 
November  2004): 18-19; Lu Weixiong as quoted by Dong Huifeng, “Guangdong qiaowu buzuo 
‘chunlai chaguan’” (Guangdong OC Affairs Must Uphold Duties), GOCAO website, 16 January 2001, 
www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2005/1216/1/126.shtml (accessed 30 September 2009).  
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Chinese children adopted overseas.453  The CCP acknowledge that these huaren youth 
have a strong sense of identification with their country of residence, are unable to 
speak Chinese, and may not share “familiarity with the motherland.”454  They are 
therefore all targets for general reconnection.  This includes strengthening their ethnic 
pride through immersion in Chinese culture, stories, legends and other forms of 
propaganda disseminated in a variety of languages.455  Various programmes (such as 
camps, tours and cultural and language classes) encourage willingness to contribute 
back to their homeland in the form of remittances and donations.456  Furthermore, the 
CCP invites them to network with their mainland counterparts (often those who hold 
high connections within the CCP, such as youth party secretaries or student body 
officials nominated by the All China Youth Federation).  An examination of these 
methods follows in Chapter Six. 
 
The third group of elite OC are those PRC students encouraged to gain knowledge 
and experiences abroad before returning to China and help with its development using 
their newly acquired business acumen, scientific and management skills.  Commonly 
referred to as haigui (a homonym for sea turtle, but literally translated as “return from 
overseas”) this transnational group is the subject of a relatively new policy area of the 
PRC.  The term haigui first appeared in internet discussions during the late 1990s, 
later in everyday usage, and finally became an official category of OC in 2002.457   
 
The haigui phenomenon deserves some historical explanation.  In 1978, as part of its 
efforts to speed modernization, the CCP sent 480 state-funded students abroad for 
study.  Numbers increased significantly over the following years (4000 between 1979-
                                                 
453 Over 62,000 Chinese children have been adopted into American homes.  See “Zai Mei Zhongguo 
guer huaxiaxing” (Traveling With American Chinese Orphans to China), Qiaoqing, no. 42 (19 October 
2005): 1; L. A. Chung, “China Declares: Welcome Home,” Mercury News, 22 July 2006, 
www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/15099265.htm (accessed 6 April 2007).  
454 Zhongguo Rencai, August 1999 as quoted by Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, 
“China: Media Report Continuing Efforts to Recruit Overseas Scientists,” December 1999, 
www.ncix.gov/archives/nacic/news/1999/dec99.html (accessed 6 April 2007). 
455 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 71. 
456 Flemming Christiansen, “Beyond Chinese Statehood? Authoritative Representations of Nation and 
Ethnicity in the Late 1990s and Early 2000s,” Department of East Asian Studies, University of Leeds, 
n.d., 7, www.personal.leeds.ac.uk/~chifc/nation.pdf (accessed 1 October 2009). 
457 Wang, Wong and Sun, “Haigui: A New Area in China’s Policy Toward the Chinese Diaspora?” 
294-309; Helene Le Bail and Wei Shen, “The Return of the “Brains” to China: What are the Social, 
Economic, and Political Impacts?” Institut des Relations Internationales, November 2008, 
www.ifri.org/files/centre_asie/AV11_ENG.pdf (accessed 1 October 2009).  See also various references 
to research on haigui by David Zweig below. 
 111
1980, and 10,000 in 1981-1982).  As early as October 1980, at the Meeting on the 
Work of Returned Students, some quarters had described the situation as a ‘brain 
drain’ (rencai wailiu),458 but the CCP decided to continue to send students.  Children 
of high-level officials benefited from a prestigious foreign education and gathering 
skills for China’s modernization was paramount.  However, by the end of 1982 there 
were over 1000 cases of PRC students seeking political asylum in the US; by 1983, of 
the 18,500 state-funded students, only 7000 returned.  Numbers traveling to study 
abroad dropped down to 3000 in 1983 following concerns of the high cost of student 
education, lack of suitable facilities for them upon their return, and poor 
performance. 459   However, numbers picked up again after 1984, when Beijing 
decentralized the allocation of foreign exchanges to individual universities and 
relaxed policies for self-funded students, fanning a trend of studying abroad in the 
mid to late 1980s.  
 
Following new legislation in 1983460 and State Council provisions in March 1985,461 
Beijing began intensive efforts to attract the pool of OC intellectual talent and their 
investment resources back to China.  These comprised of using newspaper and print 
advertising, television spots in the OC media, establishing OC liaison offices and OC 
conferences.462  By 1987, the topic of sending students abroad received mixed views 
at the top level of the CCP.  General Secretary Zhao Ziyang viewed the thousands 
settling abroad as a potentially beneficial case of “storing brainpower overseas.”463  
Others, such as political rival Vice Premier Li Peng, argued otherwise.  Consequently, 
Beijing officials tightened policies for going abroad as more students preferred not to 
return.  Beijing appealed to the US government to encourage students to return, but 
these measures had little impact.  The events of June 4th 1989 only worsened the 
situation, and Beijing continued to make efforts to limit the numbers leaving after 
                                                 
458 Zhuang, “1978 nian yilai Zhongguo zhengfu dui huaqiao huaren taidu he zhengce de bianhua,” 10; 
Hou Wenrou, “China’s International Migration Policy,” Asia and Pacific Migration Journal 10, no. 3-4 
(2001). 
459 Another 7000 self-funded students also failed to return, but they were of less interest to the PRC.  
Wang Shao-nan, “Why the CCP Decreases Its Students Abroad,” Asian Outlook, July 1984, 27-30. 
460 “Guowuyuan guanyu yinjin guowai rencai gongzuo de zanxing guiding” (State Council Provisional 
Regulations Concerning Work for Attracting Overseas Talent), in Jiang, Huaqiao huaren baike 
quanshu, 158-159. 
461 “1985 nian quanguo qiaowu gongzuo zuotanhui” (1985 National Symposium on Overseas Chinese 
Work) in Jiang, Huaqiao huaren baike quanshu, 490-491. 
462 Ip, “PRC Migrants and Returnees,” 28, 30-31. 
463 David Zweig and Chen Changgui, China’s Brain Drain to the United States: Views of Overseas 
Chinese Students and Scholars in the 1990s (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1995), 17. 
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Washington and other Western countries accorded them special immigration 
conditions (such as the Emergency Immigration Relief Act of 1989 for Chinese 
Nationals).464  As mentioned in Chapter Two, this was a sensitive period for PRC 
students abroad. 
 
In 1992, authorities announced a new policy featuring incentives, improved services 
and support for returnees.  It placed emphasis on welcoming all students – no matter 
what their past political attitudes were, as long as they renounced their links to anti-
governmental groups and their activities. 465   Other efforts to attract returnees 
continued with flexible measures for where they could work and provincial level 
authorities issued their own set of regulations.466  Another change in policy occurred 
in 1993, when the PRC supported self-funded study abroad, encouraged them to 
return, and gave them freedom to come or go as they pleased.467  Most students 
preferred to stay overseas.  By 1994, under the 1992 “Chinese Student Protection 
Act,” US authorities approved 49,000 applications for US green card residency.468  
Given this development, in 1996 the notion of ‘returning and serve the motherland’ 
changed to simply ‘serve the motherland’.  Rather than encouraging them to come 
back permanently, officials felt that students could still contribute to China’s 
development from abroad under a flexible relationship of transnational mobility 
(rouxing liudong).469  In this context, those with suitable skills and resources could 
enjoy the convenience of coming and going while the CCP could extract benefit 
                                                 
464 Ibid., 21; David Zweig, “Competing for Talent: China’s Strategies to Reverse the Brain Drain,” 
International Labour Review 145, no. 1-2 (Spring-Summer 2006): 65-90. 
465 State Council, “Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu zaiwai liuxue renyuan youguan wenti de tongzhi” 
(State Council Office Notice Regarding People Studying Abroad), 12 August 1992 in Jiang, Huaqiao 
huaren baike quanshu. 
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467 “Guanyu Zhongguo gongmin zifei chuguo liuxue de guiding” (Policy Regarding Self-funded 
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“How China Trained a New Generation Abroad,” Scientific and Development Network website, 22 
May 2003, www.scidev.net/en/features/how-china-trained-a-new-generation-abroad.html (accessed 1 
October 2009).  
469 Xi, “Non-Remaining and Non-Returning,” 169-170; Liu, “New Migrants and the Revival of 
Overseas Chinese Nationalism,” 314-315. 
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without formal relationships.470  In short, these measures served to rework the ‘brain 
drain’ so that the OC could contribute to China from abroad.471 
 
Faced with the reality that tens of thousands of its students remained overseas meant 
an alternative strategy was required.  In the late 1990s, state media acknowledged that 
bringing OC scientific talents into full play was vital to promoting China’s exchanges 
with foreign countries.  A localization strategy of hiring former PRC students and 
Chinese specialists with foreign citizenship in order to advance the interests of 
Chinese transnational firms received support in a December 1997 Kexuexue yu Kexue 
Jishu Guanli (Science of Science and Management of Science and Technology) 
article.472  In the face of regionalism and globalism, government departments created 
the necessary conditions to ensure continued knowledge transfer and collaboration.473  
This included offering them support,474 funding for study abroad,475 and encouraging 
co-operative efforts between students, Chinese institutions and government (such as 
joint research, exchange visits and international conferences.) 476   In addition, 
universities spent billions of dollars to lure top foreign-educated and overseas-born 
Chinese as academic staff.477   
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476 Cheng Xi, “Gaige kaifang yilai Zhongguo zhengfu xuantai liuxuesheng de zhengce yange (The 
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Such policies continue today.  China offers preferential policies to ethnic Chinese, no 
matter where their place of birth. 478   Different provinces and cities compete in 
attracting haigui OC experts and investment by offering different incentives.  For 
example, Beijing and Shenzhen offer more lucrative policies than those at the national 
level in an effort to secure the best talent.479  Elite OC may be invited to China and 
offered high-level positions at prestigious institutions with the freedom to come and 
go from their permanent job back home, as well as other privileges designed to attract 
them to stay in China for a longer period (such as free education for their children). 
Other local governments offer cheaper rent, lower taxes, cash grants, office space, 
reduced staff costs, and special hi-tech parks. 480   Some have taken a pro-active 
approach.  In 2003 Shandong provincial officials appointed 100 “business soliciting 
agents” to seek out influential OC.481  
 
Given these developments, the PRC is eager to promote their qiaowu policies as a 
success.  A survey conducted by the China Zhigong Party and the Beijing Science and 
Technology Committee in 2000 showed that 81 percent of PRC students abroad were 
ready to return to China for work.  50 percent were motivated by “a sense of 
responsibility to contribute to the motherland,” and 45 percent because of kinship 
ties.482  Since the 2000s, the growth of China’s economy and the relative decline in 
the West has seen more and more PRC students wishing to return.483  In 2008, there 
were 179,800 students overseas – 69,300 of whom returned after their studies.  The 
global economic crisis during that period saw a 55.95 percent increase in the number 
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of returnees over the previous year.  This was a result of difficulty in finding 
employment overseas, and the offer of special funds to support research in China.484   
 
4.12 Dual Nationality and the OC 
   
The fourth target group of jingying are former PRC students who have taken foreign 
citizenship and other talented huaren OC who wish to live and work in China.  
However, China’s laws have prevented them from doing so on a permanent basis.  
Article 3 of the PRC’s 1980 Nationality Law of the PRC clearly states that China does 
not recognize dual nationality for any Chinese national.  An increase in the number of 
OC wishing to work, invest or live in China under long term residency visas, and 
those reconsidering their choice of nationality485 prompted calls for Beijing to revise 
its legislation.486   
 
While the State Council has expressed interest in doing further research to resolve this 
issue, it is well aware of the implications and suspicions that it might raise with other 
countries and is therefore reluctant to act.  OCAO director Chen Yujie remarked that 
not recognizing dual nationality was for the sake of protecting OC interests. 487  
Qiaowu specialists recommend that cadres take pragmatic measures: such as 
emphasizing that authorities should not reprint, sensationalize or propagate the 
internal position, and must only explain dual citizenship from Beijing’s official 
perspective.488  This stance reflects the long-held concerns for the CCP in wishing to 
minimize suspicions regarding OC loyalty in host countries. 
 
To address this situation, Beijing has allowed exceptions to facilitate the residency of 
those OC who do not possess PRC citizenship.  Initially, residency for foreigners was 
only provided for a maximum of five years, and rarely granted.  Since 1986, various 
cities have conferred the title of ‘emeritus citizen’ (rongyu shimin) to hundreds of OC 
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in acknowledgment of their contributions.489  For example, the GOCAO offers such 
tokens in the hope that doing so will invigorate a sense of nationalist identity for the 
recipient, resulting in them making more contributions to China. 490   While this 
method achieved its aim of identifying, rewarding and holding onto the loyalty of a 
select few, attracting a much wider scope of the OC was required.   
 
After 2001, authorities developed a reformed permanent residence system to allow 
those with the desired skills and resources to maintain their foreign nationality while 
working and living in China.  In 2003, they issued residence permits (valid for two to 
five years with multiple entries and exits) to investors, qualified workers, academics 
and their families.  In 2004, PRC authorities launched the most significant 
development for permanent residency – a “green card” that provided skilled OC with 
the same benefits as locals (such as subsidized education, investment and obtaining 
jobs).   
 
This was Beijing’s solution for allowing the OC long term residency and by-passing 
the problem of dual nationality.  It is what qiaowu specialists termed as a “way out” 
(chulu) of the debate. 491   Every year, thousands of OC have applied under this 
scheme,492 and numbers are set to rise as more provinces follow suit by giving OC 
(particularly those from Taiwan) “convenience”.493  Moreover, in 2006, the OCAO 
indicated its desire to attract even more OC into China by articulating its desire for 
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relevant agencies to relax thresholds for obtaining a ‘green card’.494  As the labour 
market globalizes and a transnational lifestyle becomes increasingly common, China 
can be expected to continue developing measures to attract and secure more talent 
while minimizing regional concerns.  This shows that China is prepared to engage 
directly with talented OC, provide them with the necessary incentives for their 
development and mutual benefit, and hence reclaim them in a context that is 
acceptable to CCP objectives.   
 
Recognizing that the OC are mobile and can contribute to China no matter where they 
are has contributed to the most significant change to modern qiaowu policy.  Beijing 
understands that fostering strong OC populations in foreign countries can be more 
efficient than having them return.  The CCP considers those who stay overseas as 
‘patriotic.’495  By contributing to China from abroad because of certain innate Chinese 
moral qualities and loyalty to China, migrants represent a new quintessential mobile 
modernity of Chineseness.496  For the purpose of encouraging co-operation within and 
amongst various OC groups for the purposes of more efficiently distributing resources 
and talent, qiaowu has served to raise a core army of xinqiao migrants and PRC 
students capable of developing China’s interests abroad.497   
 
4.13 Conclusion 
 
Taiwan’s historical relationship with the OC and the effects of the independence 
movement is central to how China’s rival qiaowu operation has developed over the 
past twenty years.  Similarly, the scope of China’s efforts has changed according to 
the evolution of the OC diaspora.  Initial attempts that reached out to laoqiao migrants 
and sojourners capitalized upon similar dialectical and provincial origin.  After the 
Second World War, with changes in citizenship laws, qiaowu had to broaden its reach 
to connect with all ethnic Chinese.  As these populations assimilated into local society, 
the emergence of a new migrant population saw yet another change of focus, but 
retaining its overall emphasis on connecting with all OC.  Furthermore, geo-political 
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concerns, differences in ideology, and fears of a brain drain have all affected how the 
CCP has implemented and handled qiaowu.   
 
This chapter has demonstrated how the PRC has taken advantage of the failures of 
Taiwan to connect effectively with the wider OC populace.  The formation of a 
distinct Taiwanese identity and Taipei’s revised definition of the OC, as well as 
Beijing’s own internal and external sensitivities, have all contributed towards China’s 
modern qiaowu approach.  In order to achieve the most promising results, China has 
actively sought to target and attract specific groups of skilled and talented OC for its 
development by offering incentives, privileges and market opportunities.  Although 
China has official definitions regarding who can be considered a huaqiao (in order to 
satisfy the concerns of some governments, and to protect its own interests in the event 
of a legal challenge) Beijing continues to view all of the OC as part of its family – just 
as it has always done.  In this context, the question of how Beijing chooses to 
officially define an OC makes no difference at all; as long as they are ethnically 
Chinese and willing to contribute to its development, China will find a way to 
embrace them.  In guiding their behaviour into the 21st century, qiaowu has never 
enjoyed a more fertile audience throughout the world. 
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5.00 Cultural Work: Reconstructing ‘Chineseness’ 
 
Both the PRC and ROC governments, at some time or another, have had a “primary 
preoccupation, if not the sole obsession” in seeking to produce their own version of 
Chinese cultural identity for the OC in an effort to win their political and economic 
loyalty.498  The next two chapters illustrate the CCP’s construction and projection of 
its own ideal version of OC identity in order to secure the support of the OC diaspora, 
and examine how the OC have responded to these efforts.  The CCP’s articulation of 
OC identity has mostly centred around the concept of national unity.  However, 
modern OC demographics hinder the promotion and acceptance of this concept.499  
Globalization, regionalization, and most importantly, diversity of socio-economic 
background, origin, language and talent have increased the complexity of addressing, 
planning and co-ordinating qiaowu policy.500  Political scientist Hong Liu argued that 
because of the deterritorialized nature of migration flows, capital and ideas, it was 
unlikely that the OC could unite into a major Chinese nationalist movement.501  A 
primary goal of qiaowu is to challenge this argument by attempting to encourage 
unity under two major themes.   
 
Firstly, qiaowu seeks to substitute and prevent alternative ideologies and loyalties 
from taking root amongst the OC by building up and exporting a singular mindset of 
unified ‘Chineseness.’ 502   This is a CCP interpretation incorporating idealistic 
elements of history and civilization, tradition, culture and common biological traits 
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linking ethnicity with nationalism.503  As such, qiaowu exploits sentimentality for 
home and village, economic opportunity and cultural needs.504  
 
The second theme of qiaowu work encourages the OC to contribute and benefit from 
a transnational relationship with a modernized China.505  Tasks include improving 
their understanding of China’s political and economic situation, its liberalization, its 
views and position on the global community, and socialism with Chinese 
characteristics.506  CCP leaders call on all OC to advance China’s interests, with the 
assumption that they share in these goals as a part of the Chinese family.507  The OC 
are reminded of their cultural or ancestral advantage in making China strong.508  Over 
the past two decades, increasing numbers of the OC have responded positively to this 
invitation.509 
 
This chapter examines these two themes by highlighting the breakthroughs that China 
has achieved through exploiting fundamental aspects of OC culture and identity in 
Chinese education, religious work, and sentimental appeal.  The historical background 
to this development demonstrates how the CCP has taken advantage of changes in the 
geo-political environment and delivered a version of ‘Chineseness’ that appeals to a 
broad audience.   
 
5.01 Theories of Ethnic Belonging - Chineseness 
 
For mobilizing collective political action, members must retain their sense of 
belonging to a group.  This ‘belonging’ can be broken down into concepts of national 
identity and ethnic identity – both of which are open to various interpretations and 
challenges, with push and pull factors between the individual and the nation state 
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being the major factors for ascription.  Many of the OC may not agree with the CCP’s 
ideals and values for material and pragmatic reasons.510  For these groups, and for 
further strengthening bonds with those OC already loyal to it, the CCP has promoted 
its own version of ethnic nationalism and belonging – essentially an attempt to 
articulate its hegemony.  Socio-linguistics specialist Norman Fairclough defined 
hegemony as “leadership as well as domination across the economic, political, 
cultural and ideological domains of a society.  Such power over society is never 
achieved more than partially and temporarily, and thus exists in a state of ‘unstable 
equilibrium’.”  Secondly, hegemony is about “constructing alliances, and integrating 
rather than simply dominating sub-ordinate classes, though concessions or through 
ideological means to win their consent.”511  A large part of this “hegemonic struggle” 
for the hearts and minds of the OC can be illustrated using theoretical frameworks of 
incorporation and co-optation – both of which employ national and ethnic identity as 
core platforms for their operation.   
 
National identity, according to political economist Max Weber, refers to the nation 
state and its differentiation from other states, its claim to a "monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence," and how its subjects are expected to demonstate political 
loyalty to it.512  Normally this would apply to citizens loyal to their country of birth or 
residence.  Minority groups, however, may not necessarily feel a sense of loyalty to 
the state in which they reside.  For example, one Muslim organization suggested that 
while they should live within the local laws in Britain, British Muslims should give 
their first loyalty to Islam.513  In the case of the OC, because of their numbers and 
diverse political affiliations, this issue has been historically contentious and 
problematic, particularly for second and third generation members of the diaspora, 
and especially for those in Southeast Asia.  For example, some ethnic Chinese may 
not consider themselves as Chinese first and foremost (such as those living in 
Singapore).  As such, political scientist Flemming Christiansen argues that although 
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the OC share common origins of a ‘community’ 514 based upon their race, history, 
economic situation, culture, personalities and social behaviours, boundaries marking 
the distinction of belonging to the group are ambiguous, and hence make formalistic 
ascription of the OC difficult.515   
 
Theoretical frameworks for understanding ethnic identity have generally adopted an 
instrumentalist approach, which perceives it as a dynamic set of shared conventions 
and rituals defined and understood through studying the ascription and behaviour of 
groups and their membership. 516   As an ethnic identity, Chineseness is open to 
transmutation and manipulation.  It undergoes continual flux across geographical and 
political boundaries – a perpetually fluid reconfiguration and rearticulated sense of 
identity that cannot be defined in a singular and fixed racial or ethnic context.517  
Chineseness therefore serves as the ideal emulsion by which to unify, mobilize, or 
influence the OC.518   
 
As the “supreme political loyalty to the nation-state and a strong sense of cultural 
belonging to the real and/or imagined homeland,” notions pertaining to territory, 
history and ethnic affinity can exist beyond fixed geography.  As such, nationalism 
can be generated from outside the actual nation concerned.519  Amongst the most 
influential scholars on this concept, Benedict Anderson argued that “long distance 
nationalism” explained the political loyalties of migrants regardless of the state, place 
or period in which they resided.  National identity was an artificial or social construct, 
and that the convergence of print technology and capitalism created a deep horizontal 
comradeship linked by fraternity, power and time – described as the ‘imagined 
community.’520   
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While most minority groups will recognize that they have an obligation of 
demonstrating loyalty to their host country (or at least their affinity with their 
homeland/religion without leading to acts of treason) there remains a sense of ethnic 
identity that serves as a resource of ‘tactical necessity’ for defending and pursuing 
their interests.521  Anthropologist Fredrik Barth argued that this was the most decisive 
characteristic for self-ascription to a group.522  Similarly, according to sociologist 
Beatrice Drury, a heightened sense of identity/group consciousness towards a 
situation perceived to be of significance to its concerns/existence (such as being 
denied equal opportunities, access to resources, or social/economic mobility) is the 
key factor for ethnic mobilization.523  Migrant communities tend to connect to their 
homelands and strengthen ethnic affinity with their kinspeople.  Contrary to 
conventional Marxist and liberal theories that suggest a gradual substitution of ethno-
national identity through class affiliation and engagement with a host country over 
time, displacement from their homeland can generate “powerful attachments to ideas 
of homeland that seem more deeply territorial than ever”.524   
 
Qiaowu demonstrates how various Chinese governments have created rival political 
discourses that transcend their territorially defined borders.  While the KMT promoted 
its own version of ‘Chineseness’ in the latter half of the 20th century in an effort to 
empower itself, assert its rule and to subordinate certain indigenous groups to the 
nationalist nation state, 525  the CCP also took advantage of ethnocentrism and 
successfully reconstructed its own global Chinese national identity for the OC for its 
own purposes. 526   Although the CCP once rejected traditional Chinese concepts 
during the Cultural Revolution, it now uses China’s cultural and archeological 
treasures as sources for bolstering its own political legitimacy.  Moreover, the CPP 
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has promoted a common ethnic consciousness based upon biological attributes,527 
cultural and religious values/icons,528 traditions, rituals, myths (as descendents of the 
dragon, or sons of the Yellow Emperor), historical humiliation (such as foreign 
aggression) and anti-Chinese racism in seeking to deepen its attachment with the 
OC.529  In this context, advancing a nationalist discourse and identity as constructed 
by the CCP was the response of the power elite to maintain their power inside and 
outside of China.530  As such, qiaowu articulates official nationalism within a system 
of centralized and standardized interlocking agencies that can embrace the OC as part 
of this ‘community’. 
 
Supporting China’s cause in an economic or political manner during periods of 
weakness therefore defined OC loyalty throughout its modern history. 531  
Revolutionary elements used both nationality and common ethnic and racial identity 
to enhance patriotism and unity.  The late 19th century saw the emergence of 
nationhood amongst Chinese.  Monarchist reformer Kang Youwei (1858-1927) 
stressed common ancestry and race as his discourse of Chineseness.  His disciple, 
influential scholar-official Liang Qichao (1873-1929) developed the ideology of a 
nation-state by emphasizing common historical identity rather than traditional 
allegiance to the emperor, allowing a new kind of patriotism in which the OC could 
participate.532   
 
Republican revolutionaries exploited the 1909 Law of Nationality and its principle of 
jus sanguinis to promote a range of nationalist activity – encouraging Chinese identity, 
formation of OC organizations, and education of Chinese language.  Sun Yatsen’s 
principle of racial nationalism (one of “Three Principles of the People”) became a part 
of KMT official policy.  By postulating Han Chinese as a pure race, with common 
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blood from a single direct mythological ancestor, Sun claimed that only nationalism 
would forestall racial extinction.533  On this platform, he established a stronghold of 
moral and financial support from the OC as “mothers of the Revolution.”534  Thus 
patriotic OC described themselves as huaqiao, as it brought to them a sense of 
political awakening and cultural connection to their motherland.535   
 
Both the KMT and the CCP actively sought to win OC support by using nationalism 
as a unifying force.  The May 4th Movement of 1919 saw the adoption of Mandarin as 
the official language in China, and an escalation of anti-Japanese and anti-Western 
feeling.536  The KMT continued to encourage Chinese consciousness and Nationalist 
sympathy.  These efforts resulted in OC contributions towards the May 30th 
Movement of 1925 and the Northern Expedition of 1926-27. 537  The concept of ‘great 
patriotic unity’ (aiguo da tuanjie) sought to promote China’s revolutionary diplomacy 
abroad, using the OC to make “outstanding contributions to China’s revolution and 
construction.” 538   Nationalism also served to unify the two factions.  The Sino-
Japanese war provided an opportunity for a fractured KMT to reunite against a 
common enemy,539 bringing both the OC and those in China together in a plan for 
future security.540   
 
The CCP victory in 1949 provided a significant change in the way the OC viewed 
their political loyalties.  While some looked favourably towards China for 
internationalist inspiration (as described earlier), many other OC groups in the West 
shunned the PRC as a backward nation541 and were unsupportive of a communist 
regime in a Cold War environment.542  Those in sensitive regions of Southeast Asia 
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were also careful in describing themselves as OC for fear of offending their host 
government.543  Others refocused their interest away from China and began to identify 
with their country of residence.544  While certain groups of Chinese maintained their 
values, culture and mores, 545  most of them assimilated into local society. 546  
Sojourners, their families and descendants became ethnic Chinese living abroad 
(huaren).  Some academics argued this phenomenon signaled the end of OC 
nationalism.547  Thus the CCP required another method of connection with the OC – 
especially in the context of dispelling suspicions of political interference.  While it 
sought to sever their Chinese ethnicity from Chinese citizenship under the 1955 
Bandung Agreement, the OC would retain a symbolic attachment to the PRC through 
deterritorialized nationalism.548  As such, Chinese culture was something that could 
be shared and maintained without necessarily having to be a Chinese nationalist.549 
 
5.02 Promoting Cultural Unity 
 
However, the CCP faced stiff competition from its rival.  For most of the latter half of 
the 20th century, the ROC (aided by the US550) dominated cultural and educational 
work amongst the OC diaspora as its key channel for political socialization.  Taipei’s 
prime objective was to make the ROC the corridor of OC sinicization (zhongguohua 
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zhi zoulong), 551  with the OC youth as the main target. 552   Moreover, regional 
governments associated with the US (such as the Philippines) encouraged this work as 
an effort to promote anti-communist beliefs amongst their OC populations.553   
 
Using education as a means of managing OC communities was done at two levels: 
attracting students to study in Taiwan, and controlling OC schools abroad.  In regards 
to the former, since the 1950s Taiwan had successfully recruited a large number of 
qiaosheng (made up mainly of students from KMT-supportive families, or those with 
some relationship with Taiwan).  They constituted a strong and well-organized alumni 
for Taipei.554  In its effort to secure their loyalty, qiaosheng initially had to accept 
ROC citizenship, do military training and take an oath of allegiance.555  The KMT 
gradually abandoned these requirements during the 1960s and 1970s following fears 
of political interference.556  However, even up until the mid-1980s, the co-ordination 
and direction of qiaosheng activity continued through handbooks issued to students 
upon their arrival.557  After returning home, Taipei expected that qiaosheng graduates 
voice support for Taiwan by assisting its public diplomacy and business 
development.558   
 
For OC communities abroad, the KMT promoted full formal Chinese education after 
1961.559  Cantonese was initially one of the languages taught, but as a result of 
acculturation the programme was reduced to Mandarin and Chinese arts after the late 
1960s.560  Activities included patriotic rituals (such as flag raising and singing of the 
ROC national anthem), and a nationalistic curriculum (encouraging them to be good 
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citizens for China) that emphasized cultural chauvinism through the teaching of 
Chinese heritage and civilization.561  These efforts remained static for decades.  Even 
up until the early 1990s, ROC textbooks promoted Chinese scientific achievements 
and examples of historical patriotism. 562   The ROC continued as the dominant 
education provider amongst laoqiao up until this period, and remains so in staunchly 
pro-ROC communities or countries officially recognizing Taipei.563 
 
5.03 Taiwanization of ROC Cultural Work  
 
Taiwanization changed the manner of Taiwan’s cultural work with the OC.  In the 
early 1990s, the OCAC and the MOE (through its The Overseas Compatriot 
Educational Committee) had continued to assist OC youth to study in Taiwan and 
encourage them to strengthen their Chinese identity.  Taipei sent specialists all over 
the world to administer examinations and provide advice about privileges and 
subsidies.  However, authorities cut these provisions following complaints of 
favouritism from the pro-independence lobby. 564   As such, after 2000, Taiwan’s 
cultural diplomacy for the OC became more “service-oriented” in a “systematic and 
transparent manner.”565 This reflected a Taiwanized approach that emphasized its own 
distinct culture over traditional ROC ‘Chineseness.’  For example, TECO dance 
teachers offer indigenous mountain dancing as well as the traditional Chinese styles; 
similarly, examples of aboriginal dress are included with costumes lent out to OC 
groups wishing to showcase Chinese fashion.  TECO also promote numerous arts and 
cultural festivals (such as Taiwan Week and Asian Tradition Month) so as to enhance 
its unique image abroad.566   
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With education, Taiwan competes with China by offering scholarships, opportunities 
to work part time, and emphasizing a free and open environment.567  For example, 
Taiwanese universities claim to have a higher standard of teaching than in the 
mainland, and offer English tuition at some colleges.  Overseas, the OCAC sponsors 
and subsidizes more than 200 schools and organizes workshops for teachers 568 
through an Overseas Chinese Culture and Education Foundation.  In 2005, there were 
17000 students enrolled in Mandarin language and vocational training through the 
Chung Hwa Correspondence School, Global Chinese/Taiwanese Language and 
Culture Online Centre, which facilitate correspondence and computer-aided 
instruction for Mandarin, Taiwanese and Hakka language.  TECO assisted by 
providing books and other educational material for OC community libraries, language, 
art and dance teachers, teacher training, and public relations materials.  Due to 
Taiwanization during the DPP era, these resources mostly found their way to Taiqiao 
and pro-Taipei OC communities.   
 
In the contemporary period, Taiwan intends to reassert itself as a leading provider of 
Chinese education for the OC.  The main themes for Taiwan’s 2009 Overseas 
Compatriot Chinese Education strategy included the evaluation of teaching materials, 
strengthening the relationship between the OC and the mainstream community, the 
use of digital technology in education, and innovation and revitalization of OC youth 
work. 569   In addition, Ma Ying-jeou’s administration sought to revitalize its 
educational efforts for the wider community by competing with the PRC’s Confucius 
Institutes (see below).  He announced the establishment of two Taiwan Academies 
(also known as ‘Institutes of Taiwan’) in the US (and ultimately a total of 34 around 
the world) to showcase Chinese culture with Taiwanese characteristics.  The choice of 
basing both Academies in the US was no coincidence.  The OC in North America are 
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the strongest base of OC in the world; and for Taipei, it is home to most of its Taiqiao 
community.   
 
Taipei wishes to reconnect, strengthen or rebuild damaged political and cultural links 
following the DPP years.  With a reinvigorated agenda, the KMT has implemented a 
global strategy to make up for lost ground.  However, learning traditional Chinese 
language in Taiwan faces increasingly limited appeal from the OC given the 
standardized and simplified Chinese that is promoted by Beijing.  Thus, Taipei sought 
to reach out to the wider OC populace by printing booklets in simplified script.570  Ma 
also proposed that OC schools and mainland scholars be encouraged to recognize 
traditional characters while writing simplified forms, advocating compilation of a 
‘grand Chinese dictionary’ displaying both systems.571   
 
However, these initiatives have come much too late.  Taiwan’s pre-occupation with 
Taiwanization during the DPP period caused major setbacks for its educational 
outreach.  As such, China’s efforts have eclipsed Taiwan’s status as the leader of 
Chinese education amongst OC communities.  While it may still attract some support 
from Taiqiao, laoqiao, and other students wishing to study traditional Chinese, 
Taiwanese education of Mandarin and traditional culture has largely suffered a 
decline in popularity due to Taiwan’s weaker international status and the aggressive 
advancements of China’s education work abroad.  
 
5.04 PRC Education Work 
 
PRC education work for the OC has undergone significant developments over the past 
fifty years and emerged as the dominant provider of Chinese language education in 
the contemporary period.  In the same manner as the ROC, the PRC has promoted 
Chinese study both at home and abroad.  In regards to attracting the OC to study in 
China, authorities offered special admission criteria, allowances, and set up special 
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schools and universities for them during the 1950s.572  Like Land Reform, while the 
CCP acknowledged that returned OC should have given better care,573 there were 
logistical and practical difficulties in accommodating their ‘bourgeoisie’ lifestyle.  In 
1957, although not opposing any students who wanted to return, qiaowu officials 
suggested that the OC should stay in their own countries for study.574  Those who did 
go to China found themselves participating in a “rectification campaign” and the 
subject of envy or disdain from locals.575   
 
The Cultural Revolution resulted in both major OC universities closing between 1970 
and 1978.  However, China still required scientists and technicians for its 
development and the OC youth were suitable recruits.  In late 1971, all ethnic Chinese, 
no matter what their nationality, were publicly welcomed to study in China without 
discrimination.  Taiwanese, American and Japanese students were specially targeted 
and offered freedom to come and go as they pleased.576  In reality however, little had 
changed from previous policy.  For example, authorities announced generous 
scholarships as a ploy to attract students – recipients still had to pay for their tuition 
and lodging.  In addition, the selection process favoured those majoring in certain 
disciplines of benefit to China.577 
 
Following the end of the Cultural Revolution, it was clear to PRC officials that 
demand for study in China remained very limited.  Thus the emphasis during this 
period was on external policies – to promote and improve Chineseness amongst the 
OC by raising the level of propaganda concerning ancestral connections and 
improving the standard of Chinese education, teachers and materials.578  This strategy 
did not change until the early 1980s, when OC students were again encouraged to 
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578 “Huaqiao, waiji huaren shehui jiegou de bianhua,”; “Huawen jiaoyu de bianhua yu fazhan” 
(Changes and Developments in Chinese Language Education) 1988 and “Zhuanguizhong de Huawen 
jiaoyu” (Chinese Language Education in the Midst of Change) 1989 in Wang, Qiaowu chunqiu, 87-89, 
96-103, 104-108. 
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study in China by offering them incentives.  For example, they were able to enter the 
high school of their choice, and enrol at the re-opened OC universities.579  Following 
graduation, they were offered special provisions for work, study or were free to return 
home.580  Returned OC, however, still faced certain limitations if they wanted to 
continue study overseas (depending on their age and field of acceptable study).581  
Such talent was required to remain in China for its modernization.  
 
After the 1990s and into the contemporary period, Chinese schools and universities 
actively wooed the OC student market.582  In addition to offering scholarships, other 
benefits (such as admission to higher level academic institutions) were provided to 
returned OC and their families.583  This was in line with calls from the national and 
provincial level government for strengthening the promotion of Chinese language 
education for OC youth.584  In addition, the MOE instructed institutions to make 
special provision for children of returned scholars, as well as offering language 
coaching for those with Mandarin as a second language.585  Since 2005, children of 
guiqiao (and even those of foreign citizenship) no longer have to pay extra fees for 
attending government-funded schools.586  Some institutions automatically award OC 
applicants extra points to their university entrance examination grades.587   These 
methods, coupled with the popularity of learning Mandarin, has seen a trend of 
increasing numbers of ethnic Chinese going to China for study.588 
 
The OCAO oversees several insitutions for this purpose: the Beijing Chinese 
Language and Culture College (specializing in Chinese language and culture for OC, 
                                                 
579 Wang, Qiaowu zhishi shouce, 155; Qiaowu zhengce wenda, 17. 
580 Shang, Gu and Li, Dang de gongzuo fangfa shouce, 549-550.  
581 Qiaowu zhengce wenda, 19. 
582 For example, Wuyi University in Guangdong has a special Foreign Affairs Office that co-ordinates 
and receives OC students and attracts donations.  See its website, 
www.wyu.edu.cn/fao/index6_en/gjian.htm (accessed 19 December 2007).  
583 Nyiri, “The New Migrant,” 141-176.  
584 GOCAO, “Guangzhoushi qiaowu gongzuo’shiyiwu’ guihua.” 
585 Qiaowu changyong falu fagui xuanbian, 239-243. 
586 “Equal Schooling For All,” Xinhua, 9 March 2005, www.humanrights-
china.org/zt/situation/200402005712114606.htm (accessed 1 October 2009).  
587 Wang Houhong (Vice Governor of Hainan Province), “A Fresh Start for Hainan Island,”interview 
by Asian Affairs, Autumn 2000, www.asian-affairs.com/China/wanghouhong.html (accessed 1 October 
2009). 
588 Numbers of OC students from Malaysia increased from 841 to 1800 between 2003 and 2006.  See 
“Weng Shijie: xiyin daMa huayisheng, Zhongguo daxue yingzeng jiangxuejin” (Weng Shijie: Attract 
Malaysian Ethnic Chinese Students, Chinese Universities Should Increase Scholarships), Qiaoqing 
jianbao, 15 July 2007, 13. 
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as well as holding special training courses for overseas teachers) and Huaqiao 
University (designated for the educational needs of the OC and the children of 
returned OC, and marketed as China’s major base for overseas Chinese language and 
culture education).  The board of trustees for the latter is composed of celebrities and 
professionals of OC origin, Hong Kong, Macau and returned OC.  In 2000 the OCAO 
approved Nanjing Normal University as another base for Chinese language education 
for the OC.589   
 
Students from Hong Kong, Macau, and waiji huaren are special targets for qiaowu 
and Chinese education.  The CCP believes that OC studying and living in China 
establishes valuable networks amongst classmates and locals, raises their awareness, 
sensitivity and appreciation about Chinese society, culture, history and politics.  As a 
result, they provide not only a source of valuable foreign exchange but also act as an 
instrument of statecraft.  As the next generation of OC intellectual, technical and 
political elites, the CCP hope that their experience in China will make them more 
accommodating of Beijing’s demands.590   
 
To deepen their sense of appreciation and (hopefully) patriotism for China, qiaowu 
officials suggest that OC students should be given more support and care during their 
stay.591  In addition, they should be seeded with pro-China ideology so that they can 
act as a friendly force upon returning home – where they should be placed under 
continued efforts of management and co-ordination.592  The significance of targeting 
OC youth for experience in China demonstrates the importance that the CCP is 
placing on younger targets for qiaowu.  Influencing them from an early age has 
become more and more evident in recent years.  This aspect of will be examined in 
detail throughout the remainder of this thesis.   
 
 
                                                 
589 Sheng Ding, The Dragon’s Hidden Wings: How China Rises with Its Soft Power (Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2008), 122-123. 
590 David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security 29, 
no. 3 (Winter 2004/05): 78. 
591 Qiaoqing jianbao, no. 1-2, 2004, 23. 
592 “Zuohao liuhua tongxuehui gongzuo, buduan tuohuang haiwai qiaowu gongzuo de dianyumian” 
(Do Well with Work on OC Student Groups Studying in China, Unceasingly Open Up Areas of OC 
Work) Qiaoqing, no. 51 (14 November 2005): 14-16. 
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5.05 PRC External OC Education 
 
From 1949 until the 1970s, the CCP’s purpose for promoting OC education outside of 
China was not simply to foster OC scientific and technological resources for China’s 
modernization, but for them to serve as a wider UF strategy for advancing China’s 
revolutionary interests overseas.593  Chinese authorities were careful not to overtly run 
OC schools themselves, but placed them under their guidance and manipulation.  
Methods included subsidizing or buying them out, and getting influential pro-Beijing 
OC figures to run them using CCP approved textbooks and activities.  It was no 
surprise that governments (such as India and Indonesia) feared interference and 
banned such schools in the 1950s.  In response, Beijing played down its links with OC 
schools, suggesting local authorities should manage and co-ordinate them instead.594  
Furthermore, it began an effort to encourage assimilation and learning of local 
languages in the hope of improving bilateral relations with Southeast Asian 
countries. 595   In the 1980s and 1990s Beijing continued to use cultural work to 
encourage positive feelings, instill an accurate socialist image, dispel the effects of 
foreign propaganda about China amongst the OC, and promote the CCP goal of 
peaceful reunification.596 
 
In the contemporary period, qiaowu officials acknowledge culture as one of 
mankind’s basic spiritual needs, and seeks to exploit it as part of a strategy for 
managing the current and future generations of the OC.597  In accordance with the 
work set out in the MOC’s 12th Five-Year Plan for Cultural Construction, promoting 
Chinese language and culture through exchange and co-operation with foreign 
countries is paramount for the CCP’s aim to extend Chinese influence around the 
world.  This goal has support from a wealth of policies and infrastructure, capital 
resources, staff training and assistance from national and provincial level government 
agencies, embassies and consulates.598   
                                                 
593 Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese, chapters 3 and 7. 
594 “Yu Yinni Xiya waijiaobu Meizhousi sizhang Monuonutu de tanhua,” 40. 
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597 “Shenri shehui, tanjiu qiaoqing,” 10. 
598 Wen Yi, “Opportunities and Challenges in the Future,” PRC Ministry of Culture website, 16 
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5.06 Confucius Institutes  
 
The foremost example of China’s public diplomacy and cultural outreach effort is a 
global strategy of establishing Confucius Institutes around the world.  Following the 
establishment of a pilot institute in Tashkent, Uzbekistan in March 2004, the first one 
opened in Seoul, Korea in November 2004.  Over 280 Institutes have opened since, 
specifically in cities where populations of ethnic Chinese reside.  While a large 
component of their student bodies may be non-Chinese, the OC are the prime 
target.599 
 
Promoting Chinese language and culture is one means of creating a positive climate 
of public opinion for the CCP.  Teaching Chinese language is instrumental to re-
sinicizing the OC so that once educated in Mandarin, they can understand officially 
promoted versions of Chinese history and participate effectively in patriotic activities.  
The objective is to gather a wide spectrum of support for China in order to influence 
the development of host country foreign policy so that it is favourable to Beijing.600 
 
In addition to holding language and cultural classes, Institutes serve as gathering 
points for a wide range of OC activities (such as hosting dance and drama 
performances, celebrating festivities and exchanges, and as venues for Chinese 
government officials, diplomats and consular staff to meet with members of the OC 
community).  Institutes have also taken a leading role as mouthpieces for the PRC 
government to promote OC policies, opportunities, incentives and procedures, as well 
as propagate CCP objectives through seminars and press releases.601  As a result, 
Institutes threaten to replace (or at least marginalize) traditional OC associations by 
acting as the PRC-sanctioned authority for OC cultural affairs given their direct links 
to the National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (Hanban), the 
                                                 
599 In February 2009, Li Changchun commented that those countries with larger numbers of OC would 
be ideal strengthening China’s global cultural outreach strategy. Ibid. 
600 Geoff Maslen, “Warning – Be Wary of Confucius Institutes,” University World News website, 2 
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601 “Jinbabuwei Kongzi xueyuan yuanzhang: huaqiao huaren yao xuexi dangdi yuyan” (Zimbabwe 
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MOE and other government departments.  Secondly, Confucius Institutes actively 
promote putonghua Mandarin, and therefore sideline other dialects (such as 
Cantonese) and certainly challenge traditional Chinese (as used in Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and laoqiao communities) with its system of simplified characters and pinyin 
pronunciation methods.   
 
The rapid establishment of Confucius Institutes all over the world demonstrates the 
PRC’s active and aggressive outreach to OC communities.  By partnering with local 
institutions, they have the resources and clout to challenge or subsume rival educators 
of Chinese.  Institutes also have the potential to become the leading providers of 
learning materials and teachers for OC organizations.  In the contemporary period, it 
is too early to say whether Confucius Institutes have had this effect on Chinese 
education.  However, it is clear that policies designed to achieve such a goal are 
already in place. 
 
5.07 Problems Regarding PRC OC Education 
 
According to internal reports, qiaowu officials recognize three fundamental problems 
regarding Chinese education amongst OC: lack of teachers, poor quality and limited 
teaching materials, and finally, lack of funding.  Educationists realize these concerns 
cannot be addressed by simply providing resources, but they should be providing the 
‘right’ resources.  Therefore, the aim is to allocate more efficiently and matching 
particular needs rather than offering a blanket solution.602  To address the lack of 
teachers, OC officials suggest increasing the level of professional guidance, 
improving relations with current teachers, and seeking new teachers for the short term 
or for training purposes. 603   China uses a “Welcome In, Going Out” strategy604 
whereby professional artisans and performers train locals – either by sending out 
coaches, or inviting them to China for workshops and camps specializing in OC 
                                                 
602 “Haiwai huawen jiaoyu zi kun: shiyuan nanmi jiaocai shao” (OC Chinese Education’s Difficulties: 
Hard to Source Teachers and Few Teaching Materials), Qiaoqing jianbao, 25 April 2006, 15. 
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Recent Years), Qiaoqing, no. 31 (October 23, 2007): 6-9. 
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cultural development.605  For example, after strict screening, experienced teachers are 
sent to assist local teachers with materials and techniques and standardize Chinese 
language teaching.606   
 
The strategy of “Welcome In, Going Out” has major two benefits for China: firstly, to 
replace a formerly Taiwanese-dominated system with a PRC version that emphasizes 
modern China and modern Chinese concepts.607  By “Going Out”, cadres co-ordinate 
with various agencies to organize more festivals, trade shows and exhibitions for 
propaganda products, and thereby penetrate deeper into foreign arts exchange 
circles.608   These serve various purposes: to enhance relations between pro-Beijing 
groups, the embassy and OC work efforts; to provide a tangible benefit for OC 
communities and deepening their understanding and appreciation of OC work; to 
develop OC organizational capacity by active participation, co-operation and 
exchange; and to infuse a PRC-friendly version of Chineseness.609  Secondly, the 
strategy improves bilateral relations at the state level.  For example, after decades of 
an Indonesian government-imposed ban on Chinese language and culture, since 2005, 
the Indonesian MOE and Guangdong OCAO have worked together to develop 
cultural resources in a PRC context.610    
 
On the second issue concerning teaching materials, OC experts suggest practical 
methods to dispel childrens’ fear of learning Chinese characters, raise their 
understanding of textbooks, improve their aural comprehension, and improve their 
motivation for learning Chinese culture.  For example, in 2000, efforts began with 
projects such as the “Overseas/Ethnic Chinese China ABC.”  Its purpose was to 
promote Chinese language, life, history and geography under a set of “China ABC 
                                                 
605 “Aodaliaya, Xinxilan, Taxiti Zhonghua jiaoyu, huawen chuanmei jinkuang,” 9. 
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Popularization Standards” formulated specifically to “carry forward traditional 
Chinese culture and promoting unity” amongst the OC.611  The programme includes 
tours to China and scholarships. 612   In recent years, alternative non-traditional 
methods of teaching have also become popular – such as encouraging self-learning 
through song and other interactive techniques.613  For example, in 2005, cartoons 
were suggested to promote Chinese culture and language amongst OC youth.614  In 
keeping with tailoring solutions, modern teaching materials (such as DVDs) are 
continually improved and their use increased, taking note of geographical location and 
age of students in order to gain best results.615   
 
With regards to funding, these solutions are initiated at the state level, and either 
trickle down to pro-Beijing schools and foundations, or directly down to state-
controlled institutions.  For example, since 2006, Beijing has ensured a direct channel 
of control over the management of funding for Confucius Institutes.616  The External 
Propaganda Department of the CCP Propaganda Department sends money through to 
the MOE for Institute activities.617  Other examples for funding include the China 
Overseas Chinese Language Education Foundation, 618  or the Kong Linghe 
Scholarship (established by a direct descendant of Confucius himself) which work to 
encourage OC youth to learn and better understand Chinese culture;619 in addition, the 
China Chinese Cultural Education Foundation promotes Chinese education as a 
matter of “personal responsibility for each and every OC.” 620   At the frontline, 
commercialization is seen as the key.  For example, the Zhigong Party (through its 
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qiaowu cadres and education attaches) has a central role in promoting Chinese 
language and culture through a variety of marketable products to the OC 
community.621  The PRC embassy and consulates regularly offer grants and donations 
to OC schools for books and buildings.   
 
Many OC schools (particularly those that are under-funded and relying heavily on 
voluntary assistance) are very much dependent on China for providing teachers, 
materials and funding.  In a sense, these schools and the OC associations that run 
them, often look to the PRC for their continued survival.  While schools could 
continue using Taiwanese materials aided by local teachers (who may be limited in 
experience or unavailable in smaller communities), the general trend and popularity is 
for teaching simplified Chinese.  Turning to China and its obliging qiaowu agencies is 
the most convenient and accessible resource for maintaining OC education abroad. 
 
5.08 Challenging Alternative Forms of Chineseness 
 
Cultural and education work operate in an environment full of rival alternative 
discourses.  For the PRC to achieve ethnic and cultural unity, the CCP believes that it 
is necessary to embrace only one language and one culture.622  Cultural work had to 
be exclusively mainland PRC Chinese – clearly distinct from that of Taiwan or Hong 
Kong.623  For the OC of Cantonese origin, the commercialized values of the then-
British administered colony of Hong Kong defined what was “Chinese” (popular 
culture, language, music, mannerisms and attitudes) for many OC communities after 
1949, and even up until the 1990s.  As an arch-rival, PRC cultural and education work 
had to challenge Taiwan as the guardian of Chinese ‘ high’ culture and conducted it as 
part of the overall ‘service’ to the OC by exporting its own resources, materials, 
support and content.624   
 
                                                 
621 “Zhigongdang yu jiasu Zhonghua wenhua chanpin shuchu tuidong shijie huawen jiaoyu” (Zhigong 
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624 Wu, “Zhangwo xinfangfa, katuo Guangdong qiaowu xinjumian”; Live, “The Sinwa of Reunion,” 
234-253. 
 140
Although China capitalized immensely from ‘Taiwanization’ during the 2000s (in 
which many former pro-Taiwan OC groups drifted towards Beijing for cultural and 
educational support) qiaowu cadres maintained that Taiwan’s cultural efforts were 
still much more advanced than its own.  PRC educationists acknowledged that their 
methods were simplistic and monolithic in comparison.625  They suggested better and 
more attractive tools to compete – such as offering privilege, incentive, entertainment, 
scholarships, funding, education and culture to foster positive feelings for China 
amongst OC youth and their desire to study in China.626  They added that they had to 
do more work with high level, influential OC and groups in order to establish and 
work through permanent cultural centres, libraries and depositories.   
 
The long term goal is to put Chinese language education under Beijing’s complete 
domination.  In situations where it cannot exclusively do so, China reluctantly accepts 
a compromise.  For example, Beijing acknowledges that embracing simplified 
Chinese characters requires the support of all the OC, and hence it must respect their 
wishes to be successful.  In the early 1990s, notices directed towards strategic groups 
of the OC were still issued in traditional script so as not to upset them.627  This policy 
continues in the contemporary period.  For example, in 2005, China announced its 
willingness to use traditional Chinese characters and to discuss teaching Chinese as a 
second language with experts in Taiwan “as long as they do not intend to split the 
country.”628   Likewise, the US-based Advanced Placement programme uses both 
traditional and simplified characters.  This strategy ensures that by entering into 
dialogue with Taiwan, the PRC has another mechanism for influence into previously 
Taiwanese-dominated activity. 629   The Yatsen School in Fiji provides the most 
distinct and unique example of this rivalry – the secondary school is managed by the 
PRC using simplified characters, PRC texts and mainland teachers; yet the primary 
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school remains funded and co-ordinated by Taiwan using traditional script with 
Taiwanese teachers and texts.630  PRC diplomats explained the unusual situation by 
saying that Taiwan is a part of China.631 
 
However, such accommodation is only intended as a temporary measure.  Qiaowu 
officials concede that persuading pro-Taiwan schools to turn towards China is a 
difficult process.  A 2005 report noted Taipei spared no effort to control pro-Taiwan 
schools, organizations and people.  For example, South Korean OC schools were 
under the influence of Taiwanese authorities until 1992, but many still used 
Taiwanese resources in traditional script; moreover, simplified PRC textbooks were 
hardly used and put into storage.632  Therefore the key task of PRC education work 
seeks to extricate OC schools from rival ROC methodology, influence and teaching 
materials.633  For example, OC in the Philippines (also known as Chinoy or Tsinoy) 
and in particular the laoqiao historically aligned to the KMT, are mostly versed in the 
traditional script.  Efforts to introduce newspapers using simplified characters in the 
2000s were unsuccessful.  Consequently, two Confucius Institutes were established in 
an effort to change this situation.  In Fiji (where laoqiao remain staunchly pro-Taiwan) 
local OC educationists were very wary of any attempts for China to establish an 
Institute at the University of the South Pacific.   
 
In these situations, China’s strategy is to patiently and gently change their view of 
China without being overtly forceful (which might create sympathy for Taiwan).634  
Evolving from discrete efforts such as guidance and manipulation in the 1950s, its 
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modern methods reflect an assertive stance that attempt to place China as the leading 
authority of Chineseness.  MOE cadres liaise with pro-Taiwan OC and laoqiao and 
meet with teachers to discuss issues and identify areas for work.635  The next stage 
seeks to persuade education committees and school teachers to change entirely to the 
PRC system, such as using simplified characters and pinyin over traditional script and 
Taiwanese pronunciation methods,636 and promoting Beijing’s Hanyu shuiping kaoshi 
(HSK) test as a recognized standard with support from local government education 
ministries.637  In 2007, Fijian OC claimed that the PRC embassy was attempting to 
influence the Fiji-based Chinese Education Research Group and getting pro-Beijing 
xinqiao onto the Yatsen School board of trustees.638  This strong and steady approach 
demonstrates Beijing’s growing confidence in achieving dominance over OC 
education.   
 
5.09 Promoting ‘Love’ for China: OC Church Work 
 
In addition to its attempts to dominate OC education, the CCP attempts to instill 
positive feelings for China through covert methods of targeting and infiltrating key 
groups – in particular, religious organizations.639  According to internal studies, the 
State Council estimates that more than half of all OC are religious in some way or 
another. 640   Moreover, many well-known dissidents who fled China after 1989 
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Delegation Arrive in New York to Positively Promote OC Education) Zhongguo qiaowang, 20 October 
2007; “‘Meiguo xibu Zhongwen jiaoshou yanxiutuan’ laihua yanxiu jiaoliu,” 1. 
638 Laoqiao OC believed the embassy was using pro-Beijing xinqiao to ‘infiltrate’ the board of trustees.  
Fijian OC academic, interview by author, Suva, September 2007; “Jiada lidu, quanfangli kaizhan 
qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo” (Increase Strength on Developing All Fronts of OC Taiwan Work), Qiaoqing, 
no. 15 (6 June 2007): 8, 11-12. 
639 “Foreign Affairs Minister Cites Investigation of Chinese Communist Regime Spy,” Sunday Star 
Times, 14 July 2005, http://clearwisdom.net/emh/articles/2005/7/14/62895.html (accessed 1 October 
2009).  
640 “Dui huaren zongjiao zuzhi de xin renshi,” 1-9; “Meiguo huaren jidujiao xinyang tuanti de shehui 
gongneng” (The Social Power of American Chinese Christian Religious Groups), Qiaoqing, no. 58 (23 
December 2005): 11, 13-14. 
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converted to Christianity. 641   Because the CCP officially promotes atheism in 
China,642 qiaowu cadres initially overlooked churches as a target for OC work.   There 
was limited contact towards them and work methods tended to be passive.  However, 
after the 1980s, the PRC took a stronger interest in them.  Qiaowu specialists now 
view churches not as a place for religious gathering, but as another target for OC work 
and exploiting those with quintessential talent and skills.   
 
OC cadres believe that religion provides many potential channels for effectively 
dispensing qiaowu.  Few OC organizations can match the size, scope and resources of 
OC churches.643  Churches are different to ordinary OC organizations because their 
membership tends to share a much deeper level of involvement in their activities, 
beliefs and outlooks.  As such, these OC have more likelihood of being effectively 
guided.  The church network is an ideal medium for influencing OC behaviour, 
managing their morals and ethics, and hence the way in which they integrate and 
participate in local society.  Church activities often encourage co-operation with non-
Chinese groups and the media, serving as a very useful platform for spreading China’s 
soft power efforts to a wider audience.   
 
According to State Council reports, the objective for qiaowu cadres is to actively 
infiltrate, investigate and “sinify” (huarenhua) OC church groups, by seeking to 
attract, influence and mobilize them through spreading the CCP’s interpretation of 
“Chineseness” and “spiritual love”.644  These strategies build on the existing and 
historically social networks of Chinese communities that are focused around the 
church.645  Specifically, qiaowu church work includes encouraging the OC into non-
denominational units (rather than split them into Catholic or Anglican, for example).  
                                                 
641 Yuting Wang and Fenggang Yang, “More Than Evangelical and Ethnic: The Ecological Factor in 
Chinese Conversion to Christianity in the United States,” Sociology of Religion 67, no. 2 (2006): 179-
192. 
642 Since 1949 and throughout the Mao years, the CCP viewed religion as a class enemy and suppressed 
it during the Cultural Revolution.  Although greater freedoms were permitted under Deng Xiaoping’s 
Open Door policy in the 1980s, all activities were conducted within a limited spectrum.  Since this time, 
the CCP has controlled five recognized religions (Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism and 
Taoism).  The Religious Affairs Bureau of the State Council allocate resources to eight national 
organizations for monitoring purposes, and ensures that all recognized religious movements operate 
strictly according to CCP regulations.  See Beatrice Leung, “China and Falun Gong: Party and Society 
Relations in the Modern Era,” Journal of Contemporary China 11, no. 33 (2002): 773. 
643 “Meiguo huaren jidujiao xinyang tuanti de shehui gongneng,” 11, 15. 
644 “Liebian, chongzu, xinsheng, ronghe” (Split, Reconstitute, New Born, Fusion), Qiaoqing, no. 11 (1 
March 2004): 17-18; “Dui huaren zongjiao zuzhi de xin renshi,” 2-3. 
645 Fong, The Chinese in New Zealand, 53-55. 
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Further strategies use them for promoting social exchange and diversity of influence 
(such as extra activities, meals or cultural celebration after the service), and spreading 
Chinese culture (adding Chinese language, art, dance music classes for youth).  The 
goal is to accommodate all types of demographics and occupations (such as holding 
special services for restaurant workers, elderly and after-school care).   
 
In sum, the CCP has sought to take advantage of the trust and faith that religious OC 
place in their churches for their family and social development.  Given that these OC 
believe that “children who grow up in the church don’t turn out to be bad,” the CCP 
has attempted to usurp these channels for making significant inroads into determining 
their feelings towards China and what it means to be Chinese.646  Under the guise of 
religion and cultural connection, the CCP has sought to achieve direct engagement 
with important OC by satisfying their social and psychological needs, and accordingly, 
instill its political messages.  For example, OC church websites feature anti-
independence rhetoric interspersed with religious references.647 
 
5.10 Encouraging ‘Love’ for China: Earthquake Diplomacy 
 
Fostering and capitalizing on this concept of ‘love’ for China has been a significant 
development of qiaowu policy in recent years.  Many qiaowu projects now 
incorporate ‘love’ as its central premise (qiaoai gongcheng).  For example, the 
Zhigong Party has a central role in organizing conferences, courses, co-operative 
ventures, and root seeking programs for OC youth.648  The aim of these activities is to 
encourage a positive view and embrace for China, and hence often themed as ‘Love 
for Country and Homeland activities’ (aiguo aixiang huodong). 649   These efforts 
began in 1994, when OC officials in Sichuan launched the “OC Heart Project” 
                                                 
646 “Dui huaren zongjiao zuzhi de xin renshi,” 6-7; “Meiguo huaren jidujiao xinyang tuanti de shehui 
gongneng,” 14. 
647 National Committee of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Churches in China and 
the China Christian Council, “Statement on the Taiwan Issue,” New Zealand Presbyterian website, 11 
June 2001, www.presbyterian.org.nz/1250.0.html (accessed 6 April 2007); John K. Chang, “Striving 
Towards the Chinese Century,” China Source website, n.d. www.chsource.org/Striving.htm (accessed 1 
October 2009). 
648 “Zhonggguo Zhigongdang zhengxie tian: guanyu jiaqiang haixia liangan wenhua jiaoyu minjian 
jiaoliu de jianyi” (China Zhigong Party Proposes Views Concerning Strengthening Cross-Strait 
Chinese Cultural and Educational Exchange), Qiaoqing jianbao, 21 March 2008, 17. 
649 “Haiwai huaqiao huaren disanci daguimo aiguo aixiang huodong” (Third OC Broad Scope of 
Activity for Love of Country and Homeland), Qiaoqing jianbao, 25 October 2007, 2. 
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(qiaoxin gongcheng) raising large sums of donations to ‘OC Heart Schools’ for 
primary education in China.   This has since developed into a larger (and very 
successful) voluntary effort for other development programmes.650   
 
During the DPP years, much of this work was aimed at opposing independence and 
promoting reunification.  ‘Love China’ was an ideal platform for resolving cross-strait 
relations, as Taiwanese could put aside their pro-independence feeling and become 
compatriots. 651   Qiaowu officials capitalized on a burst of OC patriotism and 
sentimentality with ‘earthquake diplomacy’ following the Sichuan disaster in April 
2008.  This event sparked a massive mobilization effort amongst OC communities in 
sending money and help to China under the ‘OC Love Project – Fighting the 
Earthquake Disaster with Warmth’ (qiaoai gongcheng – kangzhen jiuzai wennuan 
xingdong). 652   Qiaowu cadres sustained momentum for over a year through 
continuous activities such as the ‘OC Love for Homeland’ project (qiaoai jiayuan)653 
and support from the OC media.  
 
When the political drive for Taiwanese independence faded after the KMT re-took 
power in the 2008 elections, the ‘Love China’ effort moved to oppose other threats to 
the CCP, such as the Tibetan independence movement and other anti-China forces.  
This was evident in the ‘Red Heart’ internet campaign leading up to the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics (examined in detail in the next chapter).  Beijing’s goal of inspiring 
nationalist activity and unity amongst pro-Beijing xinqiao and PRC students through 
the internet has reaped successful results for the CCP.  Coupled with years of patriotic 
education at home, and sustained externally through Chinese language media, modern 
communications and traditional rituals, haigui specialist David Zweig found that PRC 
                                                 
650 “300 yi ‘qiaojuan’ zhutui Zhongguo jiaoyu” (30 billion of OC Donations Assist Education in China), 
Qiaoqing jianbao, 14 May 2005. 
651 “Sichuan dizhen zhenkai liangan jumian, ‘tongbao’ chongpo ‘taidu’ jinguzhou” (Sichuan 
Earthquake Shakes Open a New Phase of Cross-Strait Relations, ‘Compatriot’ Breaks the Curse of 
‘Taiwanese Independence’), Qiaoqing jianbao, 25 May 2008, 2. 
652 “Wen Jiabao ganxie huaren dui Zhongguo kangzhen jiuzai de dali zhichi yu xiezhu” (Wen Jiabao 
Thanks Chinese for Strongly Supporting China’s Fight Against the Earthquake Disaster), Qiaoqing 
jianbao, 25 May 2008. 
653 “Sichuan dizhen zaiku ‘qiaoai jiayuan’ benyuedi jiangzai Qingchuan jiancheng” (Sichuan 
Earthquake Disaster Zone ‘OC Love Homeland’ Will be Established in Qingchuan at the End of This 
Month), Qiaoqing jianbao, 28 April 2009. 
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students who returned from study overseas were “no less jingoistic than those who 
have never gone abroad.”654    
 
5.11 Evaluation of Nationalism and the OC 
 
Measuring the effectiveness of qiaowu in spreading CCP-inspired nationalism 
amongst the OC can be given more attention as a future quantitative research project.  
One area for further analysis is to survey the extent of evolving relationships between 
the OC and the PRC so that responses and behaviours can be better understood.  This 
thesis takes some steps towards this objective by offering general observations from 
personal experience of the day-to-day operations of various OC groups.  Although 
there are difficulties in evaluating various types of qiaowu efforts against each other, 
general themes do arise.   
 
Overall, the OC of the 21st century show much less bias than their Cold War 
predecessors, and less antagonism towards the CCP than in the past.  As this thesis 
has argued, such positive feelings for the CCP amongst many of these OC are not 
manifested by heavy-handed indoctrination; instead, qiaowu efforts focus upon racial, 
cultural, economic or political forms of attraction and guidance in order for the OC to 
reconnect with China, and ultimately elicit actions of their own volition.   
 
The events of 2008 showed that strategic groups in the OC community were willing to 
proudly defend the CCP.  Mostly xinqiao and PRC students, these groups 
demonstrated the effect of years of qiaowu relations in spectacular fashion.  Having 
been continuously exposed to this ideology, these OC are particularly proud of 
China’s re-emergence.  They wish for China to take its rightful place on the world 
stage, and they defend this view vigorously.  Such pro-Beijing sentiments have 
developed in the context of several major changes to both the geo-political 
environment and OC demographic landscape since 1989.  While the change in general 
attitude amongst the OC to show support for China and the CCP can most likely be 
attributed to China’s improved global position, there are explanations and events that 
                                                 
654 Melinda Liu and Duncan Hewitt, “Rise of the Sea Turtles: China’s Most Modern Citizen Aren’t 
Drawing It Any Closer to the West,” Newsweek, 15 August 2008, 
http://en.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=18876 (accessed 1 October 2009).  
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illustrate how developments in the articulation and implementation of qiaowu policies 
have affected they way in which the OC may view their connections with Taiwan and 
China.   
 
Firstly, the OC no longer feel ashamed of China as the poor and sick man of Asia, but 
actively draw upon China as a great source of pride, respect, self-confidence and 
strength for all the OC, regardless of the regime.  Feelings of discrimination and 
frustration with language barriers and cultural shock in their host country dissipate 
when the OC participate in activities familiar to them.  Cultural events (often 
facilitated with support from qiaowu cadres in the form of decorations, promotional 
materials, and funding) such as Chinese National Day and Lunar New Year 
celebrations restore a sense of pride and dignity.655  Moreover, many welcome the 
opportunity to participate economically and politically in China’s re-emergence.  
Various events facilitated these feelings: China’s entry into the World Trade 
Organization, the 2008 Olympics, the 2010 Shanghai World Exposition, and China’s 
space programme.  These examples reflect Anderson’s argument of language and 
ritual as an important component of the ‘imagined community’.656  
 
As such, the cultural and social stigma attached to favouring the PRC has largely 
disappeared.  OC groups now openly demonstrate public acceptance of qiaowu.  They 
respond positively to qiaowu delegations and state/provincial leaders making 
“friendship visits.”  Xinqiao are more likely to look to the PRC embassy for prestige, 
status and as a resource for their cultural activities and extended political networks.  
In order to demonstrate this affiliation and strength of the relationship, they invite the 
OC media to help promote these bonds in newspaper articles (with pictures of toasting 
with officials, joining welcome parties and taking part in workshops/tours).  Building 
on these warm sentiments, visiting qiaoban cadres and government officials appeal 
for “powerful backing” from their OC audience for creating a strong China and active 
participation in its reunification.657 
                                                 
655 John Garnaut, “Rally Around Flag, China Tells Diaspora,” Sydney Morning Herald, 27 July 2009, 
www.smh.com.au/world/rally-around-flag-china-tells-diaspora-20090726-dxin.html (accessed 1 
October 2009).  
656 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 40-49. 
657 Consulate-General of the PRC in Auckland, “China’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State 
Council Delegation Visit Auckland,” 19 November 2003, 
www.chinaconsulate.org.nz/eng/xwdt/t44141.htm (accessed 30 September 2009); “Zhongguo qiaolian 
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Mainland Chinese and students also appear to respond positively to cultural 
performances organized and funded by provincial government and qiaoban 
authorities.  These shows portray a very ‘CCP’ side of Chinese culture – particularly 
nationalistic songs, to which the audience sing and clap along in time.  PRC officials 
also encourage the ritual of flag raising ceremonies amongst OC organizations in 
order to invigorate their sense of national pride and unity.  The CCP uses the PRC 
flag as a key symbol to isolate and oppose Taiwanese independence and any other 
perceived threats to the CCP regime.658  Such methods of social and cultural outreach 
are a means of keeping Chinese nationalism strong in the mind of the OC. 
 
There have also been significant demographic and socio-economic developments that 
have led to the CCP gaining more support in recent years.  The first is the decline of 
the KMT’s grip over OC communities.  The ROC no longer enjoys the monopoly and 
the advantages that it once held over the OC between the 1950s and 1980s.659  By the 
1990s, Taiwan had entered a “competing stage” in rivalry for their support. 660  
Taipei’s attitude towards the OC during the DPP period did nothing to prevent 
strategic laoqiao groups leaning towards Beijing.  Many laoqiao OC communities 
have since either accepted or shifted their support towards Beijing in return for access 
to benefits offered by the mainland.  Furthermore, the OC are no longer reliant on 
Taiwan for financial or political support; they are increasingly urbanized and 
distributed amongst the general population, and more importantly, they are now 
removed from the Chinatowns once dominated by a pro-KMT merchant elite; others 
could not reconcile their pro-KMT beliefs with a DPP ideology, or were alienated and 
frustrated because of Taiwanization.661  China has also taken advantage of Taiwan’s 
                                                                                                                                            
daibiaotuan fang maoliqiusi yu qiaojie diabiao zuotan” (Qiaolian Delegation Visits Mauritius and 
Symposium with OC Representatives) Zhongguo qiaowang, 22 October 2007. 
658 Consulate-General of the PRC in New York, “Zhongguo zhu Niuyue zhonglingshi Liu Biwei chuxi 
Feicheng qiaotuan huodong” (PRC Consulate General to New York Liu Biwei Attends Philadelphia 
OC Organizational Activities) February 19 2006, www.nyconsulate.prchina.org/chn/qwbh/t236227.htm 
(accessed 3 November 2009).  
659 Him Mark Lai, “Organizations Among Chinese in America Since the Second World War,” in Wang 
and Wang, The Chinese Diaspora: Selected Essays Volume 1, 293-344. 
660 Chiao Jen-ho (Minister of OCAC) as quoted by Wang, “OCAC Head Urges Increased International 
Publicity.” 
661 Roger Canfield, “Terror in Chinatown,” New American, 17 April 2006, 
www.thenewamerican.com/artman/publish/article_3676.shtml (accessed 6 April 2007); Li Tu, “Murder 
of Chinatown Leader a ‘Complicated Case’,” Association for Asian Research, 10 March 2006, 
www.asianresearch.org/articles/2845.html (accessed 6 April 2007). 
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relatively poor economic performance and political uncertainty.  State Council reports 
show that Beijing is confident that this trend for the OC to turn away from Taiwan is 
increasing, and has seized upon this opportunity by focusing much of its qiaowu work 
around persuading OC to embrace the PRC.662   
 
There were also specific events that provoked outrage and frustration both inside and 
outside of China after 1989.  These included the 1993 Yinhe Incident,663 Beijing 
losing its bid to host the 2000 Olympics, Lee Tenghui’s 1995 visit to Cornell,664 the 
Belgrade bombing in 1999, and the Hainan spy plane incident in 2001.  The 
perception that Western media was biased only inflamed these feelings.  In 1996, 
various groups of the OC protested against NBC for its anti-China remarks as the 
PRC contingent marched during the opening ceremony of the summer Olympics.  The 
PRC MFA sought an official apology, and the OC media fanned anti-US sentiment.665  
These feelings were again evident during Western coverage of the Olympic Torch 
rallies in 2008.   
 
The most important aspect of all, however, has been Beijing’s exploitation of the 
ethnographic connection and how that is linked to China’s rise.  By drawing upon the 
ideology of loyalty to one’s ancestral homeland, and by virtue of its size, history, 
culture, and rising influence, China has and will continue to have a profound 
influence over the formation of OC identity. 666   For those apprehensive about 
accepting CCP notions of nationalism, qiaowu focuses on China as a potential place 
for work, culture and business.  Thus OC youth work highlight a modern China and 
rich Chinese tradition upon which to reconnect with.  These aspects appear attractive 
to many OC youth all around the world, with popular uptake of state-sponsored youth 
                                                 
662 “Taiwan dasuan dui wo qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo de yingxiang,” 2-3; “Beimei qiaoqing xin 
bianhua,” 1. 
663 In July 1993, US authorities accused the Yinhe of carrying chemical weapons to Iran and forcefully 
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Ocean Development and International Law 36 (2005): 261-289, 
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Lee Teng-hui a visa to make a ‘private’ visit to Cornell University.  See Taiwan Communique, no. 66 
(June 1995), www.taiwandc.org/twcom/66-no1.htm (accessed 1 October 2009).  
665 Wanning Sun, preface to Media and the Chinese Diaspora, ed. Wanning Sun (New York: Routledge, 
2006): xi. 
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tours and programmes.  In accordance with its economic development over the past 
decade, China became increasingly confident in dealing with OC affairs and the OC 
themselves.  For example, when members of the New Zealand Chinese Association 
(NZCA) visited the PRC embassy in Wellington in 2009, ambassador Zhang Limin 
enthusiastically greeted his laoqiao audience with “Welcome home!”667 
 
5.12 Conclusion 
 
The scope for building support for the CCP through qiaowu reconnection efforts is 
continually being enlarged to accommodate a larger target audience.  By focusing on 
religious, emotional and psychological platforms that transcend the traditional cultural 
channels, qiaowu has successfully reached out to important strategic groups.  Qiaowu 
encourages the OC to identify with their imagined national communities through 
active maintenance and celebration of Chinese culture.  In turn, these methods have 
brought more of the OC into China’s embrace by facilitating nationalistic and 
patriotic feeling.  The CCP has reconstructed and popularized a singular PRC-directed 
discourse of Chineseness based upon economic, political, historical and cultural 
factors that are attractive and acceptable to the OC.  The result has produced attitudes 
amongst them that are supportive and defensive of China (and hence its leadership). 
 
Taiwan’s once-dominant relationship with the OC has since faltered, and continues to 
lose ground against a well-resourced and attractive PRC qiaowu effort.  Increasing 
numbers of OC are active in securing access to China for these benefits and as a result 
are not shy to align themselves with Beijing.  In short, overall OC identification with 
Chineseness has become deeper and more pronounced than during any other period in 
the CCP’s history.668 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
667 Zhang Limin (PRC Ambassador to New Zealand), address to NZCA, Wellington, 20 June 2009.  
668 Purnendra Jain and Gerry Groot, “Beijing’s ‘Soft Power’ Offensive, Asia Times, 17 May 2006; 
Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power,” Policy Brief, Issue 47, June 
2006, www.carnegieendowment.org/files/P13-47_FINAL.pdf (accessed 6 April 2007).  
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6.00 Cultural Work: Reconnection 
 
In addition to OC education, the PRC uses various other strategies of engagement to 
reconnect with the OC.  Most of these methods place importance on the notion of 
luoye guigen (literally ‘falling leaves return to their roots’).  Encouraging affinity with 
the motherland has been an extremely successful method of building patriotism and 
sentiment amongst the OC – particularly in light of China’s rise as a global economic, 
cultural and political power.   
 
While the platforms have remained consistent, the target groups and methodology 
have changed over time.  This chapter tracks the development of two specific areas of 
qiaowu: specially organized programmes that maximize firsthand participatory 
experience in China itself; and where direct interaction is not possible, the growth of 
OC media and telecommunications.  Both play a significant role in propagating the 
CCP’s version of Chineseness amongst the OC, and seek to build support for the 
regime.  The phenomenal growth of these two areas of qiaowu highlights the 
acceleration of efforts with key target groups – OC youth, xinqiao, and PRC students. 
 
6.01 Active Reconnection: Tours and Root Seeking 
 
Both Beijing and Taipei have used personal tours and visits as key methods for 
reconnection with the OC.  Taiwan’s efforts sought to attract the OC for opposing 
communism, promoting foreign investment, and advancing substantive relations.  It 
was most successful with attracting participants during the height of the KMT 
years,669 but numbers waned with the onset of Taiwanization.  China, however, has 
gone from strength to strength, by targeting a wider range of OC and providing 
specific groups (huaren and xinqiao, as well as non-Han minorities) with specially 
tailored activities.670  Although more than 50 years have passed since Beijing first 
invited select groups of the OC to the PRC as visitors, the basic premise has not 
changed significantly.  The core aspects and purpose of tours as tools of investigation 
and influence remain the same, as do the themes.  They continue to emphasize 
                                                 
669 17,641 OC went to Taipei for national day celebrations in 1982. “Chinese Overseas Patriotism for 
Their Motherland,” Asian Outlook, November 1982, 20-23. 
670 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 101; Wu, “Jiada lidu pushe yinjin haiwai rencai de “luse tongdao””. 
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cultural and economic opportunity, ethnographic connections, and to challenge 
potential threats to the CCP and China’s national integrity.   
 
Tours to China began on a small scale and have gradually expanded in scope and size 
over the decades.  In the early 1950s, the OC were warmly welcomed back to China, 
either as returned OC or as visitors to see the “superiority of socialism.” Tours were 
an effort to improve their sense of patriotism and unity, engage in socialist 
participation, and to rally against the KMT.671  Their qiaoban minders gave them 
handbooks that outlined how they could embrace and contribute to this effort.672  This 
theme of modernizing China in a socialist context would set the tone of activities for 
the next thirty years.   
 
During and immediately after the Cultural Revolution, restrictions on movement 
meant that OC tourism was limited.  A few OC were approved at the highest levels of 
the CCP to travel and study in China.673  Most other OC wishing to travel to China 
had to be invited by the OCAO directly through official connections; it was also 
possible for invitations to be issued by OC front agencies.  For example, the Overseas 
Chinese Travel Service (later re-named the China Travel Service CTS (Holdings) 
Corporation of China) was solely responsible for OC tourism. 674   Another front 
agency was the OC Bank in Hong Kong, whereby staff with OCAO affiliations would 
ask OC if they were interested in going to the mainland for a visit (sometimes for up 
to a month or more).  A brief interview took place (with questions such as their length 
of time in the host country, field of occupation, and salary to vet their potential for 
contributing to China) before issuing them with the necessary travel documents.   
 
The OC on these early tours were made to feel very important throughout the trip, 
meeting with provincial officials and attending state functions.  However, activities 
were carefully orchestrated, visiting only specific places of importance (such as 
Mao’s birthplace, historic or scenic spots), those that showcased China’s scientific 
achievements, and viewing spectacular cultural shows.  Participants would not 
                                                 
671 “Guanyu guonei qiaowu gongzuo de ruogan zhengce,” 47-65. 
672 Guangzhou guiguo huaqiao lianyihui, Guiqiao shouce (Handbook for Returned OC) (Guangzhou: 
Guangzhou guiguo huaqiao lianyihui, 1955). 
673 Wong, Red China Blues. 
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experience aspects of China that might cause embarrassment, nor were they allowed 
to make private visitations, or conduct one-to-one meetings with locals.675  Visits to 
the ancestral village were also managed.  To ensure this, visitors were accompanied 
and monitored by OCAO cadres (fluent in Cantonese – the dialect of the majority of 
visitors).  Their job was to investigate the OC situation by asking about life abroad, 
exchanging information of cultural interest, and soliciting donations for local 
education, welfare and other charitable causes.676  There was no effort to pressure 
participants with CCP ideology or make undue requests.  Rather, if participants 
appeared bored or complained, they were taken aside, asked why, and the situation 
then remedied.  Participants were to return home with only happy and positive 
memories of New China. 
 
In the late 1970s, OC tourism was managed in the context of the PRC’s rivalry with 
Taiwan.  For example, strategic groups of OC (such as Japanese OC who held ROC 
passports) were encouraged to visit the mainland.  In the early 1980s, China looked to 
cultural tourism as both a platform for reopening to the outside world, and as part of 
the propaganda machine to cement the socialist reconstruction of China in OC minds.  
As one visitor recalled, officials said “You are an Overseas Chinese.  You have come 
such a long way.  We welcome you back.  Besides, your parents must really love 
Chairman Mao and have faith in China to let you come all this way alone.”677  In 1986 
Deng Xiaoping noted that “Chinese living abroad and persons of Chinese descent are 
welcome to come back for a visit.  For one thing, they will be able to understand our 
country better.  For another, they will see what projects they can participate in and 
how they can contribute.  I believe they will enthusiastically support our efforts to 
build the country.678   
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6.02 Xungen – Falling Leaves Return to Their Roots 
 
For many years, thousands of OC root-seekers have made their way to Guangzhou or 
Fujian for cultural reconnection.679  In exceeding the context of conventional tourism, 
root-seeking (xungen) tours serve to complete one’s identity by providing an authentic 
and fulfilling experience.680  Tours are historically and personally significant in that 
the participants actually engage in ritualistic exchange.  Activities include visiting the 
qiaoxiang villages and houses in which their forefathers came from, rebuilding 
ancestral halls, restoring graves, and re-establishing bonds with local government 
authorities (such as receiving honorary positions).  Museums, textbooks and 
publications seek to re-educate the OC with a PRC interpretation of China’s national 
history. 681   China is promoted as one of the great human civilizations with an 
extensive contribution to global history and tradition, and the OC are invited to 
participate in continuing this legacy.682  Propaganda emphasizes common blood and 
strong feelings of family with China.  Participants are likely to receive comments 
about their Chinese attributes – such as their “yellow skin, black hair and common 
blood of the dragon.”683   
 
Most of this work is pursued for economic reasons.  After 1978, advancing 
development was at the forefront of the CCP’s agenda.684  Therefore, qiaowu worked 
to provide information on investment policy and encourage the OC to contribute 
either financially or technically in China.  At the heart of this effort was to use the 
ancestral village as a platform for building better links with the OC.685  Therefore, 
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dedicated offices at the provincial government686 and university level687 worked to 
satisfy OC visitors’ and students’ interest in rediscovering their heritage.688  In 1980 
the CPPCC proposed that “Special Economic Zones” near qiaoxiang areas be 
established on the eastern coastline to encourage FDI from OC.  From discussions 
with Shantou officials in Guangdong province in 1991, senior propaganda official 
Zhu Muzhi noted the importance of using the geographic, cultural and historical 
features of the ancestral village to appeal to OC.  In seeking donations for building 
infrastructure, the OC were not made to feel as if they were being exploited, but to 
believe that their contributions to the village would ultimately bring them benefit 
too.689  In the 1990s, authorities began to increase their scope and targeted those 
beyond the traditional areas of emigration, and established fifteen OC business 
organizations for those originating from other provinces and cities.690  By 2006, under 
the direction of the qiaolian, over 14000 organizations had emerged to embrace the 
OC.691 
 
This work continues into the contemporary period.  The 2004 Blue Book of Research 
Results Concerning China’s United Front Theory listed the key issue that cadres 
should focus upon: enhancing the cohesion of Chinese nationality, cultural identity, 
and hometown sentimentality in order to bring about patriotism and socialism for 
China amongst the OC – with strengthening the attractiveness of the CPP at the heart 
of this effort.692  Moreover, methods have become much more efficient.  For example, 
qiaowu officials carefully monitor the movement of migrants by polling villages, 
researching special directories maintained by OC groups abroad, and inviting business 
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and community leaders to assist.693  The OCAO, together with local government 
authorities under the guidance of relevant CCP Central Committee Departments, work 
together in promoting the flow of economic benefit to the villages and towns through 
better information exchange, personal networks and good relationships.  Cadres 
attract OC to invest, initiate and set up public welfare causes, as well as co-ordinating 
them to meet domestic capabilities and requirements.694  In this manner, root-seeking 
has turned into a successful platform for driving local economies.   
 
6.03 Building Links 
 
In addition to the economic benefits of reconnecting OC, the core objective of visits 
to China is to promote unity and challenge threats.  In this regard, activities seek to 
either strengthen support for the CCP, or otherwise attempt to change their opposing 
views through various soft power techniques.  Qiaowu agencies work actively to 
reinforce pro-China feeling by organizing activities tailored to specific OC groups.695  
These can take the form of forums or conferences, and can attract hundreds of 
participants.  For example, the 2001 New Century OC Associations’ Forum attracted 
over 200 leading OC representatives from 60 countries.  Participants took this 
opportunity to demonstrate their solidarity and loyalty to the CCP and its 
objectives.696  
 
Where the OC may not be so politically inclined, other events seek to embrace them 
through sympathy for China in the face of historical foreign aggression.  For example, 
a festival marked both the centennial of a famous anti-Japanese composer’s birth and 
the 60th anniversary of the end of the war against Japan in 1945.697  A similar event 
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held in Hong Kong in 2005 attracted over 1000 representatives from 100 OC 
organizations.698  In 2002 the Huanghuagang 72 Martyrs Cemetery was renamed and 
designated a “China Overseas Chinese Federation Patriotic Education Centre” to 
commemorate those OC who had returned to China and sacrificed their lives for the 
Revolution.699  Qiaowu activities seek to infuse and romanticize these sentiments in 
order to deepen the nationalistic impact. 
 
Where an overt political connection is not desirable, qiaowu employs indirect and 
seemingly benign contexts for reconnection.  For example, ethnographic connection 
uses various sub-themes, such as promoting culture, business or economic interest and 
exchange.  For example, in 2007 hundreds of well-known artists and experts attended 
a special “Artists Forum” that ostensibly sought to raise cultural standards amongst 
the OC and propagate the “culture of the motherland.”700  It was a UF effort to unify 
OC artists known for producing dissident art. 
 
In the same manner, another development for such xungen events is attracting non-
Han OC.  As part of building national unity, representatives from these ethnic 
minorities are regularly invited to showcase their unique regional music, song, dance 
and art through international arts festivals celebrating the diversity within Chinese 
culture.701  Alternatively, special delegations from the PRC are encouraged to ‘go out’ 
as performance troupes or hold exhibitions to show OC minorities that China is 
benevolent, accommodating and supportive of all its peoples (see Chapter Seven).   
 
Another attempt to reconnect with the OC is through a tangible means of linking 
personal histories with China as the ancestral homeland.  In the late 1990s, the 
GOCAO first proposed the establishment of an OC Museum to be open by 2009 – 
                                                 
698 “HK Holds Meeting to Commemorate Victory of War Against Japanese Aggression,” Xinhua, 3 
September 2005, http://english.people.com.cn/200509/03/eng20050903_206159.html (accessed 1 
October 2009).  
699 GOCAO, “Overseas Chinese & Foreign Affairs.” 
700 “Wenhua Zhongguo, Mingjia jiantan: tuijie Zhonghua wenhua de xinpinpai” (Cultural China Artists 
Forum: Promoting New Brands of Chinese Culture), Qiaoqing, no.23 (23 August 2007): 6-8. 
701 “Delegation of Taiwan Ethnic Minorities to Visit Chinese Mainland,” Xinhua, 19 August 2009, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6732429.html# (accessed 1 October 2009); 
“Jiaqiang qiaowu wenhua gongzuo, xuanchuan hongyang Zhonghua wenhua” (Intensify Overseas 
Chinese Cultural Work, Propagate and Enhance Chinese Culture), Qiaoqing, no. 16 (24 May 2005): 1-
5. 
 158
deliberately coinciding with the 60th anniversary of the PRC.702  In April 2009, shortly 
before the grand opening, the GOACO sent OC associations around the world a letter 
detailing the purpose of the museum, and called on them to promote this project to the 
wider community.  The second purpose was to invite OC associations to contribute 
writings, photographs, models, and other artifacts of historical interest for inclusion in 
its exhibitions.  The letter reaffirmed the important connections between the OCAO 
and OC organizations, and the significant role that OC played.  Qiaowu officials were 
clear that the main purpose of this museum was to invigorate ethnic spirit and 
enthusiasm.703  The museum was effectively a platform for showcasing to the OC 
their role and development in the CPP context of ‘Chineseness’. 
 
The wide scope of activity shows that the CCP is very clear in its intent to unite the 
OC, no matter their origins or political sentiments.  The development of themes for 
tours and interactive projects has moved beyond demonstrating the positive aspects of 
China and its leaders through history and sightseeing.  They have since incorporated 
important aspects of OC lifestyle and interests that can assist with successfully 
grounding a set of emotions and sentiments desired by the CCP. 
 
6.04 OC Youth Work 
 
One of the most important targets for reconnection work is the second and third 
generation youth. 704   As mentioned earlier, PRC OC officials acknowledge that 
managing the youth today will ease qiaowu efforts for the next generation of the 
OC.705  Both the PRC and ROC have made special efforts to work with them for this 
reason.  However, they have only enjoyed mixed results in appealing to them, and 
authorities from both governments have adjusted their methodology accordingly.   
 
The ROC began its efforts through a specially established unit, The China Youth 
Corps (CYC) or Zhongguo qingnian fangong jiuguotuan (China Youth Anti-
Communist National Salvation Corps) in 1952.  It was a KMT propaganda arm to 
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uphold anti-communist doctrine through mobilizing young people into organized 
military training camps.  The KMT directly sponsored the CYC until 1989.  With co-
operation from the OCAC and university student bodies, the CYC organized regular 
Overseas Chinese Youth Study Tours beginning in the mid-1950s for the purpose of 
strengthening ties with OC from a young age.  Tours ranged from twenty days to six 
weeks.  Various government agencies (including the MOE, the OCAC, the Mainland 
Affairs Council and the MFA) supported and almost completely subsidized youth 
work over this period.706  Ministerial officials would personally address participants 
and emphasize their common cultural traits.  For example, during the 1990s, US 
participants (because of their political importance to Taiwan) were told “welcome 
back to your homeland”, despite many of them having no connection at all with 
Taiwan, apart from being OC.707   
 
Activities included cultural immersion in Chinese language, arts and sporting 
activities at a dedicated training facility.  However, the primary objective of the Study 
Tour (up until 2000 at least) was to bolster support for the KMT regime.  Thus visits 
to pro-KMT tourist landmarks (such as the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall and the 
National Palace Museum) promoted the ROC as protector of traditional Chinese high 
culture and arts.  This aspect of the Study Tour was largely successful in awakening 
the Chinese identity within OC youth.  To foster political support (particularly 
important after the ROC lost its United Nations (UN) membership in 1971), 
participants were addressed with overt messages calling for support of Taiwan’s anti-
communist stance and reunification with the mainland, while patriotic activities 
included flag-raising and singing the ROC national anthem.708  However, participants 
mostly dismissed these attempts as propaganda, and the KMT’s efforts to instill 
nationalist spirit amongst them failed to take root.  
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Furthermore, like all of Taiwan’s qiaowu efforts during the 2000s, Taiwanization took 
its toll upon ROC Youth Study Tours.  After the DPP took power, the CYC became 
increasingly independent from the KMT, rejecting KMT-approved candidates for 
leadership positions.709  In 2001, it changed its Chinese name to reflect Taipei’s new 
objectives.710  Up to 2008, its strategy was not to educate youth about the old ideology 
of “One China”, but to encourage learning about Taiwan’s achievements, promotion 
of international co-operation, exchange and interaction between local and OC 
youth.711  Thus while traditional Chinese culture still plays a minor role, the emphasis 
is on raising awareness and interest in understanding Taiwanese native folk culture, 
history, tradition and language – and of course its emergence as a democracy.712   
 
Another consequence of Taiwanization was that laoqiao were no longer the target 
group.  Local politicians criticized the cost of subsidizing the program for foreigners, 
arguing that the money would be better spent on domestic affairs.713  While there was 
a US$15 million endowment for the Overseas Chinese Culture and Education 
Foundation that allows 3000 OC youth to go to Taiwan to attend language and 
cultural seminars, 714  the focus was on Taiqiao children.  Through an OCAC 
sponsored Local and Overseas Taiwanese Youth Action Forum, Taiwan mobilized 
them as part of its international engagement, considering them a key to facilitate 
direct dialogue and exchange, and therefore encourage youth activity in Taiwan’s 
public affairs.715  Because of these moves, laoqiao and huaren youth had little choice 
but to turn to China instead for cultural reconnection during the DPP period.  
 
 
 
                                                 
709 Hsu, “KMT Youth Corps Given ‘Unfair Break.’” 
710 Before 2001, the CYC’s Chinese name was Zhongguo qingnian fangong jiuguotuan (Chinese Youth 
Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps).  After 31 October 2001, it was changed to the China 
Youth National Salvation Corps or Zhongguo qingnian jiuguotuan – dropping the reference to anti-
communism and its militaristic past.  See “China Youth Corps Set to Visit Chinese Universities for 
First Time in 50 Years,” Taipei Times, 27 December 2001, 
www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2001/12/27/117489 (accessed 1 October 2009). 
711 CYC website, www.cyc.org.tw (accessed 1 October 2009).  
712 “Minjindang zhizheng houtai “qiaoweihui” de zhuyao gongzuo ji fazhan fangxiang,” 5-6; 
Application Form for 2006 Overseas Compatriot Youth Summer Formosa Study Tour to Taiwan, 
www.occcroc.org/occc/ApplicationForms/2006_FormosaAct.pdf (accessed 1 October 2009). 
713 Chung and Wang, “Overseas Chinese Policy Unchanged: OCAC Official.” 
714 Taiwan Yearbook 2002.  
715 “Overseas Taiwanese to Teach at English-language Summer Camps,” Taipei Times, 4 June 2004, 
http://th.gio.gov.tw/show.cfm?news_id=21068 (accessed 30 August 2006).  
 161
6.05 PRC OC Youth Work 
 
PRC root-seeking camps for youth first began in 1980 and attracted 158 participants.  
By 1986, this had grown to 5753 from 32 countries.716  In the contemporary period, 
tens of thousands of OC youth participate in various xungen activities.  Often being 
state-funded programmes, they are not designed to extract profit,717 but to influence 
the OC using persuasive techniques known as youjiao jiehe, yujiao yuyou (integrate 
play and education).  The trend of China’s public diplomacy and outreach efforts is to 
foster an image of China as a sincere and responsible country that is committed to 
reform and opening up, that is unified and dynamic, and that upholds equality and 
friendship.  This format has not changed since the earliest tours.  Participants are 
encouraged to learn about China’s opportunities in the hope they will promote its 
interests and strengthen filial relations amongst themselves and with China.718   
 
Goals listed in the Retrospective of Guangdong Province’s Summer Camps for 
Youths of Chinese Descent included:719 
 
1. Propagate Chinese culture and strengthen the national consciousness. 
2. Deepen knowledge of the motherland and strengthen national recognition. 
3. Foster participants’ attachment to their native village and arouse their 
nostalgic emotions. 
4. Intensify co-operation and exchange between Chinese and foreign youths and 
enhance solidarity and friendship. 
5. Advance OC affairs. 
 
Camp organizers employ a work philosophy embracing yiqing dongren, yili furen 
(persuasion through kindness and sound argument), whereby they study the 
differences of their targets (such as demographics, situation, habits and interests) and 
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provide activities and locations that evoke feelings of cultural affinity and common 
cultural heritage while minimizing feelings of distance with China.720  Given that OC 
youth are not expected to be proficient in Mandarin, the focus is not so much on 
classroom learning, but to expose them to firsthand activity and observation in an 
effort to facilitate accelerated absorption of Chineseness.  For example, martial arts 
training involve the learning of wushu values and skill through intensive practice, 
movement of body and mental discipline.721  Campers perform in a cultural show 
attended by OC officials, who inspect the fruits of their investment.722  Participants 
also visit military and scientific facilities.  After spending many days together in this 
environment, these youth enjoy a sense of united Chineseness.723   
 
6.06 Comparison of Youth Work 
 
Both the ROC and PRC efforts to influence young OC have achieved only mixed 
success.  Most participate with an apolitical mindset dominated by social priorities – 
as such, camps are often viewed as subsidized vacations and an opportunity to find 
one’s future spouse.724  These issues frustrated Taiwan’s efforts to mobilize OC youth 
en masse for direct political activism.  Camp activities sometimes did not meet 
participants’ expectations.  For example, instead of learning about their ancestral 
history, they sat through a seminar on local economic development or viewing the 
remains of a spaceship.  In addition, China’s attempt to reconstruct OC youth identity 
was often hampered by conflict with laoqiao beliefs and assumptions, as well as 
participants’ inability to speak Mandarin.725  In short, OC youth (particularly those of 
the second and third generation) hold firmly to their foreign nation-state identities 
with little patriotic PRC sentiment, unlike the portable transnational identities of new 
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Chinese migrants.  As a result, the use of biological, cultural and nostalgic links as the 
basis of forming a PRC-conscious identity was often a failed ritual.726 
 
Over the years, both Chinese and Taiwanese youth strategies focused upon promoting 
ideologically based content.  Both versions sought to reconnect youth with a distinct 
version of Chineseness.  For the ROC during the DPP years, it was about promoting 
Taiwan’s indigenous culture, goals for international status and technical achievements 
abroad in an effort to distinguish itself from China.  For the PRC, camps seek to 
advance their trust of China, educate them about the ‘special characteristics’ of CCP 
leadership and OC policies by dispelling any negative imagery, to guide and influence 
their behaviour, and to raise their patriotic spirit and enthusiasm.727  They can then be 
mobilized, networked and guided along lines of Chinese ethnicity and culture for 
China’s national interests.728  With a better ‘understanding’ of China, OC youth could 
promote progress with national reunification, disseminate Chinese culture, and serve 
as a friendly bridge between China and the world.729   
 
As such, Taiqiao and pro-Taiwan OC youth are specially targeted and invited to rival 
PRC camps in order for them to formulate an ‘objective’ view of China, while 
‘reducing misunderstandings’ owing to their ‘limited’ Taiwanese (or other foreign) 
perspective.  This ‘Welcome In’ approach seeks to challenge foreign propaganda and 
turn them towards Beijing.730  For xinqiao youth, the work has reinforced patriotic 
feelings for China and its leadership; for others who may be more sceptical, camps 
seek to change their perceptions and feelings of alienation from China.731  No matter 
where they were born, OC youth are made to feel as if they have ‘returned home’ as 
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‘children of the dragon’.732  In many cases, this is never a problem – for many OC 
youth, camps and tours are life-changing experiences.733 
 
6.07 Development of Youth Work 
 
In response to these issues, the PRC has returned to the top-down, centralized pro-
active approach over the last decade, reflecting the desire to better manage the 
activities in a context that is free of anything that might detract from CCP objectives.  
OC tours now emphasize activities that have a tangible pay-off either in terms of 
knowledge gathering or profitable enterprise. 734   Camps formerly run by OC 
organizations with financial and logistical assistance from GOCAO had their funding 
withdrawn or reduced under a ‘user pays’ scheme.  OC officials argue that this not 
only relieves financial pressure on Chinese authorities, but by paying their own way, 
they expect that participants have more enthusiasm to learn.735   
 
The proliferation of camps targeted at different types of OC youth shows that there is 
an effort to succeed with youth work.  However, there are some contradictions to this 
effort.  For example, organizers of most state-sponsored events in China now often 
assume that these youth are able to speak, read and write Chinese.736  While laoqiao 
are invited to attend, all promotional material is in Chinese, indicating these camps 
are aimed at xinqiao youth who are more likely to deliver the results expected.   
 
The second approach is to target certain groups who are receptive to embracing a 
PRC-friendly identity, such as elite OC youth, or those interested in arts and culture.  
For example, root-seeking tours for OC adoptees living with Western parents (and 
therefore limited exposure to Chineseness) have the theme “Seeking Roots Through 
Culture, Learning Through Travel” emphasizing daily family life, practical Chinese 
arts and crafts.737   
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In another attempt to reconnect with OC youth, their career ambitions, opportunities 
for personal development and interest in foreign languages serve as an attractive 
platform.738  Qiaoban cadres persuade them to view their ethnicity as an advantage 
during China’s re-emergence.739  For the laoqiao and huaren groups, building positive 
feelings for China in terms of economic, cultural and scientific advancement has been 
successful.  OC youth are interested in going to China for work or study.  For example, 
Vice Premier Qian Qichen remarked that “foreigners of Chinese origin” were 
welcome to share in opportunities brought about by China’s globalization and 
modernization.740   
 
A significant development is the deliberate focus on younger OC.  For example, after 
the early 2000s, the PRC launched a new initiative – targeting those sixteen years and 
under.  This is a pre-emptive attempt to influence OC youth before they have the 
opportunity to participate in rival tours.  These camps remain completely under the 
control of GOCAO, and consist of a selection of pre-arranged tours that include 
specific activities based on cultural, education or sightseeing themes.  Participants 
must follow these schedules without deviation and often without parental supervision.   
 
These methods show the direct hand of the CCP in influencing the development of 
OC communities through their youth.  By targeting specific groups at a younger age, 
their hope is to secure pro-CCP feelings early on, and to foster these sentiments 
throughout their lifetime.  After several years of achieving only limited results, the 
CCP has taken such steps to ensure that future reconnection provides the desired 
outcome.  This move to a centralized approach is also evident in China’s other 
outreach efforts – in particular its efforts to dominate the OC media. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
738 “Jiangmenshi qiaowu gongzuo qiuxin qiubian ‘sanxin renshi’ cheng zhongdian” (Jiangmen City OC 
Work Strive for New Change for ‘Three New Personages’ as Focal Point) Qiaoqing jianbao, 21 March 
2008, 12. 
739 “Zuohao liuhua tongxuehui gongzuo, buduan tuohuang haiwai qiaowu gongzuo de dianyumian,” 
14-16. 
740 “Representatives of Oversea Chinese Groups Meet in Beijing,” Xinhua, 20 June 2001. 
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6.08 Soft Power and the OC Media 
 
Where firsthand participation is not possible, the next best way to reconnect with the 
OC is through the media and other virtual platforms for interaction.  For decades, the 
CCP has used propaganda to influence the perceptions and behaviours of the OC.  
Media work is crucial as a direct method of communicating with target groups, 
seeking to defy the hegemony of host country national culture while attempting to re-
sinicize its audience.741  Beijing’s main objective with the OC media is to encourage 
reunification, encourage nationalist pride and to oppose anti-CCP movements.742 
 
In the 1950s, CCP propaganda techniques included uniting and enlisting OC support 
for the PRC, exposing and opposing the KMT, protecting the OC, expanding relations 
with OC through education and cultural activity, and promoting CCP and Maoist 
ideology through Chinese language publications.743  Content was not so much pro-
communist, but pro-China and respectful of sub-regional culture.  Propaganda 
received by OC groups included official statements in print and radio, or featured in 
magazines such as People’s Pictorials and China Construction.744  As mentioned 
earlier, the activities of Young Tong Shing served in this capacity.  Receiving such 
information was initially popular, but over time, news from mainland Chinese 
relatives informed them of the harsh realities – such as the heavy taxation and capital 
levies imposed upon them, various invasions of freedom (such as forced confession 
and expounding of the Party line) and having to perform demeaning tasks.  Thus, 
although pro-PRC literature was available and accepted by some, it was not widely 
                                                 
741 Supang Chantavanish, “From Siamese-Chinese to Chinese-Thai: Political Conditions and Identity 
Shifts Among the Chinese in Thailand,” in Suryadinata, Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians, 242; 
Chang-yau Hoon, “A Hundred Flowers Bloom: The Re-emergence of the Chinese Press in Post-
Suharto Indonesia,” in Media and the Chinese Diaspora, ed. Wanning Sun (New York: Routledge, 
2006): 112.  
742 Anne-Marie Brady, “China’s Propaganda and Perception Management Efforts, Its Intelligence 
Activities that Target the United States, and the Resulting Impact on US National Security,” (testimony 
to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 30 April 2009), 
www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/written_testimonies/09_04_30_wrts/09_04_30_brady_statement
.pdf (accessed 1 October 2009).  
743 The Indonesian Communist Party was comprised mostly of OC, leading to President Suharto’s 
banning of Chinese-language schools and publications in 1965 – not lifted until 1999 by President 
Wahid.  See Cheung, “Involuntary Migrants,” 57, 61-64. 
744 PRC MFA, “Zhu mianlan lishiguan guanyi shukan fenfa, dianying fangyin ji huaqiao baozhi 
gongzuo de baogao” (Report by the Medan Consulate on the Distribution of Books, Magazines, 
Movies and Newspapers for OC) Archive File no. 118-00560-05, 1956. 
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accepted amongst those communities that tended to prefer staying out of politics, or 
those who wished to be perceived as anti-communist during the Cold War period.745     
 
For most of the latter half of the 20th century, mainstream OC media operations were 
based mainly in Taiwan and Hong Kong (such as the Independence Daily and Sing 
Tao newspapers).  In this period, Beijing’s attempts to forge links with the OC were 
constrained by the ROC’s dominant position.  While there were a few exceptions,746 
the KMT sponsored the majority of OC newspapers in an effort to promote its 
interests and influence among strategic OC communities.747  However, in the wake of 
increased xinqiao migration after the mid-1980s, the emergence of the internet, and 
polarization of the community due to localization of Taiwanese politics, PRC state-
run media concerns were able to break into the market.  These companies not only 
revitalized a stagnant industry, but quickly dominated the key sources of news and 
information by catering to a new generation of migrants, PRC students abroad and 
laoqiao educated in the Chinese language.  The absence of local government 
interference allowed the OC media to develop their own identity.748  Although this 
resulted in a plethora of minor papers catering to local audiences with specific 
content,749 since the late 1990s, free advertorial newspapers distributed by scores of 
PRC-friendly media companies have virtually eliminated Taiwanese and Hong Kong 
backed OC newspapers.750   
 
Research by the Jamestown Foundation in 2001 found that the PRC either directly or 
indirectly controlled three of the four major Chinese language newspapers published 
in the US (Sing Tao Daily, The China Press and Ming Pao Daily).  The fourth (the 
World Journal) had Taiwanese connections that had increasingly given in to mainland 
                                                 
745 In Thailand, PRC support came from leftist newspapers, but members of the OC mercantile 
community denied any connection; in Vietnam, there were no communist papers due to the strict 
authoritarian control over the press, while in Malaya the communist terrorist campaign complicated the 
attitude of OC toward the PRC. 
746 Xiaojian Zhao, “Disconnecting Transnational Ties: The Chinese Pacific Weekly and the 
Transformation of Chinese American Community after the Second World War,” in Sun, Media and the 
Chinese Diaspora, 26-41. 
747 Victor Purcell, “Overseas Chinese and the People’s Republic,” Far Eastern Survey 19, no. 8 
(October 25, 1950): 194-196. 
748 Manying Ip, “Chinese Media in New Zealand,” in Sun, Media and the Chinese Diaspora, 198. 
749 Min Zhou, Wenhong Chen and Guoxian Cai, “Chinese-language Media and Immigrant Life in the 
United States and Canada,” in Sun, Media and the Chinese Diaspora. 
750 Lin Yang, “The Desert is Now Being Flooded: A Study of the Emergence of Chinese-language 
Media in New Zealand” (master’s thesis, University of Canterbury, 2005). 
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pressure. 751   Elsewhere around the world, the sole Taiwanese funded newspaper 
Independence Daily ceased operations in 2005. 752   By 2008, the only notable 
exception in print media able to communicate with OC on a global scale was the 
FLG-backed Epoch Times.  However, this paper lacks credibility and objectivity in 
the eyes of some China-watchers.  The same situation occurs in television media.  
While New Tang Dynasty Television (NTDTV) (also funded by the FLG753 and 
during the DPP years by Taiwanese government agencies 754 ) and Taiwan’s 
Macroview Television remain independent from PRC influence, their broadcast 
reaches only limited sections of the OC diaspora and cannot compete with the wider 
distribution channels that China Central Television (CCTV) and other pro-Beijing OC 
media enjoys.   
 
6.09 Borrowing Ships to Go to Sea  
 
Beijing’s overwhelming dominance over the OC media occurred because of intensive 
qiaowu efforts that have successfully encouraged the OC media to accept PRC 
influence and cultivate a standard discourse that encourages pro-China sentiment or 
demonizes groups that challenge the regime.  ‘Co-operation’ with the OC media is 
one of qiaowu’s core goals.755  Following a meeting of propaganda officials in 1992, 
provincial authorities called upon PRC media companies to establish partnerships 
abroad for exporting more “cultural products” from China.756   This method is known 
                                                 
751 Mei Duzhe, “How China’s Government is Attempting to Control Chinese Media in America,” 
Jamestown Foundation China Brief 1 Issue 10 (November 21, 2001), 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=28481&tx_ttnews
%5BbackPid%5D=191&no_cache=1 (accessed 1 October 2009). 
752 Julie Middleton, “Pro-Taiwan Newspaper Takes a Lengthy Breather,” New Zealand Herald, 12 
March 2005, A8; Joseph Berger, “Newspaper War, Waged a Character at a Time,” New York Times, 10 
November 2003, www.nychinatown.org/articles/nytimes031110.html (accessed 1 October 2009).  
753 Gaiutra Bahadur, “China’s Clash with Reporters Reverberates Here,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 16 
February 2004, www.asianresearch.org/articles/1904.html (accessed 1 October 2009); Szabolcs Toth, 
“Chinese News Network in US Finds Perils of Facing Beijing,” Boston Globe, 24 August 2003, 
www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2003/08/24/chinese_news_network_in_us_finds_perils_of_facin
g_beijing (accessed 1 October 2009).  
754 The 2005 NTDTV New Year Global Gala held in Taipei was sponsored by the OCAC, ROC 
Council for Cultural Affairs, ROC MFA, ROC MOE, ROC Government Information Office and the 
Epoch Times. NTDTV website, 2005, http://newyeargala.ntdtv.com/2005/en/venues/taipei.htm 
(accessed 6 April 2007).  
755 Lin Lin, “Nuli cujin yu haiwai qiaobao guanxi de hexie”  (Endeavour to Accelerate Harmonious 
Relations with OC) Qiaowu gongzuo yanjiu, no. 3, 2008, http://qwgzyj.gov.cn/bqch/142/1149.shtml 
(accessed 23 May 2009).  
756 Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 12, 157, 162; Zhongguo jizhe (China Reporter), “Tigao waisuan 
youxiaoxing de wudian kianyi; “Guangdong Encourages Media to Operate Overseas,” China Daily, 1 
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as ‘borrowing ships to go to sea’ (jiechuan chuhai) – to take advantage of established 
channels to disseminate the CCP’s messages.757 
 
The first strategy was for PRC companies to publish special overseas editions.  For 
example, the China Daily has a special edition printed and distributed in North 
America;758 the Fujian OC Newspaper (Fujian qiaobao) in New York is an off-shoot 
of its parent publication in China (Zhongguo qiaosheng).759  The second was for OC 
companies to join with their PRC counterparts through joint ventures, both in China 
and abroad.  For example, at the Second World Chinese Language Media Forum held 
in Changsha in 2003, OCAO vice president Liu Zepeng encouraged OC media to take 
advantage of the growing market opportunities in China – thus both growing their 
own operations while extending the reach of PRC media throughout the world.760   
 
OC media companies were also encouraged to join state-controlled international 
media groups (such as the World Chinese Language Press Institute, World Chinese 
Media Forum and the World Chinese Newspaper Association).761  As members, they 
are obliged to carry officially approved content from the CCP Office of Foreign 
Propaganda (OFP or duiwai xuanchuan bangongshi) or simply reproduce pro-CCP 
content directly from mainland mouthpieces such as China News Agency (Zhonghua 
xinwenxie) and Xinhua News Service.  In 2007 during the 60th anniversary of the 
establishment of Xinhua’s foreign bureaus, CPD director Liu Yunshan praised it for 
the special role it played in disseminating propaganda overseas.762   
 
                                                                                                                                            
October 2003, www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-10/01/content_269049.htm (accessed 6 April 
2007). 
757 Zhao, Shaoshu minzu huaqiao huaren yanjiu, 304. 
758 “Zhongguo ribao – Meiguoban’ zhengshi chuangkan” (China Daily – American Edition Officially 
Launched), Qiaoqing jianbao, 30 May 2009. 
759 “Fujian qiaobao shikanhao faxing” (Fujian OC Newspaper Journal Published) Qiaobao, 2 October 
2007. 
760 Zhang Yu, “Huawen chuanmei luntan bimu: Liu Zepeng yu liyong diyuan youshi moushangji” 
(Chinese Language Media Forum Concludes: Li Zepeng Encourages Taking Advantage of Superior 
Commercial Opportunities) Chinanews website, 23 September 2006, www.chinanews.com.cn/n/2003-
09-23/26/349925.html (accessed 3 November 2009). 
761 In 2001, Global China Group (owner of Sing Tao group) entered partnerships with Xinhua News 
Agency and the People’s Daily.  See also Barabantseva, “The Party-State’s Transnational Outreach,” 
23.  
762 “Xinhuashe juxing zhuwai jigou jianli 60 zhounian jinian zuotanhui (Xinhua Holds Symposium for 
60th Anniversary of Establishment of Foreign Bureaus), Xinhua, 31 May 2007, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/mrdx/2007-06/01/content_6184004.htm (accessed 6 November 2007).   
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Since 1989, the CCP has acknowledged that heavy doses of outdated indoctrination 
are not productive – rather, its propaganda methods have sought to promote patriotism 
over politics. 763   Therefore, feelings of nationalism and pride for China are 
encouraged as part of a larger external (duiwai) propaganda effort overseen by the 
OFP and implemented by provincial level offices.  For example, the GOCAO 
specifically advises that it should use OC media to enlarge the scope of its own 
propaganda and influence through co-operation and exchange.764  As a result, qiaowu 
officials instruct the OC media to emphasize China-related issues such as traditional 
festivals, geography, village sentimentality, and particularly China’s international 
relations with larger countries.765 
 
This work is not overtly directed by the CPD as with China’s own domestic 
propaganda methods, but like all qiaowu, is euphemistically described as “guided by 
service.” 766   In practice, the CPD manipulates them using techniques that fund, 
influence and manage friendly Chinese media outlets, or using methods that make 
things difficult for dissenters.767  Furthermore, PRC officials work to promote OC 
media companies as part of China’s wider family.  For example, diplomats personally 
visit OC newspapers, meet their editors, pose for photos and praise them for their co-
operation. 768   Officials advise their targets to strengthen their relations with the 
embassy, 769  and consequently, many papers become public relations devices for 
reducing the distance between the PRC and the local community.  These include 
publishing biographic details of consular personalities, news of upcoming embassy 
activities, travel advice and frequently asked questions (such as visa application 
processes).  As the diplomatic face for qiaowu activities, ambassadors and consular 
                                                 
763 Stanley Rosen, “Chinese Media and Youth: Attitudes Towards Nationalism and Internationalism,” 
in Chinese Media, Global Contexts, ed. Chin-Chuan Lee (New York: Routledge, 2003): 107. 
764 GOCAO, “Guangzhoushi qiaowu gongzuo’shiyiwu’ guihua.” 
765 Zhongguo jizhe (China Reporter). “Tigao waisuan youxiaoxing de wudian kianyi.” 
766 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 83, 88-89. 
767 Toth, “Chinese News Network in US Finds Perils of Facing Beijing.” 
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769 “Huawen meiti dangsi gongmian,” (Chinese Language Media Should Embrace Cooperation), New 
Zealand Mirror, 5 May 2006; Wei Ran, “Zhang dashi canguan benbao qiwang Zhongwen meiti 
chuancheng Zhonghua wenhua goujian yulun pingtai,” (Ambassador Zhang Visits Newspaper, Hopes 
Chinese Language Media Can Disseminate Chinese Culture and Construct a Platform for Public 
Dialogue), New Zealand Chinese Herald, 6 May 2006, B3. 
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staff continually seek to raise their profile amongst OC communities.770  As one of 
their first tasks after their posting, ambassadors and consular staff quickly cultivate 
relationships with local media and pro-China organizations by assisting with 
anniversary and traditional celebrations or recognizing members’ achievements. 
 
The domination of Chinese language programming is also the result of funding or 
provision of resources from China.  For example, OC radio stations receive re-
transmission fees for broadcasting content.771  Other incentives include subsidies, paid 
advertising, and access to free content.  To remain economically viable, OC 
newspapers have little choice but to place a good relationship with China over the 
quality of their editorial content and choice of employees and managers.  In return for 
their co-operation, newspapers expect prestige in being associated with diplomatic 
figures and the opportunity to tap into the lucrative mainland market.772  For example, 
local government and OCAO officials treat OC media representatives to 
entertainment and lavish hosting by when they visit China.773  Such successful events 
symbolically reaffirm the strength of relationship between the PRC and the OC 
media.774 
 
Those OC media companies choosing to remain independent or publish non-approved 
content become the targets of an aggressive campaign of elimination or control.  For 
example, in 2000, the consul general of the PRC consulate in Melbourne invited 
media leaders to a dinner during which he repeatedly warned them not to carry FLG 
content, or else have it first vetted by the consulate for approval.775  PRC diplomats 
regularly issue warnings or make threats to advertisers and distributors if they support 
                                                 
770 “Beimei qiaoqing xin bianhua,” 8; Wu, “Jiada lidu pushe yinjin haiwai rencai de “luse tongdao””; 
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Persecution of Falun Gong Overseas,” n.d. www.zhuichaguoji.org/en/upload/docs/State-
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the Epoch Times in any way (see also Chapter Seven).776  Likewise, they instruct 
performers, guests and satellite providers not to co-operate with NTDTV.777  PRC 
authorities blacklist and shut out their reporters from covering pro-PRC functions 
(such as diplomatic events and state visits). 778   Otherwise, the PRC stages rival 
functions designed to confuse participants – sometimes at the same venue, but only 
days or even hours apart.779  The CCP has also resorted to using militant methods 
against the Epoch Times and other FLG practitioners.  Staff have allegedly been 
attacked, newspapers stolen, and key equipment destroyed.780  These efforts aim to 
send a tough message to other OC media about the consequences of acting outside the 
boundaries of what is acceptable to the PRC authorities.  Although qiaowu 
memoranda do not allude to resorting to illegal and violent methods to attack the non-
PRC inclined OC media, they do prescribe using ‘intense pressure’ as the key to stifle 
independent OC media.781  In this oppressive environment, most OC media operations 
conduct self-censorship, constrained by the fear of retaliation if they behave 
otherwise.782   
 
6.10 Managing OC Reporters 
 
As well as influencing the way OC media operates, the CCP also seeks to control 
news production.  In this regard, PRC authorities carefully manage OC reporters 
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visiting China – particularly those perceived as a threat. 783   Those working 
independently and wishing to cover sensitive issues are required to get authorization 
for every reporting trip made outside of Beijing, and if caught without clearance, may 
be subject to detention or expulsion.  Ethnic Chinese reporters can be targeted or dealt 
with more severely than their non-Chinese counterparts.  For example, security 
personnel attacked photographer Ng Han Guan after taking a picture of a colleague 
being man-handled by police in 2004.784  BBC producer Bessie Du and her assistant 
were strip-searched after visiting a riot in Dingzhou in 2006.785  Others may be barred 
from entering China altogether. 786   Despite their ethnicity, those OC reporters 
considered dangerous are treated without sympathy and no different to other reporters 
that threaten to expose issues that may embarrass China. 
 
For those journalists working in China under the supervision of qiaowu minders, a 
more direct but subtle approach is used – mostly by providing regular training and 
guidance.787  Under these methods, cadres treat OC journalists with pragmatism by 
ensuring their “safety and satisfaction.”788  For example, in the early 1990s, cadres 
accompanying their targets were instructed to answer any questions by explaining 
circumstances from a third-party perspective, with essential information delivered in a 
succinct manner free of strong propaganda overtones.789  Moreover, minders were to 
avoid false and boastful statements, regurgitate from script, use excessive pleasantries, 
or appear cold.  Such demands have not changed in the contemporary period.  Qiaowu 
cadres continue to deliver information to their interlocutors in a warm-hearted and 
friendly manner.790   
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The other method to influence OC journalists so that they present a CCP-approved 
version of China is to invite them to participate in international media conferences, 
symposiums and tours that showcase the historical grandeur and economic progress of 
a post-revolutionary ‘New China’.791  Following the 1989 crackdown, there was an 
emphasis to update foreign and OC perceptions of contemporary China, as opposed to 
dwelling on cultural history.792  Their reports were to dispel old conventions, old 
methods, continuously explore and address the needs of the OC.  Since the 1990s, the 
role of the OC media and journalists has been to foster patriotism and united spirit 
amongst the OC by propagating a modern perspective of China, the friendly 
intentions of China and its leaders, issue commentary on global issues, and educate 
the OC about Taiwan policy.793   
 
In the contemporary period, OC propaganda continues to promote this positive image 
of China. 794   Provincial foreign affairs officers tailor activities and locations 
specifically to the different political and environmental perspectives, desires and 
interests of participants.  Journalists are encouraged to write positive, fair and 
objective articles about China in order to improve compatriot connections with China, 
and inform and guide the OC to make more contributions.  For example, minders 
invited reporters to cover preparations for the 2008 Olympics in an effort to portray 
China as “clean” and “civilized” – especially after Beijing’s response to the 2003 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak that consequently damaged 
China’s international reputation.795   
 
Qiaowu therefore manages the manner in which reporters receive information and 
produce content through the selective exposure to only the attractive aspects of China.  
By guiding these processes under supervision and influence, the CCP has controlled 
the most vital stage of the CCP’s outreach to OC communities.  With such influence 
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over the dissemination of mainstream OC news, the CCP has no problem in 
promoting its desired message to a wide audience.  This has certainly been the case 
with its domination of print media.  In order to appeal to the widest possible audience, 
the CCP has also invested heavily in alternative forms of media, in particular new 
technologies such as audio, video and the internet. 
 
6.11 New Technology: Television and Radio 
 
In the past, information had to be relayed through personal oral and written networks 
and the print media.  Now anyone can acquire and transmit information swiftly and 
directly.  New multi-media and electronic platforms have advantages of broader and 
more effective delivery than traditional platforms – particularly for ethnic Chinese 
and second or third generation OC.796  Thus Beijing has sought to produce a “multi-
faceted cultural product” to reach as many of the OC as possible.797  According to 
State Council reports, since the early 2000s, the goal has been to develop the OC 
media into a ‘New Chinatown’ – a comprehensive ‘supermarket’ of Chineseness and 
OC work, which is then used to the full extent (including advertisements and articles) 
in conducting and promoting qiaowu. 798   It uses both indirect methods (such as 
exhibitions on China’s development) and direct methods (such as news media).  OC 
media companies supplement these efforts by tailoring content to suit the tastes of 
local audiences.799  Lastly, qiaowu also attempts to guide these OC media companies 
to connect with and to influence their mainstream foreign counterparts in order to 
improve foreign perceptions of China.800   
 
Qiaowu specialists believe that audio-visual propaganda has been particularly 
effective in reaching out to their audiences. 801   For example, China Radio 
International specifically targets OC audiences by broadcasting in 38 languages, as 
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801 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 87-89; Gao, “Transnationality of Settled Migrants,” 18. 
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well as Mandarin and four other Chinese dialects.802  Similarly, CCTV began a global 
growth plan aimed specifically at the OC in 1992.  A dedicated channel, CCTV-4, is 
broadcast to 98 percent of the world twenty-four hours a day, through satellite and 
cable technology on un-coded frequencies.803  While exact audience numbers are 
difficult to gauge, in 2006 CCTV-4 had over 15 million subscribers (approximately 
one third of the world’s OC population).804  To reach those without subscriptions, 
CCTV purchases time or broadcasts free of charge on local public/private stations, 
and contributes to various US university campus stations.805  An initiative in 2006 
between CCTV, the local embassies/consulates and OC media companies resulted in a 
special television service targeted at OC specifically.  The Zhonghuaqing media 
service (featuring news (both locally and Chinese) as well as arts and culture) is 
aimed at OC and foreign students.806   
 
The CCP’s reach extends beyond its own state broadcasting company.  Phoenix TV (a 
private television company that has a large following amongst both OC and domestic 
elites) gave a ten percent stake to CCTV as a symbolic gesture to show it would not 
oppose the CCP.807  Consequently, while it has a reputation as a more ‘truthful’ and 
‘objective’ alternative to the state broadcaster, it refrains from sensitive stories, 
criticism of party leaders and support for independence or democratic reform, for fear 
of being shut down by censors.   
 
Despite these comprehensive propaganda efforts, qiaowu specialists believe that only 
a minority of the OC actually ‘understand’ China – these mostly being xinqiao 
migrants who have yet to assimilate with mainstream society.  Xinqiao tend to be 
more vulnerable and responsive to nationalist propaganda and ethnic chauvinism than 
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established laoqiao.  This latter group (particularly third and fourth generation OC) 
are understood to have doubts and misgivings about China owing to Western 
perspectives and philosophies.  Special propaganda work is therefore necessary for 
them, given that many may not necessarily have a strong grasp of the CCP version of 
the Chinese situation.808  The emerging popularity of the internet in the late 1990s 
facilitated these ambitions. 
 
6.12 Qiaowu and the Internet 
 
The medium most effective for managing, mobilizing and sustaining a nationalist 
spirit amongst a diverse population of OC has been the internet.  It provides an 
undiscriminating platform for “deterritorialized transnational interaction” whereby all 
OC are able to share knowledge freely.  They are also able to assert, maintain and 
demonstrate cultural and political identification, and hence unified for various causes 
under a sense of virtual Chineseness. 809   For example, news of protests outside 
Indonesian consulates and embassies after the riots in 1998 were spread quickly 
throughout cyberspace;810 in 2005, millions of mainland and OC supported an online 
petition launched by several OC websites that opposed Japan’s bid for joining the UN 
Security Council.811  Furthermore, the internet allows for effective communication 
despite diversity of dialect, culture and interests amongst OC groups and minorities 
by using a variety of local languages and images.812   
 
The PRC has taken advantage of these benefits for much of its modern qiaowu 
communication and mobilization efforts.  For example, xinqiao websites disseminate 
general information, policy, and recruitment details.  Content tends to focus upon the 
strategic issues of OC affairs and development of international relations.813  Laoqiao 
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websites promote ethnic, historical, religious, nostalgic qiaoxiang ancestral issues and 
investment opportunities.814  They include English translations in order to reach a 
larger audience. 815   For example, the GOCAO website provides information 
concerning its services, conducts surveys and has interactive features that welcome 
views, comments, and ideas.816  These websites are, in effect, the modern virtual 
renditions of the Special Economic Zones that appealed to Guangdong and Fujian 
migrants who wished to engage more with China during the early 1980s.   
 
PRC portals and Chinese-language websites (such as Guangdong qiaowang) have 
become the leading sources of mainland and OC news and information amongst the 
OC.817  Some of these websites are linked directly to state-controlled mouthpieces, 
which promote PRC government initiatives, policy and news.  In this manner Beijing 
can pool and co-ordinate various materials onto a centralized server before 
distribution as a standard narrative to the world’s OC for consumption.818   
 
Although the global information age was supposed to have encouraged democracy, 
transparency and freedom of speech, this has not been the case in China.  The CCP is 
able to police and combat threats to its regime by controlling all online content.  There, 
the internet remains tightly controlled under a highly resourced apparatus that is 
supported by laws and regulations, surveillance measures and new technological 
advances so that only the positive benefits of disseminating information is achieved, 
while any negative impacts are minimized.819 
 
The OC, however, are not bound by such state censorship or policing of their online 
activity.  They have the potential to spread democratic change in China.  Nevertheless, 
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the same benefits achieved in China have been successfully exported abroad, and 
accepted by many OC – in particular PRC student and xinqiao groups.  Beijing’s goal 
is to create a “Global Chinese Village” in the hope of unifying the OC as a single 
virtual entity through the internet.820  The ‘red heart’ campaign demonstrated how this 
could be achieved.  The concept of adding a ‘red heart’ next to one’s avatar 
(symbolizing one’s love for China) was initiated by users themselves and later 
adopted as a branding strategy for MSN China.821  Xinhua was fully supportive of the 
effort, calling for netizens to maintain an “open mind against anti-China propaganda 
while keeping patriotic.”822   Many OC responded by adding pro-China and anti-
Western media comments alongside their ‘heart’, and shared videos or songs 
criticising CNN and BBC, such as the “2008 China Stand Up!” video (which first 
circulated domestically on Sina.com and later globally on Youtube) as an effort to 
defend China’s honour.823  Soon after, the most extreme form of online nationalism 
evolved – “human flesh search engines” that tracked down OC ‘traitors’ (those who 
were perceived to support pro-Tibetan or anti-China efforts) in a virtual witch-hunt, 
ultimately resulting in physical attacks.824   
 
These OC netizens have assisted the CCP regime with promoting its political agenda, 
image and objectives throughout the world, and consequently strengthened these 
elements amongst their own communities.  For example, it was through these methods 
that Chinese language websites, blogs and chatrooms provided the detailed 
instructions that were used to rally participants for the 2008 rallies.  They were 
specifically told when and where to meet, how to dress, what to bring, and what to do 
so as to present the Chinese protestors as civilized, friendly and peaceful.825  Similarly, 
PRC students in New Zealand featured postings discussing and organizing protests 
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against Rebiya Kadeer’s visit to Auckland University in 2009.826  In this manner, the 
CCP has been successful in controlling behaviour and influencing perceptions both in 
reality and in virtual cyberspace. 
 
6.13 Conclusion 
 
The aim of qiaowu is to gather support for China and its leaders by getting the OC to 
identify positively with their motherland.  OC reconnection work, whether it involves 
guiding the OC media, through propaganda efforts, or through xungen tours, seeks to 
penetrate and influence OC communities and individuals and instill nationalistic, 
patriotic, or in the least, encourage ethnographic sentiment.  While OC may have 
unrestricted access to news when outside of China, their choice of OC newspapers 
remains very much influenced by pro-Beijing sources.  Moreover, the CCP’s methods 
of reconnection with the OC have become much more sophisticated, utilizing modern 
technologies, adapted for their cultural and economic developments.  The internet has 
been a key platform for not only linking them with China, but also spreading and 
sustaining nationalism abroad.  As a result, domination of these channels means that 
news and perceptions of China are likely to pass through CCP filters before reaching 
their intended audience. 
 
With reconnection activity, while the overall policy suggests that there should be a 
broader reach out to all OC, the actual focus of resources falls on specific groups.  
The reasons are both economic and political.  Root-seeking tours, for example, are 
hosted at huge expense, but may not produce the desired results.  Thus in recent years, 
subsidies have been gradually removed for laoqiao groups.  As well as reducing the 
cost for the host organization, it is hoped that by doing so, participants actually 
engage in a deeper and more meaningful way.  For specific groups that hold promise 
of producing positive results for the CCP, they may enjoy fully subsidized activity.  
These measures also reflect the intensified efforts for centralized control following 
conflicting agendas amongst participants in previous years.   
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This chapter demonstrates that although certain segments of the OC diaspora do not 
respond to qiaowu in the way the CCP may desire, reconnection methods will 
continue to develop as the OC become increasingly diverse and localized.  As such, 
more resources will be required to deal with their larger numbers – necessitating more 
funding and active planning from qiaowu officials.  At the same, there is no shortage 
of eager OC media companies willing to align themselves with Beijing, or OC groups 
wishing to reconnect with their ancestral homeland – allowing Beijing an even firmer 
foothold into the heart of OC communities.   
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7.00 External Work: Threats & Challenges 
 
The OC are a vast network of powerful interest groups and important political actors.  
Some writers describe the OC diaspora as a “Chinese commonwealth,” 827  the 
“Chinese Business Sphere,”828 or simply as part of Greater China.829  The OC play a 
role in shaping the future of China (either culturally or politically) from abroad.830  
They can act as bridges between East and West, as resources for China to draw upon 
in order to strengthen itself, or as defenders of Western or Chinese ideals.831  They 
can also transmit certain values back to their place of origin – as such, their role in the 
Chinese political system (while often only symbolic) offers a channel for influencing 
the construction of OC identity.832  Ultimately, the OC are challengers or supporters 
to homeland policies from abroad.833   
 
In describing long-distance nationalism, political scientist Benedict Anderson argued 
that values and information flowed from the outside to the inside.834  As they become 
increasingly articulate in society, the OC are able to use international relations, 
technology and legislation to maximize, exploit and manage their relationship with 
China for their own welfare, protection and economic advancement.  They are 
therefore a potentially influential force to promote liberal and democratic values, as 
well as freedom of thought and speech within China.835  Could the OC usher in 
democratic reform in China as some commentators have predicted?   
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In 1989, American scholar Francis Fukuyama argued that Western-educated PRC 
students would return to change China.  However, his prediction of democratic reform 
never materialized.836  Returned OC are mostly technocrats who lack commitment 
towards democratic transition.  At most, they serve only to transmit Western political 
values in an indirect manner in their roles as advisors or administrators outside the 
key political and propaganda system.837   Fukuyama later argued that nationalism 
would decline as liberalism and free markets rendered national differences 
irrelevant.838   By extension, economic liberalization and the influence of the OC 
would lead to democratic freedom in China.  The events of 2008 proved yet again, 
that Fukuyama was wrong in his prediction. 
 
Despite its monolithic appearance, claims of homogeneity, and domination of the 
principal means of social control over the OC, the CCP regime is not immune to 
conflict with interstate, trans-governmental and transnational groups.839  As examined 
in previous chapters, the CCP has to contend with rival discourses in its various fields 
of operation.  This section specifically examines those OC groups that challenge and 
oppose the CCP.  As the most important group for China’s growth and development, 
any dissent amongst the OC could be catastrophic for the regime.  Groups requiring 
particular attention include the OC pro-democracy movement, Tibetan Buddhism, the 
Taiwanese independence movement, the Xinjiang independence movement, and the 
FLG movement.840   
 
This chapter examines how qiaowu has sought to prevent OC groups from eroding the 
CCP’s grip on power.841  It describes the various threats to the CCP and the measures 
it uses to oppose them.  While the CCP prefers using enticement and nationalism to 
gain co-operation and control of the general OC population, it also employs divisive 
methods.  For the CPP, this is a long term psychological battle, and focuses on 
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methods of inclusion, persuasion, isolation or elimination – in short, this chapter 
highlights the most extreme forms of qiaowu and describes its implications for OC 
society in the contemporary period. 
 
7.01 Co-optation 
 
In comparison with policies for Turkish migrants in Germany, why has China been 
successful with incorporation of the OC?  One aspect is that the OC are embraced and 
invited to participate in strategic state-sponsored platforms through active co-optation.  
According to Gamson, co-optation can be classified as non-selective (which refers to 
attempts to absorb dissident elements into a common organization) or selective 
(which refers to inducements given to certain individuals or groups in an effort to 
‘divide-and-rule’.)842  In turn, both can employ coercive or consensual techniques, 
advancing either goals of homogeneity or pluralism.  Coercive methods might include 
genocide, expulsion, population transfer, forced assimilation, exclusion or 
subordination; consensual methods include induced assimilation, power sharing, 
coalition or inclusionist methods.843  Of these methods, the consensual approach of 
both selective and non-selective co-optation of the OC within and outside of China 
has enabled the CCP to enjoy high levels of acceptance over the past two decades.  In 
these cases, qiaowu has sought to bring in, influence and subsume targeted groups of 
OC for particular outcomes – mostly to avert threats to its stability and existence.   
 
The manner in which the CCP implements the co-optation of OC groups or 
individuals takes three forms: firstly, ideological (such as the hegemonic Marxist, 
neo-Marxist perspectives that involve co-opting diverse groups into a common belief 
system as proposed by Gramsci, Therbon, Laclau and Mouffe);844 psychological (the 
creation, maintenance and encouragement of common patterns of thought via 
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language and ritual as proposed by Michels and Edelman);845 and finally institutional 
(such as functionalist approaches whereby private individuals, groups or 
representatives are formally incorporated into state decision making as advisors, 
informants or colleagues as proposed by Selznick).846   
 
Qiaowu mechanisms conduct these forms of co-optation through two platforms: 
formal (such as the OCAO, which exists to establish the legitimacy of authority and 
administrative accessibility for the relevant audience); or informal (such as bestowing 
honorary titles on elite OC in order to adjust to the pressures of power within the 
community to suit the CCP).  To support these mechanisms, the CCP has established 
various ‘front’ organizations to create public solidarity and to legitimize their 
representation of government.  These state-sponsored specialist organizations seek to 
promote and defend linguistic, cultural, religious and economic interests in both host 
and home countries.847  As described in Chapter One, these agencies fall into Soysal’s 
statist-corporatist model of action and authority. 
The crux of co-optation is that the sharing of power is not substantive.  While it may 
appear that the OC enjoy a high level of prestige with links to the highest echelons of 
power, such status is only symbolic.  Actors from the OC community play only an 
advisory role in the policy making process.  As mentioned earlier, functional power is 
retained within the State Council, its ministries, and the CCP.  This aspect of 
corporate pluralization gives the OC community the feeling that their interests are 
being taken into account, while the elite decision makers receive a greater diversity of 
views.  Co-opted elements must remain under control so as not to encroach upon the 
actual arena of decision making.  In this capacity, the CCP has been largely successful 
with formal, informal, selective and non-selective co-optation both within and outside 
China.  As this chapter demonstrates, the CCP’s relationship with the OC varies at 
two extremes – warm and inviting to those it wishes to strengthen and maintain 
relationships with, and aggressive towards those it perceives as threats.  Various 
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academics have identified such engagement as “extending ethnic chauvinism,” or the 
“projection of an authoritarian regime’s influence beyond its borders.”848  
While China may attempt to persuade guiqiao that they are returning to a country that 
warmly welcomes them, the many incentives and privileges offered to attract them 
target only those who can contribute in the ways specified by the CCP.  Given that 
guiqiao are mostly back in China for career, family, education and business reasons, it 
is unlikely that they would wish to sabotage future opportunities for their 
advancement by engaging in sensitive activities.   
 
Domestically, the CCP has taken measures to ensure that guiqiao and OC investors 
serve only to advance China’s economic policy, but not its political reform.849  To 
prevent them from inciting any undesirable behaviour once back within China, 
authorities seek to manage them by organizing various gatherings.  Qiaowu cadres 
design activities to promote pro-CCP, pro-China and pro-socialist ideals in order to 
‘satisfy their political needs’ while stifling undesirable ‘outside influences’ and 
spreading liberal views.850  Various qiaowu agencies promote benefits and policies to 
returned OC through ‘OC Laws Propaganda Months’ (qiaofa xuanchuan yue).851  
Other economic and social organizations (such as the Chamber of Commerce of the 
Western Returned Scholars Association, Chinese Merchants Association, China 
Association for the Returned Overseas Chinese and Association for Chinese Students 
Returning from Abroad) function to draw returned OC together under semi-official 
groupings monitored and regulated by the Party-State.852  These are inclusive methods 
to strengthen a CCP-friendly attitude amongst the guiqiao population.   
 
Co-optive approaches have worked somewhat differently for huaren OC outside of 
China.  Overt support for China and its leaders is limited to those groups or 
                                                 
848 Benedict Anderson, “The New World Disorder,” New Left Review (1992); Nina Glick Schiller and 
Georges Fouron, “Terrains of Blood and Nation: Haitian Transnational Social Fields,” Ethnic and 
Racial Studies 22, no. 2 (1999): 340-366; Basch, Schiller, and Blanc, Nations Unbound, 3.   
849 He, “Returned Students and Political Change in China,” 5-29. 
850 “Woguo Dalu renkou guoji qianyi de xianzhuang, qushi ji xiangguan duice jianyi” (Current 
Situation of China’s Global Migrant Population, Countermeasures and Recommendations for Trends 
and Implications), Qiaoqing, no. 24 (5 September 2007): 18. 
851 “Quanguo gedi kaishi ‘qiaofa xuanchuan yue’” (‘OC Laws Propaganda Month Begins Everywhere 
Throughout China), Qiaoqing jianbao, 20 September 2004. 
852 He, “Returned Students and Political Change in China,” 5-29; Wang, Wong and Sun, “Haigui: A 
New Area in China’s Policy Toward the Chinese Diaspora?” 300-301. 
 187
individuals wishing to curry favour for personal prestige and status, seek self-interest 
and ingratiate themselves with diplomats.  For example, to deepen their links with 
PRC officialdom, several OC groups in NZ preferred to give their Sichuan earthquake 
donations directly to the PRC embassy itself, rather than to the charitable 
organizations doing the actual work.  Similarly, OC businesses wishing to develop 
market opportunites in China seek favour with the CCP by contributing materials or 
funding for various OC activities.  Such relationships only serve to enhance personal 
favouritism towards a select group of OC and boost only their individual egos, rather 
than facilitating outright political influence amongst entire OC communities.   
 
As noted in Chapter Three, mobilizing the OC for political involvement is largely 
hindered by a lack of interest.  The laoqiao OC in the Pacific region are a good 
example of this.  Historically, although there were pockets of strong support amongst 
some OC for the KMT, others were mostly indifferent towards the cross-strait rivalry 
between China and Taiwan.  The majority preferred to integrate with the local 
lifestyle free of interference.853  Rather than being manipulated, the majority of OC 
actively use their ethnicity and heritage for their own political and economic gain.  Sir 
Thomas Chan and son Laurie Chan of the Solomon Islands, Sir Julius Chan of Papua 
New Guinea (PNG), and Jim Ah Koy of Fiji have all used their Chineseness to benefit 
their political careers.  While their ethnicity might work to facilitate their 
government’s relationship with China and/or Taiwan, they themselves are clearly not 
political pawns. 
 
The central tenet of co-optive strategies is the existence of sufficient common 
interests and opinion amongst potential allies. 854   The aligning factor is often 
economic or business interest.855  For example, while guiqiao may respond positively 
to certain policies and activities, patriotism and ethnographic connections are not the 
sole reasons for OC wishing to return to China.856  Research by Zweig, Chen and 
Rosen in 2004 found that it was economic opportunity that mostly attracted haigui – 
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the desire to contribute to China played only a limited role.857  Similarly, an All China 
Youth Federation survey in 2005 showed that the decision of returning to China after 
study abroad was based more upon practical considerations.  Respondents cited 
preferential policies, a growing economy, familiar culture and reuniting with family 
as attractions.858  Another study in 2006 found that 88 percent of OC surveyed wanted 
to return to China, but 40 percent of those would only do so if they could earn at least 
10,000 yuan a month (five times Beijing’s average income).  Returned OC either 
found it difficult to find a satisfactory job, or refrained from doing so because of their 
excessive expectations.859  As such, huaqiao keep their options open by treating their 
PRC nationality as a tool of economic convenience.860  As noted earlier, some OC 
prefer to be naturalized abroad but insist on keeping their PRC citizenship in order to 
maintain the benefits it accords.  Others have returned to China and renounced their 
foreign nationalities to be able to work there. 
 
Therefore, demonstrating political support for the CCP (either through involvement or 
identification with Chinese authorities) occurs as a pursuit of business opportunity, 
rather than a conviction to Chineseness or assumed Han chauvinism.861  Ong and 
Nonini described this phenomenon as a Third Culture of mobile and varied 
Chineseness that formed an ‘ungrounded empire’ evasive of any manipulative state 
power.  This mobile identity does not depend on loyalty to Beijing, or any other 
nation-state or civilization-state, but rather the continual desire to seek economic 
opportunity in other various locales.862  In these cases, Beijing’s co-optive approach 
with these groups of OC, while succeeding with achieving economic objectives, 
largely fails with gaining the political loyalty of the majority. 
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7.02 Coercion of the OC 
 
For those OC posing a threat to China and the CCP, coercive approaches may be 
required to ensure control both domestically and externally.  While their ethnicity 
may provide them convenient access into and throughout China, OC visitors to China 
do not necessarily receive protection if they come into conflict with state interests.  
Those OC acting outside parameters defined by the CCP may find themselves the 
subjects of scrutiny.  Their ethnic origins, irrespective of their nationality, mean that 
their activities could be perceived as treacherous or traitorous behaviour, and 
therefore subject to even harsher treatment than their non-Chinese counterparts.  In 
these cases national security officials take over from qiaowu cadres, and use 
aggressive management techniques in an attempt to prevent any undesirable activity.  
Those accused of crimes undergo “returnee interviews” and warned about how they 
should behave (and threatened with consequences to their family in China should they 
not oblige).863   
 
Over the past few years, there have been numerous examples of visiting OC 
academics, journalists, writers and businessmen involved with matters considered as 
‘sensitive.’   MSS officials accused them of spying by and dealt with them under 
China’s strict rules and procedures.864  For example, authorities charged David Wei 
Dong and Zhao Yan of leaking state secrets during their trips to China.865  Journalist 
Ching Cheong was arrested when trying to obtain the memoirs of former pro-reform 
leader Zhao Ziyang.  Authorities argued that he had set up a spy network and sold 
military secrets to Taiwan.  He was eventually given a five-year jail sentence for 
espionage.866  NZ reporter Sun Gang (representing a pro-democracy group called the 
China Federation Party) was accused of intending to “commit violent and terrorist 
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acts” by exploding a hot air ballon over Tiananmen Square and scattering pro-
democracy leaflets.867  In 2004, Wang Bingzhang (an American advocate of labour 
rights in China) was kidnapped during a visit to Vietnam and forcibly transported to 
China, detained by PRC authorities, who charged him with terrorist activities.868 
 
Chinese authorities have arrested or imprisoned hundreds of other OC for economic 
crimes (such as tax evasion or bribery) – often as retaliation for business deals that 
have caused embarrassment for the State.  For example, under the direction of MSS 
officials who accused him of embezzlement following a dispute with a state-owned 
company (linked to the niece of Deng Xiaoping), triads kidnapped Australian James 
Peng Jiandong in Macau and spirited him to the mainland in 1993.  Despite 
insufficient evidence, the Chinese court sentenced Peng to eighteen years in jail but 
eventually freed him six years later.869  Unfortunately, the plight of these OC is hardly 
given any media attention, and victims suffer in silence.870  Since April 2001, the US 
State Department has issued a travel advisory to China-born American citizens and 
green card holders to take care if they had Taiwanese links, or engaged in activities 
critical of Chinese policies.871   
 
In short, these OC are not necessarily the beneficiaries of a warm embrace as widely 
promoted by the state.  Instead, they are considered as suspicious threats, and 
sometimes used as convenient scapegoats.  The CCP rewards those OC who play by 
the rules for their co-operation and silence, while those who fall outside of favour face 
severe consequences.   
 
7.03 The OC Pro-Democracy Movement 
 
After the Tiananen Incident, the CCP sought to aggressively eradicate, prevent or pre-
empt subversive discourses amongst the OC diaspora that challenged its objectives – 
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the foremost at the time being the OC pro-democracy movement.  Many student 
dissidents either escaped or were sent into exile.  They ended up in different 
universities all over the world and formed a variety of organizations.  Despite being 
outside China, these OC still constituted a potential threat to the CCP and were 
closely monitored.  The MSS dispatched agents as students, faculty members or 
business people to check their behaviour and correspondence, report on their activities, 
and directly warned or threatened with retaliation by pressuring their families in 
China.872   While there are some OC academics who are not intimidated by these 
actions, many practice self-censorship or at least demonstrate conservatism in order to 
maintain access to fieldwork in China and to avoid retribution, banishment or 
detainment.873    
 
The attempt by exiled Chinese student dissidents to establish a unified democratic 
movement abroad failed due to infighting, rivalry and recrimination between the 
leading antagonists.  By actively isolating their leadership and preventing individual 
organizations from consolidating, Beijing had implemented a successful ‘divide and 
conquer’ strategy.  Eventually, many activists lost their influence or lacked the 
capacity to lead – either because of the conditions of their release, or because they no 
longer felt an interest to promote their former political ideals.  Ultimately, without a 
charismatic leader, the democratic movement suffered.  Despite efforts to re-organize 
in the late 1990s (such as the Wei Jingsheng Foundation and Overseas Chinese 
Democracy Coalition), the movement remained fragmented and polarized due to 
individual personalities and rivalry for financial resources.  Dissidents accused each 
other of self-aggrandizement and self-interest.  Amongst the wider diaspora, many 
OC had grown dubious and disheartened of their ability to lead a successful 
campaign.874   
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Some of those who were once critical of the CCP during the 1990s have since fallen 
back into the embrace of ‘new’ China – reflecting the success of various co-optive 
strategies described above.  While some OC remain critical of the CCP over its 
human rights record and attitude towards religious freedom, most prefer a 
“constructive engagement” with China for commercial and political interests. 875  
Moreover, the memories of the older generation who experienced firsthand the wrath 
of communism have faded, preferring to see stability and economic development in 
China rather than bloodshed.876  Since 1989, many former activists are finding ways 
to use their overseas skills in China.877  Beijing has offered them material wealth and 
status, diluting their criticism for the regime and ideals for democracy.878   
 
7.04 Grand Unification Nationalism 
 
In addition, Taipei’s efforts to spread democracy amongst the wider OC community 
were largely unsuccessful due to a limited target audience, a lack of frontline 
diplomatic resources, and a much stronger PRC qiaowu effort.  The state of Taiwan’s 
own domestic political situation had weakened and was polarized as a result of 
Taiwanization.  Although it actively supported some activists, scholars and students 
who sought asylum abroad, in many cases the DPP funded only those dissidents 
making pro-independence demands.  Similarly, while the OCAC sought to extend its 
qiaowu to xinqiao and their associations following increased migration from mainland 
China,879 it only provided them with service if they were willing to support and 
recognize Taiwan.  Other attempts to influence OC academics and students abroad 
through the Mainland Affairs Council were quite limited, given most OC students had 
PRC links and Taiwan student numbers were extremely conservative in comparison.  
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The students themselves were critical of the lack of formal relations with TECO 
officials. 880   Taiwanization had left Taipei without the flexibility and resources 
required for dealing with these OC and sustaining a meaningful democratic movement. 
 
Even Western liberalist ideology failed to unseat many OC from their nationalistic 
support for China’s leaders.  In 2003, the ROC OCAC dispatched representatives to 
North America in an effort to raise awareness of democracy amongst the OC by 
promoting Fukuyama’s theories mentioned earlier.  However, the majority of pro-
Beijing OC refused to accept Taiwan’s right to self-determination as they staunchly 
supported the CCP discourse that argued sovereignty and economic development 
were more important than democratization.  This was the result of years of previous 
counter-subversion efforts by the CCP.  In response to the DPP and its calls for 
Taiwanese independence, qiaowu cadres had been particularly active since the early 
2000s by sending their own delegations to liaise with OC communities to promote 
peaceful reunification.881  Beijing’s qiaowu effort with these xinqiao and PRC student 
groups were extremely successful in sowing seeds of “grand unification nationalism” 
amongst the OC.882   
 
7.05 Challenging Taiwanese Independence 
 
While dealing with pro-Beijing groups is never a problem for China, attempting to 
persuade rival movements to accept and embrace the CPP is another matter.  Such a 
task focuses resources on a long term battle employing sophisticated psychological 
tools implemented using varying degrees of aggressiveness.  The leading example of 
such techniques can be found in China’s anti-independence efforts amongst Taiqiao 
and pro-Taiwan OC.  Of these, peaceful reunification has been the core focus of 
qiaowu.  The Taiwan issue is fundamentally linked to the CCP’s legitimacy and 
survival and therefore elevated to the highest level as a nationalist project.883  While 
the CCP argue this issue remains an internal concern, with sufficient support of the 
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OC, China can claim their loyalty and legitimacy over Taiwan.884  Qiaowu officials 
consider the OC as an external key to influencing Taiwan’s domestic political 
direction.885  According to CCP leaders, reunification is the “strong aspiration of the 
entire Chinese people and a firm will of all Chinese at home and overseas.” 886  
Irrespective of their origins or political orientation, as “sons and daughters of the 
Dragon,” the CCP calls upon all ethnic Chinese to support the principle of peaceful 
reunification, to oppose Taiwanese independence,887  and to accept Beijing’s ‘one 
country, two systems’ policy.888   
 
The PRC’s ‘grand unification nationalism’ strategy comprises of three main themes: 
convincing the OC that they are family, winning over the moderates, and converting 
the hardened ones to accept reunification.  The CCP established various pro-Beijing 
and pro-unification organizations amongst OC communities around the world for the 
purpose of opposing and challenging Taiwanese independence movements.889  For 
example, there are 170 branches of The Peaceful Reunification of China Association 
(PRCA) in over 80 countries.  All of them are actively funded and resourced by the 
PRC in co-ordination with qiaowu agencies,890 including the China Council for the 
Promotion of Peaceful Reunification, OCAO, and an army of diplomatic staff.  
Embassies encourage the OC media to report on PRCA activities and distribute these 
statements to foreign government agencies and media outlets.891 
 
Groups such as the PRCA seek to convince Taiqiao that the PRC embraces them as 
their own friends and compatriots and that there should be more friendly 
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exchanges.892  Furthermore, another major theme of this work is to propagate Chinese 
culture, friendship, sentimentality, blood links, and village connections893 in the face 
of Taiwanization.  For example, organizations such as the China Mazu Cultural 
Exchange Association work to improve relations between Taiqiao and China as part 
of religious exchange and building links with the ‘homeland’.894  Qiaowu seeks to 
encourage the OC to “advance the PRC/CCP stance and thinking, and reducing 
mutual misunderstanding”895  and spur emotional nationalistic patriotism based on 
common ancestry.  By strengthening exchange and mutual understanding, Beijing 
hopes that the world’s OC can come together “hand-in-hand, heart-to-heart”.896 
 
7.06 Winning Over the Middle Elements 
 
During the DPP years between 2000 and 2008, China viewed Taiwan’s own qiaowu 
effort as promoting an alternative discourse that directly threatened China’s national 
integrity.  PRC analysts correctly noted that as long as Chen Shui-bian was in power, 
the quest for Taiwanization would continue.  They argued that the ROC would retain 
the OCAC only for ‘grassroots’ and ‘Track 2’ diplomacy that promoted Taiwanese 
independence and a pro-Taiwanese spirit.  Furthermore, cultural centres, propaganda, 
influential OC and political bodies promoting independence would receive more 
resources and actively mobilized for these purposes.897   
 
One of the political bodies given official support was the Global Alliance for 
Democracy and Peace (GADP).  Although they initially rejected challenging groups 
such as the PRCA,898 DPP officials had initiated plans for an (albeit controversial) 
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anti-communist movement after taking power in 2000.899  The GADP was eventually 
established in 2002 as an OCAC-sponsored off-shoot organization to promote 
Taiwan’s pursuit of freedom, democracy, and human rights in major cities around the 
world.  GADP members were mostly pro-DPP Taiqiao and those seeking closer 
relations with the Taiwanese government.  It received financial and administrative 
support for 99 branches of the Alliance in 49 countries.  The GADP was effectively 
another diplomatic voice for a DPP-led Taiwan, and an overt political challenge to the 
CCP.  As such, the GADP lent support to the FLG movement, and enjoyed friendly 
relations with other anti-CCP groups, such as Chinese democratic and Taiwanese 
independence movements.900 
 
In the face of these pro-independence developments, Beijing quickly began intensive 
‘pro-unification’ work through a wide range of programmes under the co-ordination 
of PRC consulates and embassies.901  They encouraged OC groups to increase their 
participation in embassy activities and cultural events.  In addition, through various 
cross-strait cultural, trade and technological exchanges (such as forums, 
demonstrations, exhibitions and tours), the CPP attempted to cultivate warm feeling 
for China amongst Taiqiao experts, academics, youth and business people as fellow 
compatriots.902 
 
In response to the middle elements (that is, pro-reunification pan-Blue laoqiao and 
Taiqiao) qiaowu work sought to change their interpretation of “One China” from that 
of ‘Republic Of China’ to ‘People’s Republic of China.’903  Efforts to promote the 
PRC had to be gentle, without raising feelings that might be supportive of Taiwan.904  
Techniques included mobilizing groups to issue press releases, hand out pamphlets, 
and engaging local media to reveal the ‘truth’ surrounding Western-dominated society, 
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and explain and justify the CCP perspective.905  These methods were complemented 
with efforts to foster patriotism amongst the OC community (such as PRC national 
flag raising or glorifying the Beijing Olympics) while actively isolating or 
extinguishing Taiwanese ‘independence’ by rousing dissatisfaction for a DPP-led 
Taipei (such as criticizing the “Three Classifications” announcement or arguing 
Taipei cares only for Taiqiao and not other OC).  Some of the PRC’s more aggressive 
efforts to persuade the OC to turn to Beijing included weakening or eliminating 
Taiwanese diplomacy abroad.  These included propaganda measures to actively and 
publicly attack Taiwan and to sabotage its ‘plot’ for independence.906  For example, 
the PRC claimed that “international anti-China forces” seeking to threaten peace and 
stability in the region and damage OC interests were amongst those supporting 
Taiwan.907 
 
Another part of Beijing’s Taiwan policy was to fight efforts to internationalize its 
situation by emphasizing that it was a domestic matter.  By breaking down Taiwanese 
consciousness both in Taiwan and abroad, China moves closer to achieving its goal of 
reunification.  For example, state-controlled media coverage of KMT visits to Beijing 
in 2005 served as ice-breakers for promoting closer cross-strait relations and party-to-
party exchange, compatriotism, and a “new face of Taiwanese leadership and wisdom 
at the highest level.”  Such reports attempted to persuade the OC of Taiwan’s “official 
change” in position towards China.908 
 
In addition, Beijing also attempted to persuade Taiwanese and Taiqiao of China’s 
concern and warmth for them and their livelihoods.  PRC statements and media 
reminded Taiwanese compatriots that they were entitled to the same protection 
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offered to all Chinese nationals.909  Examples commonly cited by officials include 
evacuating ethnic Chinese out of Kuwait in 1990, extending sympathies to Taiwanese 
affected by the Hanshin earthquake that hit Japan in 1995, and assisting Taiwanese 
during the civil war in Cambodia.910  Pro-PRC media followed these propaganda lines 
closely in order to persuade pan-green (pro-independence) Taiqiao of China’s 
benevolent intentions.911  In 2009 the PRC actively supported and encouraged OC 
efforts to help Taiwan on humanitarian matters, such as typhoon Morakot.  For 
example, it approved and encouraged OC communities to fundraise for victims and 
had its embassies set up bank accounts for lodging funds (despite TECO already 
having its own facilities in place). 
 
7.07 Transformation Work 
 
Despite all of its efforts to win the support of Taiwanese compatriots and Taiqiao, 
Beijing believed that the ‘independence’ movement still remained strong amongst 
certain OC groups.  Amongst the largest of these pressure groups are the World 
United Formosans for Independence, Formosan Association for Public Affairs, and 
the World Taiwanese Congress.  Their primary goal is to advance a non-Chinese 
identity amongst Taiwanese state-owned corporations, overseas representative offices 
and within government itself.  They were particularly active in the US in the late 
1990s and 2000s, where they lobbied to boost arms sales to Taiwan and campaigned 
for high-level government officials to visit the US.912   
 
In response to these groups, qiaowu cadres considered that most of their work was 
targeted too narrowly and having effect on only a few; furthermore, efforts to 
influence those inside Taiwan and to win Taiqiao hearts were neither direct nor overt 
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enough – there needed to be more diverse and deeper work at the mainstream level.913  
In situations where these OC could not be welcomed or persuaded to side with Beijing, 
they were to be ‘transformed.’  Transformation work (zhuanbian)914 aims to ‘liberate 
the thinking’ of hardened pro-Taiwan laoqiao, pan-Green Taiqiao, and Taiqiao 
communities with robust connections to ROC investments, politics and industry by 
propagating the “One China” policy, persuading them to “advance the PRC/CCP 
stance, and reducing mutual misunderstanding.”915  It is a global campaign to siphon 
off sources of traditional support for Taiwan, by using intensive propaganda programs 
and generous financial incentives to entice them to switch allegiance.916   
 
‘Transformation’ work began in the 1970s as ‘Welcome In’ strategies for Taiqiao 
following the Diaoyutai Island protests in which thousands of OC students (mainly 
Taiwanese in the US) rallied against Japan over the disputed territory.917  The CCP 
seized on this opportunity to utilize OC with ROC links as intermediaries to spread 
“peace talk” about Taiwan.  Beijing offered US Taiwanese incentives to study in 
China, while using ping-pong diplomacy to attract Japanese Taiwanese to Beijing.918  
At that time, Chinese officials openly promoted the idea for Taiqiao and OC to go to 
the PRC in order to better understand mainland China and its ways of life.919  This 
also served as a method to investigate these groups following their return and to 
improve work methods with them.920  In 1973, China encouraged 50,000 stateless OC 
in Japan to adopt PRC citizenship as an effort to improve relations with the large 
Taiwanese community there.921   
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Those OC with strong links to pro-Taiwan organizations have leading roles in this 
effort.922  Qiaowu delegations travel to strategic areas such as the US and Japan, and 
encourage pro-unification Taiqiao groups to contact with the mainland and lobby 
their government for speedy reunification. 923   For example, Malaysian OC who 
studied in Taiwan tend to maintain strong relations with TECO and Taiwan.924  By 
capitalizing on good relationships with them, the aim is to build a consensus of 
‘peaceful reunification’ and ‘anti-independence’ amongst these OC, and then to 
mobilize them externally in order to promote these goals internally within Taiwan.925   
 
Like other forms of of qiaowu, ‘transformation’ work is an intensive psychological 
effort that involves smooth, quiet, subtle and imperceptible methods for challenging 
Taiwan’s own qiaowu efforts and promoting positive feelings about the PRC.926   
Cadres seek to gain and consolidate trust amongst their targets, actively manage them, 
and supervise their behaviour under the ‘Three Dos and Don’ts’ principle mentioned 
earlier.  For example, tactics at cultural events include actively engaging with pro-
independence OC and reducing their sense of distance with China, and encouraging 
intensive mutual exchange while accommodating and respecting their political 
attitude.  Such efforts seek to persuade and influence them into doing things 
supportive of China without actually realizing it.  These tactics are essentially a 
bombardment of small soft power efforts to reduce Taiwan’s scope of activity and 
influence.927 
 
Transformation methods have been very successful. By integrating methods of co-
optation and coercion, the CPP has managed to attract support, isolate, or threaten 
various interest groups concerned with the Taiwan issue.928  In 2005, one of Chen 
Shui-bian’s strongest corporate supporters switched over to Beijing, praised its anti-
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secession law and backed the one-China policy.  Other Taiwanese business 
associations also looked to China as their future and criticized plans for 
independence. 929   Where transformation has not been so fruitful, the PRC has 
attempted to spread negative sentiments and sabotage Taiwan-organized events.  For 
example, it was successful in putting pressure on preventing pro-independence 
activity and shutting down a local independent newspaper in Fiji.930   
 
7.08 A Conditional Relationship 
 
After Ma Ying-jeou won the ROC presidential election in 2008, the threat of 
Taiwanese independence eased significantly.  Ma demonstrated his willingness to 
concede to Beijing’s demands by changing the ROC’s nomenclature in return for 
observer membership in international bodies (such as the World Health Organization 
and Asian Development Bank), preventing the display of symbols demonstrating 
Taiwanese nationhood during a visit by PRC officials,931 and refusing to meet with 
pro-democracy activists.932  Furthermore, although it had previously enjoyed a close 
relationship with anti-CCP OC groups (such as the Free China Society),933 TECO and 
the OCAC have since reassessed its position with such groups.  For example, the 
newly appointed OCAC minister Wu Ying-yih was clear that his Commission would 
cease giving an annual subsidy of US$100,000 to the GADP for its political 
activities;934 similarly, TECO indicated that it would no longer support the FLG and 
pro-Tibet movement despite their repeated requests for assistance.935   
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These warmer sentiments towards the PRC at the state level have also been 
encouraged at the grassroots level.  In May 2009, Ma called for the confrontation 
between rival OC groups to end by saying that “we won’t oppose OC groups, which 
support us, to engage with China.”936  Consequently, the first steps towards improving 
relations took place in the form of an agreement between Taipei and Beijing based 
returned OC that suggested a series of forums, visits and other forms of co-operation.  
This apparent détente between the two Chinas resulted in diplomats from both sides 
considering organizing joint celebrations for traditional festivals.937  However, these 
developments do not suggest that qiaowu efforts to isolate Taiwan are no longer 
required – China’s ultimate goal is still to secure as many pro-Beijing OC as possible, 
no matter where they reside.  The agreement for a truce was a declaration between 
private organizations and not at the state level; nor did it reflect the views of the wider 
OC community.  While some are supportive of Ma’s policy for closer ties with China, 
others are very angry.  Taiqiao and OC communities remain split over support for 
KMT and DPP.938   
 
Ultimately, the ‘truce’ between the two Chinas is conditional upon Taiwan’s eventual 
reunification on terms acceptable to Beijing.  While Ma has demonstrated that he is 
willing to work with mainland officials by improving economic and cultural links 
with China, he is careful in dealing with the political ramifications of the warming 
relationship.  Sooner or later, Taiwan will have to address the issue of reunification.  
Pressure from Taiwan’s domestic constituency and the OC are key drivers for when 
this might happen.  In the meantime, however, given Taiwan’s apparent change of 
direction to put politics aside, China’s formerly vehement effort to oppose Taiwanese 
independence has since been overshadowed by stronger efforts to prevent other 
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political threats from gaining ground, such as the Tibetan independence movement, 
the Uygher movement, and the FLG.939   
 
7.09 Falun Gong (FLG) 
 
Originally supported by the Chinese authorities as a means to improve the spiritual 
condition amongst China’s population, FLG was registered in 1992 under the 
umbrella of the China Society for Research on Qigong Science.  With a widespread 
following (including senior CCP members and military officials attracted to its health 
benefits) and spread over many branches throughout China and over 200 contact 
points around the world, FLG eventually became a major opposition force and irritant 
to the CCP.  In 1997 it was de-registered following a CPD ban on all publications 
written by founder Li Hongzhi.  In 1999, the PRC passed a law to suppress heterox 
religion (xiejiao) and legitimized the CCP crackdown on the FLG movement as an 
evil cult.940  Suppression of the FLG and other pro-independent movements became a 
human rights issue in the early 2000s, gathering supporters in the OC community who 
pressured Beijing through their local politicians.  The FLG showed itself to be very 
capable of mobilizing quickly and effectively to threaten CCP interests. 
 
FLG uses a variety of methods to promote its anti-CCP cause.  These include writing 
letters to major newspapers, holding demonstrations outside PRC embassies and 
consulates, protesting against visiting CCP leaders, practicing exercises in public 
parks, and making use of modern communications technology and the internet to 
mobilize practitioners.  They also hold regular ‘Withdraw from the CCP Service 
Centres’ that facilitate CCP members, PLA or other CCP-sponsored groups to quit 
from the Party.  They also provide FLG and anti-CCP material, such as DVDs and 
free copies of the Epoch Times.  Those seeking further information can participate in 
‘bible study’-style meetings, dinners and casual seminars on the Nine 
Commentaries.941  
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7.10 The CCP’s Iron Fist 
 
Although the CCP has been ruthless in its attempt to shut them down entirely within 
China, FLG continues to practice abroad freely as an extreme anti-CCP movement 
outside the control of the Religious Affairs Bureau.  Subtle methods of persuasion and 
‘transformation’ work are ineffective in dealing with the FLG.  Instead, PRC 
authorities resort to direct interference in its activities by harassing and ‘blacklisting’ 
practitioners.942  Such work goes beyond the scope of the qiaowu administration, and 
is implemented by other government agencies such as the MFA and MSS.  For 
example, indicating the importance of cracking down on FLG, the CCP Central 
Committee created a special “610 Office” to deal with them.  According to FLG 
sources, all CCP agencies are co-ordinated in this effort.  PRC consular policy 
stipulates that the passports of Chinese nationals known to be FLG practitioners be 
confiscated, or their visa extensions refused.943  In 2006, Ottawa refused to renew 
PRC diplomat Wang Pengfei’s diplomatic visa following reports he was gathering 
information on Canadian practitioners.944   
 
To convince the public of the potential threat that FLG posed, the CCP stepped up its 
propaganda campaign.  PRC diplomats regularly issue anti-FLG proclamations, 
actively suppress their activities and public statements, stop media coverage of their 
events, and urge local government, community leaders and media organizations not to 
support the movement as a matter of policy.945  For example, Chinese ambassador to 
Fiji Zhang Junsai made an appearance on local television speaking against FLG 
distributing pamphlets and banners in Suva in 2003.  He mobilized local pro-Beijing 
OC groups to provide information and organized a protest at the police station.946  
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Fijian officials promptly arrested the practitioners and ordered them to leave.947  In 
July 2002, the Chinese embassy in Wellington and consulate in Auckland pressured 
Auckland International Airport to remove a pre-paid contracted billboard 
advertisement promoting FLG principles.948   
 
The CCP’s efforts on other OC and their opinion of FLG have also been persistent.  
According to a FLG report, consular attaches from the MOE organize PRC students to 
watch anti-FLG videos or attend seminars that put direct pressure on Chinese student 
associations to act against FLG, or even manipulate elections to prevent practitioners 
from becoming leaders of OC associations.949  During co-ordinated exchanges with 
OC groups, consular attaches from the MOC, MOE and MFA hand out anti-FLG 
material, or insert them into Chinese language school learning materials.  Fearing that 
their relations with the embassy might be compromised, OC leaders often co-operate 
with PRC diplomats on these activities.   
 
In many cases, the CCP’s aggressive campaign has worked.  FLG members seeking to 
challenge the CCP through legal avenues have been unsuccessful. 950   NZ prime 
minister Helen Clark said she would not consider a request by the FLG to refuse entry 
to a Chinese official. 951   Australian foreign minister Alexander Downer issued 
certificates prohibiting fixed banners and amplified noise after China complained 
about protests outside its embassy in Canberra.952  Australian immigration officials 
were also careful regarding granting political asylum to defector Chen Yonglin.953  
Furthermore, FLG has lost significant support because of the changing political 
environment in Taiwan.  As mentioned earlier, TECO have withdrawn their subsidies 
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or funding.  Desire to maintain friendly state-to-state political and economic relations 
take priority on both sides of the Strait. 
 
Overall, the CCP’s concentration of resources to undermine the FLG has mostly been 
successful.  Its primary mouthpiece (the Epoch Times) lacks credibility; its members 
have been forced underground due to fear of retaliation; and public support for them 
is weak.  However, despite its weakened state, the FLG still remains a viable threat, 
and receives support from private business interests and hardcore members.  As such, 
the CCP is adamant that it must eliminate them.  As mentioned earlier, to prevent 
embarrassment to visiting CCP leaders, the PRC embassy keeps details of their 
itinerary secret.  It mobilizes pro-Beijing OC organizations to do their utmost to 
prevent the FLG from making an appearance, or at least attempt to restrict their 
activities.  This demonstrates the CCP’s continued paranoia towards subversive 
groups (no matter how big or small they may be) in harming its carefully crafted 
image as a capable regime. 
 
7.11 Independence Movements 
 
This classification refers to other pro-independence elements amongst OC groups, 
such as the Free Tibet or Xinjiang separatist movements.  Some of these are active 
amongst the non-Han minority OC (which number approximately 7 million around 
the world).  Beijing views non-Han OC as part of the wider OC population, but treats 
them with caution.  Throughout China’s modern history, minority groups have been 
directly linked to China’s national defence of its border regions.  The growing 
influence of Islamic states and religious affiliation in these areas raise concerns that 
minorities might support claims for independence.  
 
Historically, the manner in which the CCP has dealt with Tibetan and Xinjiang OC 
shared many similarities with qiaowu for returned OC following the Land Reform 
years.   Domestically, between 1950 and 1959, the CCP attempted ‘social reform’ in 
accordance with the “Agreement on Measures for Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” 
through a systematic division and weakening of local rule.  In addition to military 
occupation, the CCP worked to cultivate the elite classes of Tibetan society and 
groomed the younger generations to accept the CCP.  These efforts failed, and an 
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uprising in March 1959 culminated in violence.  Over these years, over 110,000 
Tibetans had fled to India, Bhutan and Nepal – amongst them the Dalai Lama.  In 
exile, many of them joined resistance movements to rally the masses in the homeland 
against the CCP, such as the Tibetan Relief Association.  Similarly, in 1962, about 
50,000 Kazakhs and Xinjiang Uyghers moved to the Soviet Union following PRC 
efforts to introduce communes and alter nomadic habits.  In the late 1960s, because of 
questions surrounding their loyalty, minority groups in border areas were seen as 
potentially subversive to Beijing’s interests.954 
 
At the same time, however, non-Han OC possessed attributes that were useful to 
Chinese authorities – such as their economic, cultural and political advantages.955  
After the US normalized relations with the PRC in 1979, the CCP sought to entice 
Tibetans to return.  A special committee was established, promising to guarantee their 
religious rights and mobility.956  They were also offered preferential treatment (such 
as settlement, financial assistance, and property protection) not unlike the redress 
offered to other guiqiao of the period.  These co-optive efforts were viewed with 
suspicion and not readily taken up.  To Beijing’s chagrin, the Dalai Lama and other 
Tibetan OC continued to appeal to the UN, elicit sympathy and support for the right to 
self-determination.957 
 
In the contemporary period, the CCP continues to view Tibetan OC and other non-
Han OC minority groups (such as the World Uyghur Congress958) as a significant 
threat to China’s national integrity.  As in the past, the CCP attempts to manage them 
by using inclusionist tactics that offer a sense of belonging to the official CCP 
discourse. 959   This qiaowu effort consists of three main objectives: preventing 
independent spirit, attacking Eastern Turkistan terrorist forces, and defeating the 
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Xinjiang independence movement.960  In addition, qiaowu seeks to prevent separatism 
and internationalism of these issues by attempting to unite the Uyghur OC for the 
motherland, and opposing foreign (that is, US) pressure to weaken China.961   
 
7.12 Chinese Unity and the Minority OC 
 
One method is reconnection.  The CCP targets minority OC for friendly exchange to 
raise their ethnic pride and love for China – mostly in the form of sightseeing tours to 
the mainland that are aimed to evoke a sense of appreciation that China is doing as 
much for them and their culture as possible.962  However, while China showcases 
cultural diversity amongst the minority OC, it does so in the context of China’s 
political unity.  Qiaowu seeks to convert those OC who may not share the same 
ideology or political direction of Beijing.  As mentioned earlier, the leading targets for 
this kind of conversion are the second and third generation, and in particular, the 
youth.   
 
Control of language and culture is another strategy to achieve this.  For example, 
qiaowu specialists suggest that helping all OC youth to develop facilities in Chinese 
language is an important part for developing interest in Chinese culture and thereby 
maintaining unity amongst the diaspora.963  While special classes are provided for 
ethnic minority OC youth to study their own language, OC officials emphasize to 
them that Mandarin is the key tool of communication in China – particularly in an age 
of economic growth.964  As another example, PRC diplomats stipulate that contestants 
in the Miss China Global Competition must speak Mandarin instead of other dialects.  
They have intervened by obstructing entrants of Tibetan and Taiwanese-origin from 
participation to ensure a clear definition of what they wish to promote as the ideal 
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interpretation of Chineseness.965  In short, although their differences are celebrated as 
part of the PRC cultural fabric, minority OC are to be gradually assimilated into the 
dominant culture.  This strategy follows the same discourse of the Maoist period, in 
which the Han were representative of the dominant ethnic group to lead China 
towards economic and cultural development.966 
 
This reflects the CCP’s policy of “unity of the nationalities” (minzu tuanjie) amongst 
the OC.  At the Eighth National Congress of Returned OC and their Relatives in July 
2009, senior CCP official Wang Zhaoguo called upon delegates to have a “broad 
understanding of the truth that national unity is a blessing and national separatism a 
disaster.”967  Delegates were informed that the violent riots that killed over 200 in 
Urumqi were caused by outside separatists rather than internal conflict.968  However, 
what these OC were told was different from what was actually happening.  The CCP 
treat their Uygher population as being potentially disloyal and hence incite chauvinist 
sentiment amongst the majority Han Chinese.  To fuel these beliefs, the CCP 
constricts the flow of accurate information and alienates those with grievances.969   
 
7.13 Cracking Down on ‘Terrorists’ 
 
Where it has been unable to overpower or break down dissident elements, the PRC 
has resorted to diplomatic pressure by painting Uygher groups abroad as terrorists.  In 
April 2006, Beijing urged the US to “properly handle” Chinese nationals accused of 
terrorist activity held at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba by dealing with suspects in a 
“prudent, responsible and proper manner.” It advised US authorities to take into 
consideration Beijing’s “international anti-terrorism co-operation and China-US 
relations and abide by international law.” 970   While this may have appeared to 
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demonstrate China’s respect for the international judicial system, it was a veiled 
attempt to legitimize its crackdown on East Turkistan Islamic Movement terrorists.  
Following the closing down of the prison camp, Beijing has pressured foreign 
governments to extradite Uyghers accused of terrorism back to China for trial.  In 
claiming them as part of the Chinese population, Uyghers are to be tried under PRC 
law.  In response to those governments refusing to co-operate (such as Albania for 
accepting five Uyghers from Guantanamo in 2006) Beijing hit them with diplomatic 
and economic retaliation.971 
 
As with other potentially subversive OC groups, the CCP has been active in 
challenging them from the grass roots to the highest levels of government.  Efforts 
work from both inside and outside these movements, and feature co-optive and 
coercive methods implemented by both the qiaowu administration and other relevant 
ministries.  Intelligence reports cited that MSS authorities were active in inciting 
dissension amongst Uygher OC in an effort to break down their movement from 
within.972  In the public arena, the CCP has attempted to isolate the Uygher cause.  
The Olympic Torch rallies of 2008 showed how masses of pro-Beijing OC could 
successfully shout down its rivals.  Similarly, as mentioned earlier, various efforts 
sought to prevent the screening of a documentary highlighting the movement at the 
2009 Melbourne Film Festival.  The CCP’s efforts to influence public opinion have 
mostly been criticized for obstructing freedom of speech – but in many cases, it has 
certainly managed to influence those concerned about damaging its relationship with 
Beijing.  For example, the University of Auckland (a Confucius Institute partner) 
initially cancelled a visit by Uygher leader Rebiyah Kadeer citing security 
concerns.973   
 
7.14 Conclusion 
 
Beijing has been largely successful with containing threats to the CCP.  By 2008, the 
pro-democratic and Taiwanese pro-independence amongst the OC had been largely 
subverted or discredited, and remained only a simmering cause of concern.  Patriotic 
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re-education and peaceful reunification efforts since 1989 had ensured that many 
xinqiao and PRC students were supportive of the CCP regime.  Moreover, the KMT 
demonstrated a conciliatory approach towards Beijing by ending its support for anti-
China and other independence movements.   
 
However, there were other OC groups that remained a threat, such as the FLG, the 
Tibetan and Xinjiang independence movements.  In many cases they had widespread 
public support, or at least the potential to cause significant embarrassment to the CCP.  
At a critical period for China’s re-emergence on the international stage, the 2008 
Olympic hosts were basing their image and legitimacy upon national unity amongst 
its people.  A variety of inclusive, persuasive, or aggressive efforts were stepped up in 
order to make this claim.  In most cases, the CCP were unsuccessful with these 
methods, and resorted instead to mobilizing thousands of young supporters in an 
overwhelming show of patriotism.  
 
Despite these pockets of resistance amongst the OC, there is no single co-ordinated 
effort that can effectively challenge the CCP.  There is no doubt that this is a result of 
the surge in OC nationalism, feelings of ethnographic unity, and positive feelings for 
a rising China – all facilitated by intensive qiaowu efforts over the years. Constant 
monitoring of the situation is still required.  By seeking to align OC with the CCP 
discourse through persuasion and influence while respecting their beliefs, qiaowu 
methods have become well-established within these targeted populations.  For others 
less willing to do so, attempts to cultivate them for China’s interests continue to 
expand and strengthen, but face significant obstacles that cannot be resolved by 
carrots and sticks alone. 
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8.00 External Work: Diplomatic Assistance 
 
Having explained the methodology and reasoning behind how the CCP has dealt with 
various OC groups and the challenges it faces, this next section investigates qiaowu as 
a developing and expanding process for dealing with the mass movement of new OC 
groups.  Beijing’s relationship and policies with the OC has expanded in accordance 
with OC migration over recent decades.  According to the Migration Policy Institute, 
there were 12.7 million OC in the 1960s, 22 million in 1985, and by early 2000 there 
were 33 million.974  ROC OCAC statistics from 2005 revealed a total in excess of 38 
million. 975   A 2008 report by the China News Agency showed that the global 
population of ethnic Chinese and PRC nationals living outside of China totaled 48 
million.976  According to analysts, another 30 million Chinese citizens travel or work 
abroad each year – and this figure is expected to increase to 100 million by 2020.977   
 
This chapter examines the developments and breakthroughs for China’s consular 
affairs, and demonstrates how and why the CCP has enlarged its embrace and 
protection of the OC.  While it has achieved various successes in protecting the OC, 
Beijing accords consular assistance only on a selective basis.  This chapter shows that 
the CCP carefully balances regional concerns and promoting its desired international 
image against advancing its relationship with the OC, and explains how it has dealt 
with this predicament.  
 
8.01 The PRC and Its Protection of the OC 
 
Qiaowu is constantly subject to diplomatic rivalry with Taipei, China’s national 
interests and regional suspicions.  Throughout the latter half of the 20th century, 
Beijing appeared to put the interests of the OC behind its desire for international 
recognition.  This was a strategic move to relieve itself of the OC “problem.”  OC 
affairs were publicly downgraded as part of its détente efforts with Southeast Asia and 
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the OC were encouraged to assimilate and co-operate locally – indicating to the world 
that they had shed their political links with the mainland.978  Continuing ethnic and 
political tensions during this period ensured that there were many opportunities to 
demonstrate Beijing’s position towards the OC – but only when it suited its political 
interest.979 
 
Geo-political circumstances have always played a major role in influencing Beijing’s 
treatment of the OC.  For example, in 1959, anti-Chinese/anti-communist feeling 
spurred the Indonesian government to pass anti-alien legislation so that ethnic 
Chinese and their property were open to seizure.  Nearly 100,000 OC fled to China to 
escape the violence.  Beijing did not directly criticize Jakarta, as it was a leftist ally at 
the time.  Instead, it attempted to resolve the situation through quiet diplomacy, 
urging thousands to return to China where they could participate in “socialist 
reconstruction.”  The PRC OCAC supported the decision to receive all returned 
overseas Chinese, no matter how many there were.980  Beijing sent naval vessels to 
repatriate them.    
 
When the new anti-Beijing Suharto regime moved to destroy the ethnic Chinese-
dominated Indonesian Communist Party (ICP) in 1965, Beijing again decided to use 
the OC issue to send political signals.981  It wasted no time in demanding Jakarta 
protect the OC and again dispatched ships to collect them.982  This action caused 
Southeast Asian nations to believe that China was still championing the cause of the 
OC – despite the 1955 Bandung agreement.  Only 10,000 ethnic Chinese chose to 
leave on this occasion, as most preferred to stay as Indonesian-Chinese.  Relations 
between Beijing and Jakarta continued to deteriorate.  In 1966, Beijing closed down 
the three main consulates in Indonesia, recalled its ambassador, and cancelled 
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economic aid; moreover, it reversed all previous foreign policy.  In 1967 when 
Beijing endorsed the Maoist line of the ICP, it suspended diplomatic ties altogether.   
 
The Bandung Treaty was repealed in 1969, leaving the status of millions of 
Indonesian ethnic Chinese in question.  Countries in the region had developed their 
own citizenship laws and the OC were under pressure from host governments to 
formalize their citizenship.983  China’s priority was to advance normalization, and 
hence it continued to play down its ties with the OC and publicly encouraged their 
integration.  During this period, Beijing made it clear that it considered ethnic Chinese 
without PRC nationality to be outside the jurisdiction of PRC policy, and not its 
responsibility. 984   Only those OC who were registered with China as legitimate 
huaqiao would receive protection by PRC embassies.985   
 
In 1973 Beijing announced that it had abolished its special bureau for OC activities 
and explained to the OC that they should be loyal to their country of residence.986  
Zhou Enlai repeated that the PRC would continue to oppose the KMT policy of dual 
nationality, would encourage agreements on the nationality of OC, and would 
promulgate a law that gave OC of foreign citizenship no claim to PRC nationality.987  
Likewise, during a National Day celebration that year, Deng Xiaoping added that he 
“approved” of the decision for the OC to acquire foreign citizenship.988   
 
Eager to restore relations with Jakarta in 1973, China chose not to intervene during 
anti-Chinese rioting in Bandung, with Xinhua issuing only one late report without 
criticism of the Indonesian government.989  Beijing made it clear that it had severed 
all ties to the OC.  A 1974 South China Morning Post editorial reaffirmed that Beijing 
had set itself apart from ethnic Chinese communities and renounced guerilla 
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organizations that operated under PRC support.  Beijing signed agreements not to 
recognize dual citizenship with Malaysia in 1974 and the Philippines and Thailand in 
1975.990  However, as always, Beijing did not cut humanitarian links by adding it 
could not be expected to eschew comment or unclassified action through international 
channels in cases where Chinese minorities were subjected to unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures.”991   
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, Beijing continued to act according to political 
sensitivities or logistical practicality, and not for the protection of the OC.  For 
example, it was reluctant to involve itself in the deportation of ethnic Chinese 
Vietnamese from Hong Kong in 1974. 992   Similarly, when the Pol Pot regime 
persecuted and killed hundreds of thousands of OC in Kampuchea (Cambodia), it 
offered little acknowledgement.  Beijing preferred to seek the support of the Khmer 
Rouge instead of an increasingly hostile pro-Moscow Hanoi.993   
 
In 1976, Hanoi again attempted to register the OC as Vietnamese or else subject them 
to discriminative measures if they retained their ROC citizenship. 994   The PRC 
claimed that Hanoi had unilaterally violated a 1955 agreement between the CCP and 
the Vietnamese Workers’ Party.995  Following anti-ethnic Chinese activity in 1978,996 
Beijing argued that “the Vietnamese authorities have now returned evil for good by 
using despicable means to persecute Chinese and evict them en masse.” 997   It 
dispatched ships with capacity for 5000 evacuees, but this time, almost quarter of a 
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million OC wanted to leave.  However, Beijing could not agree on the terms of 
repatriation.998  As a result, the vessels were moored outside Vietnamese territorial 
waters for several weeks, and ultimately recalled.  Moreover, China declined to 
respond to the matter of 26,000 OC refugees who had escaped from Cambodia.999  In 
July 1978, Beijing closed the borders to Yunnan and Guangxi to Vietnamese refugees.  
China did accept boatpeople on Hainan Island and in Guangdong, housing them in 
special camps.  However, because of its weak economic and political position in the 
late 1970s, Beijing could offer no more than lip service and rhetoric, having little 
practical capability to halt abuses against the ethnic Chinese. 
 
Throughout the 1980s, renewed anti-Chinese activity in Indonesia, Mongolia and 
Rangoon all met with a weak response from Beijing.  OC affairs appeared to have 
been put aside.  It was not until 1990 that relations between Beijing and Jakarta 
resumed.  In a series of meetings in 1992 to determine the status of 300,000 ethnic 
Chinese (which included those who had resided in Indonesia for decades, illegal 
migrants, and others who wanted to leave during the 1960s but could not due to 
insufficient space on the ships sent to repatriate them) the PRC offered to provide 
them with Chinese passports.  At the same time, Indonesian minister of justice Ismael 
Saleh allowed those who had lived in Indonesia to become naturalized citizens.1000   
 
Despite this breakthrough, qiaowu remained unsteady throughout an extended period 
of ethnic tension throughout Southeast Asia.  It was clear that Beijing wanted to 
clearly separate huaqiao from huaren affairs, but its behaviour often ended up in 
contradictory circumstances. 1001   For example, in April 1994, Beijing demanded 
Jakarta take appropriate steps to protect those OC caught up in riots in Medan.  
However, only months later, Jiang Zemin promised Indonesian authorities that China 
would never use the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia for its own political or economic 
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gain.1002  Then in the midst of the Asian Financial Crisis in February 1998, observers 
noted that locals placed blame on the OC for an increase in basic commodity 
prices.1003  The Indonesian government did not condone the popular resentment, nor 
did it condemn it.  Beijing was also silent, preferring not to jeopardize its warming 
relationship with Jakarta.   
 
As part of its official duty, Beijing is responsible only for the safety of PRC citizens.  
Under Articles 50, 70, 89 of the current PRC Constitution, its embassies are 
responsible for protecting the legitimate rights of Chinese nationals residing abroad, 
and the rights and interests of returned OC.1004  In other words, Beijing officially 
extends diplomatic protection only to huaqiao (that is, those carrying Chinese 
passports, and compatriots from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao.)1005  While reports 
noted that the PRC embassy was quietly assisting its nationals on a case-by-case basis, 
Beijing publicly declared that the violence in Indonesia was a domestic issue and 
would not intervene. 1006   China maintained that governments should treat ethnic 
Chinese of foreign nationality as citizens of their domicile – any action that would 
suggest otherwise might provoke suspicions of interference in the region.1007   
 
8.02 1998 Indonesian Riots: A Turning Point in OC Affairs 
 
In May 1998, 1200 OC were killed, dozens of OC women raped, and properties 
torched as the Suharto regime ended.  Beijing was slow to react, and by making only a 
brief mention in the state controlled media, it did not have to address it as a matter of 
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foreign policy.  Those who tried to protest were rendered silent, and any news 
coverage quickly suppressed.1008  Publicly and officially, Jakarta’s domestic affairs 
were not the concern of Beijing.1009  Beijing referred to ethnic Chinese as “members 
of the Indonesian family,” whom it had no obligation to protect.1010  China had to 
distance its sentimental and ethnic connection with the huaren diaspora, and show 
that it stood by its policy to separate them from huaqiao.1011  As King and Melvin 
have argued, identity politics more often than not concerned politics rather than 
identity.  Competing visions of policy direction and domestic power struggles 
trumped any putative duty that Beijing might have felt towards those foreigners with 
shared language and culture.1012   
 
This inaction resulted in a massive public outcry amongst the world’s OC.  Both 
domestic Chinese and the OC elsewhere felt that China (or Taiwan in some cases) had 
to take responsibility over the issue.1013  Demonstrations outside PRC embassies and 
Taiwanese representative offices indicated that the OC wanted these governments to 
intervene on their behalf.1014  Finally on 3 August 1998, PRC foreign minister Tang 
Jiaxuan indicated the PRC’s official concern by saying that China was closely 
monitoring the actions of Indonesian authorities, demanding that they make 
investigation, and take effective measures for the protection and safety of ethnic 
Chinese and their interests.  This was only a cautious response, given that the majority 
                                                 
1008 The CCP did not allow protests, resulting in the expulsion of three Beijing University students who 
demonstrated outside the Indonesian embassy; posters of the only newspaper that published a story on 
the riots were torn down.  Beijing was “unnaturally silent during this period.”  Anne-Marie Brady, 
personal communication with author, Christchurch, 14 April 2007.  See also Brady, Marketing 
Dictatorship, 52. 
1009 Beijing stated it would not protest or arrange evacuation because “there is no good reason to do so 
as the majority of the Chinese in Indonesia are Indonesian citizens.” The Chinese ambassador to 
Indonesia added “it was the respnsibility of the Indonesian Government to protect its own citizens, 
including the citizens of Chinese descent.”  Chen Shiqiu quoted from “Dubes RRC Sesalkan 
Terjadinya Perkosaan Saat Kerusuhan,” (PRC’s Ambassador Deplores Raping During Riots) Suara 
Pembaruan, 7 July 1998 as noted by Leo Suryadinata, “China and Ethnic Chinese in ASEAN: Post-
Cold War Development,” in ASEAN-China Relations: Realities and Prospects, eds. Saw Swee-Hock, 
Sheng Lijun and China Kin Wah (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 361-362; 
Ruan Ci Shan, “Zhongguo zai Yinni luanjuzhong jintui liangnan,” (China is in a Dilemma in Turbulent 
Indonesia), Lianhe zaobao, 25 February 1998.  
1010 “Asia: Is Chinese Blood Thinner Than Water?” Economist, 22 August 1998, 31. 
1011 “Buyao hunxiao huaqiao, huaren de gainian,” 90-92.  
1012 King and Melvin, “Diaspora Politics,” 108-138. 
1013 Vatikiotis, Forney and Dolven, “Compatriot Games,” 23. 
1014 L. Ling-chi Wang, “What Chinese Overseas Can and Should Do,” 20 March 1999, 
www.exodusnews.com/editorials/editorial-025.htm (accessed 1 October 2009).  
 219
of the OC had Indonesian citizenship.1015  Soon after, an editorial in the People’s 
Daily called for Jakarta to punish those responsible and protect the safety and 
property of Chinese. 1016   Other papers followed with similar reports, and non-
government organizations and student groups were finally able to voice their 
opinion.1017  While China was now comfortable with making the Indonesian riots a 
public issue, the extent of the concern remained vocal.  There was no effort to send 
vessels, arrange evacuation or demonstrate direct diplomacy with Jakarta – ethnic 
Chinese had to fend for themselves.  While this strategy worked to persuade 
Indonesian leaders that Beijing was becoming more pragmatic and non-
interventionist,1018 the OC remained frustrated that they had received no assistance or 
support at all.  How would Beijing maintain sentimental connections with its diaspora 
in this antagonistic environment?   
 
As pressure mounted from around the globe, a significant turning point in qiaowu 
policy took place.  Since the debacle following the Indonesian riots of 1998, Beijing 
has demonstrated a surge of confidence in bringing all ethnic Chinese directly into the 
fold of PRC affairs, with an “international moral obligation to try and protect Chinese 
people overseas.”1019  The early 2000s saw a comprehensive reassessment of how 
Beijing would respond to the OC when caught in trouble.  During this period, China’s 
economic situation was increasingly sound, and it was gaining confidence in the 
international arena as a regional power.   
 
As such, Beijing does not necessarily abandon OC of foreign nationality in times of 
distress.  On several occasions during 2006, diplomatic assistance was extended to 
non-PRC citizens as a matter of humanitarian aid.  Diplomats maintained that 
although it would prefer not to see instability around the world, China had a 
“responsibility” to assist the “sons and daughters of the yellow emperor” as part of the 
“motherland.”1020  More importantly, the DPP’s rise to power in 2000 meant Taipei 
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had revised its attitudes towards the OC to favour Taiqiao.  In this context of political 
rivalry, Beijing recognized and seized another vital opportunity to reach out to the OC. 
  
8.03 ROC Protection for OC 
 
The ROC once openly extended diplomatic assistance to anyone of ethnic Chinese 
descent under the principle of jus sanguinis.  For example, it helped OC in Korea in 
1950, transported 40,000 OC from North to South Vietnam in 1954-55, and 
repatriated 3000 Vietnamese OC in 1957.  This policy shifted in the 1960s and early 
1970s when the ROC’s increasingly weakened diplomatic position rendered it 
powerless to offer any practical assistance.  In Malaysia, South Vietnam and the 
Philippines (where Taipei placed priority on preserving friendly relations) the ROC 
failed to protect OC interests altogether – in particular the issue of repatriation.  
Taipei had also recognized the OC “problem”, and insisted to Southeast Asian nations 
that its policy of continued ties with the OC was a “mistake.”  Taipei noted that the 
PRC was gaining favour amongst these nations by encouraging OC allegiance to their 
host country, and therefore it should do the same. 1021   This was evident when 
Vietnamese refugees sought to enter Taiwan during the late 1970s and early 
1980s.1022    
 
At the same time, Taipei was in heated rivalry with Beijing for support from the OC 
for its political survival.  In late 1979, a propaganda magazine announced that the 
ROC had accepted and resettled more than 11,000 refugees, and donated over 30,000 
tonnes of rice.1023  In October 1982, an OCAC meeting resolved to make closer and 
frequent contact with Vietnamese OC.1024  While there was a prerogative for Taipei to 
protect legal ROC nationals abroad, there was also a humanitarian obligation to assist 
                                                 
1021 Of the 1.6 million non-resident Chinese in Indonesia, only 66 held ROC passports; the remainder 
were either stateless or held PRC passports.  US Embassy Jakarta, “ROC and Indonesia,” State 
Department cable to US Secretary of State, US National Archives, 1974JAKART06903, 6 June 1974; 
Suryadinata, China and the ASEAN States, 63. 
1022 Tang, “Stateless Persons and the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action Part 1,” 201-231; Ng, 
“Taiwan’s Overseas Chinese Policy From 1949 to the Early 1980s,” 273. 
1023 Lloyd Lo, “ROC Government to Strengthen Relief for Indochinese Refugees,” Asian Outlook, 
December 1979, 40-42. 
1024 “Chinese Overseas Patriotism for their Motherland,” Asian Outlook, November 1982, 20-23.  
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overseas huaren, huaqiao and laoqiao communities.1025   In such cases, the ROC 
OCAC has donated money and offered credit loans to the OC victims of natural 
disaster and rioting.1026   
 
However, between 2000 and 2008, DPP concerns dictated Taiwan’s OC policy.  
During that period, Taiwanese government channels asserted that it offered 
humanitarian aid regardless of political background1027  and there was no official 
instruction to differentiate between OC of Taiwanese origin and others.  This was in 
contradiction to what was actually happening.  Diplomatic support would be extended 
to Taiqiao or those OC with strong Taiwan connections, while other ethnic Chinese 
were assisted only in times of extreme crisis, and then only at the discretion of local 
representatives.1028 With diplomatic appointments granted on pro-DPP affiliations,1029 
diplomats were hesitant in taking unpopular action that showed them to be anything 
else but distinctly Taiwanese.  For example, while it had assisted “so-called ethnic 
Chinese” during the 2000 SI riots,1030 priority was given to ROC nationals.  During 
that event, Taipei was careful not to overstate the situation and did not acknowledge 
the need to assist – only to “stand by” in the event of a more serious incident.1031  It 
denied an evacuation was necessary, and only acted to register and move some OC to 
a temporary refuge.  The ROC OCAC claimed otherwise, saying that it was willing to 
help PRC citizens find emergency shelter, and enlisted the help of Taiwan’s naval 
fleet (coincidently docked in Honiara on a friendship visit 1032 ) for emergency 
                                                 
1025 The ROC Constitution mandates the protection of the rights and interests of its citizens residing 
abroad, including economic, cultural and educational undertakings.  Government Information Office of 
ROC, Taiwan Year Book 2004. 
1026 “OCAC Sends Relief Funds to Florida,” Haihua, no. 93 (October 1992): 62; “OCAC Sends Relief 
Funds to Los Angeles,” Haihua, no. 89 (June 1992): 62. 
1027 “ROC Aided Mainlanders in Solomons.” 
1028 John Chen (TECO representative to New Zealand) communication with Anne-Marie Brady, 1 May 
2007. 
1029 OCAC commissioner, personal communication with author, Christchurch, June 2007. 
1030 In June 2000, SI Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa’alu was taken hostage by rebel forces and key 
installations seized during an attempted coup.  Riots quickly ensued.  A Taiwanese official commented 
that while Beijing and Taipei should not be at odds over OC affairs, there was little likelihood of 
diplomatic co-operation due to poor cross-strait relations.  Chen Jung-chieh (Former Deputy Secretary 
of the Straits Exchange Foundation) as quoted in “ROC Aided Mainlanders in Solomons.” 
1031 Catherine Sung, “Taiwan Navy on Solomons Standby,” Taipei Times, 9 June 2000, 
www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2000/06/09/39298  (accessed 24 May 2006).  
1032 The embassy cancelled the marine performance and various functions on board the vessels.  SI 
Broadcasting Corporation, “Taiwan Navy Update,” 7 June 2000, 
http://maorinews.com/karere/solomons/solo008.htm  (accessed 24 May 2006).  
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evacuation out of humanitarian concern.1033  This highlighted the conflicting attitudes 
held by the OCAC and DPP government towards the OC. 
 
In that instance, the vessels left promptly on 8 June 2000 with only seven ROC 
nationals aboard.  This was not because the evacuation had been suspended, but 
because the naval squadron was asked to leave by SI opposition, arguing the visit 
might be perceived as military and moral support for the standing government.1034  
Again, politics took precedence over assisting the OC in times of trouble.  Following 
Taipei’s line, the navy downplayed the crisis, noting that the situation was not as tense 
as reported.1035  Taiwanese authorities explained that things had calmed down, and 
about 50 expatriates and 600 ethnic Chinese “wanted to stay.”1036  A similar situation 
occurred in 2006, which will be examined in detail below.  The DPP stance towards 
consular assistance towards non-Taiwanese was apparent, and further damaged the 
enstranged relationship with the OC. 
 
It would be unfair to say that the embassy was unwilling to offer any help at all, as 
concerned individuals from Taiwan’s consular staff visited victims of the 2006 
Honiara riots.1037  They were not as heartless as made out by the PRC media (see 
below), but their demonstration of sympathy was too little too late.  For the majority 
of OC, not only did they feel neglected, they felt ROC consular staff had acted 
arrogantly towards them.1038 
 
There were several explanations for such treatment.  Firstly, Taiwan lacked the 
necessary capacity to assist.  ROC officials explained there were limitations to what 
Taipei could do for PRC nationals, given its isolation from the wider diplomatic 
                                                 
1033 “ROC Aided Mainlanders in Solomons.” 
1034 “Oppo – Taiwan,” SI Broadcasting Corporation, 8 June 2000. 
1035 Brian Hsu, “Navy Justifies Mission to Solomons,” Taipei Times, 14 June 2000, 
www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2000/06/14/39944 (accessed 24 May 2006). 
1036 Monique Chu, “Taiwan Fleet Returning From the Solomons,” Taipei Times, 10 June 2000, 1, 
www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2000/06/10/39431 (accessed 24 May 2006).  
1037  ROC embassy staff often assisted non-ROC OC in a private capacity, such as donating towards 
medical costs of victims.  OC residents, personal communication with author, Honaira, 9 September 
2007. 
1038 While the relationship with the ROC embassy was good (with financial support for Double Ten 
celebrations) since the 1990s, this declined significantly during the DPP years.  Some complained that 
they had difficulty getting multiple entry visas to Taiwan and had a cool relationship with the ROC 
embassy.  Local OC leaders, personal communication with author, Honiara, 9 September 2007.  See 
also “Jewelry Dealer Felt ‘Neglected’,” Solomon Star, 2 May 2006. 
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community and the mainland itself.  Even Taiwanese nationals have been known to 
seek help from the PRC embassy instead of Taiwan’s representative office when it 
was unable to provide assistance.1039  In other cases, diplomats may be unwilling or 
unable to assist Taiqiao.1040  Furthermore, under the DPP, PRC refugees could not be 
taken to Taiwan nor airlifted directly to the mainland under travel restrictions at the 
time.  Even if they were relocated to Taiwan, diplomats had no idea what to do with 
them, or for how long before they could be sent back.1041  If they chose to offer 
assistance, it would set a precedent.  Countries that have diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan tend to be poor and administered by unstable governments, and there could be 
expectations that such assistance be rendered time and time again.  Thus when the 
ROC embassy in Honiara was advised of the arrival of PRC diplomats coming to help 
in April 2006, it raised no objection. 
 
Secondly, ROC diplomats have mostly offered to help the OC when there was 
political value in doing so.  For example, in 2003, the ROC ambassador in the 
Marshall Islands gave PRC dissident Xu Bo a work permit and employment from a 
Taiwanese company.1042  During the 2000 Fijian coup, it was Taiwan that first offered 
to evacuate Chinese nationals.1043  Yet in April 2006 Taiwan quickly distanced itself 
from the ethnic Chinese connection and any political interference in the SI, 1044 
claiming that there were only two Taiwanese businesses and both were unaffected by 
the rioting.1045  Rather than expressing humanitarian concern, its official press release 
focused on the fear that SI politicians might switch to Beijing.1046  The statement 
came over a week after the incident, and only after pro-Taipei prime minister Snyder 
                                                 
1039 Richard Shih (ROC MFA Spokesman) as quoted by Fiona Lu, “Businessman Admonishes 
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Rini stepped down and rival Manasseh Sogavare threatened to shift ties if he was 
elected. 1047   Taiwan was in the Pacific region to challenge China for zero-sum 
diplomatic survival; hence its foreign policy interests took precedence ahead of any 
OC concerns.  In light of the DPP’s ambivalent response towards the OC, the CCP 
promptly stepped in to pursue its strategy to capture their hearts and minds.  
 
8.04 Modern PRC Diplomatic Protection 
 
Following the lessons learnt in 1998, Beijing revised its policy from non-interference 
to one of active assistance and protection of the OC.  There were several reasons for 
this.  Firstly, it recognized the public relations value of providing diplomatic 
assistance to the OC, and seized upon the first of many opportunities when riots broke 
out in the SI in 2000.  In that instance, Chinese authorities arranged to take 116 PRC 
nationals to Guangzhou, while others were airlifted with Australian and NZ 
assistance.1048   Beijing wasted no time in proclaiming that this evacuation “fully 
demonstrated the care from the Party and the government to the overseas Chinese 
compatriots.”1049  Similarly, riots in Central Kalimantan and Riau in Indonesia during 
2001 sparked an immediate response.1050  In every case, Beijing has demanded local 
governments ensure the life, property and safety of “OC and foreign citizens of 
Chinese origin” during times of crisis.1051  Where it was once cautious not to cause 
suspicions, these developments reflected Beijing’s growing sense of confidence in the 
international arena. 
 
In 2004, attacks on Chinese workers in Afghanistan provided the impetus for China to 
protect its nationals working overseas as a “new subject for the Chinese government 
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and its foreign policy.”1052  Since then, China’s diplomatic work has moved from 
“purely handling affairs between governments to enhancing the maintenance of 
overseas Chinese people’s interests.”1053  For example, it increased security spending 
and international co-operation to protect the OC from kidnapping, terrorist threats and 
natural disaster.1054  In addition, diplomatic staff received special training on effective 
planning, communication, co-ordination and international information exchange 
regarding the OC.1055  Beijing accelerated relevant legislative processes by ratifying 
the Convention on the Safety of United Nationals and Associated Personnel.1056  It 
followed this by establishing a special Department of External Security Affairs, 
consisting of 140 staff in Beijing and over 600 consular officials overseas.  It is now 
the biggest department in the PRC MFA and is responsible for making, co-ordinating 
and managing policy recommendations and implementation, guiding the operations of 
PRC diplomatic missions and managing the actitivies of foreign non-government 
organizations in China.1057   
 
To handle the affairs of a steadily increasing number of OC traveling abroad and 
requiring assistance, the MFA established a Division of Consular Protection in 2006 
(and later upgraded it to a Consular Protection Centre in 2007).1058  In addition, a 
special ‘emergency response office’ was also set up to deal with urgent OC issues.  
With such infrastructure in place, the PRC has the capability to monitor OC affairs all 
throughout the world – in particular matters concerning anti-Chinese sentiment or 
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natural disaster.  Moreover, the PRC is prepared to go “all out” to protect the OC from 
racism, harassment and damage to property.1059   
 
In April 2006, the PRC put these measures into action. 1060   Hundreds of ethnic 
Chinese (including SI citizens, old and new migrants) had fled to Honiara’s Rove 
Police station for protection as angry rioters torched their homes and businesses.  
When the ROC embassy was unwilling to offer assistance, an OC leader made a 
direct telephone call to GOCAO director Lu Weixiong, and briefed him on the 
situation.1061  Beijing authorized a launch of the “emergency response mechanism” (a 
co-ordinated system comprising of direct diplomatic aid from various regional 
governments and agencies). 1062   PRC diplomats went to investigate and provide 
further assistance.1063  Local OC greeted them with large red banners proclaiming 
“PRC Ambassador, You Have Finally Come!” and “Welcome Our Heroes to Save 
Us!”1064  – clearly indicating their sincere support for the PRC and venting their 
frustrations towards Taiwan.  The OC then promptly announced they wanted China to 
send a plane to pick them up.1065  Despite more half of them being SI citizens,1066 a 
diplomat said their livelihoods were “finished” and so they “had to go.”1067  The 
Guangdong government gladly responded.  In addition to Chinese nationals and Hong 
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Kong citizens,1068 foreign-born OC and foreign citizens of Chinese descent, and “any 
Chinese people on the islands who want to come back” all received help under clear 
instructions from officials. 1069   This demonstrated convincingly that Beijing was 
prepared to assist all ethnic Chinese, no matter what their nationality.   
 
Once back in China, evacuees were welcomed by a special workgroup comprising of 
MFA officials, Ministry of Public Security, OCAO, and Hong Kong and Macau 
Affairs Office.1070  According to SI OC, evacuees were accommodated in hotels, 
given their own mobile phone with $RMB1000 of free calling, and medical checks.  
Those repatriated to Hong Kong were given additional $HK8000 and offers of 
accommodation at a resort.  Additional privileges included access to local education 
for the children of evacuees, while those without travel documents were allowed exit 
back to the SI at any time to rebuild their lives.  In addition, Guangdong authorities 
gave visa extensions and assistance with finding work to those OC with SI 
passports.1071  
 
In November 2006, the same process occurred again following riots aimed at OC in 
Nuku’alofa, Tonga.  37 OC holding Tongan passports initially sought help from the 
PRC embassy, but were told it could only help its own nationals.1072  They then 
moved onto the NZ High Commission residency.  Staff members there were reluctant 
to help, stating that they could assist only Samoan, British and NZ, but not Tongan 
nationals.  Salvation Army officers subsequently arranged their escape to an outlying 
village.1073  Finally, the PRC ambassador later had a change of mind, and agreed to 
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take them in.1074  Embassy officials later reaffirmed that while diplomatic assistance 
was normally only extended to its own nationals, ethnic Chinese remained tongbao 
(compatriots) and therefore part of the Chinese ‘family’.1075   
 
In both these instances, China’s consular assistance was a full-scale effort to embrace 
and reclaim all the OC both physically and emotionally.  The amount of resources put 
into achieving this result was unprecedented, and demonstrates a significant push to 
raise China’s consular protection to a whole new level.  When compared with its 
response to the Indonesian riots of 1998, this abrupt turn in China’s qiaowu policy 
reflected the desire to restore a tangible bond with the OC.  Beijing wanted to 
demonstrate that it could and would assist the OC; to ensure their gratitude, loyalty 
and support for the CCP; and more importantly, to quash any remnants of support for 
Taipei’s independence effort that may have existed amongst them.   
 
These efforts were not limited to those being evacuated, but extended to OC all 
around the world.  For example, in the SI case, the OC Chinese language media was 
fully mobilized to spur on nationalism and patriotism by detailing China’s prowess, 
capability and benevolence as a responsible “people first” (waijiao weimin) power 
while criticizing Taipei’s failure to respond.1076  Pro-Beijing media attacked Taipei for 
its reluctance to send help, accusing it of “selfishness and cold-bloodedness” in 
drawing political boundaries by offering aid to Taiwanese but not other ethnic 
Chinese.1077  Another paper suggested that Taiwan had a hand in directing the rioting 
towards rival PRC Chinese as a means of political warfare.1078  A PRC publication 
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distributed amongst SI OC criticized Taiwan for its weak diplomatic response, and 
how this resulted in widespread denouncement from OC all over the world.1079  To 
boost its own image, OC newspapers published photographs of busy PRC embassy 
staff exercising “the state power for the benefit of the people”1080  together with 
orchestrated pictures of smiling evacuees holding pre-arranged colourful banners, 
waving red flags and flowers. 1081   Chinese sources openly acknowledged these 
measures were to “prop up the “national pride and dignity of those who have been 
assisted.”1082   
 
At the height of chequebook rivalry in the Pacific region, Beijing went to great 
lengths to demonize the DPP government while elevating itself in the eyes of the OC.  
This was particularly important in the SI, which held official relations with Taipei.  In 
this case, the OC community provided a strategic source of support for a switch in 
recognition.  Moreover, a growing OC community in the Pacific (and accordingly a 
rise in ethnic tensions in the region) meant that Beijing had to pay increased attention 
to the OC and manage their affairs in its best interests.  In these examples, qiaowu had 
moved beyond offering humanitarian assistance, and advanced inherent political and 
psychological objectives as well. 
 
From the aftermath of ethnic rioting during 2006, the CCP had learnt many new 
lessons for consular protection.  First was the realization that the OC were actively 
looking towards Beijing for assistance in times of trouble.  Secondly, as China’s 
presence grew around the world, and as the OC population increased and diversified, 
China’s consular work would be increasingly focused upon OC affairs.  In these 
contexts, qiaowu specialists recommended that PRC diplomats to increase their co-
ordination with qiaowu agencies. 1083   For example, diplomats were instructed to 
advise OC and companies in trouble to develop closer contacts with the Chinese 
                                                 
1079 GOCAO, Cong Suoluomen tangrenjie bei shao shuo qi…(From Speaking of the Burning of 
Chinatown…) (Guangzhou: Guangdong qiaoban, 2006), 24. 
1080 Li Yongran, “Shenye, jinji che qiao jinxingzhong…”(In the Middle of the Night, Emergency 
Evacuation of Overseas Chinese Takes Place…), New Zealand Mirror, 21 April 2006. 
1081 “Suoluomen yueji huaqiao di Sui,” (Solomons Cantonese Arrive in Guangzhou) Nanfang ribao, 24 
April 2006, http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/southnews/jwxy/200604240115.asp (accessed 24 May 
2006). 
1082 “Protect Chinese Overseas,” China Daily, 25 April 2006, 4. 
1083 He Jimeng, “Shilun Sun Zhongshan qiaowu sixiang de xianshi yiyi” (Opinion of the Real 
Significance of Sun Yatsen OC Thought) Zhongguo qiaowang, GOCAO website, 20 September 2007, 
www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2007/0920/1/6646.shtml (accessed 30 September 2009). 
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embassy and consulates, and unite for better self-protection.1084  In doing so, it was 
clear that Beijing intended to assert itself as the leading force for OC protection – not 
the local authorities, police, or their own OC associations.  Evacuation and consular 
assistance served as another important platform for the CCP in winning the hearts and 
minds of the OC.   
 
8.05 The Limits of PRC Consular Assistance 
 
Despite the success of generating support from the OC, there were major 
ramifications for qiaowu if such rescue efforts were to occur again.  Months after the 
2006 Honiara riots, one diplomat publicly praised China’s evacuation of OC as a 
“successful practice” and that the PRC was “better prepared as time goes by.”1085  His 
words were an attempt to place a positive spin on what was viewed quite differently 
back in Beijing.  Qiaowu officials maintained that the “emergency response 
mechanism” was only a stop-gap measure, and something China would rather not 
activate.  They were concerned that locals would view the OC as outsiders if they 
continued to receive help from China.1086  In turn, these ethnic tensions would hinder 
China’s own state-to-state relations.   
 
Secondly, these qiaowu officials argued that consular protection took up extensive 
resources, manpower and co-ordination, and also set into motion a culture of 
expectation for diplomatic assistance amongst the OC in times of trouble.  Moreover, 
it was a costly exercise, and sometimes abused.  Some “refugees” from the Honiara 
riots stayed at the Rove Police Shelter purely for show – ensuring that their plight was 
covered by the media, then packing up and going to their friend’s house for the 
evening, rather than endure the crowded conditions.  Others simply abused the 
hospitality that was offered.  Similar events occurred in Nuku’alofa where the PRC 
embassy was overflowing with OC riot victims.1087    
                                                 
1084 Embassy of the PRC in the USA, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman Liu Jianchao’s Press Conference 
on 8 November 2005,” 8 November 2005, www.china-embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t220541.htm (accessed 2 
October 2009); “China Concerned About Crimes Against Nationals in South Africa,” Xinhua, 9 
February 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-02/09/content_4159791.htm (accessed 2 
October 2009). 
1085 Zhang Yuanyuan (PRC Ambassador to New Zealand). Question and answer session at the NZ 
Chinese Association Annual Conference, Wellington, 17 June 2006. 
1086 GOCAO, Cong Suoluomen tangrenjie bei shao shuo qi…, 17-30. 
1087 Various OC residents, interviews by author, Honiara and Nuku’alofa, September 2007. 
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Another aspect surrounding consular assistance was how Beijing could dispense it 
without attracting criticism or suspicion.  Since 2000, PRC evacuation efforts have 
been on a relatively small scale of less than 500 persons, and from small isolated 
countries lacking adequate resources.  These factors reduced logistical concerns over 
transport, resettling and international scrutiny.  A large-scale operation elsewhere 
might have met a different response.1088  For example, China would be hesitant to 
offer evacuation in a developed Western country, or countries with large numbers of 
OC – both legal and illegal.  For example, there are reportedly up to 30,000 ethnic 
Chinese in Fiji1089 and thousands living in PNG.1090   In June 2009, the OC were the 
targets of riots in Port Moresby.  In that instance, the PRC embassy decided that an 
evacuation was not necessary.  Diplomats explained that the local government had the 
necessary capability for containing the unrest and to protect those at risk.1091  An 
evacuation had the potential to expose China’s illegal migration problem.  In other 
cases where the extraction of large populations might be required, dispatching PLA 
naval vessels would send uncomfortable signals of battleship diplomacy into the 
region and therefore compromise China’s attempt to promote a friendly and 
benevolent image.     
 
This indicates the limits to Beijing’s stance on consular assistance.  Although the PRC 
has a duty to protect its nationals abroad, and despite its eagerness to reclaim the OC 
as its own, China still remains selective on how it responds to those in trouble, and 
then only on a case-by-case basis.  For example, PRC officials are unwilling to offer 
help to those OC perceived as a liability – particularly those involved in labour 
disputes or embarrassing criminal behaviour.  While they admit some “bad eggs” turn 
up amongst the two million Chinese overseas travellers each year,1092 diplomats either 
refuse to co-operate or delay the process of repatriation for deported PRC nationals by 
                                                 
1088 Evacuation of OC is provided only after careful consideration of the local geo-political situation. 
Qiaolian official, personal communication with author, Beijing, 9 November 2007. 
1089 Michael Field, “Violence May Drive Chinese Intervention,” Stuff, 20 November 2006, 
www.stuff.co.nz/stuff/0,2106,3866439a12,00.html (accessed 6 April 2007).  
1090 Bertil Lintner, “Chinese Advance in the South Pacific: Entrepreneurs Undaunted by Papua New 
Guinea Dangers,” Japan Focus website, 5 December 2006, www.japanfocus.org/-Bertil-Lintner/2288 
(accessed 6 April 2007). 
1091 PRC diplomat, personal communication with author, Wellington, 20 June 2009. 
1092 Radio New Zealand International, “China’s Ambassador to Fiji Accuses Media of Bias in Crime 
Reporting,” 10 December 2003, www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?id=7752&op=read (accessed 2 
October 2009). 
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citing bureaucratic red tape.  For example, the PRC embassy will take action only if 
notified within four days of an arrest, and “if proven to be Chinese nationals.”  
Without travel documents, criminals are not allowed to re-enter China, even as 
deportees.1093  When criminals are confirmed as PRC nationals, diplomats contend 
that they are not responsible for their activities.  As internal domestic issues of a 
foreign government, “the embassy can only grant limited assistance because it is not 
our country.” 1094   PRC diplomats in Suva referred to the arrest of 41 Chinese 
allegedly involved in illegal gambling and prostitution as “the responsibility of the 
immigration department and police.”1095   
 
Where it has no official representation, Beijing may choose to distance itself from OC 
problems altogether.  Even though there are large numbers of PRC nationals working 
in Saipan, Beijing has yet to establish a consulate on the island state.1096   Thus 
Chinese garment workers based in northern Pacific sweatshops have no avenue for 
resolving their grievances.1097  Similarly, Chinese nationals jailed in the pro-Taipei 
Marshall Islands have also failed to receive assistance.1098  In other cases, China has 
also argued it could not be responsible for accepting deportees from non-Approved 
Tourist Destination (ATD) destinations (this term will be explained in the following 
chapter).1099   
 
China’s lack of a response towards those OC viewed as a liability demonstrates that it 
has focused its efforts on cases where embarrassment is minimized and public 
relations value is maximized.  Therefore consular assistance and qiaowu methods for 
                                                 
1093 Liang Zhenqua (PRC Consul in Los Angeles) as quoted by Cookie B. Micaller, “Another Chinese 
Immigrant Boat Diverted to Tinian,” Saipan Tribune, 26 April 1999, 
http://archives.pireport.org/archive/1999/april/04%2D27%2D02.html (accessed 19 February 2007). 
1094 “Boat People Seen in PNG’s National Capital District,” Post Courier, 3 September 1999, 
http://archives.pireport.org/archive/1999/september/09%2D06%2D04.html (accessed 19 February 
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1095 Craig Skehan, “Fiji to Crack Down on Foreign Prostitutes Posing as Students,” Sydney Morning 
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http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2000/march/03%2D27%2D14.htm (accessed 2 October 2009). 
1096 Jude O. Marfil, “Rota Hotel Operator Protests China Travel Ban,” Marianas Variety, 20 December 
2004, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2004/december/12%2D20%2D11.htm (accessed 2 October 
2009).  
1097 “Chinese Garment Workers on Hunger Strike,” Agence France Presse, 7 March 2000. 
1098 Giff Johnson, “Lawyer Alleges Abuse of Marshall Islands Chinese,” Marianas Variety, 11 May 
2006, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/may/05%2D12%2D14.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).  
1099 Micaller, “Another Chinese Immigrant Boat Diverted to Tinian.” 
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the 21st century focus upon monitoring developments and investigating methods of 
preventing a recurrence rather than placing efforts on actual rescue.1100   Qiaowu 
experts propose that qiaowu should seek to minimize their internal differences, 
strengthen OC society as a whole, and thereby reduce reliance on Beijing in times of 
trouble.1101  This is indicative of a new evolution in OC policy that seeks to upgrade 
the migrant in order to fit China’s desired international image.  As the future of 
qiaowu, this subject is the topic of the final chapter. 
 
8.06 OC Protection and China’s International Relations 
 
The presence of OC throughout the world places China in an interesting situation.  
How Beijing chooses to respond to matters concerning those populations will affect 
its bilateral relations with foreign governments.  There are various contexts to how 
these relationships might unfold.  As Chinese investment abroad grows, Beijing might 
consider naval diplomacy or military protection to oversee assets under OC control or 
intervene when OC are in trouble.1102  For example, it has advocated dispatching PRC 
police officers to assist the investigations of foreign law enforcement agencies 
following attacks on OC; similarly it has considered the possibility of sending China’s 
own security personnel for protection.1103  In the meantime, however, China desires 
acceptance in the international community and refrains from demonstrating what may 
be perceived as aggressive behaviour.  For example, it has been hesitant to send in 
uniformed assistance, chartered commercial aeroplanes instead of sending military 
aircraft, and dispatched good-will naval visits.  Any demonstration of hard power has 
been approved under the UN (such as in the form of peace-keeping forces in 
Sudan.) 1104   Beijing prefers to play a co-operative leadership role (such as co-
ordinating humanitarian efforts, sending medical supplies, and asking for assistance 
                                                 
1100 Lu Weixiong and Zheng Jianmin, “‘Yuanqiao’ shijian shi shei re de huo” (Who is the Unfortunate 
Victim of Anti-Chinese Incidents?) Qiaowu gongzuo yanjiu, no. 2 (2007): 23; GOCAO, Cong 
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China’s Strength Should Help the OC), Qiaoqing jianbao, 27 September 2007, 18; “Somalia 
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1103 Consulate-General of the PRC in Houston, “How Should China Protect Its Citizens Overseas?” 
1104 Su Qiang and Le Tian, “Peacekeeping – A Rising Role for China’s PLA,” China Daily, 24 July 
2008, www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-07/24/content_5442172.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).  
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from third parties).  In this manner, China could be “rated as the region’s most 
trustworthy and responsible friend in time of need.”1105   
 
To improve bilateral relations, regional governments may be called upon for 
assistance where China is unable (or unwilling) to act alone.  China expects and 
demands that countries protect its nationals (and by implication, huaren) in trouble.  
For example, Beijing thanked Syria, Greece and Cyprus for their efforts in evacuating 
143 Chinese from Lebanon in 2006.1106  In the Pacific, Australia, NZ and PNG were 
praised for their role in the SI and Tonga.1107  In this context, some experts suggested 
that NZ and Australia might have served as unwitting proxies for China’s interests in 
the region.1108 
 
In contrast, China may berate or criticize local inadequacies concerning the treatment 
of OC in trouble.1109  For example, it had nothing to lose by criticizing the pro-Taipei 
SI government after the 2006 riots.1110  Moreover, in late 2005, four ethnic Chinese 
women detained at Kuala Lumpur Airport as suspected prostitutes resulted in their 
unlawful detainment, assault and humiliation.  Before the authorities had even 
confirmed whether the complainants were Chinese or Malaysian nationals, Beijing 
reacted strongly.  The PRC vice foreign minister Wu Dawei summoned the Malaysian 
ambassador to lodge a protest, demanding that his government immediately 
investigate and punish those responsible.1111  Newspapers in China printed negative 
stories about the incident contributing to a 49 percent drop in Chinese tourism.  In 
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response, the Malaysian government tried to resolve the situation by sending interior 
minister Azmi Khalid to Beijing for damage control.1112   
 
Similarly, other governments have placed OC affairs as an important part of their 
bilateral relationship with Beijing.  After a spate of murders and crimes against PRC 
nationals in South Africa in 2006 resulted in negative publicity and a 14.9 percent 
decline in Chinese tourists, the South African ambassador to Beijing Vusi Koloane 
quickly reassured that there was “no organized effort” against Chinese, and that his 
government was doing everything possible to “completely eliminate” crimes.  He 
stated “We want zero Chinese people to be killed in South Africa forever.”1113  When 
Zambian opposition presidential candidate Michael Sata threatened to evict OC 
companies out of the country (but more importantly recognizing Taiwan) in 2006, the 
PRC embassy threatened to sever ties with the African nation if he won.1114  In 2007, 
the PRC embassy called on Pakistan to offer better protection for OC after seven 
Chinese hostages accused of prostitution were abducted from an acupuncture clinic in 
Islamabad.  They were later released in the interests of maintaining friendly 
relations.1115   
 
In all these cases, the treatment of OC has served as a barometer for the strength of 
Sino-foreign relations.  As mentioned previously, qiaowu is effectively a core part of 
China’s foreign affairs.  Just as it did with Vietnam and Indonesia during the 1960s, 
Beijing has continued to use the OC as convenient bargaining chips in its international 
relations.  As demonstrated above, the manner and timing in which qiaowu is 
implemented depends entirely on Beijing’s strategic interests.  Like Taiwan, China is 
only prepared to act on behalf of the OC if the issues have enough political 
importance or public relations value for its international image.   
 
 
                                                 
1112 China CSR, “Chinese Journalists Invited to Review Malaysia’s Security Situation,” 6 December 
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8.07 Conclusion 
 
Handling the affairs of the OC has been a historical cause of concern for both Beijing 
and Taipei.  The logistical, financial and human resources put into consular protection 
for ethnic Chinese have often come into conflict with regional suspicions, domestic 
opposition and national interests.  Between the 1960s to late 1990s, China’s stance 
was extremely cautious – responding to OC affairs as contentious issues that 
threatened to undermine regional political relationships.  Similarly, Taiwan’s 
relationship with the OC had deteriorated to the extent that it enacted legislation to 
ensure that it only had limited responsibility towards them; the rise of Taiwanization 
meant that consular assistance focused only upon Taiqiao.  For much of the mid to 
late 1990s, OC caught in ethnic tension or trouble had no-one to turn to at all. 
 
Following the lessons of 1998, Beijing attempted to reclaim trust and respect of the 
OC by boosting its consular protection efforts.  The 2000s saw a massive 
implementation of new legislation and infrastructure designed to show that China was 
capable of protecting its nationals.  To maintain its emotional and ethnographic 
connection with the rest of the OC, it was obligated to demonstrate that it could also 
offer humanitarian assistance to them as well.  Beijing’s conduct of evacuations and 
the way in which they are reported both point towards a strategic and conscientious 
effort to bring as many of the OC as possible under its embrace.  This was particularly 
evident during the DPP years when pro-independence efforts were at their apex. 
 
Despite these developments, political and national interests continue to take priority 
over those of the OC.  Beijing remains in the predicament of finding a balance 
between securing loyalty of the OC against maintaining its international relations.  
The latter is dependent on external concerns and whether there is any benefit for 
China.  This chapter has demonstrated that qiaowu is dictated and limited by the 
scope and robustness of China’s international relations.  Where it is dominant and not 
perceived as a threat, Beijing is quite confident of extending its hand; otherwise, it is 
much more hesitant to inflame the situation or invite embarassment.  For the 
meantime, Beijing is careful not to over-extend itself.  Managing the large numbers of 
OC is, and will continue to be, a critical factor in maintaining stability and security 
throughout the world, and an important factor in Beijing’s foreign policy. 
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9.00 The Future of Qiaowu 
 
Each of the preceding chapters has illustrated a specific aspect of qiaowu and 
examined its development in both a historical and contemporary context.  This 
chapter examines the future direction of qiaowu, the thoughts and ideologies behind 
its strategy, and projects how it will develop.  Policies concerning the spread of 
xinqiao OC reflect the rationale behind a new model of OC affairs that recognizes that 
OC society is constantly evolving, and that the CCP wishes to be a core part of this 
development.  Moreover, qiaowu seeks to capitalize on the upwardly mobile social 
trends amongst certain groups of elite OC, and using them as part of ‘branding’ the 
public face of China abroad.  The ultimate objective, however, is to guide their 
behaviours towards a CCP-friendly outlook.  
 
As this thesis has shown, the goals of qiaowu remained largely consistent up until the 
mid-1980s: realizing the long term development of the OC; promoting ethnic unity for 
political stability and economic modernization and development; fostering Sino-
foreign friendship; and mobilizing revolutionary liberation.1116  The immediate years 
after 1978 through to 1989 saw qiaowu efforts focused upon repairing the damaged 
relationship with returned OC and providing incentives or building links with the OC 
to attract investment.  After 1989, the CCP had to revise this strategy and concentrate 
on better management of the OC diaspora for maintaining its political legitimacy.  In 
the 2000s, China’s qiaowu strategy looked at the OC from a wider perspective – not 
only as a source of economical, cultural and political support, but also for improving 
China’s soft power and international image in the modern era. 
 
Contemporary qiaowu policy thrives in a context of transnationalism and 
globalization.  In this context, China mobilizes both ‘old’ and ‘new’ OC communities 
at the forefront of efforts promoting economic and cultural development, as well as 
political integration with a growing China.  To reassert itself as a global economic 
power, China has actively promoted tourism, trade and enterprise amongst the OC as 
a key aspect of its “Going Out” strategy.1117  Since the late 1990s, China has used 
                                                 
1116 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 16. 
1117 “Zhuanjia xixun weiyuanhui wei qiaowu gongzuo xianji xiance,” 11. 
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migration as a tool to further its national interests by engaging with and cultivating the 
OC through dedicated bureaucratic structures.   
 
This chapter will bring all of these key factors together in describing China’s OC 
affairs for the 21st century – specifically for two quickly emerging groups at opposite 
ends of the OC spectrum: contract labourers/working class OC and new elite migrants.  
The increase in these types of OC has, and will have, profound implications upon the 
political, economic, cultural and social relationships between receiving governments 
and Beijing.  As such, qiaowu methods are continually adapted to address these 
concerns.  
 
9.01 Export of Labour  
 
There are several causes for the spread of ethnic Chinese communities throughout the 
world.  As previous chapters have shown, immigration, education and trade have 
facilitated OC movement abroad for many decades.  China’s own development and 
security strategies also provide an explanation.  Beijing’s emphasis on promoting 
migration and export of contractual labour is consistent with its foreign policy of 
forging stronger links with countries rich in resources.  An international forum of OC 
in 2001 sought to establish transnational entities and investment overseas for securing 
access to essential resources and increasing exports of Chinese-manufactured 
goods.1118  For example, Chinese companies have set up 28 Baoding villages (each 
housing up to 2000 Chinese workers) in various parts of Africa.1119  Similarly, free 
movement of labour is always an important component of China’s Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) negotiations.1120  ‘Going Out’ and migration from China carry not 
so much an intention of global expansionism or colonialism, but the prime objective 
of improving China’s situation from abroad. 
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China’s foreign investment, reconstruction, contract projects and foreign aid in recent 
years have resulted in a proportionate increase in the number of PRC nationals going 
abroad.  Over the past thirty years, the PRC has become a major competitor in the 
global labour market.  Shortages of skilled manpower for the completion of official 
aid projects have seen hundreds of thousands of workers sent overseas since the 
1970s.1121   Prior to the 1980s, exporting labour was part of China’s foreign aid 
contribution to developing countries.1122  In the mid-1980s, Beijing redeveloped it as a 
‘win-win’ business arrangement, facilitated by assistance from international 
development agencies as a poverty reduction strategy.1123  An outdated system of 
unified labour allocation during the 1990s saw responsibility for contract labourers 
passed from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation (MOFTEC) 
onto private agencies (such as labour exporters, travel agents, foreign employers or 
private corporations).  These companies are accredited with the authority to recruit 
workers in an open market.  By 2004, 1400 Chinese companies were licensed to 
contract workers to foreign markets, providing over 500,000 labourers to work legally 
in foreign construction and textile industries.1124    Given these trends, China will 
continue to be a major source of migration as international markets accept (and in 
some cases depend upon) foreign labour as part of the globalized economy.1125 
 
China’s foreign policy of ‘Going Out’ was supposed to promote an environment 
conducive to its continued growth and development by projecting a non-threatening 
image.1126  However, in many cases, this has not been the case.  The increase in the 
number of Chinese workers and investors abroad has been controversial, and as such, 
raised ethnic tensions.  For example, conditions and benefits for Chinese staff tend to 
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be better than their African counterparts, causing jealousy.1127  Zambian locals blame 
OC businessmen for ignoring safety concerns, underpaying workers and driving out 
local businesses with cheap imported goods and labour.1128  Politicians alleged China 
was “dumping their people here to take up shops meant for our people.”1129  These 
concerns are shared throughout the world where the PRC has encouraged large 
numbers of Chinese to invest, trade or settle.     
 
9.02 Qiaowu in the Pacific 
 
As the previous chapter demonstrated, recent attention surrounding evacuations of the 
OC in the Pacific have led to definitive and significant changes concerning the 
implementation of consular assistance.  The following section also uses specific 
examples from the Pacific to describe regional concerns, and then describes how 
China has responded to them.  Qiaowu policies in this geographic context are 
representative of its wider policies towards labourer-class OC elsewhere in the world 
(such as Africa or Eastern Europe); furthermore, these examples are especially 
important for indicating the emerging trends for its future policy development. 
 
In 2006, following years of denying any strategic interest in the region, Beijing finally 
revealed its active stance for economic development in the Pacific by establishing a 
comprehensive set of measures to promote OC trade and tourism there.1130  These 
included a special fund and the designation of seven pro-Beijing nations as ATDs for 
PRC citizens.1131  Such a status allows tour groups of five or more to make visits 
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organized through approved Chinese travel agents.  Without ATD accreditation, 
visitors require special visas to visit those countries.  ATD status also encourages 
hosts to gear marketing and infrastructure specifically towards Chinese visitors.  A 
PRC ambassador hoped that Pacific nations would welcome “thousands” of them.1132  
This sentiment is shared by impoverished island nations looking towards China as a 
source of income.1133   
 
Forecasts show that the number of visitors from China to the Pacific is to rise 
significantly, eventually making them the largest tourism market in the world.1134  
Tourism and migration paves the way for a wider scope of Chinese influence.1135  The 
OC are already involved in enterprises ranging from multi-million dollar mining 
ventures to small shops and restaurants,1136 and have quickly asserted dominance.1137  
Similarly, PRC state-owned or OC investment has established and upgraded 
accommodation, cuisine, news media, education, finance and other services for 
Chinese visitors. 1138   Taiwanese OC own larger retail facilities or have fishing 
interests and control prominent industries.  Malaysian OC are involved in much of the 
region’s logging and mineral extraction business.1139   
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As an initiative to send more contract labour abroad as part of its ‘Going Out’ strategy, 
Beijing has encouraged efforts to make destinations more favourable for workers.  For 
example, to improve their safety, one state-owned company suggested basing contract 
labourers and their families in regions of relative political stability, and operating a 
‘fly-in fly-out’ system.1140  Another sought to make the Fijian garment industry more 
competitive through loans, equipment and training.1141   In 2007, the Ministry of 
Commerce and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission mulled over 
programmes to insure OC workers for specific risks normally exempted by regular 
policies.  In an industry where immigration problems and ethnic tensions with 
Chinese workers are already rife, increasing their numbers would only serve to 
complicate matters.  Nevertheless, Beijing is adamant to push forward with its 
objectives. 
 
China’s aim to increase and advance investments and its presence throughout the 
Pacific has significant implications for regional security.  By highlighting areas for 
investment in ‘Going Out’, PRC migrants are attracted to the new opportunities that 
may arise.  Unfortunately, these OC workers, tourists and investors provide another 
channel for the expansion of other undesirable groups of OC – particularly those 
involved in transnational criminal activities.  It is these groups that have caused 
significant concern for both the PRC and regional authorities.  Problems include 
illegal migration, drug trafficking and prostitution.  All three are inter-linked, with 
mass movement of the OC being the common factor.1142 
 
 
 
 
9.03 Illegal Migration in the Pacific 
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Due to its clandestine nature, accurate statistics on the scale of people smuggling and 
illegal migration from the PRC are elusive and often unreliable due to the political 
nature of the topic.  Data comes mostly from estimates based on reports of arrests, 
court proceedings and deportations. However, there are some widely accepted 
estimates representative of the broader situation.1143  China appears at the top of the 
list as the source for illegal migration and unauthorized arrivals in the Asia-Pacific 
region.1144  The problem is so big that Fijian authorities have lost track of controlling 
them.1145  Island nations with poor immigration controls are commonly used as back 
doors to enter more developed countries.1146  They are flown in, dropped off by 
fishing boats, or arrive under the guise of tourists.  Some of them become local 
residents after receiving coaching on how to evade immigration controls.1147  Such 
large influxes of illegal migration and people smuggling are a frustrating issue for 
border management agencies of the receiving country.  It also puts stress on local 
infrastructure, and raises bilateral problems with China.1148  For example, during the 
late 1990s, hundreds of PRC migrants were housed temporarily in fenced compounds 
in Guam, raising health, hygiene and security concerns.1149   
 
Human trafficking is predominantly co-ordinated through internationally organized 
triad crime rings.  Immigrants going through these channels end up indentured to pay 
for their legal bills, smugglers’ fees and their transportation costs associated with 
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leaving China – and as a result, they resort to working illegally. 1150   Hence, 
prostitution is a widespread problem throughout the Pacific.  In the Northern 
Marianas, 90 percent of the 1500 prostitutes in Saipan are Chinese.1151  Some arrive 
on valid papers for employment in garment factories, but end up overstaying and 
working without permits (as hostesses in nightclubs, bars and restaurants) to repay 
their recruitment fees and living expenses.  At least forty “Chinese only” brothels 
exist in Suva, staffed by Chinese on visitor or student visas working on the side while 
trying to gain entry into Australia.1152  A similar situation occurs in Samoa.1153   
 
OC migration also facilitates the illegal trafficking of drugs and other contraband.  For 
example, foreign students and PRC nationals on short-term visas comprise a 
significant proportion of carriers used in the pseudoephedrine trade.1154  The Pacific is 
a popular transhipment destination with relatively lax legal structures, impotent 
monitoring systems, and ineffective punitive measures; moreover, the possibility of a 
short jail sentence or extradition is a small price to pay for the potentially lucrative 
gains resulting from illegal activity.  Illicit goods are smuggled unchecked, often 
aided by customs, immigration and police officers with a “good relationship” with 
Chinese business people.  Moreover, many wharves and marinas have poor border 
security, with authorities relying solely on the captain’s declarations of cargo and 
number of people on board.1155  There are also reports of mothership vessels loaded 
with contraband by their company supply vessels while at sea. 1156   Payment to 
crewmen for smuggling is arranged by way of radio communication to China.1157  In 
response to the high number of incidents concerning undeclared goods in 2005, the 
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Fijian Customs Department imposed a 100 percent search on all containers imported 
by Chinese nationals, deeming them as “high risk.”1158  
 
Transnational criminal activity is a sophisticated operation, backed by powerful 
multinational elements.  Furthermore, there are big ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors 
concerning illegal immigration that are beyond the control of Chinese and local 
authorities.  Coupled with insufficient monitoring and enforcement at both the origin 
and destination, the situation requires a significant amount of resources and 
management that is unavailable due to economic constraints and other priorities.  
Governments in the Pacific lack the infrastructure to deal effectively with this 
problem, and Beijing does not demonstrate an urgent need to resolve it either.  The 
next section reveals why the PRC has not considered illegal immigration an important 
issue to address.  The answer lies at the very core of China’s long term strategy for the 
OC. 
 
9.04 Passing On Responsibility for Migrant Behaviour and Illegal Migration 
 
The increase in illegal OC is a long-standing problem, and Chinese authorities are 
aware of the implications.  An internal State Council migration and population report 
noted that the number of illegal migrants from China exceeds that of legal ones.1159  
For its part, China has made some efforts to combat illegal migration.  Laws and 
regulations prohibiting this practice include Articles 176 and 177 of the 1979 
Criminal Law.  In 1985, PRC authorities passed legislation regarding migration, 
passport and border control.1160  In 1992, the OCAO and other government ministries 
issued their first document outlining illegal migration from China, describing the 
situation and addressing how it could damage China’s national interests.  In 1993, 
Beijing authorities issued a second document to curb illegal migration along the 
southern coastal regions.1161  Since then, the PRC has promised (at the state and 
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provincial level) to co-operate with international and regional bodies (such as the 
International Organization for Migration) and immigration authorities through the 
issuance of official statements. 1162   It also holds discussions between concerned 
parties. 1163   Domestically, counter-measures include fines and imprisonment for 
smugglers, investigating and rescuing women and children coerced into prostitution, 
and holding prevention campaigns using education materials.   
 
However, these measures are mostly ineffective and penalties are not a deterrent.1164  
The main problem is that ambivalent local officials hardly care to enforce directives 
from Beijing.1165  From their perspective, illegal migration helps solve unemployment 
concerns, and money sent back assists with constructing infrastructure. 1166  
Consequently, they usually “keep one eye open and close the other.”1167  As for 
transnational crime perpetrated by illegal PRC migrants, the reaction of PRC officials 
is equally mixed.  China absolves itself of any responsibility and blames the situation 
on macro-economic disparity, criminal gangs, and the immigration policies of 
receiving countries.1168  Furthermore, PRC officials argue that the numbers of illegal 
immigrants are an exaggeration, and instead promote the positive aspects of xinyimin 
migration and contract labour to the local economy.1169   
 
Because of Beijing’s failure to effectively address and combat people smuggling and 
transnational crime, some observers argue that there is official support, or at least tacit 
recognition, from PRC authorities.1170  The historical link between Chinese criminal 
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gangs, the CCP, and qiaowu can be traced back over several decades.  In 1984, Deng 
Xiaoping pointed out that not all triads were bad, and some were good and 
patriotic.1171  In 1993, the PRC minister for public security Tao Siju commented that 
as long as triads were patriotic and concerned about the stability and prosperity of 
Hong Kong, the CCP should join forces with them because “the more people we unite 
the better.”1172  In this regard, the CCP worked with such groups in bringing stability 
leading up to the 1997 handover by dominating OC communities throughout North 
America. 1173   Similarly, the OCAO has worked with criminal gangs in order to 
maintain OC affairs in Southeast Asia.  In 2000, Guo Dongpo (director of the Beijing 
office of the OCAO) met Teng Bunma (a leader of the Cambodian Chinese 
community and suspected drug dealer) to ask for his assistance in controlling unruly 
mainland gang activity in the region.1174    
 
Furthermore, PRC government officials, law enforcement authorities and military 
personnel face accusations of helping gather illegal migrants, procuring travel 
documents and facilitating their transit.1175  They allegedly collaborate with consular 
officials and triad snakeheads in forging documents for illegal immigration, 
trafficking and other criminal activity in order to fund PRC foreign intelligence 
operations.1176  There are suspicions that PRC diplomats cultivate criminals to spy, 
corrupt and infiltrate.1177 An increase of OC migrants is suspected to be part of a 
deliberate expansionist effort, or as a fifth column tool mobilized by Beijing.1178  Of 
course, Beijing vehemently denies such allegations.1179 
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9.05 PRC Views on Illegal Migration 
 
Beijing seeks to manage migration in the context of its own internal situation and for 
serving China’s development.1180   Encouraging migration (whether it be legal or 
illegal) has advantages for China.  In addition to the benefits mentioned above, it 
relieves domestic population and environmental pressures, and provides a channel to 
promote Chinese interests abroad.1181  For Beijing, while illegal migration frustrates 
international relations, it does not consider it as an important issue to address.1182  As 
long as there is no major negative impact upon its own interests, Beijing does not care 
about illegal migration from its shores.  For example, an internal report cited that the 
majority of Americans felt that “black work” performed by illegal migrants was 
acceptable as long as they did not encroach on the livelihoods of locals.1183  Similar 
research found that while there was opposition towards illegal migrants in some 
countries, others were mostly sympathetic to them.1184  Given these opinions, Chinese 
authorities maintain a lax attitude towards policing the issue.  For them, this 
contradiction between official policy and the demand for cheap labour abroad, 
coupled with the economic benefits, make illegal migration an acceptable practice.1185 
 
The PRC government is well-versed about illegal migration.  It is aware of how 
migrants evade authorities, their diversity of origin, destinations, and even the 
numbers involved.1186  State Council reports reveal that rather than seeking resolution, 
China assumes that illegal migration from its shores is inevitable.  Beijing views 
migration and globalization of ethnic Chinese as a natural phenomenon of human 
societal development whereby OC society and organizations are constantly 
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internationalizing and regionalizing.1187  From a human resources perspective, their 
integration and development in global society has profound implications for the unity 
of groupings, division of labour, exchange and competition.  Therefore, OC cadres 
suggest that policies should emphasize how to better accommodate illegal migrants in 
OC work in ten or twenty years time when they have become established as part of 
the general OC population.1188  OCAO cadres conduct empirical research about illegal 
migration not for putting an end to it, but for accurately forecasting and mapping 
changes in demographics and labour movements in order to guide future qiaowu 
policy development.1189   
 
9.06 ‘Unqualified’ Chinese 
 
Although it chooses not to adequately address the problem of illegal migration, the 
residual implications remain a significant irritant to Beijing’s interests.  One area of 
migration that has received recent attention is the phenomenon of lower-class, 
uneducated migrants who have left China for economic reasons.  As mentioned 
previously, their movement is poorly regulated, and they tend to be the most visible 
component of Chinese abroad – particularly in Africa and the Pacific.  Migrants to 
these (mostly) less-developed parts of the world often do not possess academic or 
technical expertise.  Furthermore, their behaviour is sometimes selfish and insular, 
causing difficulties or conflicts with locals.  Some qiaowu specialists are extremely 
critical of these ‘new’ migrants, saying that they lack not only education, but also 
ethics and values.  Their presence serves only to add to a low-end economy rather 
than to strategic economic and social development.1190  For China, they are another 
liability for its desired international image, and hence described as “unqualified 
Chinese.”1191  In other words, this group has become the modern iteration of Beijing’s 
“OC problem.” 
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“Unqualified Chinese” are problematic for the PRC because they hinder its 
aspirations to become a respected global citizen.  Much of how the world perceives 
China depends on the image of the ethnic Chinese.  China cannot reach its goal of 
becoming a “responsible great nation” or winning the world’s trust if certain groups 
of the OC continue to act undesirably.  Qiaowu seeks to alleviate these concerns by 
actively presenting a benevolent face – emphasizing co-operation and friendship by 
promoting the benefits of Chinese aid projects and making local residents feel it is 
sincere in helping them.1192  The task is to operate pragmatically and flexibly without 
upsetting bilateral relations. 
 
The PRC response is that these issues should not be politicized, but dealt with using a 
long term approach of “upgrading the software of migrants.”1193  From the perspective 
of some qiaowu officials, migrants are simply another type of export commodity – 
and like any other product, there should be standards put in place.  Therefore, the 
interests of lower class OC must receive attention. 1194   ‘New’ OC must take 
responsibility for their own actions and raise their ‘quality.’ These include improving 
their attributes and behaviour, such as manners, hygiene, discipline, education, morals 
and lifestyle.1195   
 
Although love for the ancestral homeland is widely encouraged by qiaowu officials, 
they understand it is too one-sided.  Qiaowu should not be ethnographically focused 
on solely promoting the premise of “I am Chinese” or “Chineseness” – this would 
only reinforce chauvinistic thinking amongst the OC. 1196   Instead, the Chinese 
government promotes the notion that the OC should act as a member of the “world’s 
family.”1197  For example, induction efforts attempt to manage migrants before they 
depart – teaching them local customs, laws and policies in order to “prepare the 
                                                 
1192 Consulate-General of the PRC in Houston, “How Should China Protect Its Citizens Overseas?”  
1193 Qiaoqing, 2007/1 (8 January 2007): 22. 
1194 “Dasuan hou de Yinni huaren ji wo dui Yinni qiaowu gongzuo,” 19. 
1195 Lu and Zheng, “‘Yuanqiao’ shijian shi shei re de huo,” 23. 
1196 Lin Lin, “Jianchi yi qiao wei ben, nuli goujian hexie qiaowu” (Uphold Overseas Chinese as the 
Priority, Diligently Build Harmonious Overseas Chinese Relations) Qiaowu gongzuo yanjiu, no. 6 
(2006): 5. 
1197 Lu and Zheng, “‘Yuanqiao’ shijian shi shei re de huo,” 23.  
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migrant.”1198  Upon completion of training by approved agencies, migrants receive a 
certificate to prove that they meet the requirements.1199   
 
These efforts are supposed to improve integration between OC and local populations.  
Diplomats claim that export labourers are checked for security clearance to avoid 
“unfortunate incidents”.  They are expected to show good behaviour, and face 
consequences if they fail to do so. 1200   However, about 10,000 workers remain 
uncertified by China’s only authorized employment verification agency, the Chinese 
Economic Development Association.1201  Many labourers (particularly those from 
rural areas with low education and low skills) continue to be recruited through 
unauthorized brokers.1202  Moreover, since 2002, all contracted labourers were issued 
private (rather than ordinary public) passports to facilitate ease of monitoring their 
movement.  However, whereas public passports are held by their employers and 
provide more control over their activities, private passports are held by the employees 
themselves and offer more mobility, but with the potential for abuse.1203 
 
Despite attempts for state regulation, there remain many informal and semi-official 
operators competing with registered agencies.1204  Although MOFTEC provided rules 
and instructions to labour-exporting agencies that were supposed to implement 
training and screening prior to their departure, these systems for governing migrant 
worker behaviour lack sufficient monitoring, let alone enforcement.1205  In addition, 
such training is subject to a charge (and therefore often avoided); furthermore, not all 
migrants go through these official channels (many prefer less bureaucracy and 
security checks); finally, these brief and superficial efforts may not be effective in 
truly grounding ethnic sensitivities.   
 
                                                 
1198 Qiaoqing, 2007/1 (8 January 2007): 23-24; Lin, “Jianchi yi qiao wei ben, nuli goujian hexie 
qiaowu,” 6; Li, “Transformation of Contingency into Meaning.” 
1199 Li, “Brokering Migration from Southern China,” 12-13. 
1200 Zhang Yuanyuan (PRC Ambassador to NZ and Cook Islands) as quoted by John Woods, “China 
Announces Major Projects in Cook Islands,” Cook Island News, 6 March 2006, 
http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/march/03%2D06%2D08.htm (accessed 2 October 2009). 
1201 “China: 10,000 Workers Without Clearance in CNMI,” Marianas Variety, 24 January 2003, 
http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2003/january/01%2D24%2D08.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).  
1202 Li, “Labour Brokerage in China Today.” 
1203 Xiang Biao, “Emigration from China,” 27. 
1204 Pieke et al, Transnational Chinese: Fujianese Migrants in Europe. 
1205 Zha, “Chinese Migrant Workers in Japan,” in Nyiri and Saveliev, Globalizing Chinese Migration, 
138-139.  
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9.07 Raising China’s Image: Getting Along Together 
 
China also works at the destination countries by seeking to integrate migrants and 
locals in a way that promotes a positive image of China and Chinese abroad.  
However, ethnic tensions ensure that achieving this goal remains problematic.  
Historically, locals often accused the OC mercantile (particularly those in Southeast 
Asia) for having pro-Beijing allegiances.  They therefore became a target for 
discrimination whenever regional tensions arose.1206   From Beijing’s perspective, in 
competing for limited resources or market share, conflict and ethnic tensions are 
inevitable and expected to continue.1207   
 
While consular protection for OC was an issue that was subject to the geo-political 
environment, one goal of qiaowu has always been consistent.  Qiaowu seeks not to 
make ethnic divisions nor cause suspicion, but to improve mutual trust and affinity 
with the objective of integration and co-operation.1208  As early as 1951, the PRC 
MFA instructed its ambassadors to emphasize commonality and promotion of China’s 
successes – and the OC were the leading vehicle to achieve this.1209  In the 2000s, 
these policies have not changed.  The duties of consular offices and embassies include 
protecting the interests and well-being of ethnic Chinese, raising their quality of life, 
promoting their long term existence, and integrating them into local society by 
reducing perceptions of China and the OC as exploitive.1210  At the grass roots level, 
for example, a co-operative effort between the OC, the PRC embassy and local 
government and law enforcement agencies in South Africa saw the establishment of 
“Police-Citizen Co-operation Centres” as a visible contribution to society.1211  At 
official functions, PRC diplomats praise the long history of Chinese involvement in 
                                                 
1206 Goodman, “Are Asia’s ‘Ethnic Chinese’ a Regional-Security Threat?” 140-156. 
1207 Qiaoqing, 2007/1, January 8, 2007, p.22. 
1208 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 80-81, 93-95, 99; Wang, Qiaowu zhishi shouce, 70-72; Chen, Gongmin 
shouce, 362; Gu, Qiao, Tai, minzu, zongjiao zhengce wenda, 2. 
1209 PRC MFA, “Waijiaobu jiu Dongnanya huaqiao guoqing qingchu huodong xiang youguan shiguan 
zhishi” (MFA Instruction to Concerned Embassies on OC National Day Celebrations in Southeast Asia) 
Archive File no. 117-00081-08, 1951. 
1210 “Kaizhan dui huaren wenti mingan guojia de qiaowu gongzuo xu jiji, shenshen” (Postively and 
Cautiously Develop OC Work in Countries with Ethnic Chinese Sensitivities), Qiaoqing, no. 8 (15 
February 2004): 1-12. 
1211 “Overseas Chinese in S. Africa Set Up Anti-Crime Fund,” Xinhua, 23 December 2006; “Zhongguo 
qiaolian fuzhuxi Lin Mingjiang fang Nanfei canguan jingmin hezuo zhongxin” (Qiaolian Vice 
President Lin Mingjiang Visits South Africa and Police-Citizen Cooperation Centre) Zhongguo 
qiaowang, 25 October 2007. 
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local development and friendly exchanges between peoples. 1212   Community 
gatherings serve to remind the OC of their obligations by making friendly efforts 
towards locals, earning their money through honest labour, abiding by the laws of the 
land, and respecting their local colleagues.1213   
 
In this context, as a long term effort to integrate and raise the image of the OC in local 
society, qiaowu officials call for mutual co-operation and development amongst the 
OC mercantile community in order to improve the “made in China” image by way of 
media, training and exchange.1214  Firstly, the OC media is the key to changing the 
perceptions of foreign media (particularly in the West, Africa and the Pacific), which 
often label the OC as a problem.1215  Propaganda efforts seek to reduce jealousy or 
fears of economic or political domination amongst locals by emphasizing China’s 
liberalization and economic development while downplaying or avoiding sensitive 
historical problems (such as mobilizing OC for local politics, propagation of socialism, 
the concern of Chinese goods conflicting with local products, and China’s growing 
sphere of influence).  Thus, the state-controlled OC media prohibit public disclosure 
of the amount of OC investment or their contributions to China’s economic 
development. 1216   Similarly, the PRC tones down any news of successful OC 
economic development in the foreign media.1217   Rather, Chinese media receives 
guidance to promote OC investment or assistance in local industries not as a one-way 
injection, but as a ‘win-win’ co-operative result that goes beyond monetary terms.1218  
For example, China encourages OC relations through mutually beneficial platforms 
and legitimate regional frameworks such as the China-ASEAN FTA.1219  To reduce 
ethnic divisions, the OC media advise their audience that they should not refer to 
                                                 
1212 “Chinese Residents Told to Maintain Good Relations with PNG,” Post-Courier, 3 October 2000, 
http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2000/october/10%2D04%2D16.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).  
1213 “Chinese Ambassador Zhao Concerned Over Another Port Moresby Killing,” Post-Courier, 11 
September 2002, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2002/september/09%2D12%2D05.htm (accessed 
2 October 2009). 
1214 “Qianxi Ouzhou huaqiaohuaren jingji xianzhuang ji fazhan qushi” (Analysis of Trends and 
Development of the European OC Economic Situation), Qiaoqing, no. 49 (8 November 2005): 1-13. 
1215 Pal Nyiri, “Global Modernisers or Local Subalterns? Parallel Perceptions of Chinese 
Transnationals in Hungary,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31, no. 4. (July 2005): 659-674. 
1216 Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 163-164.  
1217 Kim, “The Greater Chinese Economic Area and East Asia.” 
1218 “Kaizhan dui huaren wenti mingan guojia de qiaowu gongzuo xu jiji, shenshen,” 1-12. 
1219 “Dasuan hou de Yinni huaren ji wo dui Yinni qiaowu gongzuo,” 19. 
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locals as “those Indonesians” in order to avoid an ‘us versus them’ mentality.1220  In 
the same vein, qiaowu cadres make sure to refer to the OC as huazu (ethnic Chinese) 
rather than huaqiao in order to avoid connotations of a political relationship.1221 
 
In the same way as ‘upgrading their software,’ OC should be educated about local 
legislation, policies, as well as the availability of public funding and state support in 
order to maintain their rights, interests and organizational activities. 1222   These 
measures have gained importance in recent years following ethnic tensions between 
the OC and local populations.1223  Over the last few decades, many governments have 
adopted liberal policies of “ethnic cultural preservation’.1224  Qiaowu officials advise 
OC groups to take advantage of these policies and use them to build enthusiasm for 
China and Chinese cultural products amongst non-Chinese audiences.  They 
encourage OC groups to act as initiators and organizers of bilateral exchange as part 
of the integration process. 1225   For example, cadres suggest that the OC use 
celebration of traditional festivals to engage with local politicians and to interact and 
co-operate with authorities and law enforcement agencies.  These events all work to 
dispel anti-Chinese feelings amongst the wider population.1226   
 
Such efforts are co-ordinated with help from the PRC embassy, cultural and education 
attaches, and Beijing-friendly organizations.1227  In this manner, Chinese authorities 
relieve themselves of the logistical effort of doing the actual work themselves; and 
more importantly, they are not seen as the ones directly pushing outreach or cultural 
diplomacy, and thus diluting any sensitivity towards qiaowu.1228  For the OC, they 
enjoy a sense of achievement and first-hand appreciation of culture through co-
                                                 
1220 “Yinni huaren buying zaishuo ‘tamen Yinniren’” (Indonesian Chinese Should Never Say Again 
‘Those Indonesians’), Qiaoqing jianbao, 28 April 2009. 
1221 Huazu is a term more acceptable to locals than huaqiao, which connotes a political connection.  
See “Dasuan hou de Yinni huaren ji wo dui Yinni qiaowu gongzuo,” 15, 18-19.  
1222 “Shenri shehui, tanjiu qiaoqing,” 5-6, 12; “Liebian, chongzu, xinsheng, ronghe,” 14-15; Qiaowu 
gongzuo gailun, 66. 
1223 “Zhongguo qiaolian chengli haiwai lushituan jiaqiang weihu haiwai qiaobao quanli” (Qiaolian 
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1225 “Jiaqiang qiaowu wenhua gongzuo, xuanchuan hongyang Zhonghua wenhua,” 3-5. 
1226 “Shenri shehui, tanjiu qiaoqing,” 3-4, 11-12. 
1227 “Xuanwei haiwai qiaobao, hongyang Zhonghua wenhua” (Encourage Overseas Compatriots, 
Advance Chinese Culture), Qiaoqing, no. 37 (8 October 2005): 6-12. 
1228 Qiaowu gongzuo gailun, 95. 
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operative experience.  By way of such training, OC groups have become experts in 
facilitating Beijing’s soft power objectives abroad. 
 
9.08 Consolidation of the OC 
 
According to a GOCAO report concerning the modern development of qiaowu, there 
are three new strategic aspects (sanxin gongcheng) for policy development aimed at 
the entire OC diaspora: strengthening root-seeking and ethnic affinity with jingying; 
encouraging co-operation and exchange with these groups; and finally, capacity 
building and training for youth and middle aged OC.1229  Earlier chapters addressed 
root seeking and building ethnic affinity, which sets the foundation and friendly pro-
China mindset upon which to advance qiaowu.  This section examines the latter two 
aspects by analyzing how and why the CCP promotes the co-ordination, consolidation 
and capacity building of diverse OC groups in order to benefit from their combined 
attributes. 
 
Qiaowu cadres suggest that OC associations should be the channels for co-ordinating 
the improvement of their image, status and social awareness by reducing the impact of 
negative examples and events concerning their members.1230  While China may not 
always directly initiate or orchestrate their behaviour, it actively assists in establishing, 
maintaining and enhancing links with them through guidance and funding.1231   
 
Historically, laoqiao associations existed to look after their fellow countrymen, 
maintaining a sense of responsibility to those who possessed the requisite origins.  
They were based on clan/kinship, regional/county or quasi-political ties steeped in 
parochial traditions, values and principles. 1232   Associations were established to 
provide leadership and cohesiveness for their members, mostly described as the 
‘Three Knives”: lowly-educated market gardeners, restauranteurs and 
                                                 
1229 “Jiefang sixiang tuidong Guangdong qiaowu gongzuo kexue fazhan” (Liberate Thinking, Promote 
Scientific Development of Guangdong OC Work) Qiaoqing jianbao, 21 March 2008, 2. 
1230 Lu and Zheng, “‘Yuanqiao’ shijian shi shei re de huo,” 23; Lin, “Jianchi yi qiao wei ben, nuli 
goujian hexie qiaowu,” 5.  
1231 “Ministry to Continue Protecting Chinese,” China Daily, 30 September 2006, 
www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-09/30/content_700236.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).  
1232 Liu, “Old Linkages, New Networks,” 585; Fong, The Chinese in New Zealand, 61, 94. 
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clothiers/cobblers.  Their goals were internally focused to determine their survival,1233 
providing social and financial services, education and cultural maintenance in the face 
of discrimination, oppression and hardship throughout the late 19th to mid-20th 
century.1234  More importantly, many of these laoqiao groups had strong ties to the 
KMT.  By the 1980s, ‘old’ associations were mostly in a state of stagnation unless 
they could replenish their membership.  Young laoqiao tended not to subscribe to 
traditional cultural themes and contributed little to organizational growth.  While 
cadres acknowledge that ‘old’ migrants and their descendants had entered mainstream 
society and raised their social status from modest beginnings, they criticize laoqiao 
for not engaging in co-operative activity and a poor distribution of human resources 
due to their insular social structure.1235  In this new demographic context, laoqiao 
organizations do not reflect the image of the OC desired by the CCP.1236   
 
Instead, the PRC encourages a construction of “new migrant” culture by actively 
avoiding the laoqiao ‘Three Knives’ image and thereby shedding the “stain of 
boorishness inherent in its rural Southern origins.”1237  In 2007, OC specialists called 
for looking beyond the ‘Three Knives’ and ‘Chinatowns’ to targeting the “Three 
News”: ‘new’ migrants of PRC nationality and ethnic Chinese, ‘new’ OC 
organizations, and the ‘new’ generation of elite OC and youth of ethnic Chinese 
descent.1238  These target groupings are encouraged to feel as if they have moved on 
from being a labourer class, or even a professional class, to become an important 
force of global technological and scientific development.1239   
 
Various elements of the wider qiaowu super structure support this objective by 
promoting the jingying concept amongst the wider OC community.  In the extant 
literature, qiaowu academics describe modern OC as the ‘Six Masters’ (lawyers, 
                                                 
1233 Crissman, “The Segmentary Structure of Urban Overseas Chinese Communities,” 194-195.  
1234 Ip, “Immigrants and Transnationals in New Zealand,” 348-351. 
1235 “Fu Xinxilan diaoyanhou de xinsikao,” 15-16. 
1236 Nyiri, “The New Migrant,” 141-176. 
1237 Nyiri, “Expatriating is Patriotic?” 635-653. 
1238 Lu, “Lishi dangjia, wutai zaiwai, neiwai wudong, gongchuang gongying.” 
1239 Nie Chuanqing, “Chaoyue chuantong ‘san ba dao’ haiwai xinhuaqiao huaren zhuangong zhuliu 
hangye” (Transcending the Traditional ‘Three Knives’: Overseas Chinese and Ethnic Chinese Change 
into Mainstream Industries) Peoples Daily, 11 September 2007. 
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engineers, doctors, accountants, professors and scientists).1240  The OC media plays a 
major role in showcasing examples of these successful migrants in order to “promote 
China’s national vitality and spread Chinese culture.”1241  Newspapers have sections 
advising readers on modern daily life, information on important local issues, 
regulations and laws to facilitate their advancement abroad.1242  In turn, xinqiao OC 
view this connection with China as another form of patriotism.1243  As Benedict 
Anderson predicted, the mass media has certainly enabled long distance nationalism 
amongst the OC diaspora.1244  
 
Although they are no longer the sole representation of OC, laoqiao remain an 
important group for China’s soft power efforts.  For example, when meeting with 
them, diplomats often express praise for their contribution to society, their native 
language ability and how they relate easily with locals.  One important aspect of 
qiaowu is uniting old laoqiao with new xinqiao.  The former possess years of 
accumulated experience and kudos in their host society, yet are deeply acculturated 
and entrenched in local values and outlooks; the latter (particularly xinqiao jingying 
groups) are skilled, dynamic and more importantly, responsive to political and 
emotional cues from Beijing. 1245   Together, both laoqiao and xinqiao can be a 
powerful force for advancing CCP interests.  Qiaowu officials acknowledge and 
embrace all OC under the premise “old friends are not to be forgotten, while relations 
with new friends are to be expanded.”1246  ‘New friends’ refers to xinqiao who have 
gradually exerted their dominance over laoqiao, both in numbers and organizational 
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capacity.  As such, qiaowu seeks to address these concerns by working closely with 
these groups and encouraging more participation.1247   
 
This is because ‘new’ OC also have their weaknesses.  Qiaowu analysts note that 
xinqiao organizations tend to have limited resources, finances, and scope of activity.  
Many new groups lack assets or even a permanent physical address; nor do they have 
substantial institutional experience and skills.  Often they are nothing more than 
‘shells’ – having plenty of vigour to begin with, but fizzling out soon after due to 
diminished capacity and low enthusiasm.1248  Groups tend to be insular and think of 
themselves first without thought for co-operation with others.  An investigative report 
by the State Council found that many xinqiao organizations are weak and unstable – 
internal rivalry and management problems are common.1249  Small sub-groups have 
conflicting agendas, causing splits in the wider OC community. 1250   Such 
complications prevent the formation of the unified OC society that Beijing strives 
for.1251   
 
Therefore, qiaowu cadres encourage xinqiao associations to draw leading laoqiao into 
their ranks and to co-operate with them for mutual benefit and development.1252  As 
such, new OC groups bestow honorary membership, organize attractive activities, and 
fundraise for causes relevant to laoqiao.  Various platforms (such as ‘study groups’ or 
‘networking conferences’) are used to facilitate more co-operation, and act as cultural 
and ethnic platforms for eventual unity.1253  For example, traditional celebrations, 
such as Chinese New Year serve as a platform for bringing distinct groups together. 
 
Bringing ‘new’ and ‘old’ together involves avoiding conflict and contradiction and 
promoting mediation, guidance, co-ordination and co-operation.  Smaller groups are 
                                                 
1247 Lu, “‘San ge jianchi’ quanmian tuozhan qiaowu gongzuo.” 
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1253 “Ouzhou huaqiaohuaren shetuan lianhehui di 13 jie nianhui ji Aierlan, Fenlan qiaoqing” (13th 
European Overseas Chinese Federation and Ireland and Finland Overseas Chinese Affairs), Qiaoqing, 
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encouraged to join or form alliances.1254   Making the OC diaspora aware of the 
opportunities and benefits provided through joining these associations is an important 
strategic concern for the PRC.  This works towards consolidating resources and power 
under a multi-faceted federation of wide-ranging membership and talents that could 
represent modern OC society.1255  Xinqiao inject a considerable amount of cultural 
knowledge and experience into a previously geographically and politically isolated 
laoqiao society – thereby reviving enthusiasm for Chineseness.1256  ‘New’ migrants 
can also influence ‘old’ OC by enhancing their sentimentality and reducing their 
suspicions about China.1257  This effort seeks to dispel internal political differences, 
participate in assisting their own and their children’s education, and ultimately 
increase community spirit and unification.1258   
 
In addition to bringing groups of OC together, modern qiaowu policy has sought to 
institutionalize its own designs upon OC organizations so as to fuse a single spirit 
within the wider organization.1259  In a 2004 internal report, officials suggested using 
the hierarchical structure of modern organizations, with a democratically elected core 
executive to handle day-to-day activities.  Such groupings had to reflect the increasing 
trend of hi-tech OC to be internationally mobile (both geographically and industrially), 
and have sister branch groups all over the world to facilitate networking, support and 
advice through a large and varied membership.1260  To support these associations, 
modern groups have the backing and patronage of influential and respected figures 
(such as diplomats or leading CCP officials), and as a result are able to make the 
connections required for sourcing funding and support.  They have a permanent 
secretariat to co-ordinate large-scale activities and arrange functions and forums.1261   
 
For the OC organizations themselves, such a unified structure is attractive because it 
can improve the efficiency of running their affairs, as well as being recognized as a 
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sentiment.  See Ip, “Immigrants and Transnationals in New Zealand,” 350-351.  
1255 “Liebian, chongzu, xinsheng, ronghe,” 9, 12-16; “Shenri shehui, tanjiu qiaoqing,” 1-12; Wu, 
“Qiaowu gongzuoju zhanluexing qianzhanxing.” 
1256 Nyiri, “Expatriating is Patriotic?” 635-653; Barabantseva, “The Party-State’s Transnational 
Outreach,” 20. 
1257 He, “Shilun Sun Zhongshan qiaowu sixiang de xianshi yiyi.” 
1258 “Meiguo huaren jidujiao xinyang tuanti de shehui gongneng,” 15. 
1259 “Liebian, chongzu, xinsheng, ronghe,” 14. 
1260 “Guigu diqu xin huaqiaohuaren qunti ji qi shetuan qingkuang fenxi,” 10-12. 
1261 Liu, “Old Linkages, New Networks,” 582-587. 
 261
leading and representative OC organization (both to local authorities and those in 
China).  For Beijing, the main benefit is ease of mobilization.  Qiaowu cadres guide 
these associations with a common vision of service and contribution under a PRC-
friendly political discourse that reflect the policies and propaganda of the CCP.1262  
These developments indicate the emergence of stronger, more robust organizations 
amongst the OC, with the potential for global inter-connectedness.   
 
With unity however, comes a loss of individual identity.  OC groups are re-educated 
with CCP-friendly modes of operation and behaviours that qiaowu officials expect to 
see demonstrated at every opportunity.  For example, groups normally using dialects 
make an effort to communicate in Mandarin with qiaowu and CCP officials as a show 
of deference (even if they can speak the dialects as well).  Likewise, protocol and 
other unique aspects of their organizational culture also become subject to specific 
guidelines set down by Beijing.  The methods and values of traditional OC 
organizations face possible extinction if these trends are to continue.   
 
9.09 Capacity Building 
 
In addition to providing the appropriate structures to better manage the OC, the CCP 
also offers them the necessary tools to further their relationship with China.  Modern 
qiaowu policies for the OC find their roots in China’s domestic situation.  Since the 
early 1980s, Beijing has sought to raise its “socialist spiritual and material 
civilization” and “population quality” for achieving a “well-off society” (xiaokang 
shehui) in recognition of China’s post-Mao modernity.  In 1996, Jiang Zemin 
launched the first nationwide spiritual civilization construction movement (jingshen 
wenming jianshe), which achieved further traction following the 2002 16th CCP 
Congress.1263  As a form of mass social education, the spiritual civilization project 
sought to construct a new set of values that reflected China’s modern economic 
situation and infrastructure. 1264   CCP leaders included xinqiao as part of this 
government agenda.  Qiaowu officials saw a need to acknowledge the modern face of 
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Chinese around the world and to break down old concepts tied to Chineseness.  OC 
societies had evolved into modern and mobile bodies – in accordance, qiaowu cadres 
argued that their work should not be stuck in post-revolutionary ways.1265   
 
For the 21st century, OC affairs officials assume that the majority of the OC will 
remain in their host countries for the long term – from luoye guigen (falling leaves 
return to their roots) to luodi shenggen (growing roots after settling down).1266  This 
view is substantiated by evidence that qiaowu is increasingly used to encourage the 
OC to help themselves by raising their own status in local government and society.  
For example, qiaowu cadres pay more attention to providing assistance to the 
development and subsistence of the OC, serving them well through protecting their 
legitimate rights, and promoting unity, co-operation and exchange.1267   
 
To reach the heart of OC communities and directly influence them on a global scale, 
qiaowu officials target leaders of pro-Beijing organizations and selected individuals of 
influence for fully subsidized organizational development work and capacity building 
in China.1268  Qualified candidates (such as top academic, youth, community and 
business leaders of high calibre, suitable age and experience) are made aware of their 
China connection1269 by attending programmes that promote networking, management 
and team-building under PRC methods. 1270   Embassies and the OCAO act as 
gatekeepers by extending invitations to selected individuals and then vetting 
applicants in order to prevent undesirable consequences.1271 
 
These efforts have received greater attention in recent years.  Specific measures 
include direct connections with Overseas Exchange Association Directors to receive 
                                                 
1265 “Fu Xinxilan diaoyanhou de xinsikao,” 3, 6. 
1266 Wang Ling-chi, “On luodi shenggen,” in Wang and Wang, The Chinese Diaspora: Selected Essays 
Volume 1, x-xi. 
1267 “Overseas Chinese Affairs Officials Told to Work Harder in New Century.”  
1268 “Overseas Chinese Elites Invited to “Hi-Tech Week” in China,” People’s Daily, 20 April 2000, 
http://english.people.com.cn/english/200004/20/eng20000420_39378.html (accessed 2 October 2009); 
“Overseas Chinese Seeking for Development in Motherland,” People’s Daily, 17 April 2000, 
http://english.people.com.cn/english/200004/17/eng20000417_39098.html (accessed 2 October 2009). 
1269 “Guanyu Fa, He, Ying sanguo huaqiao huaren rongre zhuliu shehui qingkuang de diaoyan 
baogao,” 14-15. 
1270 Lu Weixiong (GOCAO director), letter to OC leaders, June 26, 2008; “Shenri shehui, tanjiu 
qiaoqing,” 11. 
1271 “Guowuyuan qiaoban xinfangtuan fu Ouzhou siguo diaoyan,” 5; Biao, “Promoting Knowledge 
Exchange Through Diaspora Networks,” 55. 
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regular guidance through international forums, workshops, surveys and activities.  In 
addition, the Developing Motherland and Benefiting Assisting OC plan (xingguo 
liqiao zhuqiao) aims to promote interaction amongst old and new OC and China 
through its website, trade fairs and university courses.1272  Both hosts and participants 
perceive these kinds of events as leading prestigious platforms for managing global 
OC affairs.1273   
 
Such programmes directly influence the development of OC communities so that they 
are confident and capable of working with Beijing.  This is achieved by educating 
their future leaders about how to manage their associations and how to build capacity 
in the context of the qiaowu infrastructure and philosophy.1274  Like other state-
sponsored visits to China, these events have similar goals: firstly, to improve 
networking and unity with other OC groups, and to link them with mainland cultural, 
industrial, commercial or political counterparts for mutual benefit.1275  In this regard, 
cadres advise participants of the latest qiaowu economic policies – summarized under 
themes of xingguo liqiao (building China for their benefit), hudong fazhan (mutual 
action for development) and zhuqiao xingye (helping them develop industry).  These 
events seek to support OC businesses both in China and abroad as an attractive and 
co-ordinated product of business development, service and networking for a win-win 
result.1276  Chinese industry can develop and modernize, while the OC can continue to 
develop their own industrial talent, benefit financially from their investment, gain 
trust and understanding of China, and raise their status and integration abroad.1277 
 
The ultimate goal of these programmes is to lift OC status and skills in order to 
enhance foreign perceptions of things Chinese.1278  Upgrading OC business practices 
                                                 
1272 “Huayi xinshengdai qiyejia Zhongguo jingji gaoji yanxiuban” (High Level Chinese Economic 
Research Course for New OC Entrepreneurs), Qiaoqing jianbao, 28 May 2006, 12. 
1273 “247 Students of Chinese Origin to Visit Mainland,” People’s Daily, 10 July 2002, 
www.china.org.cn/english/2002/Jul/36566.htm (accessed 2 October 2009); “Disanjie shijie huawen 
chuanmei luntan zai Wuhan chenggong juban” (Third Global Chinese Media Forum Successfully Held 
in Wuhan), Qiaoqing, no. 37 (8 October 2005): 1-5. 
1274 “Shenri qiaoshe, tuozhan Feizhou diqu qiaowu gongzuo,” 3-4. 
1275 “Guanyu Fa, He, Ying sanguo huaqiao huaren rongre zhuliu shehui qingkuang de diaoyan 
baogao,” 14; “Guangzhoushi rongyu shimin he qingnian caijun fangwentuan fangsui” (Guangdong 
Honorary Citizens and Talented Youth Delegation Visit). Qiaoqing jianbao, 25 October 2006, 11. 
1276 “Beimei qiaoqing xin bianhua,” 5. 
1277 “Hudong fazhan zhuqiao xingye,” 1, 6-7, 12, 22.  
1278 OCAO of the State Council, “Yiqiao yinqiao, yiqiao yinwai: Zhejiang qiaowu gongzuo zai 
kaituozhong qianjin” (Use OC to Attract OC, Use OC to Attract Foreigners: Zhejiang OC Work Moves 
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is one example of such capacity building.  State Council delegations sent to Europe in 
2004 and 2005 noted the falling standard of Chinese cuisine in an under-developed 
and fiercely competitive industry.  Moreover, chefs were sub-standard, and many 
restaurant owners were unwilling to invest for the long term.1279  This situation further 
deteriorated after French television aired a show about poor hygiene in certain 
Chinese restaurants.  Confusion over which restaurants were good or bad led to a poor 
image for the entire industry.  As a result, overall turnover dropped up to 60 percent, 
causing some eateries to close down or be sold off.  In turn, other unrelated OC 
businesses were also affected.  The State Council acknowledged that the behaviour 
and practices of new migrants was often to blame.1280   
 
To rectify this perception, qiaowu cadres suggested holding conferences to 
consolidate the talents and skills of industrial representatives and elite OC business 
people in dispelling the ‘Chinese Economic Threat’.1281  For example in 2007, OC 
officials suggested that OC associations, guided by the PRC and its embassies, could 
develop standards and norms of behaviour within the industry.1282  They proposed 
ideas such as training chefs to improve culinary skills through special events and 
performances, actively propagating and magnifying the influence of Chinese cuisine 
culture and its uniqueness, and generally raising the level and standing of Chinese 
restaurants.1283  In 2009, the establishment of such an association in Europe sought to 
reignite acknowledgement and understanding for China – not only for locals, but also 
amongst the OC themselves who had become localized in their outlook.1284   
 
This example shows that qiaowu has successfully encouraged and institutionalized 
certain aspects of the OC relationship in accordance with Beijing’s expectations.  
                                                                                                                                            
Forward with Development) Zhejiang ribao, 12 June 2007, 
www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2007/0612/1/5372.shtml (accessed 3 November 2009). 
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China’s effort to re-define the OC and their image is an on-going effort.  By working 
step-by-step at various levels of organization, the CCP aims to draw together a diverse 
grouping of OC.  With an obliging target amongst xinqiao and PRC students, these 
efforts may find fruition quicker than expected; however, there are still other OC 
groupings that prefer sticking to their old ways and therefore require continued 
attention.   
 
9.10 Conclusion 
 
The policies and methodology highlighted in this chapter shows that China’s qiaowu 
administration has the infrastructure, programs, resources and most importantly, the 
ambition, will and desire to further links and relations with the OC in a PRC-friendly 
context.  These measures forge both personal and institutional connections with key 
sections of the OC diaspora, guiding them directly into the extended qiaowu xitong 
structure in the appropriate heirarchical context.   
 
After a period of concentrating on attracting the OC for assisting the development of 
China’s economy and infrastructure between the late 1970s and 1990s, contemporary 
qiaowu policies for the OC have moved to focusing on both huaren and huaqiao 
development with a win-win objective in mind – to improve China’s international 
image by enhancing the status and lifestyle of the OC abroad.  To achieve this, their 
livelihoods must remain stable and prosperous. 
 
This goal remains distant and confounded by complications.  For example, in the 
Pacific, ethnic tensions continue to threaten stability.  Over two years had passed 
since riots in Honiara and Nukua’lofa, when violence broke out in PNG in June 2009.  
This indicates that illegal migration, illegal activity, and other problems associated 
with ‘unqualified’ migration proliferate despite measures outlined at the state level.  
Unfortunately, PRC officials do not consider efforts to ‘upgrade’ the migrant a 
priority.  In addition, OC agencies implement measures poorly, and target the wrong 
groups.  To rectify this particular problem, there needs to be much work done over the 
long term, and supplemented with the appropriate resources.  Given these difficulties 
in achieving a successful outcome, China has looked to groups of OC who offer the 
promise of concrete results. 
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The projection of qiaowu policies for the 21st century looks towards soft power 
methods for shaping public opinion.  Two apects of this are evident: improving the 
status of the OC and China by improving their relationship with local authorities and 
taking advantage of ‘politically correct’ liberal government policies for promoting 
multiculturalism; secondly, to improve the sustainability and management of strategic 
OC groups through active capacity building and soothing inter-group tensions.  By 
fostering the consolidatation of OC societies for ease of management and encouraging 
them to forge a closer relationship with China through its embassies and other 
government links, China has sought to re-institutionalize contacts between the new 
generation of OC and the PRC.  By thinking globally and acting locally, qiaowu has 
tailored efforts to develop the OC through their associations, led by an elite generation.  
Trained and guided according to PRC methods, this group has the potential to act 
together with embassies and other OC agencies to direct their local communities to 
act in support of Beijing.  The Olympic Torch relay protests demonstrated how such 
strategies might play out.  The success with this latter effort has highlighted to the 
CCP the appropriate areas of qiaowu to focus upon.   
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10.00 Conclusion 
 
Qiaowu is the CCP’s most effective tool for dealing with the world’s largest ethnic 
grouping.  While it faces both challenges and opportunities, the CCP has shown it is 
capable of retaining a significant level of control and influence over specific targets.  
This thesis has exhaustively dissected qiaowu down to its core attributes and 
philosophies concerning every aspect of China’s relationship with the OC in order to 
make a complete and thorough assessment of how they form an integral part of 
China’s comprehensive national power.  As the OC population increases throughout 
the world, their presence and influence naturally change the demographic, social, 
economic, cultural and ultimately, political context of their host countries.  They serve 
as a financial and skilled resource, and increasingly, as a ready supply of soft power 
to advance or support Beijing’s agenda throughout the world.   
 
Although this thesis does not attempt to design an overarching theoretical explanation 
per se, the examples raised throughout this thesis shows that the CCP has consistently 
used inducement and punishment as tools for the management, elimination and 
isolation of OC challenges and threats as a means of extending China’s foreign policy 
objectives.  To locate itself in the literature, this thesis has surveyed and linked 
qiaowu to various theoretical frameworks concerning diaspora, nationalism and 
international relations to demonstrate the use of extra-territorial influence in 
supporting national interests.  It has also made comparisons with other patterns of 
incorporation regimes and highlighted the reasons why the CCP has made significant 
advances with its efforts. 
 
The primary goal of this research was to take the social phenomenon of qiaowu and 
examine how and why OC policy has evolved over time.  As mentioned earlier, Wang 
and Pieke both identified a four-stage relationship between the OC and the Chinese 
government spanning three centuries.  They observed an initial period of neglect and 
isolation as a political threat during the Qing dynasty; a second period embracing the 
OC through nationalism and jus sanguinis during the early half of the 20th century; 
another period of neglect during the Cultural Revolution; and finally another embrace 
for China’s development.  While both were correct in illustrating these apparent 
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changes in policy, they failed to account for the underlying premise that has pervaded 
qiaowu all throughout China’s modern history.   
 
This thesis has shown that the main thrust of Beijing’s OC policy has never really 
changed.  Despite some periods of chaotic and contradictory behaviour, it was always 
Beijing’s intention to retain the support of the OC, and more importantly, to co-opt 
and secure access to their political and economic resources in the context of its 
national interests and geo-political situation.  Therefore, although there was a 
turbulent relationship with ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia during the Cold War 
years (with Beijing continuously making public reassurances and demonstrations of 
non-interference in local affairs), the OC remained the ‘sons and daughters’ of 
China’s extended family.  Similarly, although domestic qiaowu activity was seriously 
impaired during 1966 to 1970, external UF efforts with strategic OC communities in 
the West continued.  During the late 1990s, Beijing was careful not to get involved 
with ethnic Chinese tensions in Indonesia, yet it was determined to use selected OC 
for influencing elections in the US.  Into the 21st century, Beijing has continued to 
actively rally the OC in support of the CCP, boost Chinese pride, challenge threats to 
its national integrity, and quietly mobilize some others for covert missions.  The 
findings from this thesis have clearly demonstrated how Beijing has continued to 
expand and intensify its extra-territorial influence and dominance over the OC 
populace for these purposes.   
 
10.01 From Strength to Strength: The Evolution of Qiaowu 
 
As such, qiaowu’s true objectives are shrouded in secrecy, preferring to show a 
benevolent public face.  Efforts have worked with such success because of the 
continued improvement of its techniques, activities and themes over many years.  
Embracing the common themes of Chinese unity and modernity, and implemented 
under techniques of articulate persuasion and systematic management, qiaowu has 
enjoyed considerable success with strategic groups of the OC.  As this thesis has 
shown, these efforts may be overt and active with some, or subtle and suggestive with 
others.   
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Through a set of comprehensive programmes, activities, responses and policies, the 
CCP has gradually built up a positive public image of how qiaowu can serve the OC.  
Since 1989, there has been a stream of steady advances, such as significant increases 
in resources for consular protection, capacity building and reconnection efforts with 
the OC.  In addition, qiaowu authorities have closely examined areas requiring 
improvement and dealt with those challenges by upgrading or taking a more 
centralized approach to its management and organization.  Whether it provides 
educational materials or evacuation, Beijing has demonstrated that it is capable of 
taking care of its people.  Qiaowu has become a comprehensive set of programmes 
and policies that ensures that anyone of ethnic Chinese descent has unprecedented 
access to cultural, economic and political development in a PRC-friendly context.  In 
many cases, OC organizations and schools depend on qiaowu as a matter of survival.   
 
In the contemporary period, the methods of control and influence over the OC have 
expanded significantly according to the changes in OC demographics, transnational 
migration patterns, technological innovation, economic developments, and even 
popular trends in culture.  A new generation of OC policy for a new generation of 
transnational OC has given rise to a new model for OC affairs.  As such, qiaowu has 
evolved and strengthened over the last twenty years to the extent that it has become a 
major influence for determining the future direction of the OC diaspora – with equally 
significant implications for the host and receiving countries, and of course, the OC 
themselves. 
 
10.02 Consolidating Power and Eliminating Rivals 
 
Since the Tiananmen crisis, the CPP has become increasingly confident with 
advancing OC affairs as a result of a broader acceptance for China and its leaders 
amongst the OC.  The regime has tightened its grip on guiqiao and OC investors by 
ensuring that they serve only to further China’s economic policy, but not its political 
reform.  For the OC outside of China, despite counter-efforts from rival political 
factions, alternative ideologies and gradual assimilation into local society, qiaowu has 
been largely successful in deterring potential threats, and unifying a heterogeneous 
population of the OC in support of Beijing’s interests.   
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As the only serious contender in challenging China’s relationship with the OC in 
recent years, Taiwan failed to connect with the wider OC diaspora by focusing only 
on Taiqiao and the pro-Taiwan cohort.  The PRC took advantage of this and has been 
successful with grounding “grand unification nationalism” sentiment amongst OC 
communities around the world.  As a result, the majority of pro-Beijing OC refuse to 
accept Taiwan’s right to self-determination, and embrace the CCP discourse that 
places sovereignty and economic development above democratization.  At the same 
time, laoqiao and pro-unification OC leant even closer to Beijing as a result of 
Taiwanization.  After the KMT retook power in 2008, the independence movement 
lost traction as cross-strait relations warmed. 
 
Other rivals have been mostly rendered impotent in challenging China’s better-
resourced, more attractive and generously subsidized qiaowu efforts.  FLG has been 
largely isolated, weakened and dismissed as a cult by the CCP, while separatist 
movements have either been subdued or shouted down.  In short, China’s qiaowu 
effort simply has no effective alternative.  Qiaowu works to capture the hearts and 
minds of the OC in a pre-emptive effort to challenge rival groups, and has become the 
dominant force for prescribing the behaviour and direction of strategic OC groupings. 
 
10.03 The Rise of China and the OC 
 
Qiaowu is also a strategic investment for the CCP.  This thesis has shown that with 
minority and rival OC groups the return has been poor; for laoqiao groups, the results 
quite mixed; but with xinqiao and PRC students, the CCP has made significant 
advancements in securing their loyalty and support.  Disjuncture amongst the OC due 
to their place and manner of upbringing means that while some have actively sided 
with Beijing and are eager to forge a closer relationship with CCP leaders, many 
others find it difficult to reconcile aspects of PRC-defined “Chineseness” with their 
Westernized identity.  
 
As such, Beijing’s new strategy targets specific cohorts of the OC community – 
particularly the younger, talented and ambitious OC and their associations (the ‘Three 
News’).  Although they may not totally identify with CCP-sanctioned ideals and 
values because of materialism and pragmatism, PRC students and xinqiao tend to 
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retain patriotism and sentimentality for their homeland despite many years away.  
Raised under the influence of CCP rhetoric, values and nationalism, they have at least 
a better ‘understanding’ of modern China over laoqiao and other ethnic Chinese 
overseas and have the potential to align closer to China.  Consequently, such 
individuals, groups or businesses no longer require specific instruction on how to 
behave, but act upon their own initiative given the appropriate opportunity and 
guidance.  
 
Other OC groups still view the CCP with distrust.  In targeting these groups, Beijing 
seeks not to indoctrinate, but to expose their membership to a ‘fresh’ perception of 
China in the hope that they might look towards it with renewed interest.  As a result, 
igniting sentimental love and pride for China has attempted to cast aside (or at least 
dilute) any suspicions amongst them.  The remaining groups of staunchly anti-CCP 
OC are much more difficult to deal with – thus techniques of inclusion, co-optation or 
coercion continue to work steadily against their interests.  As the numbers of pro-
Beijing OC increase as a natural consequence of migration and intensified qiaowu 
efforts, they have the potential to eventually dominate those groups preferring 
independent thought.   
 
10.04 Implications for the World 
 
The relationship between Beijing and the OC has implications for the rest of the world.  
In a globalized world of transnationalism and export labour, qiaowu serves as a useful 
resource for human resource planning and strategy.  Many countries are experiencing 
‘brain drains’ and struggle to harness the lost potential of their diasporas.  This thesis 
provides many illustrations of how they could learn from qiaowu’s success.   
 
Secondly, given Beijing’s policy of encouraging the OC to stay abroad for the long 
term, host countries should seek to better manage and engage with their migrant 
populations, and actively find ways of improving their integration and dealing with 
their related concerns (such as transnational crime and ethnic tension).  Beijing 
remains adamant in ‘Going Out’ – preferring to promote integration through fostering 
friendship with locals.  However, such efforts to raise the status of ‘unqualified’ OC 
arrivals have suffered due to lax attitudes of PRC officials towards the problem, and 
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often resulted in violence at the grass roots level.  Unfortunately, these consequences 
are outweighed by the positive benefits that migration brings to China.  Regional 
frameworks will be left with the task of putting pressure on China to contribute to 
ethnic stability.  For example, they could take note of China’s own efforts to ‘upgrade 
the migrant’ to reduce the possibility for conflict.  Government responses might 
include sponsoring induction programs in China that encourage local civic culture; 
alternatively, they could advance multicultural programmes amongst their own 
populations. 
 
Thirdly, qiaowu shows that diasporas can play a significant role in foreign policy 
decision making.  The OC play a role many aspects of China’s objectives abroad – 
whether it be a direct or indirect soft power role to improve its situation.  As regional 
and international interests with the OC become more interwoven and complex 
through trade, migration and social developments, qiaowu policy also becomes more 
complex.  The making and implementation of qiaowu policy therefore requires a cost-
benefit analysis of opportunities and constraints in the international arena.   
 
Finally, to what extent are the OC influenced by the CCP?  Ultimately, the limits to 
the CCP’s influence over the OC lie in their own personal feelings towards China and 
their willingness to offer voluntary support for the regime.  While the CCP would like 
to see OC contribution to China’s economic, social and political affairs as a 
demonstration of nationalistic loyalty (and hence support for the regime), the evidence 
shows that such participation cannot be confused with their desire to identify as being 
Chinese.  
 
While many pro-Beijing groups will have no hesitation in aligning themselves with 
China and its leaders, other OC organizations have reached a crossroad.  They can 
rely on internal strength to continue for as long as they can; seek support from 
alternative sources, such as Taiwan; or alternatively, they can attempt a stronger 
independent approach and simply choose aspects of Chineseness that it wishes to 
maintain and preserve.  However, given that qiaowu is continually growing in 
strength, such groupings will eventually find themselves against a dominant pro-CCP 
effort that seeks to subsume its activities altogether.  Qiaowu does not necessarily 
broaden the scope of OC activity and knowledge, but restricts their behaviours, 
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outlook and identities by promoting only aspects acceptable to the CCP.  The OC 
have to recognize the issues and implications at hand, and make some serious 
decisions concerning their future aspirations.  For their own sake, if the OC wish to 
demonstrate loyalty to their place of residence, they should continually seek to 
improve their reputation in society, raise their capabilities and resources on their own 
merits.  They should not rely on, or at least selectively limit their acceptance of 
qiaowu as a primary resource for their personal and organizational development.   
 
While co-option of the OC does not necessarily enhance the CCP’s own legitimacy, 
Beijing’s actions reflect upon ethnic Chinese everywhere.  No matter whether they are 
huaren, huaqiao, laoqiao or xinqiao, their ambiguous relationship with China means 
that all OC are potential targets for qiaowu.  Therefore, they may find themselves in 
an awkward situation of attempting to balance their allegiance between China and 
their host country.  Historically, fears of fifth column activity surrounded OC 
communities during the Cold War.  To maintain relations with them, Beijing 
welcomed the OC under conflated and blurred definitions of huaqiao and huaren so 
as not to officially breach the principles set down at Bandung.  To a lesser degree, 
these suspicions have continued into the contemporary period with threats of 
espionage and spying for China reported regularly in the media.  Beijing’s continued 
refusal to recognize dual nationality coupled with its issuance of ‘green cards’ for 
permanent residence illustrates this deliberately vague interpretation of China’s 
embrace for the entire OC diaspora.  The OC have an obligation to ensure that fears 
surrounding them and their loyalty do not materialize, or else they could face a 
discriminatory response from their host country.  Commentators have long sought to 
disconnect the ethnic Chinese from China and its leaders for this precise reason.   
 
10.05 Conclusion 
 
In attempting to harness the collective power of the OC, qiaowu is not merely an 
opportunistic attempt to take advantage of their resources.  Rather, it is a strategic and 
pro-active approach to guiding, fostering, manipulating and influencing their 
behaviour for constructing an international environment friendly to China’s interests.  
Qiaowu actively creates, fosters, maintains and develops relations so that both OC and 
China can benefit economically, culturally and politically.  Nor is qiaowu simply a 
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means of encouraging domestic development, but a tool for promoting Chinese 
nationalism and identity.  Ultimately, qiaowu is a key component for advancing 
China’s strategic foreign policy.   
     
Confidence has led to Beijing’s growing assertive stance with the OC.  Qiaowu efforts 
will only continue to grow in line with China’s own re-emergence and national pride.  
By raising the capacity of selected elite and new migrant OC, Beijing seeks to 
improve China’s image in the eyes of the world as a responsible global citizen and 
partner.  By taking advantage of its growing economy, geo-political might and its 
long history, a stronger PRC has prompted the OC to acknowledge the importance of 
being Chinese, and encouraged them to advance China’s development as part of its 
extended Chinese “family.”  Qiaowu, as a pragmatic and attractive means of ‘service 
to the OC’ has been, and will continue to be, a significant frontline strategy for 
advancing China’s relationship with not only the Chinese diaspora, but also the rest of 
the world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 275
11. 00 Bibliography 
 
Interviews 
 
Bloomfield, Posesi (Attorney General of Marshall Islands). “Crack Down on 
Overstaying Chinese Nationals.” Interview by Megan Flamer. Pacific Beat. 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation website, 8 June 2006. 
www.abc.net.au/ra/pacbeat/stories/s1658230.htm (accessed 19 February 2007). 
 
Chan, Julius. “Former PNG PM Calls Taiwan Deal a Desperate Act.” Interview by 
Michael Brissenden. Australian Broadcasting Corporation website, 6 July 1999. 
www.abc.net.au/pm/stories/s34120.htm (accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
Chen, Shuibian. “Interview with Chen Shui-bian: Bring a New Party to Power, 
Democratize Taiwanese Politics.” Interview by David Mayer. Taiwan Panorama, 
2000.http://www.sino.gov.tw/en/show_issue.php?id=200038903022e.txt&cur_pag
e=1&distype=text&table=2&h1=&h2=&search=1&height=1&type=0&scope=3&
order=1&keyword=David%20Mayer&lstPage=17&num=10&year=2000&month
=03 (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Chen, Yonglin. “Chinese Defector Details Spy Claims.” Interview by Tony Jones. 
Lateline. Australian Broadcasting Corporation website, 20 June 2005. 
www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2005/s1396471.htm (accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
Downer, Alexander (Australian Foreign Minister). “Doorstop Interview – Honiara, 
Solomon Islands.” Australian Department of Foreign Affairs website, 22 April 
2006. www.foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2006/060422_honiara.html 
(accessed 24 May 2006). 
 
Former PRC diplomat and agents (including Hao Fengjun). “Behind Chinese Walls.” 
Interviews by Sarah Ferguson, ninemsn website, 2005. 
http://sunday.ninemsn.com.au/sunday/cover_stories/transcript_1825.asp (accessed 
3 February 2006). 
 
Kuo Min Tang official. Interview by author, Taipei, 25 October 2005 and 19 April 
2008. 
 
Lin, Jih-Wen (Research Fellow at Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica). 
Interview by author, Taipei, 24 October 2005. 
 
McBryde, Michael (NZ High Commissioner to Tonga). Interview by author, 
Nuku’alofa, 28 August 2007. 
 
Moore, Paul (former FBI Chief Analyst for Chinese Intelligence). “Biased 
Prosecution?” Interview by Jim Lehrer. News Hour. Public Broadcasting System, 
14 December 1999. www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july-dec99/wenholee_12-
14.html (accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
 276
Overseas Chinese residents. Interviews by author, Honiara, September 2007. 
 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission officials. Interview by author, Taipei, 27 
October 2005. 
 
PRC diplomat. Interview with author, Nuku’alofa, 29 August 2007. 
 
Qiaolian official. Interview by author, Beijing, 9 November 2007. 
 
ROC diplomat. Interview by author, Taipei, May 2008. 
 
Tobias, Amanda Darling. “Economic Growth Sees Rise of Crime Syndicates.” 
Interview by Graeme Dobell. Australian Broadcasting Corporation website, n.d. 
www.abc.net.au/ra/asiapac/programs/s1783293.htm (accessed 12 January 2008). 
 
Wang, Gungwu. “Diaspora, A Much Abused Word: Asian Affairs Interview with 
Wang Gungwu.” Interview by Laurent Malvesin. Asian Affairs. n.d. www.asian-
affairs.com/Diasporas/wanggungwu.html (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Wang, Houhong (Vice Governor of Hainan Province). “A Fresh Start for Hainan 
Island.” Interview. Asian Affairs, Autumn 2000. www.asian-
affairs.com/China/wanghouhong.html (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Wei, Wei (Deputy Director of the Department of Consular Affairs of PRC Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs). “Deputy Director General Wei Wei of the Department of 
Consular Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Accepts an Interview with the 
China Youth Daily on the Issue of Consular Protection,” Interview by China 
Youth Daily. Consulate-General of the PRC in Gothenburg. 29 December 2005. 
www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cggb/eng/gyzg/xwdt/t229139.htm (accessed 15 April 2007). 
 
Wu, Yu-Shan (Director of Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica). Interview 
by author, Taipei, 24 October 2005. 
 
Zhang, Boli. “China Embracing Capitalism, But Trampling on Democracy.” 
Interview by Crystal Hsu. Taipei Times, 25 June 2001. 
www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2001/06/25/91430 (accessed 1 October 
2009). 
 
Government Records 
 
Government Information Office. “Haiwai huaqiao tuanti lianxi dengji zuoye yaodian” 
(Main Points on Overseas Chinese Association Liaison and Registration). “Foreign 
Relations: Overseas Chinese.” 2004. www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-
gp/brief/info04_7.html (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Kerry Burke, Review of Immigration Policy, Appendices to the Journals of the House 
of Representatives 1986-87.  Wellington: New Zealand Government Printer, 1987. 
 
 277
House Report 105-851. “Report of the Select Committee on US National Security and 
Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, submitted by 
Mr. Cox of California, Chairman.” .Washington: US Government Printing Office, 
1999. www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/hr105851/ (accessed 30 September 
2009). 
 
PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Waijiaobu jiu Dongnanya huaqiao guoqing 
qingchu huodong xiang youguan shiguan zhishi” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Instruction to Concerned Embassies on OC National Day Celebrations in Southeast 
Asia). Archive File no. 117-00081-08, 1951. 
 
_____. “Zhu mianlan lishiguan guanyi shukan fenfa, dianying fangyin ji huaqiao 
baozhi gongzuo de baogao” (Report by the Medan Consulate on the Distribution 
of Books, Magazines, Movies and Newspapers for OC). Archive File no. 118-
00560-05, 1956. 
 
RCMP-CSIS Joint Review Committee. “Chinese Intelligence Services and Triads 
Financial Links in Canada.” Prime Time Crime, 24 June 1997. 
www.primetimecrime.com/Articles/RobertRead/Sidewinder%20page%201.htm 
(accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
State Department Cables 
 
US Embassy Canberra. “Sir Keith Waller’s Observations on Chou-Whitlam 
Conversations.” State Department cable to US Secretary of State. US National 
Archives, 1973CANBER06095, 9 November 1973. 
 
US Consulate Hong Kong. “Peking and the Taiwanese.” State Department cable to 
US Secretary of State. US National Archives, 1973HONGK08157, 14 August 
1973. 
 
_____. “Beijing and the Overseas Chinese.” State Department cable to US Secretary 
of State. US National Archives, 1973HONGK11347, 12 November 1973. 
 
_____. “Beijing on Overseas Chinese Taiwan.” State Department cable to US 
Secretary of State. US National Archives, 1973HONGK09864, 1 October 1973. 
 
_____. “Hong Kong Government Deportation of Ethnic Chinese Residents in South 
Vietnam.” State Department cable to US Secretary of State. US National Archives, 
1974HONGK06952, 19 June 1974. 
 
_____. “Media Reaction – China’s Relations with her Neighbours.” State Department 
cable to US Secretary of State. US National Archives, 1974HONGK06255, 4 June 
1974. 
 
_____. “Teng Hsiao-Ping’s October Meeting with Overseas Chinese.” State 
Department cable to US Secretary of State. US National Archives, 
1974HONGK13174, 6 December 1974. 
 
 278
US Embassy Jakarta. “Foreign Minister Malik’s Weekly Press Conference.” State 
Department cable to US Department of State. US National Archives, 
1973JAKART03851, 31 March 1973. 
 
_____. “Malik on China.” State Department cable to US Secretary of State. US 
National Archives, 1973JAKART04895, 26 April 1973. 
 
_____. “ROC and Indonesia.” State Department cable to US Secretary of State. US 
National Archives, 1974JAKART06903, 6 June 1974. 
 
US Embassy Wellington. “NZ Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Overseas 
Chinese.” State Department cable to US Secretary of State. US National Archives, 
1973WELLIN02425, 11 September 1973. 
 
Newspapers/Online Newspapers 
 
AAP General News Wire 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation News Online 
Radio Australia 
Age (Melbourne) 
Agence France Presse 
Asia Times 
Associated Press 
Australian 
Bangkok Post 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 
BBC Monitoring 
Boston Globe 
Central News Agency (Taipei) 
China Business Information Network 
China Daily 
China Post 
China Youth Daily 
Chinese Life (Christchurch) 
Christian Science Monitor 
Cable News Network (CNN) 
Columbia News Service 
Cook Island News 
Daily Post 
Epoch Times 
Fiji’s Daily Post 
Fiji Times 
Fiji Sun 
Fiji Sunday Times 
Globe and Mail 
Guardian 
Gotham Gazette 
Huashengbao 
Inter Press Service 
 279
International Herald Tribune 
Jiangmen ribao 
Kyodo News International 
Lianhe zaobao 
Liberty Times 
Marianas Variety 
Matangi Tonga 
Mercury News 
Nanfang baoye 
Nanfang ribao 
Nanfei huarenbao 
Nanmei qiaobao 
Nation 
National (Port Moresby) 
New York Daily News 
New York Jewish Times 
New York Sun 
New York Times 
New Yorker 
New Zealand Chinese Herald 
New Zealand Herald 
New Zealand Mirror 
New Zealand Messenger 
Otago Daily Times 
Pacific Islands Report 
PACNEWS 
Panama News 
Papua New Guinea Post Courier 
Pasifik Nius 
People’s Daily 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Daily 
Philadelphia Inquirer 
Port Vila Presse 
Press (Christchurch) 
Qiaobao 
Radio Australia 
Radio Free Australia 
Renmin ribao 
Reuters 
Saipan Tribune 
Samoa News 
San Diego Daily Transcript 
San Francisco Chronicle 
San Jose Mercury 
Scoop 
Shanghai Daily 
Sina.com 
Sing Tao Daily 
Sinocast China Business Daily News 
Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation 
 280
Solomon Star 
South China Morning Post 
Standard 
Star Bulletin 
Straits Times 
Sun (Christchurch) 
Sunday Star Times 
Stuff 
Sydney Morning Herald 
Tahitipresse 
Taipei Times 
Taiwan News 
Taiwan Today 
Times Online 
United Daily News 
USA Today 
Voice of America News 
Wall Street Journal 
Washington Post 
Washington Times 
Wen Wei Po 
Xinhua 
Xinhua International Herald 
Xinhuanet 
Xinjingbao (Beijing) 
Yahoo News 
Zhejiang ribao 
Zhongguo qiaowang 
Zhongxinwang 
 
Magazines 
 
“A World of Exiles.” Economist, 2 January 2003.  
 
“Aodaliya huaren shouhao shenghuo ‘zuihou yiban gang’” (Australian Chinese 
Guarding the Olympic Flame the ‘Last Sentry’). Guoji Xianqu Daobao, 25 April 
2008. http://bak.zxtv.com.cn/News/Print.asp?ArticleID=10760 (accessed 30 April 
2008). 
 
“Asia: Is Chinese Blood Thinner Than Water?” Economist, 22 August 1998, 31. 
 
“China Turns to Cambodia’s Bunma.” Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 October 2000. 
 
“Chinese Overseas Patriotism for Their Motherland.” Asian Outlook, November 1982, 
20-23. 
 
“Jieqiao renwu shunli wancheng 325 ming Suoluomen qiaobao andi jiaxiang” 
(Reception of Overseas Chinese Successfully Completed, 325 Solomon Overseas 
Compatriots Arrive Home Safely). Guangdong qiaoxun 1 (2006): 1. 
 281
 
“Never Too Late to Scramble.” Economist, 26 October 2006. 
 
“New Legislature Lineup Brings Expectation.” Haihua, no. 102 (July 1993): 62-64. 
 
“Ningju qiaoxin, shijie Qingtian huaqiaohuaren tongxianghui jiangyu 11 yue chengli” 
(Consolidating OC Hearts, World OC Qingtian Association to be Established in 
November). Zhongguo qiaolian, 18 October 2007. 
 
“OCAC Sends Relief Funds to Florida.” Haihua, no. 93 (October 1992): 62. 
 
“OCAC Sends Relief Funds to Los Angeles.” Haihua, no. 89 (June 1992): 62. 
 
“On Their Way Back.” Economist 369, Issue 83498, November 2003, 59-60 
 
“Pacific Security.” Contraband, September 2004, 20. 
 
“The China Connection.” Economist 342, Issue 8008, 15 March 1997. 
 
“The Historic Track of Overseas Chinese Affairs.” Haihua, no. 87 (April 1992): 60-
62. 
 
“The Plight of Chinese Mainland Intellectuals.” Asian Outlook, March 1988, 17-18. 
 
“‘Zhongguo qiaolian huashanghui’ jiang gengming wei ‘Zhongguo qiaoshang 
lianyihui’” (‘Qiaolian OC Business Assocation’ Changes its Name to ‘China OC 
Business Friendship Association’). Zhongguo qiaolian, 12 October 2007. 
 
Beech, Hannah. “The Exile and the Entrepreneur.” Time, 7 June 2004, 30-36. 
 
Bennet, Brian. “China’s Big Export.” Time, 21 February 2005, 7. 
 
Bonavia, David. “The Overseas Chinese.” Far Eastern Economic Review, June 16, 
1978, 18. 
 
Callick, Rowan. “Defector Opens Door on Chinese Australia.” Australian Financial 
Review, 2 August 2005. www.fofg.org/news/news_story/php?doc_id=1127 
(accessed 7 March 2007). 
 
Canfield, Roger. “Terror in Chinatown.” New American, 17 April 2006. 
www.thenewamerican.com/artman/publish/article_3676.shtml (accessed 6 April 
2007). 
 
Chen, Jeremy. “The Spy Who Shanghaied Me.” Hardboiled, November 2005. 
http://hardboiled.berkeley.edu/issues/92/92.pdf (accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
Chen, Wendy. “A Man with a Mission.” Beijing Review, 2004. 
www.bjreview.com.cn/200439/Business-200439(B).htm (accessed 9 August 2007). 
 
 282
Ching, Frank. “China, Taiwan Vie for Support of Chinese in North America.” Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 8 July 1993, 28. 
 
Chiu, Anna Shu-ju. “The Chinese Overseas Organizations on the Internet, with a Note 
on the Socio-Cultural Phenomena Beyond the Webscape.” Zixun shehui yanjiu 
(Research on the Information Society) no. 9, July 2005. 
 
Dannen, Frederic. “Partners in Crime.” New Republic, 14 and 21 July 1997, 24. 
 
Ding, Ying. “Close to the People: Overseas Chinese Nationals Get Better Support 
System.” Beijing Review, 2004. www.bjreview.com.cn/200434/Nation-
200434(A).htm (accessed 14 November 2006). 
 
Dusevic, Tom. “Fair-Weather Friends.” Time, 20 June 2005, 64. 
 
_____. “The Quiet Revolution.” Time, 25 April 2005, 14-26. 
 
Field, Michael. “China’s Intriguing Moves.” Island Business, 2007. 
http://www.islandsbusiness.com/islands_business/index_dynamic/containerNameT
oReplace=MiddleMiddle/focusModuleID=4981/overideSkinName=issueArticle-
full.tpl (accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
_____. “Currency of Persuasion.” Listener 198, no. 3391, 7 –13 May 2005.  
www.listener.co.nz/issue/3391/features/3950/currency_of_persuasion,2.html;jsessi
onid=185F35BFD774DA2CD41E47234608B224 (accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
Feizkhah, Elizabeth. “How to Win Friends: Beijing is Courting Tiny Pacific Nations.” 
Time Pacific, 4 June 2001. 
 
Frederick, Jim. “Standing Their Ground.” Time, 2 May 2005, 34-37. 
 
Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History?” National Interest (Summer 1989). 
 
Hale, David. “China’s Growing Appetite.” National Interest (2004). 
www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_76/ai_n6127320/print (accessed 2 
October 2009). 
 
 Hicks, George, and J. A. C. Mackie. “A Question of Identity.” Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 14 July 1994, 46-48. 
 
 Jayasankaran, S. “Chasing the World’s Chinese Readers.” Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 7 August 2003, 37. 
 
Keith-Reid, Robert, Samisoni Pareti, and Mere Tuqiri. “Chinese Galore.” Islands 
Business, August 2002, 12. 
 
Kondapalli, Srikanth. “Tsunami and China: Relief with Chinese Characteristics.” 
Asian Affairs, 17 January 2005. 
 
 283
Kurlantzick, Joshua. “China’s Chance.” Prospect Magazine, Issue 108, March 2005. 
www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=6736 (accessed 3 February 
2006). 
  
Lee, Coral. “An Invisible Bridge: Malaysian Students in Taiwan.” Translated by 
Christopher Findler. Sinorama, May 2005. http://www.taiwan-
panorama.com/en/show_issue.php?id=200559405008e.txt&cur_page=1&distype=
text&table=2&h1=&h2=&search=1&height=1&type=0&scope=0&order=0&key
word=Malaysian%20students%20in%20Taiwan&lstPage=1&num=10&year=200
5&month=05 (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Li, Laura. “With a Little Help From Your Friends – Chinese Seniors’ Associations 
Are Booming in the US.” Translated by Jonathan Barnard. Sinorama, May 1998. 
http://www.taiwan-
panorama.com/en/show_issue.php?id=199858705036E.TXT&cur_page=1&distyp
e=text&table=2&h1=&h2=&search=1&height=1&type=0&scope=3&order=0&ke
yword=Jonathan%20Barnard&lstPage=7&num=10&year=1998&month=05 
(accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Li, Tu. “Murder of Chinatown Leader a ‘Complicated Case’.” Association for Asian 
Research, 10 March 2006. www.asianresearch.org/articles/2845.html (accessed 6 
April 2007). 
 
Li, William. “A Reciprocal Relationship.” Taiwan Journal, 9 October 1990. 
http://taiwanjournal.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xitem=9929&CtNode=122 (accessed 6 
April 2007). 
 
Lintner, Bertil. “A New Battle for the Pacific.” Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 
August 2004. 
 
_____. “The Third Wave.” Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 June 1999, 28. 
 
 Liu, Melinda, and Duncan Hewitt. “Rise of the Sea Turtles: China’s Most Modern 
Citizen Aren’t Drawing It Any Closer to the West.” Newsweek, 15 August 2008. 
http://en.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=18876 (accessed 1 October 
2009). 
 
 Lo, Lloyd. “ROC Government to Strengthen Relief for Indochinese Refugees.” Asian 
Outlook, December 1979, 40-42. 
 
 Magick, Samantha, and Floyd K. Takeuchi. “Power 10: Who Has the Real Power?” 
Pacific Magazine, May, 2006. 
www.pacificmagazine.net/pm52006/pmdefault.php?urlarticleid-0013 (accessed 28 
January 2007). 
 
 Mong, Adrienne. “Loyalty Tests.” Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 December 2001, 
66. 
 
 284
Morais, Richard C. “China’s Fight with Falun Gong.” Forbes, 9 February 2006. 
www.forbes.com/home_europe/technology/2006/02/09/falun-gong-
china_cz_rm_0209falungong.html (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Ng, Susanna. “Seeing Red in Canada.” asia!, Issue 9 (2007): 12-19. 
 
Ni, Yanshuo. “Feeling Safe Outside China.” Beijing Review, 2005. 
www.bjreview.com.cn/05-05-e/World-2005-4.htm (accessed 15 April 2007). 
 
Norris, Graham. “There is Only One China: Beijing’s Pacific Ties Span 200 Years.” 
Pacific Magazine, October 2005. 
www.pacificmagazine.net/pm102005/pmdefault.php?urlarticleid=00093 (accessed 
19 February 2007). 
 
Pao, Maureen. “The Call of Home.” Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 June 2001, 25. 
 
_____. “Wanted: Overseas Chinese.” Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 June 2001, 
24-25. 
 
Powles, Anna, and Brendan Taylor. “Double Headed Dragon.” Diplomat, June/July 
2005: 32-33. 
 
PRC Foreign Ministry. “Statement of Chinese Foreign Ministry on Expulsion of 
Chinese Residents by Vietnam.” Beijing Review, 16 June 1978. 
 
Rosario, Frank S. “Prostitution Up As Factories Close: Chinese Workers Most at 
Risk.” Pacific Magazine, October 2005. 
www.pacificislands.cc/pm102005/pmdefault.php?urlarticleid=0004 (accessed 19 
February 2007). 
 
Roseingrave, Matthew. “An International Perspective: Beijing.” Contraband, 
September 2006, 11. 
 
Santoli, Al. “Chinese Spies Use NZ, Australia to Target US and Pacific.” China 
Reform Monitor, Washington D.C.: American Foreign Policy Council, no. 347, 11 
December 2000. www.afpc.org/crm/crm347.shtml (accessed 24 May 2006). 
 
_____. “Jiang Urges Overseas Chinese Help Beijing Absorb Taiwan.” China Reform 
Monitor, no. 237, 8 September 1999. http://63.123.226.152/crm/crm237.htm 
(accessed 30 August 2007). 
 
Stratton, Jake. “The Straight and Narrow.” China Business Review, 12 January 1998. 
http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/9801/stratton.html (accessed 2 
October 2009). 
 
Suryadinata, Leo. “China’s Hands-Off on Indonesia.” Far Eastern Economic Review, 
16 April 1998, 31. 
 
Takeuchi Cullen, Lisa. “To China with Love.” Time, 21 April 2003, 40. 
 
 285
Vatikiotis, Michael, Matt Forney, and Ben Dolven. “Compatriot Games.” Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 20 August 1998, 23. 
 
Wang, Shao-nan. “Why the CCP Decreases Its Students Abroad.” Asian Outlook, July 
1984, 27-30. 
 
Webb, Alysha. “Back to the Motherland.” Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 August 
2002, 60. 
 
Xiao, Qiao. “Pros and Cons of Overseas Study.” China Today, April 2005. 
www.chinatoday.com.cn/English/e2005/e200504/p36.htm (accessed 19 February 
2007). 
 
Yan Xi, “Suoluomen cheqiao shimo yu sikao” (Evacuation of Solomons Overseas 
Chinese: Analysis from Start to Finish). Qiaowu gongzuo yanjiu, no. 3 (2006): 18-
20. 
 
Internal Memoranda 
 
“2008 huayi baogao: 4800 wan huaqiao huaren fenbu zai shijie gedi” (2008 Ethnic 
Chinese Report: 48 Million Overseas and Ethnic Chinese Spread Around the 
World). Qiaoqing jianbao, 30 March 2009. 
 
“300 yi ‘qiaojuan’ zhutui Zhongguo jiaoyu” (30 billion of OC Donations Assist 
Education in China). Qiaoqing jianbao, 14 May 2005. 
 
“Aodaliaya, Xinxilan, Taxiti Zhonghua jiaoyu, huawen chuanmei jinkuang” (Recent 
Situation of Chinese Media and Education in Australia, New Zealand, Tahiti). 
Qiaoqing, no. 13 (15 March 2004). 
 
“Aodili huaren canyin fuwu lianhe zonghui chengli” (Austrian Chinese Food and 
Drink Service Central Association Established). Qiaoqing jianbao, 30 March 2009. 
 
“Baijia huawen meiti ping shida Zhongguo xinwen he haiwai huaren shequ xinwen” 
(One Hundred Chinese Media Comment on the Top Ten News Items from China 
and Overseas Chinese Communities). Qiaoqing jianbao, 29 December 2008. 
 
“Beijing aoyunhui xuyao huayi qingnian zhiyuanzhe” (Beijing Olympics Require 
Ethnic Chinese Youth Volunteers). Qiaoqing jianbao, 20 September 2006. 
 
“Beimei qiaoqing xin bianhua” (New Changes in North American OC Affairs). 
Qiaoqing, no. 56 (20 December 2003). 
 
“Chen Yujie: qiaoban yuanyu youguan bumen xieshang tiaodi Zhongguo luka 
menkan” (Chen Yujie: OCAO Hopes Relevant Agencies Will Consult to Reduce 
Chinese Green Card Threshold). Qiaoqing jianbao, 26 June 2006. 
 
 286
“Chuangxin waixuan celue, chuanbo guojia xingxiang” (Bring Forth New Overseas 
Propaganda Tactics, Disseminate the National Image). Qiaoqing, no. 22 (14 
August 2007). 
 
“Cong ‘sanbadao’ bianwei ‘liugeshi’” (From ‘Three Knives’ Transformed Into ‘Six 
Masters’). Qiaoqing jianbao, 21 December 2007, 4. 
 
“Dashi pinpai huodong, zengjin shaosu minzu qiaobao dui Zhongguo de liaojie” 
(Hitting the Right Brand of Activity, Promote Understanding of Ethnic Minority 
OC Towards China). Qiaoqing, no. 22 (14 August 2007). 
 
“Dasuan hou de Yinni huaren ji wo dui Yinni qiaowu gongzuo” (Indonesian Chinese 
After the Election and Our OC Work). Qiaoqing, no. 51 (1 December 2004). 
 
“Disanjie shijie huawen chuanmei luntan zai Wuhan chenggong juban” (Third Global 
Chinese Media Forum Successfully Held in Wuhan). Qiaoqing, no. 37 (8 October 
2005). 
 
“Disijie shijie huawen chuanmei luntan zai Sichuan chengdu chenggong juxing” 
(Fourth Chinese Language Media Forum Held Successfully in Sichuan’s Capital). 
Qiaoqing jianbao, 27 September 2007. 
 
“Dui huaren zongjiao zuzhi de xin renshi” (New Knowledge Regarding OC Religious 
Organisations). Qiaoqing, no. 7 (14 March 2007). 
 
“Dui jiaqiang xinxingshi xia Xinjiangji huaqiao huaren gongzuo de sikao” (Thoughts 
on Strengthening Xinjiang OC Work In Light of a New Situation). Qiaoqing, no. 
14 (6 June 2007). 
 
“Fahui qiaojie qingnian zuoyong, licu liangan heping yu fazhan” (Make Best Use of 
OC Youth for Urging Cross-Strait Peace and Development). Qiaoqing jianbao, 26 
April 2007, 13. 
 
“Fu Xinxilan diaoyanhou de xinsikao” (New Thoughts Following Research in New 
Zealand). Qiaoqing, no. 11 (1 March 2004): 8. 
 
“Guangzhoushi rongyu shimin he qingnian caijun fangwentuan fangsui” (Guangdong 
Honorary Citizens and Talented Youth Delegation Visit). Qiaoqing jianbao, 25 
October 2006, 11. 
 
“Guanyu Fa, He, Ying sanguo huaqiao huaren rongre zhuliu shehui qingkuang de 
diaoyan baogao” (Investigative Report of the Situation Concerning Integration of 
French, Dutch and English OC in Mainstream Society). Qiaoqing, no. 24 (5 
September 2007). 
 
“Guigu diqu xin huaqiaohuaren qunti ji qi shetuan qingkuang fenxi” (Situational 
Analysis of Overseas and Ethnic Chinese Groups and Societies in the Silicon 
Valley Area). Qiaoqing, no. 14 (25 April 2005). 
 
 287
“Guowuyuan qiaoban xinfangtuan fu Ouzhou siguo diaoyan” (State Council OCAO 
Trust-building Delegation Go to Four Nations for Research). Qiaoqing, no. 54 (5 
December 2005). 
 
“Haiwai huaqiao huaren yongyue weifan ‘du’ cutong jianyan xiance” (OC 
Enthusiastically Oppose Independence, Promote Unification, Offer Advice). 
Qiaoqing, no. 17 (2 June 2005): 4-5. 
 
“Haiwai huaqiao huaren disanci daguimo aiguo aixiang huodong” (Third OC Broad 
Scope of Activity for Love of Country and Homeland). Qiaoqing jianbao, 25 
October 2007, 2. 
 
“Haiwai huawen jiaoyu zi kun: shiyuan nanmi jiaocai shao” (OC Chinese 
Education’s Difficulties: Hard to Source Teachers and Few Teaching Materials). 
Qiaoqing jianbao, 25 April 2006, 15. 
 
“Haiwai Zhongguo feifa yimin diaocha” (Investigation into Illegal Chinese Migrants 
Abroad). Qiaoqing jianbao, 23 November 2006, 6. 
 
“Hu Jintao shou ti qiaowu ‘sange dayou zuowei’” (President Hu Jintao Mentions 
Three Grand Goals of OC Work). Qiaoqing jianbao, 25 December 2005, 1. 
 
“Huadong liusheng yishi qiaoban changdao ‘qinqing qiaowu’ nuanqiaoxin” (Chinese 
Southern Six Provinces and One City Propose Warm Hearted OC Work). Qiaoqing 
jianbao, 21 December 2007, 12. 
 
“Huayi xinshengdai qiyejia Zhongguo jingji gaoji yanxiuban” (High Level Chinese 
Economic Research Course for New OC Entrepreneurs). Qiaoqing jianbao, 28 
May 2006, 12. 
 
“Hudong fazhan zhuqiao xingye” (Mutual Action for Development, Helping OC 
Developing Industry). Qiaoqing, no. 10 (5 April 2005). 
 
“Jiada lidu, quanfangli kaizhan qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo” (Increase Strength on 
Developing All Fronts of OC Taiwan Work). Qiaoqing, no. 15, 6 June 2007. 
 
“Jiangmenshi qiaowu gongzuo qiuxin qiubian ‘sanxin renshi’ cheng zhongdian” 
(Jiangmen City OC Work Strive for New Change for ‘Three New Personages’ as 
Focal Point). Qiaoqing jianbao, 21 March 2008, 12. 
 
“Jiaqiang qiaowu wenhua gongzuo, xuanchuan hongyang Zhonghua wenhua” 
(Intensify Overseas Chinese Cultural Work, Propagate and Enhance Chinese 
Culture). Qiaoqing, no. 16 (24 May 2005). 
 
“Jiefang sixiang tuidong Guangdong qiaowu gongzuo kexue fazhan” (Liberate 
Thinking, Promote Scientific Development of Guangdong OC Work). Qiaoqing 
jianbao, 21 March 2008, 2. 
 
 288
“Jiyao ‘qiaoli weiguo’ yeyao ‘guoli weiqiao’” (As Well As OC Strength for Helping 
China, China’s Strength Should Help the OC). Qiaoqing jianbao, 27 September 
2007, 18. 
 
“Jinnian lai qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo qingkuang” (The Situation of OC Work Towards 
Taiwan in Recent Years). Qiaoqing, no. 31 (23 October 2007). 
 
“Kaizhan dui huaren wenti mingan guojia de qiaowu gongzuo xu jiji, shenshen” 
(Postively and Cautiously Develop OC Work in Countries with Ethnic Chinese 
Sensitivities). Qiaoqing, no. 8 (15 February 2004): 1-12. 
 
“Kongzi xueyuan zhongfang zijin guanli banfa (zanxing) chutai” (Provisional State 
Management of Funding for Confucius Institute Announced). Qiaoqing jianbao, 
23 November 2006, 10. 
 
“Li Haifeng: Shenru guanche luoshi kexue fazhanguan” (Li Haifeng: Views to 
Deepening Practical Implementation and Scientific Development). Qiaoqing 
jianbao, 27 September 2007, 2. 
 
“Lian Song fangwen Dalu dui haiwai qiaoshe de yinxiang ji wo gongzuo duice” 
(Effects on Overseas Chinese from the Lian Song Visits to China and Our 
Countermeasures). Qiaoqing, no. 19 (27 June 2005). 
 
“Lianluo goutong haiwai huawen meiti, yingzao lianghao guoji yulun huanjing” 
(Contact Overseas Chinese Media, Create a Good International Media 
Environment). Qiaoqing, no. 44/1 (2005). 
 
“Liebian, chongzu, xinsheng, ronghe” (Split, Reconstitute, New Born, Fusion). 
Qiaoqing, no. 11 (1 March 2004). 
 
“‘Mazure’ zai huaren shehui buduan shengwen” (Mazu Fever Heats Up in Chinese 
Society). Qiaoqing jianbao, May 31, 2007, 12. 
 
“Meiguo dasuan huaren canzheng liliang zhanlou” (Chinese Political Participatory 
Strength in American Election Revealed). Qiaoqing, no. 51 (1 December 2004). 
 
“Meiguo huaren jidujiao xinyang tuanti de shehui gongneng” (The Social Power of 
American Chinese Christian Religious Groups). Qiaoqing, no. 58 (23 December 
2005). 
 
“‘Meiguo xibu Zhongwen jiaoshou yanxiutuan’ laihua yanxiu jiaoliu” (Southern US 
Chinese Teachers Study Group Come to China for Exchange). Qiaoqing, no. 41 
(19 October 2005). 
 
“Minjindang zhizheng houtai “qiaoweihui” de zhuyao gongzuo ji fazhan fangxiang” 
(Essential Development and Direction Behind the Scenes of Overseas Chinese 
Affairs Commission Following DPP Ascent to Power). Qiaoqing, no. 29 (15 
August 2000): 4-11. 
 
 289
“‘Nanfei huayi xiaojie fanghuatuan’ fanghua xiaoguo hao” (Good Results for Miss 
South African Chinese Delegation to China). Qiaoqing, no. 41 (19 October 2005). 
 
“Nimen de shengli, jiushi women de shengli, geng shi quanqiu huaren de shengli!” 
(Your Victory is Our Victory, Moreover is all the World’s OC’s Victory!). 
Qiaoqing jianbao, 20 September 2004. 
 
“Ouzhou huaqiaohuaren shetuan lianhehui di 13 jie nianhui ji Aierlan, Fenlan 
qiaoqing” (13th European Overseas Chinese Federation and Ireland and Finland 
Overseas Chinese Affairs). Qiaoqing, no. 33 (12 September 2005). 
 
“Qianxi Ouzhou huaqiaohuaren jingji xianzhuang ji fazhan qushi” (Analysis of 
Trends and Development of the European OC Economic Situation). Qiaoqing, no. 
49 (8 November 2005): 1-13. 
 
“Qiaowu gongzuozhe yao yi ‘da qiaowu guan’ tongling qiaowu gongzuo” (OC Cadres 
Must Work by Following the Philosophy of OC Work on a Large Scale). Qiaoqing 
jianbao, 26 April 2007, 13. 
 
“Qinqing de guanhuai zui neng dadong qiaobao de xinling” (Close Care is the Best 
for Moving the Hearts of Compatriots). Qiaoqing, no. 34 (12 September 2005). 
 
“Quanguo gedi kaishi ‘qiaofa xuanchuan yue’” (‘OC Laws Propaganda Month Begins 
Everywhere Throughout China). Qiaoqing jianbao, 20 September 2004. 
 
“Shenri qiaoshe, tuozhan Feizhou diqu qiaowu gongzuo” (Penetration of Overseas 
Chinese Society, Develop African Overseas Chinese Work). Qiaoqing, no. 24 (15 
July 2005. 
 
“Shenri shehui, tanjiu qiaoqing” (Penetrate Chinese Society, Investigate Overseas 
Chinese Affairs). Qiaoqing, no. 27 (5 August 2005). 
 
“Shijie huaqiao huaren de renkou guji 2005 nian” (2005 Estimate of Global OC 
Population). Qiaoqing, no. 32 (10 September 2006). 
 
“Sichuan dizhen zhenkai liangan jumian, ‘tongbao’ chongpo ‘taidu’ jinguzhou” 
(Sichuan Earthquake Shakes Open a New Phase of Cross-Strait Relations, 
‘Compatriot’ Breaks the Curse of ‘Taiwanese Independence’). Qiaoqing jianbao, 
25 May 2008, 2. 
 
“Sichuan dizhen zaiku ‘qiaoai jiayuan’ benyuedi jiangzai Qingchuan jiancheng” 
(Sichuan Earthquake Disaster Zone ‘OC Love Homeland’ Will be Established in 
Qingchuan at the End of This Month). Qiaoqing jianbao, 28 April 2009. 
 
“Taiwan dasuan dui wo qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo de yingxiang” (Effect of Taiwanese 
Elections on Our Overseas Chinese and Taiwan Work). Qiaoqing, no. 28 (23 June 
2004). 
 
 290
“Waijiaobu guanyuan jieshao Zhongguo de lingshi baohu qingkuang” (Foreign 
Ministry Staff Introduce China’s Situation for Consular Protection). Qiaoqing 
jianbao, 28 May 2006. 
 
“Wen Jiabao ganxie huaren dui Zhongguo kangzhen jiuzai de dali zhichi yu xiezhu” 
(Wen Jiabao Thanks Chinese for Strongly Supporting China’s Fight Against the 
Earthquake Disaster). Qiaoqing jianbao, 25 May 2008. 
 
“Weng Shijie: xiyin daMa huayisheng, Zhongguo daxue yingzeng jiangxuejin” (Weng 
Shijie: Attract Malaysian Ethnic Chinese Students, Chinese Universities Should 
Increase Scholarships). Qiaoqing jianbao, 15 July 2007, 13. 
 
“Wenhua Zhongguo, Mingjia jiantan: tuijie Zhonghua wenhua de xinpinpai” (Cultural 
China Artists Forum: Promoting New Brands of Chinese Culture). Qiaoqing, no.23 
(23 August 2007). 
 
“Woguo Dalu renkou guoji qianyi de xianzhuang, qushi ji xiangguan duice jianyi” 
(Current Situation of China’s Global Migrant Population, Countermeasures and 
Recommendations for Trends and Implications). Qiaoqing, no. 24 (5 September 
2007). 
 
“Xibanya shaoxie shijian” de fansi yu qishi” (Reflections and Thoughts on Spanish 
Shoe Store Fire). Qiaoqing, no.51 (1 December 2004): 13-14. 
 
“Xinlao qiaotuan lianghao hezuo, huawen jiaoyu zaixian shengji (Good Cooperation 
Between New and Old OC Groups, Produce New Opportunities for Chinese 
Education). Qiaoqing, no. 34 (2 August 2004). 
 
“Xuanwei haiwai qiaobao, hongyang Zhonghua wenhua” (Encourage Overseas 
Compatriots, Advance Chinese Culture). Qiaoqing, no. 37 (8 October 2005): 6-12. 
 
“Yaoqing haiwai huawen meiti xuanchuan Beijing aoyun” (Invite OC Media to 
Propagate Beijing Olympics). Qiaoqing no. 23 (23 August 2007). 
 
“Yige Zhongguo, heping fazhan” (One China, Peaceful Development). Qiaoqing, no, 
18 (21 June 2007). 
 
“Yindu qiaomin buyuan huiguo touzi, Yindu zhengfu huyu ‘xuexi huaqiao’” (Overseas 
Indians Don’t Wish to Return for Investment, Indian Government Calls on Them 
to Learn from the Overseas Chinese). Qiaoqing jianbao (20 March 2007): 17. 
 
“Yindu qiaomin zhengce yanjiu” (Indian Expatriate Policy Research). Qiaoqing, no. 
49 (23 November  2004). 
 
“Yinni huaren buying zaishuo ‘tamen Yinniren’” (Indonesian Chinese Should Never 
Say Again ‘Those Indonesians’). Qiaoqing jianbao, 28 April 2009. 
 
“Zai Mei Zhongguo guer huaxiaxing” (Traveling With American Chinese Orphans to 
China). Qiaoqing, no. 42 (19 October 2005). 
 
 291
“Zhigongdang yao nuli kaituo haiwai lianyi gongzuo xinjumian” (Zhigong Party Must 
Strive to Enter a New Phase of Overseas Relations Work). Qiaoqing jianbao, 25 
December 2006, 10. 
 
“Zhigongdang yu jiasu Zhonghua wenhua chanpin shuchu tuidong shijie huawen 
jiaoyu” (Zhigong Party Calls on Speeding Up Chinese Cultural Products for Export, 
Push Global Chinese Education). Qiaoqing jianbao, 25 December 2005, 12. 
 
“Zhongguo 15 ge shengshi chengli le huashang zuzhi” (15 Provinces and Cities in 
China Have Established OC Commercial Organisations). Qiaoqing jianbao, 25 
December 2004. 
 
“Zhongguo guoji yimin qushi tantao” (Inquiry into Chinese International Migration 
Trends). Qiaoqing, no. 54 (5 December 2005): 7-16. 
 
“Zhongguo qiaolian chengli haiwai lushituan jiaqiang weihu haiwai qiaobao quanli” 
(Qiaolian Establishes Overseas Lawyers Group to Strengthen Defense of  OC 
Rights and Interests). Qiaoqing jianbao, 30 November 2008. 
 
“Zhongguo qiaolian zuzhi fazhan dao yiwansiqian duoge” (Qiaolian Organizations 
Reaches Over 14000). Qiaoqing Jianbao, 25 October 2006, 11. 
 
“Zhongguo ribao – Meiguoban’ zhengshi chuangkan” (China Daily – American 
Edition Officially Launched). Qiaoqing jianbao, 30 May 2009. 
 
“Zhonggguo Zhigongdang zhengxie tian: guanyu jiaqiang haixia liangan wenhua 
jiaoyu minjian jiaoliu de jianyi” (China Zhigong Party Proposes Views Concerning 
Strengthening Cross-Strait Chinese Cultural and Educational Exchange). Qiaoqing 
jianbao, 21 March 2008, 17. 
 
“Zhongguo zhu Ri shiguan jinqi jiang wei huaqiao huaren banhao san jian shi” 
(Chinese Ambassador to Japan’s Recent Efforts to Achieve Three Goals for OC). 
Qiaoqing jianbao, 22 October 2004. 
 
““Zhou chu qu” fuwu haiwai qiaobao, tigao Zhongcanye shuizhun” (‘Going Out’ to 
Serve Overseas Compatriots, Raising the Standard of Chinese Restaurants). 
Qiaoqing, no. 53 (15 December 2004). 
 
“Zhuanjia xixun weiyuanhui wei qiaowu gongzuo xianji xiance” (Specialist Advisory 
Committee Offer Suggestions for OC Work). Qiaoqing, no. 8 (15 March 2005): 9-
10. 
 
“Zuohao liuhua tongxuehui gongzuo, buduan tuohuang haiwai qiaowu gongzuo de 
dianyumian” (Do Well with Work on OC Student Groups Studying in China, 
Unceasingly Open Up Areas of OC Work). Qiaoqing, no. 51 (14 November 2005). 
 
“Zuohao qinTai qiaotuan gongzuo, cujin haiwai ‘fandu cutong’” (Do Good Work 
with Groups Close to Taiwan, Promote Overseas Anti-Independence and Promote 
Reunification). Qiaoqing, no. 38 (8 October 2005). 
 
 292
“Zuohao xinyimin shehui gongzuo zhongzai guli he yindao” (Succeed in New Migrant 
Society Work Through Encouragement and Guidance). Qiaoqing, no. 15 (29 April 
2005). 
 
Guangdong Provincial Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. Cong Suoluomen tangrenjie 
bei shao shuo qi…(From Speaking of the Burning of Chinatown…). Guangzhou: 
Guangdong qiaoban, 2006. 
 
 
Websites/Homepages 
 
80/20 Initiative. http://www.80-20initiative.net/about/organization.asp  
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). www.china.org.cn.   
Chinese Students and Scholars Association (CSSA). http://umdcssa.org/. 
China Travel Service (CTS). www.ctsgroup.com.cn.  
China Youth Corps (CYC). www.cyc.org.tw.  
Fiji Government News Briefs. www.fiji.gov.fj.  
Guangdong Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (GOCAO). http://gocn.southcn.com, 
www.gqb.gov.cn.  
Guizhou Province Foreign Affairs Office. www.gzgov.gov.cn.  
Hawaii Public Radio. www.hawaiipublicradio.org.  
International Committee for the Promotion of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives 
(ICCIC). http://www.iccic.org.cn/en.  
International Community Radio Taiwan. 
http://english.csie.ncnu.edu.tw/modules/iWSML/Ben/html/200903250950.html.  
Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq. www.iraq-iri.org/. 
Jewish Agency. www.jewishagency.org. 
Kuomintang (KMT). www.kmt.org.tw.  
Ministry of Overseas Indians Affairs. www.moia.gov.in/. 
OCAC Service Station of Auckland. http://163.29.16.20/auckland/english/. 
ROC Ministry of Education. http://english.education.edu.tw.  
ROC Overseas Compatriots Affairs Commission. www.ocac.net.  
ROC government website. 
www.taiwan.com.au/Polieco/Policies/OverseasChinese/report01.html. 
PRC Consulate in New Zealand. www.chinaconsulate.org.nz.    
ROC Government Information Office. www.gio.gov.tw.  
Shanghai OCAO. http://qwb.sh.gov.cn/gb/shqb/english/index.html.  
State Council OCAO. 
http://www.gqb.gov.cn/node2/node3/node22/node23//index.html 
Taiwan Communique. www.taiwandc.org.  
US House of Representatives. www.house.gov.  
World Council of Hellenes Abroad. http://en.sae.gr/. 
Wuyi University Foreign Affairs Office. www.wyu.edu.cn/fao/index6_en/gjian.htm. 
 
 
Online Articles 
 
 293
URL addresses of online articles may be subject to change or deletion over time.  
Some online posts that were removed were later recovered by using the cache 
function on the google.com search engine.  The author has endeavoured to ensure that 
as many as possible of the online references were current at the time of submission by 
rechecking them between September and October 2009. 
 
“An Investigation Report on the Use of Propaganda and Penetration Abroad to Extend 
the Persecution of Falun Gong Overseas.” n.d. 
www.zhuichaguoji.org/en/upload/docs/State-
Run%20Media/Overseas%20Media%20report.doc (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
“Chinese Learning Fervour Gathers Momentum.” n.d. www.clta-
gny.org.chineselearningfervor.htm (accessed 6 April 2007). 
“Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.” 4 December 1982. 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (accessed 1 
October 2009) 
 
ABC Radio Australia. “China Sends Expat Evacuation Flight to Tonga.” 22 
November 2006, www.abc.net.au/ra/news/stories/s1795185.htm (accessed 6 April 
2007). 
 
All-China Women’s Federation. “Director Chen Yujie: Love for Overseas Chinese 
Affairs.” 27 June 2006. www.womenofchina.cn/people/politicians/5507.jsp 
(accessed 21 August 2006). 
 
Asia Pacific Media Network. “Chinese Embassy Aims to Shut Newspaper, says 
Crusading Editor.” 30 June 2004. 
www.faluninfo.net/displayAnArticle.aspID=8715 (accessed 25 April 2007). 
 
Baah, Anthony Yaw, and Herbert Jauch. “Chinese Investments in Africa: A Labour 
Perspective.” African Labour Research Network, May 2009. 
http://www.fnv.nl/binary/report2009_chinese_investments_in_africa_tcm7-
23663.pdf (accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
Barme, Geremie. “Torching the Relay.” China Beat website, 5 April 2008. 
http://thechinabeat.blogspot.com/search/label/2008%20Tibet (accessed 30 April 
2008). 
 
Beijing This Month. “Overseas Chinese to Join ‘Singing on the Yellow River.” 1 June 
2005. www.btmbeijing.com/contents/en/btm/2005-06/wah/singing (accessed 1 
October 2009). 
 
boxun.com. “Zai Ri huaren liuxuesheng aoyun shenghuo shengyuan huodong lakai 
weimu” (In Japan, Chinese Foreign Students’ Support of Olympic Flame Lift Open 
Curtain). 17 April 2008. 
http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/intl/2008/04/200804170715.shtml (accessed 30 
April 2008). 
 
 294
British Broadcasting Corporation. “China ‘Snatched Exiled Dissidents’.” BBC 
website, 26 July 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2153101.stm 
(accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
CCTV. “Haiwai huaqiao huaren gonghuo fazhan daji” (Cooperative Development 
Strategy for the OC).  CCTV website, 22 June 2001. 
www.cctv.com/overseas/chinareport/200106.22.html (accessed 3 November 2009). 
 
Chan, Antonio C. S. “ROC Press Release.” Solomon Islands Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet website, 4 May 2006. www.pmc.gov.sb/?q=node/261 
(accessed 24 May 2006). 
 
Chang, Fu-mei. “Jiushiernian qiaowu weiyuanhuiyi shizheng baogao” (OCAC 
Administrative Report of OCAC for 2003). OCAC website, 19 November 2003. 
www.ocac.net/policy/policy02_04.asp (accessed 6 April 2007). 
 
Chang, John K. “Striving Towards the Chinese Century.” China Source website, n.d. 
www.chsource.org/Striving.htm (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Chen, Angel. “Aoyun shenghuo 24 ri di Aozhou” (Olympic Sacred Flame Reaches 
Australia on the 24th). sohu.com website, 8 April 2008. 
http://angelchenlifang.blog.sohu.com/84117956.html (accessed 30 April 2008). 
 
Chen, San-Ching. “Scholar, Official and Politician: The Three Careers of Zheng 
Yanfen.” n.d. www.lcsc.edu/hstcc/chensanab.htm (accessed 8 July 2008). 
 
Chen, Schenley. “A Common Thread.” In The Guilded Path (forthcoming) n.d. 
www.click2asia.com/studytour/studytourfeature.html (accessed 30 August 2006). 
 
Cheow, Eric Teo Chu. “China’s Rising Soft Power in Southeast Asia.” Singapore 
Institute of International Affairs, 6 May 2004. 
www.glocom.org/debates/20040506_cheow_china/ (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Chin, James K. “Trends and Government Policies: Reducing Irregular Migration from 
China.” n.d. http://ctool.gdnet.org/conf_docs/Chin-Paper.doc (accessed 17 May 
2008). 
 
China CSR. “Chinese Journalists Invited to Review Malaysia’s Security Situation.” 6 
December 2005. www.chinacsr.com/2005/12/06/chinese-journalists-invited-to-
review-malaysias-security-situation/ (accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
China Informed. “Lee Wishes Chinese Everywhere a Happy New Year.” 27 January 
1998. www.chinainformed.com/current.html (accessed 30 September 2009).    
 
China Internet Information Centre. “Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference.” n.d. www.china.org.cn/english/archiveen/27750.htm (accessed 30 
September 2009). 
 
 295
China Radio International. “Thai Policy Toward Ethnic Chinese Commended.” China 
Internet Information Centre, 9 September 2002. 
www.china.org.cn/english/2002/Sep/42268.htm (accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
_____, “‘Water Cube’ Received Donations from Overseas Chinese,” China Internet 
Information Centre, 15 July 2004, www.china.org.cn/english/China/101337.htm 
(accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
Chinavista. “Mass Media.” n.d. www.chinavista.com/entravel/show_culture-193.html 
(accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. “China Zhi Gong Dang.” 14 
Feburary 2007. 
www.cppcc.gov.cn/English/brief_intro_non_comm/200702140128.htm (accessed 
30 September 2009). 
 
Chou, Pei-Ming. “A Study Tour Perspective.” Study Tour Newsletter 7, Issue 1, n.d. 
www.click2asia.com/studytour.newsletter2000.html#sightings (accessed 30 
August 2006). 
 
Christiansen, Flemming. “Beyond Chinese Statehood? Authoritative Representations 
of Nation and Ethnicity in the Late 1990s and Early 2000s.” Department of East 
Asian Studies, University of Leeds, n.d. 
www.personal.leeds.ac.uk/~chifc/nation.pdf (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Clear Harmony. “Chinese Embassy Interferes with New Zealand Internal Affairs.” 28 
July 2002. www.clearharmony.net/articles/200207/5885.html (accessed 2 October 
2009). 
 
Clear Wisdom, “Greater New York Chapter of the Overseas Chinese People’s 
Alliance Holds a Forum Against Article 23.” 31 December 2002. 
http://clearwisdom.net/emh/articles/2001/12/31/30369.html (accessed 30 August 
2007). 
 
Consulate-General of the PRC in Auckland. “Celebrations on Beijing’s Successful 
Bid for Hosting the 2008 Olympic Games.” 14 July 2001. 
www.chinaconsulate.org.nz/eng/xwdt/t44155.htm (accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
_____. “China’s NPC Delegation in Auckland.” 19 November 2003. 
www.chinaconsulate.org.nz/eng/xwdt/t44152.htm (accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
_____. “China’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council Delegation 
Visit Auckland.” 19 November 2003. 
www.chinaconsulate.org.nz/eng/xwdt/t44141.htm (accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
Consulate-General of the PRC in Canada. “Remarks by H.E. Ping Mei at Chinese 
New Year’s Celebration on the Parliament Hill 27 February 2001.” 27 October 
2003. www.chinaembassycanada.org/eng/xw/dsjy/t38912.htm (accessed 30 
September 2009). 
 
 296
Consulate-General of PRC in Chicago. “Full Text of Chinese FM’s Press 
Conference.” 3 August 2004. 
www.chinaconsulatechicago.org/eng/zzxw/t72127.htm (accessed 24 May 2006). 
 
Consulate-General of the PRC in Houston. “How Should China Protect Its Citizens 
Overseas?” 22 June 2004. http://houston.china-consulate.org/eng/nv/t140336.htm 
(accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Consulate-General of the PRC in New York. “Zhongguo zhu Niuyue zhonglingshi Liu 
Biwei chuxi Feicheng qiaotuan huodong” (PRC Consulate General to New York 
Liu Biwei Attends Philadelphia OC Organizational Activities).  February 19 2006. 
www.nyconsulate.prchina.org/chn/qwbh/t236227.htm (accessed 3 November 
2009). 
 
Dai, Ruijun. “Shuangzhong guoji wenti zai sikao” (Re-Thinking the Problem of Dual 
Nationality). n.d. http://english.china.org.cn/Chinese/zhuanti/xxsb/1104065.htm 
(accessed 6 April 2007). 
 
Democratic Progressive Party. “White Paper on Foreign Policy for the 21st Century.” 
28 November 1999. www.taiwandocuments.org/dpp02.htm (accessed 6 April 
2007). 
 
Deng, Xiaoping. “Address to Officers at the Rank of General and Above in Command 
of the Troops Enforcing Martial Law in Beijing.” Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Deng 
Xiaoping Selected Works), Vol. 3. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp 
(accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
Dong, Huifeng. “Guangdong qiaowu buzuo ‘chunlai chaguan’” (Guangdong OC 
Affairs Must Uphold Duties). GOCAO website, 16 January 2001. 
www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2005/1216/1/126.shtml (accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
Dunnigan, James. “China’s Thousand Grains of Sand.” Strategy Page, 21 July 2005. 
www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/2005721212041.asp (accessed 26 December 
2006). 
 
eBeijing. “Olympic Games-time Volunteer Projects.” 2008. 
www.ebeijing.gov.cn/Home_of_EV/AboutEV/t915421/htm (accessed 25 
September 2009). 
 
Eduwo.com. “Aozhou guoli daxue juban ‘qingqian aoyun xinxi Zhongguo” (ANU 
Organizes ‘Love Leads the Olympics, Hearts Tied to China). 31 August 2007. 
www.eduwo.com/eduwo/news/10/hotnews/ProviderNews/files/1719.shtml 
(accessed 30 April 2008). 
 
Ellis, Viveca. “Chinese Language Media Deals with Censorship.” Langara 
Journalism Review, 2005. www.langara.bc.ca/ljr/archive/LJR2005/chinese2.html 
(accessed 25 April 2007). 
 
 297
Embassy of the PRC in Australia. “China Asks Malaysia to Probe Assault Cases.” 29 
November 2005. www.chinaembassy.org.au/eng/xw/t223932.htm (accessed 24 
May 2006). 
 
Embassy of the PRC in Canada. “Afghan Terror attack Sounds Alert on Security of 
Overseas Chinese.” 14 June 2004. http://ca.china-
embassy.org/eng/xwdt/t132623.htm (accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
Embassy of the PRC in the Republic of Lithuania. “Official of the Department of 
Consular Affairs Takes an Interview on the Evacuation of Chinese Citizens from 
Lebanon.” 26 July 2006. www.chinaembassy.lt/eng/xwdt/t265432.htm (accessed 2 
October 2009). 
 
Embassy of the PRC in Switzerland. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s 
Regular Press Conference on April 8, 2008.” 9 April 2008. www.china-
embassy.ch/eng/fyrth/t423126.htm (accessed 30 April 2008). 
 
Embassy of the PRC in the USA. “Chinese Government Helped Its Citizens in Tonga 
Return to China with a Chartered Plane.” 22 November 2006. www.china-
embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t281398.htm (accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
_____. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Kong Quan’s Press Conference on April 27 
2004.” 27 April 2004. www.china-embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t93857.htm (accessed 1 
October 2009). 
 
_____. “Foreign Ministry Spokesman Liu Jianchao’s Press Conference on 8 
November 2005.” 8 November 2005. www.china-
embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t220541.htm (accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
_____. “More Overseas Chinese, Media Hail Hu-Lien Meeting.” 5 April 2005. 
www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/t194165.htm (accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
_____. “Overseas Chinese Key Force in Nation’s Revival.” 21 July 2004. 
www.china-embassy.org/eng/qwgz/t143663.htm (accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
Ethnic Minorities & Great Power Strategies in Asia Conference at the Asia-Pacific 
Centre for Strategic Studies. “Conference Executive Summary.” 12-14 October 
2004. www.apcss.org/core/Conference/CR_ES/ethncconexecsum2.doc (accessed 2 
October 2009). 
 
Falun Dafa Information Center. “Taiwanese Falun Gong Practitioner Speaks at GADP 
Conference in Houston.” 11 August 2003. 
http://faluninfo.net/displayAnArticle.asp?ID=8009 (accessed 30 August 2007). 
 
Falun Dafa Practitioners in Maryland State. “Greater Washington D.C. Area Falun 
Dafa Practitioners Attended Local Chinese New Year Celebration and Received 
Commendation.” Falun Dafa website, 3 February 2001. 
http://clearwisdom.net/emh/articles/2001/2/3/4836.html (accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
 298
Falun Gong Human Rights Working Group. “Alienating Its Own Citizens: A Report 
on the Chinese Government’s Worldwide Refusal to Renew Its Citizen’s 
Passports.” April 2005. www.flghrwg.net/reports/Passport/Passport-S.pdf 
(accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
Falun Gong Practioners. “Chinese Spies Infiltrate NZ Church and Falun Gong 
Group.” Scoop website, 5 July 2005. 
www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO0507/S00034.htm (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Fiji Government. “News Briefs.” 3 August 2005. 
www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/page_5090.shtml (accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
Field, Michael. “Pacific Chinese – Who Next to Face the Rioters?” Michael Field’s 
website, 22 April 2006. www.michaelfield.org/solomons21.htm (accessed 2 
October 2009). 
 
Gao, Wei. “CCTV-4 fugai 98% diqiu” (CCTV-4 Covers 98% of the World). Huaren 
shijie website, 2007. http://qkzz.net/magazine/1671-2536/2007/06/1073785.htm 
(accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Gelbras, Vilia. “Chinese Migration into the Russian Regions: A New Phase.” 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006. 
http://www.iiss.org/programmes/russia-and-eurasia/copyof-russian-regional-
perspectives-journal/copyof-rrp-volume-1-issue-2/chinese-migration-into-the-
russian-regions-a-new-phase/ (accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
Guangdong Institute of Socialism. “‘Zhongguo tongyi zhanxian lilun yanjiu chengguo 
lanpeishu’ shouci jiang woyuan yanjiu chengguo lieru kexin neirong” (Blue Book 
of Research Results Concerning China’s UF Theory Has Included Our Institute’s 
Findings as Core Content). 9 September 2005. www.gdsy.com.cn/new7.htm 
(accessed 3 November 2009). 
 
Guangdong Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. “Donation Confirmation Certificates 
Awarded.” 20 August 2004. 
http://gocn.southcn.com/english/whatson/200408200001.htm (accessed 30 
September 2009). 
 
_____. “English Channel of GOCN Opened on 18 June 2004.” 18 June 2004. 
http://gocn.southcn.com/english/whatson/2004061800021.htm (accessed 23 
August 2007). 
 
_____. “Guangdong Returned Overseas Chinese Association to Invite More 
Members.” 12 July 2005. 
http://gocn.southcn.com/english/whatson/200507120006.htm (accessed 30 
September 2009). 
 
_____. “Guangzhoushi qiaowu gongzuo’shiyiwu’ guihua” (Guangzhou City OC 
Affairs Work ‘10-1-5’ Plan). 15 December 2006. 
www.gz.gov.cn/vfs/content/newcontent.jsp?contentId=452864&catId=4100 
(accessed 3 November 2009). 
 299
 
_____. “Guowuyuan qiaowu bangongshi keti guanli banfa” (State Council OC Affairs 
Office Task Management Guidelines). 13 September 2006. 
www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2006/0913/1/3149.shtml (accessed 30 September 2009).  
 
_____. “Malaysian Youngsters Follow Chinese Martial Arts Master “Huang 
Feihong”.” 11 June 2004. 
http://gocn.southcn.com/english/whatson/200406110025.htm (accessed 30 August 
2006). 
 
_____. “Overseas Chinese & Foreign Affairs.” 10 June 2006. 
http://gocn.southcn.com/english/brief/200406100026.htm (accessed 30 September 
2009). 
 
_____. “Recruitment of Overseas Chinese Language Education Volunteer.” 11 June 
2004. http://gocn.southcn.com/english/whatson/200406110023.htm (accessed 2 
October 2009). 
 
_____. “The 8th Guangzhou Convention of OCS To Be Held.” 7 July 2005. 
http://gocn.southcn.com/english/whatson/200507070027.htm (accessed 30 
September 2009). 
 
Guo, Nei. “Closer Bonds with Overseas Chinese.” China Education and Research 
Network website, 2001. www.edu.cn/20010101/21945.shtml (accessed 6 April 
2007). 
 
Hai, Dao. “Gedi liuxuesheng huwei aoyun shenghuo: women de xin yu zuguo xiangyi” 
(Foreign Students All Over Protect the Olympic Flame: Our Hearts and the 
Motherland are Interdependant). sohu.com website, 24 April 2008. 
http://2008.sohu.com/20080424/n256483814.shtml (accessed 30 Aptil 2008). 
 
Hanban. “Indonesian Minister of Education Held a Farewell Ceremony for Chinese 
Volunteer Teachers.” 23 June 2005. 
http://english.hanban.edu.cn/market/HanBanE/423707.htm (accessed 6 April 2007). 
 
He, Jimeng. “Shilun Sun Zhongshan qiaowu sixiang de xianshi yiyi” (Opinion of the 
Real Significance of Sun Yatsen OC Thought). Zhongguo qiaowang, GOCAO 
website, 20 September 2007. www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2007/0920/1/6646.shtml 
(accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
Henderson, Anne, and Andrew Trlin. “New Chinese – Changing Characteristics: A 
New Settlers Programme Profile.” Chinese in NZ website, n.d. 
http://www.stevenyoung.co.nz/The-Chinese-in-New-Zealand/Chinese-in-
Australasia-and-the-Pacific/New-
Settlers.html#3.1%20New%20Chinese%20%E2%80%93%20Changing%20Chara
cteristics:%20A%20New%20Settlers%20Programme%20Profile (accessed 1 
October 2009). 
 
Ho, Soyoung. “Chinese Authorities Suppressing Falun Gong Movement in the US.” 
Columbia News Service, 7 July 2002. 
 300
www.jrn.columbia.edu/studentwork/cns/2002-07-07/199.asp (accessed 30 August 
2007). 
 
Hua, Vanessa. “A Cultural Awakening: Program Lets Young Chinese Americans 
Discover Their Identity.” Huaren website, 6 July 1998. 
www.huaren.org/diaspora/n_america/usa/docs/0798-04.html (accessed 6 April 
2007). 
 
_____. “Playing the Panama Card – The China-Taiwan Connection.” International 
Reporting Project, 30 June 2002. 
http://www.internationalreportingproject.org/stories/detail/658/ (accessed 1 
October 2009). 
 
Huang, Xianmu. “Zuohao renda qiaotai gongzuo de jidian sikao” (A Few Thoughts 
on Succeeding with Taiqiao Work). GOCAO website, 12 February 2003. 
www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2003/0212/1/312.shtml (accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
Human Rights Watch. “Indonesia Alert: Economic Crisis Leads to Scapegoating of 
Ethnic Chinese.” 11 February 1998. 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/1998/02/11/indone8880.htm (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Ip, Manying. “Chinese.” Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand website, updated 
4 March 2009. 
www.teara.govt.nz/NewZealanders/NewZealandPeoples/Chinese/en?print=true 
(accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
KMT News Network. “Merger of Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission 
Opposed.” 11 March 2009. 
www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=5891 
(accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
Kurlantzick, Joshua. “How China Controls African Politics.” TNR Online, 10 May 
2006. www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?I=w061002&s=kurlantzick100506 (accessed 24 
May 2006). 
 
Lamont, Ian. “China’s Emerging Overseas Chinese Policy in the Late 1970s and 
Implications for Ethnic Chinese Communities in Vietnam and Kampuchea.” 17 
May 2005. www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ilamont/alm/final_paper.pdf (accessed 9 
December 2006). 
 
Le Bail, Helene, and Wei Shen. “The Return of the “Brains” to China: What are the 
Social, Economic, and Political Impacts?” Institut des Relations Internationales, 
November 2008. www.ifri.org/files/centre_asie/AV11_ENG.pdf (accessed 1 
October 2009). 
 
Liang, Yingming. “Guanyu huawen xuexiao he huawen jiaoyu gainian de shangque” 
(Discussions Concerning the Concept of Chinese Schooling and Education). 
GOCAO website, 18 February 2005. 
www.gqb.gov.cn/node2/node3/node12/node14/node49/userobject7ai2028.html 
(accessed 30 September 2009). 
 301
 
Liao, Yiyang. “Xinhuaqiao – Shenme shi xin de, shenme shi jiu de” (Xinhuaqiao: 
What is the New? What is the Old?). n.d. 
www.nias.ku.dk/issco5/documents/Liao_000.doc (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Lin, Li. “Yun huoju weidao Aozhou, huaren shetuan yishi xiaoyan miman” (Before 
the Torch Reaches Australia, Smoke of OC Group Gunpowder Already Fills the 
Air). boxun.com website, reprinted in cn-view.blogspot.com, 15 April 2008. 
http://cn-view.blogspot.com/2008/04/g2g_6775.html (accessed 30 April 2009). 
 
Lintner, Bertil. “Chinese Advance in the South Pacific: Entrepreneurs Undaunted by 
Papua New Guinea Dangers.” Japan Focus website, 5 December 2006. 
www.japanfocus.org/-Bertil-Lintner/2288 (accessed 6 April 2007).  
 
_____. “In Changing Times, the New Face of Chinese Emigrants.” Hankyoreh, 27 
November 2006. 
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/174466.html (accessed 
30 September 2009). 
 
Lu, Weixiong. “‘San ge jianchi’ quanmian tuozhan qiaowu gongzuo” (Three 
Perseverances for Comprehensive Development of OC Work). GOCAO website, 
22 February 2006. www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2006/0222/1/1925.shtml (accessed 30 
September 2009). 
 
_____. “Weihu qiaobao quanyi dui qiaojuan xiangmu shishi guifan jianguan” 
(Safeguard OC Rights and Interests, Better Management of OC Contributions). 
GOCAO website, 31 May 2006. www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2006/0531/1/2518.shtml 
(accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
Luard, Tim. “Chinese Diaspora: Britain.” BBC website, 3 March 2005. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4304845.stm (accessed 1 October 
2009). 
 
Lunev, Stanislav. “China’s Intelligence Machine – Overseas Intelligence Activities.” 
BNET, 17 November 1997. 
www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_n42_v13/ai_19986874/pg_1 
(accessed 30 September 2009).   
 
Maslen, Geoff. “Warning – Be Wary of Confucius Institutes.” University World 
News website, 2 December 2007. 
www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20071130094503100 (accessed 
1 November 2009). 
 
Mercer, Phil. “Chinese Diaspora: Australia.” BBC website, 3 March 2005. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4311063.stm (accessed 30 September 
2009). 
 
National Committee of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Churches 
in China and the China Christian Council. “Statement on the Taiwan Issue.” New 
 302
Zealand Presbyterian website, 11 June 2001. www.presbyterian.org.nz/1250.0.html 
(accessed 6 April 2007). 
 
National People’s Congress Standing Committee. “Message to Compatriots in 
Taiwan.” PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, 1 January 1979. 
www.fmprc.gov.cn/ljzg/3568/t17790.htm (accessed 30 August 2007).  
 
New Zealand Chinese Students in Support of Olympics. “4.27 jihui xuzhi! Qing wubi 
zixi yuedu! Yange zunshou!” (Important Notice for April 27 Rally! Please Be Sure 
to Read Carefully! Observe Strictly!). baidu.com website, 22 April 2008.  
http://hi.baidu.com/%CD%B5%B5%C3%B0%EB%C8%D5%CF%D0/blog/item/a
27910bf2da8a40f19d81f34.html (accessed 30 April 2008). 
 
New Zealand Falun Dafa Association. “Falun Gong Will Sue Chinese Minister in 
Auckland.” Scoop website, 4 April 2006. 
www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO0604/S00024.htm (accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
Ng, James. “Social Differences Between Kiwi-Chinese and Chinese Newcomers.” 
Chinese in NZ website, n.d. http://www.stevenyoung.co.nz/The-Chinese-in-New-
Zealand/Chinese-in-Australasia-and-the-Pacific/Identity-and-
Culture.html#2.2%20Social%20Differences%20between%20Kiwi-
Chinese%20and%20Chinese%20Newcomers (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Nyiri, Pal. “Scenic Spot Europe: Chinese Travellers on the Western Periphery.” 
Espaces Temps website, 25 March 2005. 
www.espacestemps.net/document1224.html (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive. “China: Media Report 
Continuing Efforts to Recruit Overseas Scientists.” December 1999. 
www.ncix.gov/archives/nacic/news/1999/dec99.html (accessed 6 April 2007). 
 
Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission. “History.” n.d. 
www.ocac.gov.tw/english/public/public.asp?selno=707&no=707&level=B 
(accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
Overseas Chinese Corner. “Home to Overseas Chinese.” 8 March 2002. 
http://newsgd.com/gd/overseachinesecorner/200305140242.htm (accessed 30 
September 2009). 
 
PRC Ministry of Commerce. “Preferential Policy Concerning the Administration of 
Entry and Exit.” March 2007. 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/subject/buiness/lanmue/200703/2007030450
1378.html (accessed 6 April 2007). 
 
PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing Requires 
Enhanced Efforts in Consular Protection.” 29 May 2006. 
www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t255697.htm (accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
 303
_____. “Close Friends Gather Together: The Foreign Ministry Holds the First “Public 
Day” Activity in 2006.” 3 June 2006. www.chineseembassy.org/eng/zxxx/t256785 
(accessed 15 April 2007). 
 
PRC State Administration of Radio, Film and Television. “Woguo guangbo yingshi 
zhouchuqu jinru quanmian fazhan de xin jieduan” (Entering a New Phase in the 
Overall Development of ‘Going Out’ in Our Nation’s Television Broadcasting). 3 
November 2006. www.sarft.gov.cn/article.do?articleId=20070910174338600875 
(accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Preparatory Group of the Volunteer Department. “FAQ About Volunteers of the 29th 
Olympic Games & 13th Paralympic Games.” 9 August 2006. 
www.sportingfemale.com/www_en/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=180 (accessed 30 
September 2009). 
 
Press Division of TECO in New York. Review of Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan: 
Pragmatic Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, by Chen Jie. TECO New York website, 
no. 028 (November-December 2002). www.taipei.org/book/1112/foreign.htm 
(accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Promotion Committee for Building English Living Environment. “Minutes of the first 
Meeting of Promotion Committee for Building English Living Environment.” 12 
December 2002. 
www.bless.nat.gov.tw/prg/er_view01.asp?act=report&autoid=47&id=20&s=3 
(accessed 6 April 2007). 
 
Puah, Pauline. “Nude Woman Police Abuse Clip Sparks Uproar.” Malaysiakini 
website, 24 November 2005. www.suaram.net/display_article.asp?ID=403 
(accessed 24 May 2006). 
 
Public Broadcasting System. “Four Chinese Espionage Investigations.” Frontline, 15 
January 2004. www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/spy/spies/four.html 
(accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
Radio Australia. “Beijing Tells Solomons to Protect Chinese from Rioters.” 21 April 
2006. www.radioaustralia.net.au/news/stories/s1620510.htm (accessed 24 May 
2006). 
 
_____. “More Boats Smuggling Illegal Chinese Immigrants Expected in Guam and 
Northern Marianas.” 21 April 1999. 
http://archives.pireport.org/archive/1999/april/04%2D21%2D01.html (accessed 2 
October 2009). 
 
_____. “‘One China’ Group Set Up in Tonga.” 20 January 2004. 
http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2004/january/01%2D20%2D12.htm (accessed 
2 October 2009). 
 
Radio Free Australia. “Tsunami: Refugees in Sumatra.” 6 January 2005. 
www.rfa.org/english/news/2005/01/06/asian_tsunami/ (accessed 6 April 2007). 
 
 304
Radio Guangdong. “The First HK Youth Military Summer Camp Held.” 21 July 2005. 
www.newsgd.com/prdcorner/hkmacaoexpress/200507210073.htm (accessed 30 
August 2006). 
 
Radio New Zealand International. “China’s Ambassador to Fiji Accuses Media of 
Bias in Crime Reporting.” 10 December 2003. 
www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?id=7752&op=read (accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
_____. “Chinese Embassy in Suva Can’t Confirm Interest in Regional Airline.” 10 
March 2005. www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=15390 (accessed 2 
October 2009) 
 
_____. “Fiji Police Arrest Falun Gong Members at Games.” 3 July 2003. 
http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2003/july/07%2D03%2D09.htm (accessed 2 
October 2009). 
 
Reporters Without Borders. “Chinese Government Bans Two Canadian Journalists 
with Chinese-language TV Station.” 18 January 2005. 
www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=12320 (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
_____. “Ching Cheong Completes Six Month in Detention on Spying Charge.” 21 
October 2005. www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=15380 (accessed 2 October 
2009). 
 
_____. “Journalist with the Epoch Times Assaulted in Atlanta: the Newspaper 
Accuses Chinese Authorities.” 14 February 2006. 
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=16436 (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
ROC Ministry of Education. “What is the Difference Between Overseas Compatriot 
Students, Students from HK and Macao, and Students of Foreign Nationalities?” 
13 June 2006. 
http://english.education.edu.tw/ct.asp?xItem=636&ctNode=2680&mp=12 
(accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
_____. “What is the ROC’s Educational Policy for Overseas Compatriots?” 13 June 
2006. http://english.moe.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=635&ctNode=1181&mp=2 
(accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Rowa, Aenet. “Marshall Islands Gives Refuge to Chinese Dissident  Xu Bo.” Yokwe 
website, 14 June 2003. www.yokwe.net/index-
php?name=News&file=article&sid=439 (accessed 24 May 2006). 
 
Salvation Army. “Tongan Salvationists Help After Civil Unrest.” Scoop website, 21 
November 2006. www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO0611/S00297.htm (accessed 2 
October 2009). 
 
Santoli, Al. “China: The Best Friend of Asia’s Dictators.”American Foreign Policy 
Council website, 17 July 2003. www.afpc.org/apsec.shtml (accessed 24 May 2006). 
 
 305
Schweitzer, Vivien. “Chinese Diaspora: United States.” BBC, 3 March 2005. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4308955.stm (accessed 1 October 
2009). 
 
Siddiqui, Kalim. “The Muslim Manifesto: A Strategy for Survival.” London: The 
Muslim Institute, 1990. http://www.muslimparliament.org.uk/MuslimManifesto.pdf 
(accessed 11 May 2010). 
 
Skeldon, Ronald. “China: From Exceptional Case to Global Participant.” Migration 
Policy Institute website, April 2004. 
www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/print.cfm?ID=219 (accessed 30 September 
2009). 
 
Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation. “Taiwan Navy Update.” 7 June 2000. 
http://maorinews.com/karere/solomons/solo008.htm  (accessed 24 May 2006). 
 
Sydney Eat, Drink Fun Club. “Mianfei daba Kanpeila Beijing aoyun shenghuo 
chuandi zi lu” (Free Coach for Canberra Beijing Olympic Torch Relay Trip). 7 
April 2008. www.ozchinese.com/bbs/archiver/tid-150584.html (accessed 30 April 
2008). 
 
Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the USA. “Harmony Between Overseas 
Chinese Groups Urged.” 15 July 2009. www.roc-
taiwan.org/US/fp.asp?xItem=99322&ctNode=2295&mp=12 (accessed 2 October 
2009). 
 
Taipei Representative Office in Germany. “Qiaomin ji qiaotuan lianxi yu fuwu” 
(Relations and Service for Overseas Chinese and OC Organizations) n.d. www.roc-
taiwan.de/info/yb_c/yearbook/htdocs/rocyb86c/86060903.html (accessed 6 April 
2007). 
 
Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the State Council. “The One-
China Principle and the Taiwan Issue.” 21 February 2000. http://jm.china-
embassy.org/eng/zt/zgtwwt/wp/t211261.htm (accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
Television New Zealand. “Meeting Over Journalist’s Ejection.” 4 April 2007. 
http://tvnz.co.nz/view/news_politics_story_skin/1049022 (accessed 1 October 
2009). 
 
The Overseas Chinese World Conference for Promoting the Peaceful Reunification of 
China. “Declaration.” 17 July 2001. www.yokohama-chinese.gr.jp/sinsuji-en.html 
(accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
Transnational Communities Programme. “The Past Decade of Migration from the 
People’s Republic of China to Europe and Asia.” Workshop organized by Pal Nyiri 
and Igor Saveliev, 26-27 May 2000, Budapest. 
www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/wwwroot/Nyiri.htm (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
 306
UKChinese.com. “Zhongguo zhu Ying shiguan juxing qing aoyun huoju chuandi 
zhaodaihui” (PRC Embassy in England Hosts Olympic Torch Relay Ceremony). 
www.ukchinese.com/www/18/2008-04/590.html (accessed 30 April 2008). 
 
Voice of America (Chinese Division). “Tai waijiaobu xiezhu Suoluomen qundao 
qiaomin cheli” (Taiwanese Foreign Ministry Assists Solomon Islands Overseas 
Chinese Nationals Leave). Boxun.com website, 24 April 2006. 
www.peacehall.com/news/gb/taiwan/2006/04/200604242122.shtml (accessed 1 
October 2009). 
 
Wang, L. Ling-chi. “What Chinese Overseas Can and Should Do.” 20 March 1999, 
www.exodusnews.com/editorials/editorial-025.htm (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Wen, Yi. “Opportunities and Challenges in the Future.” PRC Ministry of Culture 
website, 16 September 2009. www.culturallink.gov.cn/focus/2009-
09/16/content_349202_3.htm (accessed 1 November 2009). 
 
Woodrow, John. “Chinese Intelligence New Zealand Connection.” 4 December 2000. 
http://cryptome.sabotage.org/cn_nz_link.htm (accessed 24 May 2006). 
 
World Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong. “Investigation 
Report on the Jiang Regime’s Persecution of Falun Gong Outside China.” 13 May 
2004, 
www.zhuichaguoji.org/en/index2.php?option=content&task=view&id=84&pop=1
&page=0 (accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
Wu, Ruicheng. “Qiaowu gongzuoju zhanluexing qianzhanxing” (Strategic and 
Forward Looking Nature of OC Work Tools) GOCAO website, 15 February 2007. 
www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2007/0215/1/3993.shtml (accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
_____. “Zhangwo xinfangfa, katuo Guangdong qiaowu xinjumian” (Master New 
Techniques, Open Up New Phase of Guangdong OC Work). GOCAO website, 30 
August 2007. www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2007/0830/1/6401.shtml (accessed 30 
September 2009). 
 
Wu, Sophia. “Chiefs of ROC Overseas Missions Fully Support ‘Name-Change’ 
Plan.” Global Security.org website, 10 December 2004. 
www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/taiwan/2004/taiwan-041210-cna02.htm 
(accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Wu, Zhiling. “Jiada lidu pushe yinjin haiwai rencai de ‘luse tongdao’” (Increase 
Strength for Laying the ‘Green Passage’ in Attracting Overseas Talent). GOCAO 
website, 6 March, 2003. www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2003/0306/1/321.shtml (accessed 
30 September 2009). 
 
_____. “Zuohao xinshiqi qiaowu gongzuo” (Succeeding with New Age OC Work). 
GOCAO website, 12 February 2003. 
www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2003/0212/1/311.shtml (accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
 307
Xin Development Post. “More Than 200 Expatriates Have Obtained Permanent 
Residence in Shanghai,” n.d. www.pudongxin.com/11q/e-index.htm (accessed 1 
October 2009). 
 
Xing, Liyu. “Summer Camps in Beijing Invite Overseas Chinese Youth.” Translated 
by Li Jinhui, China News Service, 31 May 2002. 
www.china.org.cn/english/2002/May/33588.htm (accessed 30 August 2006). 
 
Xu, Mingyang. “Thai Chinese Journalists Enhanced Cooperation.” GOCAO website, 
11 June 2004. http://gocn.southcn.com/english/whatson/200406110013.htm 
(accessed 30 August 2006). 
 
Xue, Fei. “Olympic Attitudes Split Amongst Overseas Chinese.” 14 April 2008. 
www.meyul.com/2008/04/13/olympic-attitudes-split-among-overseas-chinese/ 
(accessed 30 April 2008). 
 
Young, Rok Cheong. “Chinese Business Networks and their Implications for South 
Korea.” Insititute for International Economics, n.d. 
www.iie.com/publications/chapters_preview/365/3iie3586.pdf (accessed 1 October 
2009). 
 
Young, Stuart. “Guangdong Winter Camp 2004.” GOCAO website, 24 August 2005. 
http://gocn.southcn.com/english/rootsearching/200508240019.htm (accessed 30 
August 2006). 
 
Zhang, Yingqin. “Huang yiyuan, Huolushi, Wang Xiansheng: qing chuxi 4.27 jihui!” 
(Pansy Wong, Lawyer Huo, Mr Wang: Please Attend the April 27 Rally!). 
nzchinese.net.nz website, n.d. www.nzchinese.net.nz/news.asp?p=561933 
(accessed 30 April 2008). 
 
Zhang, Junsai. “Zhi zaiAo huaren huaqiao he liuxueheng pengyou de yifeng xin” (A 
Letter to Australian Chinese, OC, Foreign Students and Friends). PRC Embassy in 
Australia website, April 24, 2008, http://au.china-
embassy.org/chn/sgjs/sghd/t428847.htm (accessed 30 April 2008). 
 
Zhang, Yu. “Huawen chuanmei luntan bimu: Liu Zepeng yu liyong diyuan youshi 
moushangji” (Chinese Language Media Forum Concludes: Li Zepeng Encourages 
Taking Advantage of Superior Commercial Opportunities). Chinanews website, 23 
September 2006. www.chinanews.com.cn/n/2003-09-23/26/349925.html (accessed 
3 November 2009). 
 
Zhao, Haiyan. “Shoujie shijie huawen chuanmei luntan zai Nanjing bimu” (First 
Chinese Media Forum Concluded in Nanjing). Chinanews.com website, 18 
September 2001. www.fcm.chinanews.com.cn/2001-09-18/2/257.html (accessed 1 
October 2009). 
 
Zhongguo jizhe (China Reporter). “Dui wai xuanchuan baodao youxiaoxing de jiben 
pingjie” (Report on Effectiveness of Overseas Propaganda). n.d. 
http://203.192.6.68/2004/2/2-18.htm (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
 308
Zhongguo jizhe (China Reporter). “Tigao waisuan youxiaoxing de wudian kianyi 
(Five Suggestions for Raising Effective Foreign Propaganda). 2004. 
http://203.192.6.68/2004/2/2-23.htm (accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
Zweig, David and Stanley Rosen. “How China Trained a New Generation Abroad.” 
Scientific and Development Network website, 22 May 2003. 
www.scidev.net/en/features/how-china-trained-a-new-generation-abroad.html 
(accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Speeches/Papers Presented 
 
Anh, Dang Nguyen. “Enhancing the Development Impact of Migrant Remittances and 
Diaspora: The Case of Vietnam.”  Paper presented at the Regional Seminar on the 
Social Implications of International Migration, Bangkok, 24-36 August 2005. 
www.unescap.org/esid/psis/meetings/SIIM/VietNam.pdf (accessed 30 September 
2009). 
 
Anne-Marie Brady, “China’s Propaganda and Perception Management Efforts, Its 
Intelligence Activities that Target the United States, and the Resulting Impact on 
US National Security.” Testimony to the US-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, 30 April 2009. 
www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/written_testimonies/09_04_30_wrts/09_04_
30_brady_statement.pdf (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Brady, Anne-Marie, and John Henderson. “New Zealand, the Pacific and China: The 
Challenges Ahead.” Paper presented at ‘Looking North, Looking South’ 
Conference, School of Political and Social Sciences, University of Canterbury, 
Christchurch, New Zealand, 17-18 June 2008. 
 
Chang, Fu-mei. “Dangqian qiaowu shizheng baogao” (OCAC Current Administrative 
Report of OCAC). Report presented at the Fifth Session of the Fifth Legislative 
Yuan Meeting, 25 February 2004. www.ocac.net/policy/policy01-1_03.asp 
(accessed 6 April 2007). 
 
Chin, Ko-Lin, and Sheldon Zhang. “Transnational Chinese Organised Crime 
Activities.” Paper presented at the Second International Conference on Criminal 
Intellegence Analysts, London, 1-3 March 1999. 
 
de Vienne, Marie-Sybille. “For a Tentative Modelization of the Economic Weight of 
Overseas Chinese at the Beginning of the 3rd Millenium.” Paper presented at the 5th 
Conference of the International Society for the Study of Chinese Overseas, 
University of Copenhagen, 10-14 May 2004. 
 
Gao, Jia. “Transnationality of Settled Migrants and the Evolving Nature of their 
Transnational Lives: A Case Study of the Mainland Chinese Migrants in 
Australia.” Paper presented at the 5th Conference of the International Society for 
the Study of Chinese Overseas, University of Copenhagen, 10-14 May 2004. 
http://www.nias.ku.dk/issco5/documents/GaoJia.doc (accessed 30 September 
2009). 
 309
 
Ip, Manying. “PRC Migrants and Returnees: New Trends in Globalisation.” Paper 
presented at the 5th Conference of the International Society for the Study of 
Chinese Overseas, University of Copenhagen, 10-14 May 2004. 
 
Kwok, Kian-Woon. “The New ‘Global Chinese Community’?” Paper presented at the 
5th World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention, Melbourne, 7 October 1999. 
http://english.wcbn.sg/index.cfm?GPID=26 (accessed 22 September 2009). 
 
Li, Minghuan. “Transformation of Contingency into Meaning: Emergence of a New 
Qiaoxiang in South China.” Paper presented at the CCTR conference “People on 
the Move: The Transnational Flow of Chinese Human Capital at Hong Kong 
University of Science and Technology, 21-22 October 2005. 
http://www.cctr.ust.hk/materials/conference/conference/papers/Li,Minghuan_paper
.pdf (accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
Link, Perry. “The Anaconda in the Chandelier: Chinese Censorship in China Today.” 
Paper presented at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 24 
October 2001. Originally entitled “Scholars Under Seige? Academic and Media 
Freedom in China. www.gov.textonly/txlink.htm (accessed 2 November 2009).   
 
Lu, Weixiong. “Lishi dangjia, wutai zaiwai, neiwai wudong, gongchuang gongying” 
(Directors as Family, Stage is Outside, Work Both Inside and Out, Initiate and 
Prosper Together). Speech presented at the 15th Anniversary of Guangdong 
Overseas Exchange Association, Guangzhou, 23 November 2007. 
 
Madsen, Deborah L. “Performing Community Through the Feminine Body: The 
Beauty Pageant in Transnational Contexts.” Paper presented at the Network Swiss 
Graduate Programme in Gender Studies, University of Zurich, October 2005.  
http://home.adm.unige.ch/~madsen/Zurich_pageants.htm (accessed 2 October 
2009). 
 
Smith, I.C.  Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, 30 April 2009. 
www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/hr09_04_30.php (accessed 1 November 
2009). 
 
Terrill, Ross. “China’s Propaganda and Influence Operations.” Testimony before the 
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 30 April 2009. 
www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/hr09_04_30.php (accessed 1 November 
2009). 
 
Wen, Jiabao. “Win-win Cooperation for Common Development.” Speech presented at 
the Opening of the First Ministerial Conference of the China-Pacific Island 
Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum, Nadi, Fiji, 5 April 
2006. http://english.people.com.cn/200604/05/eng20060405_256110.html 
(accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
Young, Steven. “Politics and Culture.” Paper presented at Victoria University of 
Wellington Stout Research Centre Seminar, 26 March 26, 2003. 
 310
 
Yang, Lin. “The Desert is Now Being Flooded: A Study of the Emergence of 
Chinese-language Media in New Zealand.” Masters thesis, University of 
Canterbury, 2005. 
 
Yao, Linqing. “The Chinese Overseas Students: An Overview of the Flows Change.” 
Paper presented at the 12th Biennial Conference of the Australian Population 
Association, Canberra, 15-17 September, 2004. 
 
Yow, Cheun Hoe. “Detraditionalised and Renewed Qiaoxiang Areas: Case Studies of 
Panyu and Wenzhou in the Reform Period since 1978.” Paper presented at the 5th 
Conference of the International Society of the Study of Chinese Overseas, 
University of Copenhagen, 10-14 May 2004. 
 
Zhuang, Guotu. “The Factor of Chinese Ethnicity in China-ASEAN Relations as 
Mirrored in Investments from Southeast Asia in Fujian.” Paper presented at the 
China and Southeast Asia symposium, Xiamen University, 24-25 September 2004. 
 
Research/Working/Discussion Papers 
 
Barabantseva, Elena. “The Party-State’s Transnational Outreach: Overseas Chinese 
Policies of the PRC’s Central Government.” Greater China Occasional Papers no. 
2, Institute of Chinese and Korean Studies, University of Tuebingen, August 2005. 
www.uni-tuebingen.de/sinologie/sino/gcs/papers/paper2.pdf (accessed 30 
September 2009). 
 
Biao, Xiang. “Promoting Knowledge Exchange Through Diaspora Networks (The 
Case of People’s Republic of China)” Report written for the Asian Development 
Bank, Oxford: ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), March 
2005. www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/GCF/reta6117-prc.pdf (accessed 1 
October 2009). 
 
Callahan, William H. “Diaspora, Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism: Overseas 
Chinese and Neo-Nationalism in China and Thailand.” Southeast Asia Research 
Centre Working Paper Series no. 35, Southeast Asia Research Centre, City 
University of Hong Kong, October 2002. 
www.city.edu.hk/searc/WP35_02_Callahan.pdf  (accessed 14 March 2006). 
 
Cheng, Joseph Y.S., Ngok Kinglun, and Philip Y.K. Cheng. “China’s Overseas 
Chinese Policy in the Globalization Era: Challenges and Responses,” CSEA 
Workshop Papers, n.d. 
www6.cityu.edu.hk/searc/CSEA_Workshop/CSEA_Workshop/PAPERS/Septembe
rSymposium/JosephCheng(Eng_rev).pdf (accessed 30 September 2009).  
 
Chiu, Ann Shu-ju, and Chee Beng Tan. “Old Chinese Overseas Communities and 
New Chinese Migrants on the Internet.” Paper presented at the 5th Conference of 
the International Society for the Study of Chinese Overseas, University of 
Copenhagen, 10-14 May 2004. 
 311
http://192.38.121.218/issco5/documents/ChiuandTan_002.doc (accessed 1 October 
2009). 
 
Chua, Beng Huat. “Gossips About Stars: Newspaper and Pop Culture China.” Asia 
Research Institute Working Paper Series no. 29, Asia Research Institute, National 
University of Singapore, August 2004. 
www.ari.nus.edu.sg/docs/wps/wps04_029.pdf (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Crocombe, Ron. “The Fourth Wave: Chinese in the Pacific Islands in the Twenty-
First Century.” CSCSD Occasional Paper no.1, May 2007. 
 
Diraor, Burcu Mirac. “How to Mobilize the Turkish Diaspora as a Political and 
Economic Actor In the EU Accession Process.” Havard Kennedy School Faculty 
Working Paper, 2009, 
www.hks.harvard.edu/kokkalis/gsw/2009/.../Diraor%20PAPER.pdf (accessed 16 
March 2010). 
 
Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs. “Main Determinants and 
Impacts of Foreign Direct Investments on China’s Economy.” Working Paper on 
International Investment, No. 2000/4, December 2000, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/23/1922648.pdf (accessed 10 April 2010). 
 
Frost, Frank. “Directions in China’s Foreign Relations – Implications for East Asia 
and Australia.” Department of Parliamentary Services Research Brief no. 9, 5 
December 2005. www.aph.goc.au/library/pubs/RB/2005-06/06rb09.pdf (accessed 
28 January 2007). 
 
Hoadley, Steve. “New Zealand and Taiwan: The Policy and Practice of Quasi-
Diplomacy.” Occasional Paper no. 7, New Zealand Institute of International 
Affairs, Wellington, October 1993. 
 
Hugo, Graeme. “Migration and Development: A Perspective from Asia.” IOM 
Migration Research Series, No. 14, International Organisation for Migration, 2003. 
http://www.iom.int/DOCUMENTS/PUBLICATION/EN/mrs_14_2003.pdf 
(accessed 15 January 2007). 
 
Latapi, Agustin Escobar, and Eric Janssen, “Migration, the Diaspora and 
Development: The Case of Mexico.” Discussion paper DP/167/2006, International 
Institute of Labor Studies Discussion Paper, Geneva, 2006. 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/dp16706.pdf (accessed 7 
July 2009). 
 
Li, Minghuan. “Labour Brokerage in China Today: Formal and Informal 
Dimensions.” Duisburg Working Papers on East Asian Studies, no. 58/2004, 
February 2004. www.uni-due.de/in-east/fileadmin/publications/gruen/paper58.pdf 
(accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
Lu, Yu-sun. “Programs of Communist China for Overseas Chinese,” Communist 
China Problem Research Series EC12 (1956). 
 
 312
Schloenhardt, Andreas. “Organised Crime and Migrant Smuggling: Australia and the 
Asia-Pacific.” Australian Institute of Criminology Working Research and Public 
Policy Series, No. 44, 2002. 
http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/9/7/E/%7B97EFC2BE-3D43-4E9B-B9D0-
4AC71800B398%7Drpp44.pdf (accessed 22 May 2010). 
 
Tai, David (NZCA National President). Annual President’s Report 2004, presented at 
the Annual NZCA Conference (19-20 June 2004). 
 
Talcott, Greg. “The Context and Risk of Organised Illegal Immigration to New 
Zealand.” Centre for Strategic Studies Working Paper no. 15/00, Victoria 
University, New Zealand, 2000. 
 
Tracy, Noel. “The Making of a New Little Dragon: The Overseas Chinese and the 
Transformation of Guangdong.” Asia Research Centre Working Paper no. 36, 
Murdoch University, Australia. 
 
Yin, Xiao-huang, and Zhiyong Lan. “Why Do They Give? Change and Continuity in 
Chinese American Transnational Philanthropy Since the 1970s.” Harvard Global 
Equity Initiative website, May 2003. 
http://fas.harvard.edu/~acgei/PDFs/PhilanthropyPDFs/Phil_Why_Do_They_Give.
pdf (accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
Young, Nick, and June Shih. “The Chinese Diaspora and Philanthropy.” Harvard 
Global Equity Initiative website, May 2003. 
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~acgei/PDFs/PhilanthropyPDFs/Phil_Chinese_Diaspor
a.pdf (accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
Zhang, Guotu. “Southeast Asian Research in China: A Historical Review.” ICS 
Working Paper no. 2006-10, University of Malaya, 2006. 
http://ics.um.edu.my/umweb/ics/workingpaper/2006-10.pdf (accessed 30 
September 2009). 
 
Periodicals 
 
“Beijing Uses Overseas Chinese for Political Aims.” The Beijing Informers 36, Issue 
12 (1978): 1-4. 
 
Adler, Emmanuel. “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism and World Politics.” 
European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 3 (1997): 319-363. 
 
Ali, Bessie Ng Kumlin. “Quong Tart and Early Chinese Businesses in Fiji.” Journal 
of Pacific Studies 28, no. 1 (2005). 
 
Anderson, Benedict. “The New World Disorder.” New Left Review (1992). 
 
Appadurai, Arjun. “Patriotism and Its Futures.” Public Culture, no. 5 (1993): 411-429. 
 
 313
Armstrong, John A. “Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas.” American Political 
Science Review 70, no. 2 (June 1976): 393-408. 
 
Barabantseva, Elena. “Trans-nationalising Chineseness: Overseas Chinese Policies of 
the PRC’s Central Government.” ASIEN 96 S. (July 2005): 7-28. 
www.asienkunde.de/articles/Barabantseva96.pdf (accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
Biao, Xiang. “Emigration from China: A Sending Country Perspective.” International 
Migration 41, no.  3 (2003). 
 
Biddick, Thomas V. “Diplomatic Rivalry in the South Pacific: The PRC and Taiwan.” 
Asian Survey 29, no. 8 (1989): 800-815. 
 
Bolt, Paul J. “The New Economic Partnership Between China and Singapore.” Asian 
Affairs: An American Review (1 June 1996). 
 
Bolz, Jennifer. “Chinese Organized Crime and Illegal Alien Trafficking: Humans as a 
Commodity.”Asian Affairs, an American Review (Fall 1995). 
 
Brady, Anne-Marie. “The Beijing Olympics as a Campaign of Mass Distraction.” 
China Quarterly, 197 (March 2009). 
 
Buruma, Ian. “Taiwan’s New Nationalists.” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 4 (July/August 
1996): 77-91. 
 
Callahan, William A. “Nationalism, Civilization and Transnational Relations: The 
Discourse of Greater China.” Journal of Contemporary China 14, no. 43 (May 
2005). 
 
Chan, Anthony B. “Chinese Canada: Reflections on Historical Eras and Watersheds.” 
Polyphony: The Bulletin of the Multicultural Historical Society of Ontario 15 
(2000): 1-12. 
 
Chang, C. Y. “Overseas Chinese in China’s Policy.” China Quarterly 82 (June 1980). 
 
Chang, Maria Hsia. “Greater China and the Chinese “Global Tribe”.” Asian Survey 35, 
no. 10 (October 1995): 955-967. 
 
Chang, Sen-Dou. “The Distribution and Occupation of Overseas Chinese.” 
Geographical Review 58, no. 1 (January 1968). 
 
Chen, Chung, Lawrence Cheng and Yimin Zhang. “The Role of Foreign Direct 
Investment in China’s Post-1978 Economic Development.” World Development, 
23, no. 4 (1995): 691-703. 
 
Chen, David. “All Chinese Should Help ROC.” Taiwan Journal 18 August 1988. 
http://taiwanjournal.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=4189&CtNode=122 (accessed 30 
August 2006). 
 
 314
Chen, Zhimin. “Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy.” Journal 
of Contemporary China 14, no. 42 (February 2005): 35-53. 
 
Cheung, Gordon C. K. “Involuntary Migrants, Political Revolutionaries and 
Economic Energisers: A History of the Image of Overseas Chinese in Southeast 
Asia.” Journal of Contemporary China 14, no. 42 (February 2005). 
 
Chin, James K. “Reducing Irregular Migration from China.” International Migration 
41, no. 3 (2003). 
 
Chiu, Hungdah. “China’s Legal Position on Protecting Chinese Residents in 
Vietnam.” American Journal of International Law 74, no. 3 (July 1980): 685-689. 
 
Choe, Hyun. “National Identity and Citizenship in the People’s Republic of China and 
the Republic of Korea.” Journal of Historical Sociology 19, no. 1 (March 2006). 
 
Chun, Allen. “Fuck Chineseness: On the Ambiguities of Ethnicity as Culture as 
Identity.” boundary 2 23, no. 2 (Summer 1996). 
 
Cordua-von Specht, Franka. “Chinese Students Fear Spies.” Ubyssey 8, no. 1 (5 July 
1989): 1,  
http://www.library.ubc.ca/archives/pdfs/ubyssey/UBYSSEY_1989_07_05.pdf, 
(accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
_____. “Discourse on the China Crisis: Three Perspectives.” Ubyssey 8, no. 1 (5 July 
1989): 5,  
http://www.library.ubc.ca/archives/pdfs/ubyssey/UBYSSEY_1989_07_05.pdf, 
(accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
Crissman, Lawrence W. “The Segmentary Structure of Urban Overseas Chinese 
Communities.” Man 2 (New Series, 1967): 185-204. 
 
Deng, Shichao. “Zhongguo-dongmeng ziyou maoyi qu dui dongnanya huaren 
zhengzhi de yingxiang shixi” (Preliminary Analysis of the Impact of the China-
ASEAN Free Trade Area on the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia). Dongya 
yanjiu (Southeast Asian Studies), no. 3 (2003): 64-68.  
 
Der-Karabetian, Aghop. “Relation of Two Cultural Identities of Armenian-
Americans.” Psychological Reports 47 (1980): 123-128. 
 
Dittmer, Lowell. “Taiwan as a Factor in China’s Quest for National Identity.” Journal 
of Contemporary China 15, no. 49 (November 2006): 671-686. 
 
Dorill, William F. “The Fukien Rebellion and the CCP: A Case of Maoist 
Revisionism.” China Quarterly, no. 37 (January-March 1969). 
 
Eng, Ien. “The Differential Politics of Chineseness.” Southeast Asian Journal of 
Social Science 22 (1994): 72-79. 
 
 315
Fu, Tengxiao. “Yimin wenhua yu wenhua xiandaihua” (Migrant Culture and Cultral 
Modernization). Journal of Shenzhen University (Humanities and Sciences), no. 5 
(2003). 
 
Guo, Gang. “Party Recruitment of College Students in China.” Journal of 
Contemporary China 14, no. 43 (May 2005): 371-393. 
 
Glick Schiller, Nina, and Georges Fouron. “Terrains of Blood and Nation: Haitian 
Transnational Social Fields.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 22, no. 2 (1999): 340-366. 
 
Godley, Michael R. “Reflections on China’s Changing Overseas Chinese Policy.” 
Solidarity, no. 123 (July/September 1989): 108-112. 
 
_____. “The Sojourners: Returned Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of 
China.” Pacific Affairs 62, no. 3 (Autumn 1989): 330-352. 
 
Goodman, David S. G. “Are Asia’s ‘Ethnic Chinese’ a Regional-Security Threat?” 
Survival 39, Issue 4 (Winter 1997/1998): 140-156. 
 
Greene, Katrine R. C. “Repatriating China’s Expatriates.” Far Eastern Survey 17, no. 
4 (25 February 1948): 44-47. 
 
Greif, Stuart W. “Political Attitudes of the Overseas Chinese in Fiji.” Asian Survey 15, 
no. 11 (November 1975). 
 
Hamilton, Gary. “Competition and Organization: A Reexamination of Chinese 
Business Practices.” Journal of Asian Business 12, no. 1 (1996). 
 
Harding, Harry. “The Concept of ‘Greater China’: Themes, Variation, and 
Reservation.” China Quarterly, no. 136 (December 1993). 
 
Harrison, Selig S. “Taiwan After Chiang Ching-kuo.” Foreign Affairs 66, no. 4 
(Spring 1988). 
 
He, Li. “Returned Students and Political Change in China.” Asian Perspective 30, no. 
2 (2006): 5-29. 
 
Holslag, Jonathan. “China’s Diplomatic Manoeuvering on the Question of Dafur.” 
Journal of Contemporary China 17, no. 54 (February 2008): 71-84. 
 
Hou, Wenrou. “China’s International Migration Policy.” Asia and Pacific Migration 
Journal 10, no. 3-4 (2001). 
 
Hughes, Christopher. “Nationalism and Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: 
Implications for Southeast Asia.” Pacific Review 18, no. 1 (2005): 119-135. 
 
Ichikawa, Tetsu. “Chinese in Papua New Guinea: Strategic Practices in Sojourning.” 
Journal of Chinese Overseas 2, no. 1 (May 2006): 111-132. 
 
 316
Johnston, Alastair Iain. “Learning versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese 
Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s.” China Journal, no. 35 (January 
1996): 27-62. 
 
Kang, Zhengguo. “Arrested in China.” Translated by Perry Link. New York Review of 
Books 48, no. 14, 20 September 2001. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14501 
(accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
Kao, John. “The Worldwide Web of Chinese Business.” Harvard Business Review 
(March-April 1993): 24-36. 
 
Kim, Kwang-yong. “The Greater Chinese Economic Area and East Asia.” Institute of 
East Asian Studies 11, no. 1 (Spring 1999). 
http://www.ieas.or.kr/vol11_1/kimkwangyong.htm (accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
King, Charles, and Neil J. Melvin. “Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign 
Policy, and Security in Eurasia.” International Security 24, no. 3 (Winter 1999-
2000): 108-138. 
 
Kurlantzick, Joshua. “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power.” Policy 
Brief, Issue 47 (June 2006). www.carnegieendowment.org/files/P13-
47_FINAL.pdf (accessed 6 April 2007).  
 
Lawler, Edward J., George A. Youngs Jr., and Michael D. Lesh. “Co-optation and 
Coalition Mobilization.” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 8, no. 3 (1978): 
199-214. 
 
Lee, Ann. “How the Chinese Government Came to Dominate Chinese Language 
Media in the United States.” Chinascope (June 2005). 
 
Lee, Jeanyoung. “China’s Policy Towards the Overseas Chinese: From Exclusion and 
Exploitation to Network Making.” Hyonsang Kwa Insik 29 (2005): 54-76. 
 
Leung, Beatrice. “China and Falun Gong: Party and Society Relations in the Modern 
Era.” Journal of Contemporary China 11, no. 33 (2002): 761-784. 
 
Li, Haifeng. “Yongqing yongxin yongli zuohao qiaowu gongzuo” (Use Kindness, Use 
Heart, Use Strength to Achieve OC Work). Qiaowu gongzuo yanjiu, no. 2 (2008). 
http://qwgzyj.gov.cn/bqch/141/1095.shtml (accessed 2 May 2009). 
 
Li, Minghuan. “Brokering Migration from Southern China.” IIAS Newsletter, no. 42 
(Autumn 2006): 12-13. www.iias.nl/nl/42/IIAS_NL42_1213.pdf (accessed 1 
October 2009). 
 
Lin, Lin, “Jianchi yi qiao wei ben, nuli goujian hexie qiaowu” (Uphold Overseas 
Chinese as the Priority, Diligently Build Harmonious Overseas Chinese Relations). 
Qiaowu gongzuo yanjiu, no. 6 (2006): 5. 
 
 317
_____. “Nuli cujin yu haiwai qiaobao guanxi de hexie”  (Endeavour to Accelerate 
Harmonious Relations with OC). Qiaowu gongzuo yanjiu, no. 3 (2008). 
http://qwgzyj.gov.cn/bqch/142/1149.shtml (accessed 23 May 2009). 
 
Lin, Man-Houng. “Overseas Chinese Merchants and Multiple Nationality: A Means 
for Reducing Commercial Risk (1895-1935)” Modern Asian Studies 35, no. 4 
(2001): 985-1009. 
 
Liu, Hong. “New Migrants and the Revival of Overseas Chinese Nationalism.” 
Journal of Contemporary China 14, no.43 (May 2005): 291-316. 
 
_____. “Old Linkages, New Networks: The Globalisation of Overseas Chinese 
Voluntary Associations and Its Implications.” China Quarterly 155 (1998): 582-
609. 
 
Louie, Andrea. “Re-territorializing Transnationalism: Chinese Americans and the 
Chinese Motherland.” American Ethnologist 27, no. 3 (2000): 645-669. 
 
_____. “When You Are Related to the “Other”: (Re)locating the Chinese Homeland 
in Asian American Politics Through Cultural Tourism.” Positions 11, no. 3 
(Winter 2003): 735-763. 
 
Low, Linda. “The Overseas Chinese Connection: An ASEAN Perspective.” Southeast 
Asian Journal of Social Science 23, no. 2 (1995). 
 
Lu, Weixiong and Zheng Jianmin. “‘Yuanqiao’ shijian shi shei re de huo” (Who is the 
Unfortunate Victim of Anti-Chinese Incidents?). Qiaowu gongzuo yanjiu, no. 2 
(2007). 
 
Mansingh, Surjit. “Beijing and the Overseas Chinese.” China Report 27, no. 4 (1991). 
 
Mei, Duzhe. “How China’s Government is Attempting to Control Chinese Media in 
America.” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 1 Issue 10 (November 21, 2001). 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5
D=28481&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=191&no_cache=1 (accessed 1 October 
2009). 
 
Moravcsik, Andrew. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of 
International Politics.” International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 513-553. 
 
Nathan, Andrew J. “Authoritarian Resilience.” Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 
(January 2003): 6-17. 
 
Nyiri, Pal. “Expatriating is Patriotic? The New Discourse on ‘New’ Migrants in the 
People’s Republic of China and Identity Construction Among Recent Migrants 
from the PRC.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 27, no. 4 (October 2001): 
635-653. 
 
 318
_____. “Global Modernisers or Local Subalterns? Parallel Perceptions of Chinese 
Transnationals in Hungary.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31, no. 4. 
(July 2005): 659-674. 
 
_____. “The Yellow Man's Burden: Chinese Migrants on a Civilizing Mission.” 
China Journal, Issue 56 (July 2006): 83-106. 
http://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=268668219785151;res=IELH
SS (accessed 30 September 2009). 
 
Ogden, Chris. “Diaspora Meets IR’s Constructivism: An Appraisal.” Politics 28, no. 1 
(2008): 1-10. 
 
Peterson, Glen D. “Socialist China and the Huaqiao: The Transition to Socialism in 
the Overseas Chinese Areas of Rural Guangdong.” Modern China 14, no. 3 (July 
1988): 309-335. 
 
Pieke, Frank N. “Four Models of China’s Overseas Chinese Policies.” China 
Information 2, no. 1 (Summer 1987): 8-16. 
 
Porteous, Holly. “Beijing’s United Front Strategy in Hong Kong.” Commentary, no. 
72 (1998). http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/cmmntr/cm72-eng.asp (accessed 30 
September 2009). 
 
Portyakov, Vladimir. “Russian Vector in the Global Chinese Migration.”  Far Eastern 
Affairs 34, Issue 1 (Jan-March 2006): 47-62. 
 
Purcell, Victor. “Overseas Chinese and the People’s Republic.” Far Eastern Survey 
19, no.8 (October 25, 1950): 194-196. 
 
Rosenthal, D.A. “Intergenerational Conflict and Culture: A Study of Immigrant and 
Non-Immigrant Adolescents and Their Parents.” Genetic Psychology Monographs 
109 (1984): 53-75. 
 
Ruggie, John Gerard. “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in 
International Relations.” International Organization 47, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 139-
174. 
 
Santoli, Al. “Extensive Chinese Espionage Operation in U.S. Detailed.” China 
Reform Monitor, no. 181 (23 March 1999). www.afpc.org/crm/crm181.shtml 
(accessed 24 May 2006). 
 
Schwalje, Nancy L. review of Lords of the Rim: The Invisible Empire of the Overseas 
Chinese, by Sterling Seagrave. Journal of International Affairs (Winter 1996): 
633-638. 
 
Shain, Yossi, and Aharon Barth. “Diaporas and International Relations Theory.” 
International Organization 57, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 449-479. 
 
 319
Shain, Yossi, and Martin Sherman.  “Dynamics of Disintegration: Diaspora, 
Seccession and the Paradox of Nation-States.” Nations and Nationalism 4, no. 3 
(1998): 321-346.  
 
Shambaugh, David. “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order.” 
International Security 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004/05). 
 
_____. “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Process and Efficacy.” The China 
Journal, no. 57 (January 2007): 25-58. 
 
_____. “China’s “Quiet Diplomacy”: The International Department of the Chinese 
Communist Party,” China: An International Journal 5, no. 1 (March 2007): 26-54. 
 
_____. “Introduction: The Emergence of ‘Greater China’.” China Quarterly, no. 136 
(December 1993). 
 
Skilling, H. Gordon. “Interest Groups and Communist Politics.” World Politics 18, no. 
3 (April 1966): 435-451. 
 
Skinner, G. William “Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia.” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 321 (January 1959): 136-147. 
 
Song, Yann-Huei. “Declarations and Statements with respect to the 1982 UNCLOS: 
Potential Disputes Between the United States and China After US Ascension to the 
Convention.” Ocean Development and International Law 36 (2005): 261-289. 
www.southchinasea.org/docs/Song,%20UNCLOS,%20US,%20&%20China.pdf 
(accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Steiner, Arthur H. "Current 'Mass Line' Tactics in Communist China." The American 
Political Science Review, 45, no. 2 (June 1951): 422-436. 
 
Tang, Lay Lee. “Stateless Persons and the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action Part 1: 
Chinese Nationality and the Republic of China (Taiwan).” International Journal of 
Refugee Law 1, no. 2 (1995). 
 
Thompson, Drew. “Tsunami Relief Reflects China’s Regional Aspirations.” 
Jamestown Foundation Brief 5, Issue 2. 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3708 
(accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
Thompson, Fred. “The China Connection.” National Review 50, Issue 11, 22 June 
1998. 
 
Thomson, Janice. “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap 
Between Theory and Empirical Research.” International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 
2 (June 1995): 213-233. 
 
Thuno, Mette. “Reaching Out and Incorporating Chinese Overseas: The Trans-
Territorial Scope of the PRC by the End of the 20th Century.” China Quarterly 168 
(2001): 910-929. 
 320
 
Tseng, Yen-Fen. “From “Us” to “Them”: Diasporic Linkages and Identity Politics.” 
Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 9 (2002): 383-404. 
 
Tu, Wei-ming. “Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center.” Daedalus 120, no. 2 
(Spring 1991): 1-32. 
 
Wang, Caibai, Wong Siu-Lun, and Sun Wenbin. “Haigui: A New Area in China’s 
Policy Toward the Chinese Diaspora?” Journal of Chinese Overseas 2, no. 2 
(November 2006). 
 
Wang, Gungwu. “China and the Region in Relation to Chinese Minorities.” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 1, no. 1 (May 1979). 
 
_____. “External China as a New Policy Area.” Pacific Affairs 58, no.1 (1985): 28-43. 
 
_____. “Greater China and the Chinese Overseas.” China Quarterly 136 (1993): 937-
938. 
 
_____. “South China Perspectives on Overseas Chinese.” Australian Journal of 
Chinese Affairs, no. 3 (January 1985): 69-84. 
 
Wang, L. Ling-chi. “Double Trouble in Dual Citizenship.” Huaren E-Magazine, Issue 
8 (May 2005): 10-14. 
 
_____. “Race, Class, Citizenship and Extraterritoriality: Asian Americans and the 
1996 Campaign Finance Scandal.” Amerasia 24, no. 1 (1998): 1-21. 
 
_____. “The Structure of Dual Domination: Toward a Paradigm for the Study of the 
Chinese Diaspora in the United States.” Amerasia 21, no. 1 & 2 (1995). 
 
Wang, Yuting, and Fenggang Yang. “More Than Evangelical and Ethnic: The 
Ecological Factor in Chinese Conversion to Christianity in the United States.” 
Sociology of Religion 67, no. 2 (2006): 179-192. 
 
Weiner, Myron. “On International Migration and International Relations.” Population 
and Development Review 11, no. 3 (September 1985): 441-455. 
 
Windybank, Susan. “The China Syndrome.” Policy (Winter 2005). 
www.cis.org.au/Policy/winter05/polwin05-5.htm (accessed 2 October 2009).  
 
Wu, Ellen D. “America’s Chinese: Anti-Communism, Citizenship, and Cultural 
Diplomacy During the Cold War.” Pacific Historical Review 77, no. 3 (2008): 391-
422. 
 
_____. “Chinese American Transnationalism Aboard the Love Boat: The Overseas 
Chinese Youth Language Training and Study Tour to the Republic of China.” 
Chinese America: History and Perspectives (Annual 2005): 51-65. 
 
 321
Wu, Guoguang. “Identity, Sovereignty, and Economic Penetration: Beijing’s 
Responses to Offshore Chinese Democracies.” Journal of Contemporary China 16, 
no. 51 (May 2007): 295-313. 
 
Wuthnow, Joel. “The Integration of Cooptation and Coercion: China’s Taiwan 
Strategy Since 2001.” East Asia 23, no.3 (Fall 2006): 22-45. 
 
Xi, Cheng. “Gaige kaifang yilai Zhongguo zhengfu xuantai liuxuesheng de zhengce 
yange (The Evolution of Chinese Government’s Policies on Selecting and Sending 
Students Abroad Since China’s Opening to the World)” Huaqiao huaren shi yanjiu 
(Overseas Chinese History Studies) 1 (1999). 
 
_____. “Guanyu muqian huaqiao huaren yanjiu ruogan wenti de guancha yu sikao” 
(Observations and Reflections on Current Issues Related to Overseas Chinese 
Studies). Huaqiao huaren lishi yanjiu (Overseas Chinese History Studies), no. 4, 
(2002): 1-6. 
 
_____. “Liuxuesheng de zhiliu yu Zhongguo zhengfu de duice” (PRC Students 
Remaining Abroad and the PRC Government Response). Huaqiao huaren lishi 
yanjiu (Overseas Chinese History Studies), no. 2 (1999): 63-76. 
 
Ya, Ming. “Hongyang Aoyun jingshen huhuan shijie heping” (Enhance the Olympic 
Spirit, Call Out for World Peace). Qiaowu gongzuo yanjiu, no. 3, 2008. 
http://qwgzyj.gov.cn/aypd/142/1137.shtml (accessed 7 June 2009). 
 
Yamaguchi, Masaki. “The Emerging Chinese Business Sphere.” Nomura Asian 
Perspectives 11, no. 2 (July 1993). 
 
Zhang, Yongjin. “China and the Emerging Regional Order in the South Pacific.” 
Australia Journal of International Affairs 61, no. 3 (September 2007): 367-381. 
 
Zhao, Shuisheng. “A State-led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in 
Post-Tiananmen China.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31, no. 3 (1998): 
287-302. 
 
Zhu, PingPing Lincoln. “Towards a Theory on Sino-Southeast Asian Relations.”  
NUCB Journal of Language, Culture and Communication 7, no. 2 (2005): 55-67. 
 
Zhuang, Guotu. “1978 nian yilai Zhongguo zhengfu dui huaqiao huaren taidu he 
zhengce de bianhua” (Changes in PRC Government Attitudes and Policies 
Towards Overseas Chinese and Ethnic Chinese Since 1978). Nanyang wenti yanjiu 
(Research on Nanyang Issues) 103, no. 3 (2000). 
 
Zhuang, Guotu. “China’s Relations with Ethnic Chinese Entrepreneurs in Southeast 
Asia: A Research Agenda.” NIASnytt, no. 3 (September 2004). 
 
_____. “Trends of Overseas Chinese Business Network in East Asia: As Mirrored 
from Overseas Chinese Investment in Mainland China Since 1978.”  Ritsumeikan 
International Affairs 4 (2006): 1-23. 
 
 322
Zweig, David. “Competing for Talent: China’s Strategies to Reverse the Brain Drain.” 
International Labour Review 145, no. 1-2 (Spring-Summer 2006): 65-90. 
 
Zweig, David, Chen Changgui, and Stanley Rosen. “Globalization and Transnational 
Human Capital: Overseas and Returnee Scholars to China.” China Quarterly, 170 
(2004). 
 
Books 
 
Bixu zhongshi qiaowu gongzuo (We Must Pay Attention to Overseas Chinese Work). 
Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1978. 
 
Life and Life Styles (China Handbook Series). Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 
1985. 
 
Qiaowu Weiyuanhui (Overseas Chinese Affair Commission). Qiaosheng fudao 
shouce (Overseas Chinese Students Instruction Manual). Taipei: Qiaosheng 
fudaoshi, 1985. 
 
Qiaowu changyong falu fagui xuanbian (Selection of Commonly Used Overseas 
Chinese Laws and Regulations). Beijing: Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 2004. 
 
Qiaowu gongzuo gailun (Outline of Overseas Chinese Work). Beijing: Guowuyuan 
qiaoban qiaowu ganbu xuexiao, October 1993. 
 
Qiaowu zhengce wenda (Questions and Answers Regarding Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Policy). Xiamen: Fujian qiaofangbao, 1983. 
 
Qiaowu zhengce wenji (Collection of OC Policy). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1957. 
 
Republic of China/Taiwan Yearbook.  Taipei: Government Information Office, 1993, 
1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004. www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook, 
www.roc-taiwan.org/taiwan/5-gp/yearbook/2002/chpt09-5.htm#22 (accessed 6 
April 2007). 
 
The Good Youths of Chung Hua. Taipei: Overseas Chinese News Agency, 1973. 
 
Alexander, Garth. Silent Invasion: The Chinese in Southeast Asia. London: 
MacDonald & Company (Publishers) Ltd, 1973. 
 
Allison, Graham. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1971. 
 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983. 
 
_____. Long-Distance Nationalism: World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity 
Politics. Amsterdam: Centre for Asian Studies, 1992. 
 
 323
_____. Spectres of Comparison: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World. London: 
Verso, 1998. 
 
Appadurai, Arjun. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Modernity. London 
and Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996. 
 
Barnett, Doak A. Communist China: The Early Years 1949-1955. London: Pall Mall 
Press, 1964. 
 
Barth, Fredrik, ed. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of 
Cultural Difference. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969. 
 
Basch, Linda, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc. Nations Unbound: 
Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-
States. Langhorne: Gordon and Breach, 1993. 
 
Benton, Gregor. Chinese Migrants and Internationalism: Forgotten Histories, 1917-
1945. Oxon, London: Routledge, 2007. 
 
Bertelsen, J. Non State Nations in International Politics: Comparitive System Analysis. 
New York: Praeger, 1980. 
 
Bolt, Paul J. China and Southeast Asia’s Ethnic Chinese: State and Diaspora in 
Contemporary Asia. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2000. 
 
Boulding, Kenneth D. Conflict and Defense. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 
 
Brady, Anne-Marie. Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the 
People’s Republic. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 
 
_____. Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary 
China. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008. 
 
_____. “The War That Never Was, or, New Zealand-China Relations in the Cold War 
Era.” In Lenin’s Legacy Down Under: New Zealand and the New Cold War 
History, edited by Aaron Fox and Alex Trapeznik. Dunedin: University of Otago 
Press, 2003. 
 
Brady, Anne-Marie, and John Henderson. “New Zealand, the Pacific and China: The 
Challenges Ahead.” In Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the 
South Pacific, edited by Anne-Marie Brady.  Singapore: World Scientific, 
(forthcoming) 2010. 
 
Brinkerhoff, Jennifer M. “Diaspora Mobilization Factors and Policy Options.” In 
Converting Migration Drains in to Gains: Harnessing the Resources of Overseas 
Professionals. Draft manuscript. Asia Development Bank, Manila, 2006. 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Events/2006/Knowledge-Exchange-
Workshop/Diaspora-Draft.pdf (accessed 2 October 2009). 
 
 324
Brugger, Bill. China, Liberation and Transformation, 1942-1962. Lanham: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 1981. 
 
Chan, Ngor Chong. “PRC Policy on the Overseas Chinese.” In ASEAN and China: An 
Evolving Relationship, edited by Joyce K. Kallgren, Noordin Sopiee, and Soedjati 
Djiwandono. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Affairs, University of 
California,1988. 
 
Chang, Fu-mei. Introduction to Spring Hope: 2005 Lunar New Year Goodwill 
Mission of Taiwan, Oceania Group Program. Taipei: Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Commission, 2005. 
 
Chantavanish, Supang. “From Siamese-Chinese to Chinese-Thai: Political Conditions 
and Identity Shifts Among the Chinese in Thailand.” In Ethnic Chinese as 
Southeast Asians, edited by Leo Suryadinata. Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1997. 
 
Chen, Jie. Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan: Pragmatic Diplomacy in Southeast 
Asia. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2002. 
 
Chen, Xitong. Report and Checking the Turmoil and Quelling the Counter-
Revolutionary Rebellion. Beijing: New Star Publishers, 1989. 
 
Chen, Youzheng, ed. Gongmin shouce (Citizens’ Handbook). Beijing: Huayi 
chubanshe, 1988. 
 
Cheng, Tuan Y. “The ROC’s Changing Role in the Asia-Pacific Region.” In Taiwan 
in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s, edited by Gary Klintworth. St. Leonards: Allen & 
Unwin in association with Dept. of International Relations, Australian National 
University, 1994. 
 
Cheung, Peter T. Y. and James T. H. Tang. “The External Relations of China’s 
Provinces.” In The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of 
Reform, edited by David M. Lampton, 91-120. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2001. 
 
Chin, James K. “Gold from the Lands Afar: New Fujianese Emigration Revisited.” In 
Globalizing Chinese Migration: Trends in Europe and Asia, edited by Pal Nyiri 
and Igor Saveliev, 242-253. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2002. 
 
Chin, Ko-lin. Smuggled Chinese: Clandestine Immigration to the United States. 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999. 
 
_____. “The Social Organization of Chinese Human Smuggling.” In Global Human 
Smuggling: Comparitive Perspectives, edited by David Kyle and Rey Koslowski. 
Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2001. 
 
Chiu, Hungdah, and Wang Ke-wen. “Diaoyutai Controversy.” In Modern China: An 
Encyclopaedia of History, Culture and Nationalism. London: Taylor & Francis, 
1998. 
 325
 
Choi, C. Y. Chinese Migration and Settlement in Australia. Sydney: Sydney 
University Press, 1975. 
 
Christiansen, Flemming. Chinatown, Europe: An Exploration of Overseas Chinese 
Identity in the 1990s. New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 
 
_____. “Chinese Identity in Europe.” In The Chinese in Europe, edited by Gregor 
Benton and Frank Pieke. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998. 
 
Christiansen, Flemming, and Shirin Rai. Chinese Politics and Society: An 
Introduction. London: Prentice Hall, 1996. 
 
Cohen, Robin. Global Diasporas: An Introduction. London: UCL Press Ltd., 1997. 
 
Crocombe, Ron. The South Pacific. Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, University of 
South Pacific, 2001. 
 
Dahrendorf, R. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1959. 
 
de Bary Brett, and Victor Nee. “The Kuomintang in Chinatown.” In Counterpoint: 
Perspectives on Asian America, edited by Emma Gee. Los Angeles: Asian 
American Studies Center, 1976. 
 
Dikotter, Frank. “Race in China.” In China Inside Out: Contemporary Chinese 
Nationalism and Transnationalism, edited by Pal Nyiri and Joanna Breidenbach, 
177-204. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2005.  
 
_____. The Discourse of Race in Modern China. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press, 1992. 
 
Ding, Sheng.  The Dragon’s Hidden Wings: How China Rises with Its Soft Power. 
Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008. 
 
Drury, Beatrice. “Ethnic Mobilization: Some Theoretical Considerations.” In Ethnic 
Mobilization in a Multi-Cultural Europe, edited by John Rex and Beatrice Drury, 
13-22. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1994. 
 
Edelman, Murray. Political Language: Words That Succeed and Policies That Fail. 
New York: Academic Press, 1977. 
 
Edwards, Penny. “Time Travels: Locating xinyimin in Sino-Cambodian Histories.” In 
Globalizing Chinese Migration: Trends in Europe and Asia, edited by Pal Nyiri 
and Igor Saveliev, 254-289. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2002. 
 
Eftimiades, Nicholas. Chinese Intelligence Operations. Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 1994. 
 
 326
Elazar, Daniel J. “The Jewish People as the Classic Diaspora: A Political Analysis.” 
In Modern Diasporas in International Politics, edited by Gabriel Sheffer, 212-257. 
Kent: Croom Helm Ltd., 1986. 
 
Elazar, Daniel J., and Alysa Dortort, eds. Understanding the Jewish Agency. 
Jerusalem and Philadelphia: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 1986. 
 
Elegant, Robert S. The Dragons’ Seed: Beijing and the Overseas Chinese. New York: 
St Martin’s Press, 1959. 
 
Eriksen, Thomas. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives. London: 
Pluto Press, 1993. 
 
Esman, Milton. “Diasporas and International Relations.” In Modern Diasporas in 
International Politics, edited by Gabriel Sheffer, 335-226. Kent: Croom Helm Ltd., 
1986. 
 
_____. Diasporas in the Contemporary World. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009. 
 
_____. Ethnic Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994. 
 
_____. “The Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia.” In Modern Diasporas in 
International Politics, edited by Gabriel Sheffer, 130-163. Kent: Croom Helm Ltd., 
1986. 
 
Fairclough, Norman. Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language. 
Harlow: Longman Group Limited, 1995. 
 
Faist, Thomas. The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and 
Transnational Social Spaces. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
 
Ferdinand, Peter. “Interest Groups and Chinese Politics.” In Groups and Politics in 
the People’s Republic of China, edited by David Goodman, 10-23. Cardiff: 
University College Cardiff Press, 1984. 
 
Fijalkowski, Jurgen. “Conditions of Ethnic Mobilization: The German Case.” In 
Ethnic Mobilisation in a Multi-Cultural Europe, edited by John Rex and Beatrice 
Drury, 123-134. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1994. 
 
Fitzgerald, Charles P. The Third China: The Chinese Communities in South-East Asia. 
Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs Ltd. for the Australian Institute of 
International Affairs, 1965. 
 
Fitzgerald, Stephen. China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Beijing's Changing 
Policy, 1949-1970. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. 
 
Fong, Ng Bickleen. The Chinese in New Zealand. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press, 1959. 
 
 327
Fowler, Josephine. Japanese and Chinese Immigrant Activists: Organizing in 
American and International Communist Movements, 1919-1933. Piscataway: 
Rutgers University Press, 2007. 
 
Friedrich, Carl J., and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1956. 
 
Friman, H. Richard. “Evading the Divine Wind Through the Side Door: The 
Transformation of Chinese Migration to Japan.” In Globalizing Chinese Migration: 
Trends in Europe and Asia, edited by Pal Nyiri and Igor Savaliev, 9-33. Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2002. 
 
Fukuda, Shozo, and George Hicks. With Sweat & Abacus: Economic Roles of 
Southeast Asian Chinese on the Eve of World War II. Singapore: Select Books, 
1995. 
 
Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Maxwell 
Macmillan International, 1992. 
 
Gamson, W. A. Power and Discontent. Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1968. 
 
Garson, David. Group Theories of Politics. London: Sage, 1978. 
 
Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1983. 
 
Goodman, David, ed. Groups and Politics in the People’s Republic of China. Cardiff: 
University College Cardiff Press, 1984. 
 
Gramsci, A. Selections from Prison Notebooks.  Edited and translated by Q. Hoare 
and G. Nowell Smith. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971. 
 
Groot, Gerry. Managing Transitions: The Chinese Communist Party, United Front 
Work, Corporatism, and Hegemony. New York: Routledge, 2004. 
 
Gu, Xiling, ed. Qiao, Tai, minzu, zongjiao zhengce wenda (Questions and Answers 
Regarding Overseas Chinese, Taiwan, Ethnic and Religious Policy). Shanghai: 
Shanghai Jiaotong University Press, 1996. 
 
Guangzhou guiguo huaqiao lianyihui. Guiqiao shouce (Handbook for Returned OC). 
Guangzhou: Guangzhou guiguo huaqiao lianyihui, 1955. 
 
Helicke, James. “Turks in Germany: Muslim Identity “Between” States.” In Muslim 
Minorities in the West: Visible and Invisible, edited by Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad 
and Jane I. Smith, 175-191. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2002. 
 
Hinton, Harold C. Communist China in World Politics. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1966. 
 
 328
Hoon, Chang-yau. “A Hundred Flowers Bloom: The Re-emergence of the Chinese 
Press in Post-Suharto Indonesia.” In Media and the Chinese Diaspora, edited by 
Wanning Sun. New York: Routledge, 2006. 
 
Hsia, Tao-Tai. Peking’s Policy Toward the Dual Nationality of the Overseas Chinese. 
Washington D. C.: Library of Congress, 1976. 
 
Hughes, Christopher. Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status 
in International Society. London; New York: Routledge, 1997. 
 
Huntingdon, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1968. 
 
Huo, Zhongwen, and Wang Zongxiao. Guofang keji qingbaoyuan ji huoqu jishu 
(Sources and Techniques of Obtaining National Defense Science and Technology 
Intelligence). Beijing: Kexue jishu wenxuan chubanshe, 1991. English translation 
available www.fas.org/irp/world/china/docs/sources.html (accessed 30 September 
2009). 
 
Ip, Manying. “Chinese Media in New Zealand.” In Media and the Chinese Diaspora, 
edited by Wanning Sun. New York: Routledge, 2006. 
 
_____. “Immigrants and Transnationals in New Zealand: A Fortress Opened.” In The 
Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility, and Identity, edited by Laurence J.C. 
Ma and Carolyn Cartier. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 
 
_____. Unfolding History, Evolving Identity: The Chinese in New Zealand. Auckland: 
Auckland University Press, 2003. 
 
Jia, Gao. “Radio-activated Business and Power: A Case Study of 3CW Melbourne 
Chinese Radio.” In Media and the Chinese Diaspora, edited by Wanning Sun. 
New York: Routledge, 2006. 
 
Jia, Qingguo. “Disrespect and Distrust: The External Origins of Contemporary 
Chinese Nationalism.” Journal of Contemporary China 14, no. 42 (February 2005): 
11-21. 
 
Jiang, Shujuan, ed. Huaqiao huaren baike quanshu-falu tiaoli zhengce juan 
(Encyclopedia of Chinese Overseas: Volume of Laws, Regulations and Policies). 
Beijing: Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 2000. 
 
Johnston, Alastair Iain and Robert S. Ross. New Directions in the Study of China’s 
Foreign Policy. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006. 
 
Keohane, Robert, and Joseph Nye. Power and Interdependence. Boston: Scott, 
Foresman and Company, 1989. 
 
_____. Transnational Relations and World Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1972. 
 
 329
Kerr, Pauline, Stuart Harris and Qin Yaqing. “Tactical or Fundamental Change?” In 
China’s ‘New’ Diplomacy: Tactical or Fundamental Change? Edited by Pauline 
Kerr, Stuart Harris and Qin Yaqing, 229-245. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008. 
 
Kuhn, Philip. Chinese Among Others: Emigration in Modern Times. Singapore: 
National University of Singapore Press, 2008. 
 
Kurlantzick, Joshua. Charm Offensive. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2007. 
 
Kwong, Peter. Forbidden Workers: Illegal Chinese Immigrants and American Labor. 
New York: New Press, 1997. 
 
Laclau, E., and C. Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics. Translated by W. Moore and P. Cammack. London: Verso, 
1985. 
 
Lai, Him Mark. “China Politics and the U.S. Chinese Communities.” In Counterpoint: 
Perspectives on Asian America, edited by Emma Gee, 152-159. Los Angeles: 
Asian American Studies Center, 1976. 
 
_____. “Organizations Among Chinese in America Since the Second World War.” In 
The Chinese Diaspora: Selected Essays Volume 1, edited by Wang Ling-chi and 
Wang Gungwu, 293-344. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998. 
 
Lampton, David M. “China’s Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Process: 
Is It Changing, and Does It Matter?” In The Making of Chinese Foreign and 
Security Policy in the Era of Reform, edited by David M. Lampton, 1-36. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2001. 
 
Lapid, Yosef, and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds. The Return of Culture and Identity in IR 
Theory. London: Lynne Reinner, 1996. 
 
Li, Minghuan. “A Group in Transition: Chinese Students and Scholars in the 
Netherlands.” In Globalizing Chinese Migration: Trends in Europe and Asia, 
edited by Pal Nyiri and Igor Saveliev, 173-188. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing 
Company, 2002. 
 
Liao, Chengzhi. “Pipan ‘siren bang’ suowei ‘haiwai guanxi’ wenti de fandong 
miulun” (Criticize the ‘Gang of Four’s’ Reactionary Fallacy of the So-Called 
‘Overseas Connections’ Problem). In Bixu zhongshi qiaowu gongzuo (We Must 
Pay Attention to Overseas Chinese Work). Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin 
chubanshe, 1978. 
 
Lindblom, Charles. Politics and Markets. New York: Basic, 1977. 
 
Lintner, Bertil. Blood Brothers: The Criminal Underworld of Asia. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 
 
 330
Live, Yu-Sion. “The Sinwa of Reunion: Searching for a Chinese Identity in a 
Multicultural World.” In Beyond Chinatown: New Chinese Migration and the 
Global Expansion of China, edited by Mette Thuno, 234-253. Copenhagen: NIAS 
Press, 2007. 
 
Louie, Andrea.  Chineseness Across Borders: Renegotiating Chinese Identities in 
China and the United States. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004. 
 
Lu, Ning. The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 2000). 
 
_____.  “The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council 
Ministries, and Party Departments.” In The Making of Chinese Foreign and 
Security Policy in the Era of Reform, edited by David M. Lampton, 39-60. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001. 
 
Ma, Laurence J.C., and Carolyn Cartier. The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, 
Mobility, and Identity. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 
 
Ma, Yin, ed. Questions and Answers About China’s National Minorities. Beijing: 
New World Press, 1985. 
 
McCraw, David. Chinese Foreign Policy: An Ideological Approach. Wellington: 
Price Milburn for New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1975. 
 
McDonald, John W. "Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy." In Timing the 
De-Escalation of International Conflicts, edited by Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J. 
Thorson, 201-220. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991. 
 
McNair, Harley Farnsworth. The Chinese Abroad: Their Position and Protection – A 
Study in International Law and Relations. Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1924. 
 
Mearsheimer, John J., and Stephen M. Walt. The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign 
Policy. NewYork: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007. 
 
Melvin,Neil. Russians Beyond Russia: The Politics of National Identity. London: 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995. 
 
Michels, Robert. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical 
Tendencies of Modern Democracy. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1915. 
 
Milner, Helen V. Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and 
International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. 
 
Mitrany, David. A Working Peace System. London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1943. 
 
Mo, Sung-nien. Preface to Stories of the Chinese People in Pictures. Taipei: Overseas 
Chinese Affairs Commission, 1983. 
 
 331
Morse, Edward. Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations.  
New York: Free Press, 1976. 
 
Mozingo, David. “China and Indonesia.” In China in Crisis, edited by Tang Tsou, 
333-356. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968. 
 
_____. Chinese Policy Toward Indonesia, 1949-1967. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1976. 
 
Ng, Wing Chung. “Collective Ritual and the Resilience of Traditional Organizations: 
A Case Study of Vancouver Since the Second World War.” In The Chinese 
Diaspora: Selected Essays Volume 1, edited by Wang Ling-chi and Wang Gungwu, 
252-292. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998. 
 
_____. “Taiwan’s Overseas Chinese Policy From 1949 to the Early 1980s.” In East 
Asia Enquiry, Selected Articles from the Annual Conferences of the Canadian 
Asian Studies Association 1988-1990, edited by Larry Shyu, Min-sun Chen, 
Claude-Yves Charron and Matsuo Soga. 
 
Nye, Joseph. Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization. 
Boston: Little, Brown, 1971. 
 
Nyiri, Pal. Chinese in Eastern Europe and Russia: A Middleman Minority in a 
Transnational Era. New York: Routledge, 2007. 
 
_____. “From Class Enemies to Patriots: Overseas Chinese and Emigration Policy 
and Discourse in the People’s Republic of China.” In Globalizing Chinese 
Migration: Trends in Europe and Asia, edited by Pal Nyiri and Igor Saveliev, 219-
219. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2002. 
 
_____. New Chinese Migrants in Europe: The Case of the Chinese Community in 
Hungary. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 1999. 
 
_____. “The New Migrant: State and Market Constructions of Modernity and 
Patriotism.” In China Inside Out: Contemporary Chinese Nationalism and 
Transnationalism, edited by Pal Nyiri and Joanna Breidenbach, 141-176. Budapest: 
Central European University Press, 2005. 
 
O’Sullivan, Patrick. Geopolitics. New York: St. Martins Press, 1986. 
 
Ong, Aihwa. Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logistics of Transnationality. 
Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1999. 
 
Ong, Aihwa, and Donald M. Nonini. Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of 
Modern Chinese Transnationalism. New York: Routledge, 1997. 
 
Pan, Lynn ed.  The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1999. 
 
 332
Pieke, Frank N., Pal Nyiri, Mette Thuno, and Antonella Ceccagno. Transnational 
Chinese: Fujianese Migrants in Europe. Stanford University Press, 2004. 
www.anth.mq.edu.au/maa/unit_pages/805/ANTH805_Chapter2TransnationalChin
ese.pdf (accessed 1 October 2009). 
 
Postin Jr., Dudley L., and M. Y. Yu. “The Distribution of the Overseas Chinese.” In 
The Population of Modern China, edited by Dudley L. Poston Jnr. and D. Yaukey. 
New York: Plenium Press, 1992. 
 
Pye, Lucian. “China: Ethnic Minorities and National Security.” In Ethnicity: Theory 
and Experience, edited by Nathan Gkazer and Daniel Moynihan, 489-512. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976. 
 
Qian, Ning. Liuxue Meiguo (Studying in America). Nanjing: Jiangsu wenyi 
chubanshe, 1996. 
 
Rawnsley, Gary D. Taiwan’s Informal Diplomacy and Propaganda. New York: 
Palgrave, 2000. 
 
Reid, Anthony, ed. Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the 
Chinese. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001. 
 
Rex, John. “Ethnic Mobilization in Multi-Cultural Societies.” In Ethnic Mobilization 
in a Multi-Cultural Europe, edited by John Rex and Beatrice Drury, 3-12. Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 1994. 
 
Riggens, Stephen H. Ethnic Minority Media: An International Perspective. London: 
Sage Publications, 1992.  
 
Rosecrance, Richard. The Rise of the Trading State. New York: Basic Books, 1986. 
 
Rosen, Stanley. “Chinese Media and Youth: Attitudes Towards Nationalism and 
Internationalism.” In Chinese Media, Global Contexts, edited by Chin-Chuan Lee. 
New York: Routledge, 2003. 
 
Rosenau, James N. Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. 
 
Ross, Robert S. “China and the Ethnic Chinese: Political Liability/Economic Asset.” 
In ASEAN and China: An Evolving Relationship, edited by Joyce K. Kallgren, 
Noordin Sopiee, and Soedjati Djiwandono. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian 
Affairs, University of California,1988. 
 
Rothschild, J. Ethnopolitics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. 
 
Saward, Michael. Co-optive Politics and State Legitimacy. Aldershot: Dartmouth 
Publishing Co. Ltd., 1992. 
 
 333
Schein, Louisa. “Minorities, Homelands and Methods.” In China Inside Out: 
Contemporary Chinese Nationalism and Transnationalism, edited by Pal Nyiri and 
Joanna Breidenbach, 99-140. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2005. 
 
See, Teresita Ang. “Influx of New Chinese Immigrants to the Philippines: Problems 
and Challenges.” In Beyond Chinatown: New Chinese Migration and the Global 
Expansion of China, edited by Mette Thuno. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007. 
 
_____. “The Ethnic Chinese as Filipinos.” In Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians, 
edited by Leo Suryadinata. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997. 
 
Selznick, Philip. TVA and the Grass Roots. Berkley: University of California Press, 
1949. 
 
Shain, Yossi. Kinship and Diasporas in International Affairs. Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 2008. 
 
Shang, Wen, Gu Anlin and Li Kunrui, eds. Dang de gongzuo fangfa shouce 
(Handbook on CCP Work). Beijing: Hongqi Chubanshe, 1992. 
 
Sheffer, Gabriel. “A New Field of Study: Modern Diasporas in International Politics.” 
In Modern Diasporas in International Politics, edited by Gabriel Sheffer, 1-15. 
Kent: Croom Helm Ltd., 1986. 
 
Shkurkin, Anatolii M. “Chinese in the Labour Market of the Russian Far East: Past, 
Present, Future.” In Globalizing Chinese Migration: Trends in Europe and Asia, 
edited by Pal Nyiri and Igor Saveliev, 74-99. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing 
Company, 2002. 
 
Sinn, Elizabeth. “A Study of Regional Associations as a Bonding Mechanism in the 
Chinese Diaspora: The Hong Kong Experience.” In The Chinese Diaspora: 
Selected Essays Volume 1, edited by Wang Ling-chi and Wang Gungwu, 345-369. 
Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998.  
 
Smith, Anthony. National Identity. London: Penguin, 1991. 
 
Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu. Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational 
Membership in Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. 
 
Sun, Wanning. Preface to Media and the Chinese Diaspora, edited by Wanning Sun, 
xi. New York: Routledge, 2006. 
 
Sun, Yatsen. Sanminzhuyi (The Three Principles). Shanghai, Shangwu yinshuguan, 
1927. 
 
Suryadinata, Leo. China and the ASEAN States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension. 
Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985. 
 
 334
_____. “Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia: Overseas Chinese, Chinese Overseas or 
Southeast Asians?” In Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians, edited by Leo 
Suryadinata. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997. 
 
Tan, Chee Beng. “Comments on “Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia: Overseas 
Chinese, Chinese Overseas or Southeast Asians?” In Ethnic Chinese as Southeast 
Asians, edited by Leo Suryadinata, 36-38. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1997. 
 
Tan, Pamela. The Chinese Factor: An Australian Chinese Woman’s Life in China 
from 1950 to 1979. Sydney: Rosenberg Publishing Pty, 2008. 
 
Therborn, G. What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules?: State Apparatuses and 
State Power Under Feudalism, Capitalism and Socialism. London: Verso, 1980. 
 
Tran, Khanh. “Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and Their Identity.” In Ethnic Chinese as 
Southeast Asians, edited by Leo Suryadinata. Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1997. 
 
Trewin, Dennis. Year Book Australia 2002. Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2002. 
http://www.yprl.vic.gov.au/cdroms/yearbook2002/cd/wcd00001/wcd00127.htm 
(accessed 22 May 2010). 
 
Truman, David. The Governmental Process: Political Process and Public Opinion. 
New York: Knopf, 1951. 
 
Van Vranken Hickey, Dennis. Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan: From Principle to 
Pragmatism. New York: Routledge, 2007. 
 
Wang, Chun. Chinese Communist United Front and Economic Plunder of Overseas 
Chinese. Taipei: World Anti-Communist League (China Chapter) and Asian 
Peoples’ Anti-Communist League (Republic of China), 1980. 
 
Wang, Gungwu. “A Single Chinese Diaspora? Some Historical Reflections.” In 
Imagining the Chinese Diaspora: Two Australian Perspectives, edited by Wang 
Gungwu and Annette Shun Wah, 10-11. Canberra: Centre for the Study of the 
Chinese Southern Diaspora, 1999. 
 
_____. China and the Chinese Overseas. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991. 
 
_____. Don't Leave Home: Migration and the Chinese. Singapore: Times Academic 
Press, 2001. 
 
_____.  “The Origins of Hua-Ch’iao.” In Community and Nation: China, Southeast 
Asia and Australia. St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1992. 
 
_____. “Upgrading the Migrant: Neither Huaqiao nor Huaren.” In The Last Half 
Century of Chinese Overseas, edited by Elizabeth Sinn. Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 1998. 
 335
 
Wang, Hsuan-chih. The True Features of Chinese Communist ‘Tibet Model’. Taipei: 
World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter, 1982. 
 
Wang, Jingzhi, ed.  Qiaowu zhishi shouce (Handbook of Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Knowledge). Beijing: Zhongguo huaqiao chuban gongsi, 1989. 
 
Wang, Tang, ed. Qiaowu chunqiu (Spring and Autumn of Overseas Chinese Affairs). 
Beijing: Zhongguo guojiguangbo chubanshe, 1997. 
 
Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Glencoe: The Free 
Press, 1964. 
 
Wei Yingqi and Xiaming Liu. Foreign Direct Investment in China: Determinants and 
Impacts. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2001. 
 
Wendt, Alexander. “Identity and Structural Change in International Politics.” In The 
Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, edited by Yosef Lapid and Friedrich 
Kratochwil, 47-64. Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1996. 
 
Wickberg, Edgar. “Chinese Organizations in Philippine Cities Since the Second 
World War: The Case of Manila.” In The Chinese Diaspora: Selected Essays 
Volume 1, edited by Wang Ling-chi and Wang Gungwu. Singapore: Times 
Academic Press, 1998. 
 
Wickberg Edgar, and Harry Con, eds. From China to Canada: A History of the 
Chinese Communities in Canada. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982. 
 
Williams, Lea E. The Future of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1966. 
 
Wong, Jan. Jan Wong’s China: Reports from a Not-So-Foreign Correspondent. New 
York: Anchor Books, 1999. 
 
_____. Red China Blues. New York: Anchor Books, 1996. 
 
Wu, David Yen-ho. “The Chinese in Papua New Guinea: Diaspora Culture of the Late 
20th Century.” In The Chinese Diaspora: Selected Essays Volume II, edited by 
Wang Ling-chi and Wang Gungwu, 206-216. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 
1998. 
 
Wu, Ningkun, and Yikai Li. A Single Tear: A Family’s Persecution, Love and 
Endurance in Communist China. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1993. 
 
Wu, Tsai-kuang. A Study of Communist China’s Intensification of ‘Political Thought 
Work’ Among University Students. Taipei: World Anti-Communist League, China 
Chapter, 1987. 
 
Xi, Cheng. Qiaowu yu waijiao guanxi yanjiu: Zhongguo fangqi “shuangchong guoji” 
de huigu yu fansi (Overseas Chinese Affairs and Diplomatic Relations:  Retrospect 
 336
on China’s Abandoning of its Policy of “Dual Nationality”). Beijing: Zhongguo 
huaqiao chubanshe, 2005. 
 
_____. “The ‘Distinctiveness’ of the Overseas Chinese as Perceived in the People’s 
Republic of China.” In Beyond Chinatown: New Chinese Migration and the Global 
Expansion of China, edited by Mette Thuno, 53-59. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 
2007. 
 
_____. “Non-Remaining and Non-Returning: The Mainland Chinese Students in 
Japan and Europe since the 1970s.” In Globalizing Chinese Migration: Trends in 
Europe and Asia, edited by Pal Nyiri and Igor Saveliev, 158-172. Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2002. 
 
Xu, Guoqi. China and the Great War: China's Pursuit of a New National Identity and 
Internationalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005. 
 
Yang, Tangcheng. Xinxilan huaqiao shi (History of New Zealand Chinese). Edited by 
Ding Shenzun. Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2001. 
 
Yen, Ching-hwang. Studies in Modern Overseas Chinese History. Singapore: Times 
Academic Press, 1995. 
 
Ying, Esther Cheo. Black Country Girl in Red China. London: Hutchinson & Co, 
1980. 
 
Youngs, Gillian. International Relations in a Global Age: A Conceptual Challenge. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999. 
 
Zha, Daojiong. “Chinese Migrant Workers in Japan: Policies, Institutions and Civil 
Society.” In Globalizing Chinese Migration: Trends in Europe and Asia, edited by 
Pal Nyiri and Igor Saveliev, 129-157. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 
2002. 
 
Zhao, Heman. Shaoshu minzu huaqiao huaren yanjiu (Research on Overseas Chinese 
Ethnic Minorities). Beijing: Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 2004. 
 
Zhao, Xiaojian. “Disconnecting Transnational Ties: The Chinese Pacific Weekly and 
the Transformation of Chinese American Community after the Second World 
War.” In Media and the Chinese Diaspora, edited by Wanning Sun, 26-41. New 
York: Routledge, 2006. 
 
Zheng, Yongnian. Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, 
Identity, and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999. 
 
Zhongguo qiaolian quanyi baozhangbu. Qiaowu changyong falu fagui xuanbian 
(Selection of Commonly Used Overseas Chinese Laws and Regulations). Beijing: 
Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 2004. 
 
 337
Zhou, Min, Wenhong Chen, and Guoxian Cai. “Chinese-language Media and 
Immigrant Life in the United States and Canada” In Media and the Chinese 
Diaspora, edited by Wanning Sun. New York: Routledge, 2006. 
 
Zhu, Muzhi. Zhu Muzhi Lun Duiwai xuanchuan (Zhu Muzhi Discusses Foreign 
Propaganda). Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 1995. 
 
Zhuang, Guotu. “The Policies of the Chinese Government Towards Overseas Chinese 
(1949-1966)” In The Chinese Diaspora: Selected Essays Volume 1, edited by 
Wang Ling-chi and Wang Gungwu. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998. 
 
Zweig, David, and Chen Changgui. China’s Brain Drain to the United States: Views 
of Overseas Chinese Students and Scholars in the 1990s. Berkeley: Institute of 
East Asian Studies, 1995. 
 
